Territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning: Interaction between indigeneity crisis, farmer-pastoralist conflicts and Benue-Nasarawa border dispute

Territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning: Interaction between indigeneity crisis, farmer-pastoralist conflicts and Benue-Nasarawa border dispute | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning: Interaction between indigeneity crisis, farmer-pastoralist conflicts and Benue-Nasarawa border dispute Cletus Famous Nwankwo This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6968058/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The paper explores the interaction between village-based border disputes resulting from territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning, indigeneity crisis and farmer-pastoralist conflicts (FPCs) in the Benue-Nasarawa border and how this leads to territorial politics between Benue and Nasarawa States in Nigeria. The primary study from which this paper is derived is ethnographic fieldwork to explore the FPCs in the Benue Valley region. Emerging from the study, among other issues, is how jurisdictional partitioning resulted in an informal boundary dispute between villagers on the Benue-Nasarawa border, which interacts with the indigeneity crisis and FPCs. There is a reciprocal interaction between the informal boundary dispute, indigeneity crisis and FPCs. Formalising informal border enforcement by villagers resulting from the interaction of partitioning and indigeneity tensions reinforces the indigeneity crises, escalating tensions between farmers and herders. The results are exclusion, counter-exclusion, and violent confrontations in neighbouring jurisdictions with similar social groups but unequal proportions, leading to a formal boundary dispute between Benue and Nasarawa States. This indicates how everyday geopolitical practices lead to formal geopolitics. Thus, the FPCs in the Benue Valley, including these other crises, are an interconnected web of crises reinforcing each other, creating a vicious circle of conflicts. The article contributes to the literature by showing how the FPCs are shaped by territorial partitioning in relation to identity and also shapes territorial politics between sub-national states. This perspective has not been investigated. It argues that while partitioning can reduce regional tensions that could threaten the stability of a state, it can breed further ground-level tensions in highly ethnic heterogeneous areas like the Benue-Nasarawa border, which can interact with other issues like the FPCs, further creating tensions between the sub-national states. Other Political Science Behavioral Geography Border dispute Territoriality territorial homogenisation partitioning indigenous identity farmer-herder conflicts Figures Figure 1 1.0 Introduction Throughout its history, modern Nigeria has witnessed several phases of jurisdictional partitioning, that is, the partition of the internal territory of Nigeria in the process of creating regions, provinces and divisions in the colonial period and states and local government areas in the post-colonial period. Africa’s colonial and post-colonial boundary-making process has been closely tied to conflicts, exacerbating tensions related to ethnicity, indigeneity, and other social identities (Sjögren, 2015 ). In Nigeria, colonial and post-colonial territorialisation processes have contributed to ethno-religious conflicts, resource allocation and land disputes tied to identity and belonging, especially in the Middle Belt region (Adebanwi, 2009 ; Arowosegbe, 2019 ; Kraxberger, 2005 ; Nnabuihe, 2019 ). Practices of ethnolinguistic classification have perpetuated the idea of strangers or non-indigenes, influencing resource distribution, particularly land, between majority and minority groups (Arowosegbe, 2019 ). In brief, partitioning refers to dividing a geographical area, formerly a single administrative unit, into several units (Klieman, 1980 ) for strategic reasons such as to weaken a country’s regions, prevent them from seceding, which is territorial homogenisation (Schetter, 2005 ). Indigeneity is primarily defined through ancestors of original state inhabitants who have privileges that non-indigenes do not enjoy within that territorial jurisdiction (Adebanwi, 2009 ). Hence, indigeneity is defined by a sense of geographical attachment and belonging, leading to practices of privileging certain groups based on territorial identity and ancestral roots (Adebanwi, 2009 ; Nnabuihe, 2019 ). In Nigeria, the intersection of territory and identity is laid bare in “indigeneship” or indigeneity. Indigeneity is based on ancestral ties to land but has been extended to territorial jurisdiction, becoming a source of tension in Nigeria (Adebanwi, 2009 ). Decentralisation efforts to manage minorities’ agitations for autonomous jurisdictions can also create tensions, influencing demographic changes and competition for power and resources based on group identities (Nnabuihe, 2019 ). Jurisdictional partitioning resulting from decentralisation intensifies the indigeneity crisis and further exacerbates conflicts, as seen in Kaduna, Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt (Angerbrandt, 2015 ; Adebanwi, 2009 ; Harnischfeger, 2004 ; Nnabuihe, 2019 ). Territorial partitioning has significant implications for pastoralism, inhibiting nomadic life and creating tensions between sedentary farmers and mobile herders (Plessis, 2020 ). Identity plays a critical role in FPCs because they are shaped by social identities, e.g., ethnic, cultural, religious and indigeneity (Akov, 2017 ; Maiangwa, 2017 ; NOF, 2020; NOAK, 2021, 2022). For example, the perception of Fulani pastoralists as “settlers” has been identified as contributing to the tensions and discrimination experienced by Fulani herders (Akov, 2017 ; Arowosegbe, 2019 ). The existing literature on FPCs has addressed identity and resource competition (Bello & Kazibwe, 2022 ; MADNK, 2021) but needs a comprehensive exploration of the interplay between territorialisation, indigeneity, and conflict dynamics in West Africa. Research in other regions, such as northern Kenya, southern Ethiopia, and South Sudan’s Gogrial region, explored conflicts relating to and among herders over territorial boundaries (Cormack, 2016 ; Galaty, 2016 ). These studies have not focused explicitly on FPCs. Also, they did not consider the interaction of the local border disputes between ethnic groups, identity tensions and the FPCs. Further, they did not consider how border disputes between the pastoralists result in boundary disputes between sub-national states. Thus, what distinguishes my paper from Cormack ( 2016 ) and Galaty ( 2016 ) is its focus on the interaction between communal disputes from administrative boundary changes, identity crises, and FPCs and how this results in territorial boundary disputes between sub-national states. Thus, paper focuses on the politics linked to the historical partitioning of Nigerian internal territory and how village-based border disputes which interacts with indigeneity crisis and interacts with conflicts over crop damage between farmers and herders in the Benue-Nasarawa border in the last three decades. It also considers how the FPC developing from this process further amplify the indigeneity crisis leading to territorial politics between sub-national states. This paper employs a qualitative research design that uses ethnographic interviews and observation for data collection and grounded theory to analyse the data. Concerning the research question, the finding reported in this paper is unanticipated. It emerged from the opinions of the interviewees when asked, “What is the origin of the FPC?”. Although their answers usually begin with the issue of crop damage by cattle, as claimed by the farmers and cattle theft by pastoralists, one of the several issues they mentioned is the partitioning of states and the boundary disputes that emerged from it. During the interviews, these issues were retold as stories by the participants, and they relied mostly on individual and collective political memories of this border. A careful analysis of this aspect of the interviews shows two major interrelated issues: Jurisdictional partitioning engendered border disputes between villagers and indigeneity crises at the Benue-Nasarawa border. The border dispute and indigeneity crisis engendered FPC and reinforced the indigeneity crisis, eventually triggering territorial politics between the Benue and Nasarawa states. Thus, this article shows how the partitioning of what was Benue Province into several territorial jurisdictions from the colonial to post-colonial period produced boundary disputes between villagers at the Benue-Nasarawa border without the government involvement at this stage. The border dispute between the villagers reinforced indigeneity tensions, leading to FPCs. The interaction between indigeneity crisis and FPCs can be reciprocally reinforcing, leading to a rancorous cycle of violence. The formalisation (through legislation) of the practices of pastoralists exclusion by farming villagers stemming from the border dispute further reinforced the indigeneity crisis, leading to counter-exclusion in neighbouring jurisdictions where the pastoralists have representation in government. Thus, this further intensifies the farmer-herder violence in those jurisdictions leading to formal territorial politics and boundary disputes between Benue and Nasarawa States. The paper argues that these processes show how the FPC has been shaped and shapes everyday and formal geopolitical practices. Theoretically, the paper uses an incorporation of theoretical lenses viz. territoriality, particularly the idea of territorialisation through partitioning, identity conflicts, spiral model of conflicts (Motitz, 2010; Pruitt & Kim, 2004 ) and the vicious circle of violence (Collier, 2003 ; Menkhaus, 2004 ). Territoriality, which, as defined by Sack ( 1983 , 1986 ), involves the deliberate effort by individuals or groups to influence, control, or affect various aspects of territory, such as objects, people, and relationships, within a defined geographic area, termed the “territory.” It brings this in productive dialogues with studies of identity conflicts in Africa particularly those focusing on the majority/minority and indigene/settler conundrum in relation to territoriality (Arowosegbe, 2017; Mamdani, 2001; Angerbrandt, 2015 ; Adebanwi, 2009 ; Harnischfeger, 2004 ; Nnabuihe, 2019 ). It builds further on literature on the geopolitics of African conflicts, especially at borderlands that frame ethnic conflict in Africa as interacting crises (Berg, 2008 ; Carmody, 2009 ; Dal Santo & van der Heide, 2018 ). It also uses the spiral model of conflicts which emphasises the interaction between the conflicting parties, particularly the cycle of their actions and reactions involving retaliation and deterrence, creating a vicious circle (Motitz, 2010; Pruitt & Kim, 2004 ). It uses the spiral model of conflicts to emphasises the interaction between the FPC, indigeneity crisis and border disputes showing how it creates the cycle of actions and reactions involving retaliation and deterrence, creating a vicious circle. Then it weaves this around the “vicious circle” concept from the security-development nexus literature that suggests that insecurity impedes economic recovery and, in turn, economic stagnation reinforces conflict and criminality (Collier, 2003 ; Menkhaus, 2004 ). From this perspective, it frames the FPC as part of interacting web of conflicts reinforcing each other, creating a vicious circle of violence in the Benue-Nasarawa border. Thus, it deviates from political ecology analysis that focuses on the marginalisation and exclusion of pastoralists in access to land through government land use policies (e.g., Benjaminsen & Ba, 2009; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Walwa, 2020) and the environmental security perspective (e.g., Homer-Dixon, 1999; Belo & Kazibwe, 2022). It argues that sub-national jurisdictional partitioning as a way of homogenising national territory and resolving conflicts can be fruitful as it significantly paralysed the regional coalition strong enough to confront the national state. However, tensions resurfaced at the sub-national level with indigeneity as its fuel. Thus, partitioning can breed further ground-level tensions in highly ethnic heterogeneous areas like the Benue-Nasarawa border, which can interact with other issues like the FPCs, further creating tensions between the sub-national states. The paper is organised as follows. This first section introduces the paper. The second section presents the theories, and a discussion of the methods is done in section three. The presentation of the results is done in sections four and five. Sections six gives the discussion and conclusion. 2.0 Theoretical approach The conceptual entry point for understanding territorial struggles is territoriality. Territoriality, as defined by Sack ( 1983 , 1986 ), involves the deliberate effort by individuals or groups to influence, control, or affect various aspects, such as objects, people, and relationships, within a defined geographic area, termed the “territory.” Territorialisation serves as a valuable framework for understanding FPC in the study area, especially in the context of territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning. Territorial homogenisation refers to territorial strategies such as partitioning to keep the state as one entity (Schetter, 2005 ), asserting exclusive territorial sovereignty by homogenising internal space (Ó Dochartaigh, 2011 ). Jurisdictional partitioning involves partitioning a sovereign state into sub-states with no sovereign authority, like the nation-state (Klieman, 1980 ) with distinct meanings, constituting acts of territorialisation. The partitions can be made within the sub-state territories for further local administrative jurisdictions (Klieman, 1980 ). Nigerian internal territory has been partitioned in this sense to create various sub-national states and local jurisdictions. Thus, as O’Leary ( 2007 ) explained, this kind of partitioning does not connote secession, which denotes transforming internal borders into sovereign demarcations. Beyond keeping the country united, the partitioning of Nigeria’s internal territory was also a product of minority agitations, especially in the Middle Belt of the northern region (Ukase, 2013 ). The significance of territorial partition in conflicts has been investigated, particularly highlighted in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Newman, 2002 ), in South Africa (Christopher 1994 ) and Northern Ireland (Anderson & Shuttleworth, 1998 ; Rankin, 2007 ) among other areas. Advocates of partition argue that it effectively prevents the recurrence of war when it involves the physical separation of different ethnic groups (Sambanis & Schulhofer-Wohl, 2009 ). It has been argued that partition overlooks the possibility of reconciliation and offering political cover for ethnic cleansers (Jenne, 2012 ). Newman ( 2002 ) suggest that partitioning contributes to the perpetuation of conflict by reinforcing ethnic divisions as it often led to further separation, contributing to and reinforcing conflict and mutual antagonism. Using Ireland serves as a case study Rankin ( 2007 ) argues that while partition may aim to resolve conflict, it often introduces new complexities and can perpetuate existing tensions. Territory, including property, jurisdictions, and borders, forms the foundation of state power and sovereignty (Elden, 2013a ; Kabra, Das & Bathla, 2023 ). Vela-Almeida ( 2018 ) emphasizes that territory is essential for the state as it provides opportunities to materialize national interests through processes of state territorialization. State territorialization involves the state's strategies to regulate socio-spatial relations within a specific area such as through jurisdictional partitioning. These strategies redefine the meaning of territory, establish new identities, land use regimes, and socio-economic relations (Kabra, Das & Bathla, 2023 ). State territoriality can involve partitioning to excluding specific uses and users from territorial land partitions. In pastoral frontiers, these exclusions can be contested, often leading to violent conflicts and this is particularly pronounced at the boundaries of newly established jurisdictions, where conflicts revolve around defining spatial units and determining who belongs and who is excluded (Vela-Almeida, 2018 ) based on indigeneity. Thus, indigeneity and territoriality can influence power dynamics and exclusion, contributing to FPCs. Of web of interacting crisis: intersection of territorialisation and identity crisis In Nigeria, the practice of indigenship aims to achieve a balanced federation at the national level, ensuring the representation of indigenes from all states in federal appointments and the federal government (Kraxberger, 2005 ). However, it often leads to local tensions and disagreements over who should be considered indigenous in states and LGAs (Adebanwi, 2009 ; Kraxberger, 2005 ). This indigeneity question is even more serious in the Middle Belt region that is home to many ethnic minorities who have constructed political identities based on their experiences within the Nigerian state, particularly the northern region (Egwu, 2011; Ochonu, 2015 ). Tensions related to the indigene/settler or non-indigene identity rooted in their fears of domination, exclusion from power and resources and respect for their culture and language (Egwu, 2011; Ochonu, 2015 ). Crucial to this process, however, is the colonial and post-colonial territorialisation pursued through jurisdictional partitioning. Tonwe and Eke (2016) suggest that the fragmentation of regions in Nigeria into smaller states has led to the emergence of majorities and minorities, creating identity-based conflicts such as indigene/settler conflict resulting from the overlapping boundaries of ethnic and religious identities. This has resulted in struggles over territory and land such as the Tiv-Jukun conflict, the Jos and Kaduna crisis (Adebanwi, 2009 ; Angerbrandt, 2015 ; Harris, 2013; Nnabuihe, 2019 ). Angerbrandt ( 2015 ) jurisdictional partitioning of the Nigerian federating units (states), has led to alienation as individuals who used to claim indigeneity but have now found themselves in the "wrong" state because of the jurisdictional partitioning (Angerbrandt, 2015 ). Thus, indigeneity has been a source of conflicts and this has been more vigorous since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 (Akov, 2017 ; Maiangwa, 2017 ). Studies emphasize power dynamics between indigenes and settlers and often escalate due to ethnic tensions that shape FPC (Akov, 2017 ; Bukari & Kuusaana, 2018; Maiangwa, 2017 ; Olaniyi, 2015 ; Ogundairo & Ijimakinwa, 2021; Nwankwo & Okafor, 2021; Anonymous, 2024a, 2024b) and also relating to majority/minority status (Arowosegbe, 2019 ). However, the interaction and mutual reinforcement of jurisdictional partitioning, indigeneity crisis and FPCs and this leads to territorial politics between sub-national states has not been explored in the literature. Studies of geopolitics of African conflicts, especially borderlands, have framed them as interacting crises. Berg ( 2008 ) argued that the conflicts in Chad and the Central African Republic that have escalated since 2005 are interconnected, forming an interacting system with ethnic groups, including nomadic populations living across the current borders, crucial in intertwining these conflicts. Belloni ( 2007 ), who cited De Waal ( 2005 ) to state that the conflict in Darfur is "ultimately" a fight to control productive agricultural land between pastoralists and settled farmers that has been growing over the years and connected to the five-decades-old civil war that overwhelmed Sudan. Dal Santo and van der Heide ( 2018 ) call the 2012 conflict in northern Mali, which involves nomadic groups are an “escalating complexity” that spilled over from neighbouring Sahel countries inadvertently exacerbating other conflicts. These studies demonstrate that conflicts involving nomadic groups like pastoralists and sedentary farmers can be interacting with other issues (Belloni, 2007 ; Berg, 2008 ; Dal Santo & van der Heide, 2018 ; Potteck et al., 2015). Furthermore, the interaction is supported by the conflict spiral model of conflicts which emphasises the interaction between the conflicting parties, particularly the cycle of actions and reactions involving retaliation and deterrence, creating a vicious circle (Motitz, 2010; Pruitt & Kim, 2004 ). This spiral model highlights the reciprocal and escalating nature of conflict dynamics (Pruitt & Kim, 2004 ). This model is valuable for explaining the mutual reinforcement of indigeneity crisis, FPC, boundary dispute, and territorial politics as a vicious circle. The “vicious circle” concept, suggests that insecurity impedes economic recovery and, in turn, economic stagnation reinforces conflict and criminality (Collier, 2003 ; Menkhaus, 2004 ). The “vicious circle” concept is well-established in political economy and development studies, which have been applied to explain the self-reinforcing nature of poverty in poor and affluent countries (Menkhaus, 2004 ). This idea can be applied to explore the interaction of and linkages of conflicts that reinforce each other. It is a powerful approach as it provides a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted causes of conflicts and their interactions compared to linear approaches (Menkhaus, 2004 ). Taken together, these perspectives offer a framework to think that the FPC in the study area is as interconnected with informal border disputes between villagers, the indigeneity crisis and territorial politics reinforcing each other. Informal exclusion of specific minority groups from the border disputes between villagers when formalised into rules and institutions (Raineri & Strazzari, 2019) prompts counter-exclusions in other jurisdictions. This process is influenced by the fragmentation of social groups across jurisdictional territories and the majority/minority and indigene/settler conundrum resulting from partitioning (Nnabuihe, 2019 ). Thus, mutual reinforcement between FPCs and indigeneity crises can lead to counter-exclusion in other jurisdictions. The complications arising from these mutually reinforcing conflicts lead to territorial politics and disputes between sub-notational states, creating a vicious circle of interacting conflicts. Fragmentation of groups (i.e., the splitting of an ethnic group into different territories) because of jurisdictional partitioning can result in horizontal inequalities between groups and exacerbate conflicts (Nnabuihe, 2019 ). These conflicts can stem from the fact that ethnic groups that have been split into different sub-national territories are still attached to their previous territory. If a segment of a group becomes a minority in a newly created territory, they may face discrimination in land access which creates tension between claims of indigenous land ownership and the control over land through state authority usually controlled by the majority group. Thus, because territoriality satisfies material and emotional needs and plays a role in maintaining control over collective and individual lives, the attempt to use state power to control access to lands where group(s) claimed to the indigenous can spark brutal conflicts. In this process, stories of the past are connected to the present to reconstruct land ownership through indigeneity and breeds conflicts and perpetuating further divisions between groups in territorial jurisdictions, shaping collective identity and shaping social interactions, exclusions and entwining with other conflicts. 3.0 Methods The larger study from which this paper is derived used a combination of ethnography, discourse analysis and constructivist grounded theory. The aspect discussed in this paper uses ethnographic interviews and grounded theory to analyse the interviews. The larger study adopted an ethnographic sensibility akin to Anna Tsing’s (2015) discussion of ‘noticing’ as part of the multi-sited ethnography in The Mushroom at the End of the World . Tsing writes that “[t]o learn anything we must revitalise arts of noticing and include ethnography and natural history” (p. 37). Thus, observations and noticing ethnographies help to deeply explore the material worlds of farmers and herders and territorialisation processes. It enables better comprehension of the worlds, meanings, preferences, and behaviours of farmers, herders, and other actors linked to the FPCs vis-à-vis territorialisation. The larger study conducted 93 interviews with 128 participants from diverse backgrounds, primarily farmers and herders, including village heads, traditional rulers, security agencies, NGOs, and socio-cultural groups. During the interviews, participants struggled with discussing the conflicts in the context of the research objectives. However, when the researcher asked them to narrate their stories of the conflict from the past as far as they could remember, it became easy for them to discuss their experiences. This storytelling and/or memory approach is useful because as Paasi ( 1998 ) asserts, boundaries reflect power dynamics between societies and boundary can be deconstructed through narratives. They represent power flows, transforming memories into present and future realities (Paasi, 1998 ). Stories are imperative as an investigative and analytical tool as “language, narratives, dialects, and accents” can be vital spots of “geopolitical voice and agency” (Jackman et al., 2020, p. 5). They are “bordered by the structures of power in which they are articulated” (Jackman et al., 2020, p. 5). Analysing the emergence, evolution, and impact of rituals, symbols, discourses, and power practices on political decisions requires a contextually, culturally, and historically sensitive approach to boundary studies (Paasi, 1998 ). In discussing their experiences, especially on the origin of the conflict, farmers and herders often narrate stories of how the dispute started from boundary adjustment because of partitioning. Partitioning creates new boundaries, leading to a shift in previous boundaries. The memory of where previous boundaries was located can thus be a source of contestation when new boundaries are created following jurisdictional partitioning, especially where there is no physical demarcation. Thus, the study involved observations and mixed in-depth interviews (unstructured and semi-structured) that incorporated storytelling as a tool for data collection. The study period was six months (January to July 2022). The research was conducted in Central Nigeria in Benue and Nasarawa in local government areas (LGAs) where the FPCs have been intense. These LGAs form the border of these three neighbouring states (i.e., they are the LGAs bordering the opposite state). In Benue State, the LGAs are Agatu, Gwer West, Guma and Logo are opposite the LGAs of Nasarawa, Doma, Keana and Awe in Nasarawa State, nearly respectively. The communities where the conflicts manifest and intensify are at the boundaries between the states and fall within the area called the Benue Valley or Benue Trough in Nigerian geography. The author’s University’s appropriate committee ethically approved the research. Standard ethical practices of informed consent, confidentiality, voluntary participation and withdrawal were adhered to in the study. The constructivist grounded theory research design was adopted. It incorporates constructivist epistemology into the grounded theory. The grounded theory is an approach developed through the works of Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). It focuses on producing a theoretical explanation of issues through an inductive collection and analysis of data without a predetermined hypothesis to accept or jettison. The explanation is made through the people’s stories and accounts of the issue of concern (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The difference between the grounded theory and constructivist grounded theory is that while both focus on developing theoretical concepts from data to explain a phenomenon, constructivist grounded theory adds an extra analysis. constructivist grounded theory also considers how meanings of the phenomenon are socially constructed and how they are linked to history, culture, and power relations (Charmaz, 2020 ). The analysis involved coding the interviews’ transcripts and notes and constantly comparing the data to seek connections and divergences from which theoretical explanation is made but ensuring that the participant’s voices and meaning are retained in the final theoretical framing (Charmaz, 2020 ). The constructivist grounded theory emphasises reflexivity, which directs researchers to reflect on their position in the study context and how they use grounded theory strategies to make claims about the results of their inquiry (Charmaz, 2020 ). Through this strategy, the concepts of territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning and indigeneity emerged to be vital to explaining how territory is implicated in the FPCs in Central Nigeria. The analysis shows that these conflicts are interconnected and mutually reinforcing each other. The following section discusses how territory is conceptualised based on the findings. 4.0 Jurisdictional partitioning and boundaries dispute: Indigeneity and FPCs 4.1 Brief history of the partitioning Before the analysis, a brief historical background to the partitioning leading to the creation of Benue and Nasarawa States is provided. This history is connected to colonial territorialisation in making the Nigerian state through the agglomeration of precolonial kingdoms into a series of territorially bounded administrative units. Following British colonial control in 1900, what became the northern protectorate was partitioned into various provinces, as shown in Table 1 (see also the supplementary file). The province of interest is the Benue Province, created in 1900 but divided into two in the same year. The idea of state creation with the Westphalian notion of fixed bounded territory in Nigeria can be traced to these earliest colonial partitioning. Within these provinces, non-Islamic chiefs in the northern protectorate sought autonomy and restoring indigenous control and cultural identity within their respective areas from 1908 rather than a distinct Middle Belt identity or creation of states (Emmanual & Tari, 2015; Ochonu, 2015 ). Further partitioning of the Benue Province was made in 1903 to create the Nasarawa Province. In 1926 the Muri and Nasarawa Provinces were merged. Since the British Colonial Residents ruled indirectly through the traditional authorities, the ethnic minorities were under the control of Hausa-Fulani aristocracy. A new Plateau Province was carved out from Bauchi Province in an attempt to give some ethnic minorities a separate province to reduced tensions between the Hausa-Fulani and the minority ethnic groups. The Richard’s Constitution of 1946 divided Nigeria into three regions: Eastern, Western, and Northern. All the provinces in the northern protectorate in 1900 were subsumed into the Northern Region Authority in 1946, bringing all the ethnic minorities back into Hausa/Fulani control. Ethnic minorities in the northern region felt marginalised by the Hausa/Fulani, leading to demands for creating the Middle Belt region since the 1940s. United Middle Belt Congress, led by late Senator Joseph S. Tarka, played a significant role in mobilising support for these movements (Ukase, 2013 ), making it more organised than the earlier demand for indigenous autonomy (Emmanuel & Tari, 2015 ). The Willink Commission of 1957 recommended the creation of an autonomous region for the Middle Belt. It was rejected by the colonial administration to maintain the North’s dominance in Nigeria. After independence in 1960, the Eastern Region attempted to secede as the Biafra Republic in 1967, creating a war. At this time, the movement by the ethnic minorities in the Middle Belt to create states of their own become appreciated as it was then seen as a solution to an impending breakup of Nigeria. The attempt to prevent Nigeria’s breakup and also address the demand for states of their own by minorities in Middle Belt led to the creation of Benue-Plateau State in 1967 and later their separation into Benue and Plateau States in 1976 and separation of Nasarawa from Plateau in 1996 (Ukase, 2013 ). Table 1 Timeline of jurisdictional partitioning of the vital area of Northern Nigeria Period Territorial jurisdiction New territorial jurisdiction Remark Jan 1900 Northern Protectorate British colonial administration controlled a restricted territory of Kabba and Ilorin, “together with a strip on either side of the river Niger and Benue” (Kirk Greene, Mss Afr. S. 1452). The remaining parts of the Northern Protectorate were outside British control. 1900 Northern Protectorate Middle Niger Province Northern Protectorate was partitioned into five provinces: Middle Niger, Benue, and Kano, which were designated as “civil provinces”, and Borgu and Borno as military “provinces” (Colonial Office Record 586/1, 1900). Benue Province Kano Province Borgu Province Borno Province August 1900 Benue Province Upper Benue Province Benue Province was divided into Upper Benue Province and Lower Benue Province. Lower Benue Province 1903 Benue Province Bassa Benue Province was divided into Bassa, Muri and Nasarawa. Muri Nasarawa 1926 Muri Benue Province Muri and Nasarawa Provinces merged to create Benue Province, with the northeastern section of Muri cut to join Adamawa Province and some northern parts of Nasarawa carved out to join the new Plateau Province. There was internal partitioning within the provinces into divisions, such as the Idoma Division, and districts, such as Wukari and Katsina-Ala. Nasarawa Plateau Province Plateau Province It was created from southwestern Bauchi Province, southeastern Zaria Province and northeastern Nasarawa Province. 1946 Northern Region Benue Province Plateau Province and Plateau Province subsumed into the Northern Region. Plateau Province 1967 Benue Province Benue-Plateau State The northwestern section of Benue Province cut to join the large North Western State. The rest of Benue Province and Plateau Province merged to form the Benue-Plateau State. Plateau Province 1976 Benue-Plateau State Benue State Benue-Plateau State was divided to create separate Benue and Plateau State. Plateau State 1996 Plateau State Plateau Plateau State is divided into Plateau and Nasarawa State. Nasarawa Thus, the study area has experienced significant boundary-making during the colonial and post-colonial periods, creating new territorial identities and exacerbating tensions related to indigeneity. The former Benue and Plateau Provinces of 1926 are crucial in understanding FPCs in the Benue-Nasarawa border. The main ethnic groups involved in these conflicts are the Tiv, Hausa, Idoma, Jukun, and Fulani, with smaller groups present. Specific LGAs in Benue State (Guma, Logo, Agatu, Gwer West, Makurdi) and Nasarawa State (Awe, Keana, Doma) play a significant role in FPCs at the Benue-Nasarawa border. The Tiv are significant in most Benue LGAs, while the Fulani and Hausa dominate Awe, and the Alago dominate Keana and Doma. The next section discusses how the boundary dispute among villagers from these ethnic groups developed from jurisdictional partitioning. 4.2 Informal boundary disputes between villagers The formalisation of indigeneity in Nigeria lacks clarity in constitutional provisions. While the constitution defines citizenship based on birth or descent from indigenous communities, it does not specify the indigenes or non-indigenes within each state or local government area. However, indigeneity has been institutionalised through the issuance of indigeneity certificates by local government authorities, which may provide certain benefits (Kraxberger, 2005 ) but do not guarantee land access. Given that there are no physical markers indicating the boundary between Benue State and Nasarawa State because there was no proper demarcation, claims of indigeneity based on the territorial extent of the states became tense in Guma, Makurdi, Gwer West and Agatu LGAs of Benue State and Doma, Awe and Keana LGAs of Nasarawa State. These LGAs form the Benue-Nasarawa borderlands (Fig. 1 ). The indigeneity tensions that the boundary dispute generated get translated into FPCs between the Tiv and Fulani herders and between Alago farmers and Fulani herders who are struggling with one another to have better access to land. This tension also manifests when the majority groups marginalise the minorities in jurisdictions where, because of stronger voting strength, the majority can win more elective positions (Interview A26). Thus, the FPCs since 1999 can be argued to have entangled with post-transitional issues in Nigeria because of the question of indigeneity with territorial jurisdictions. The post-transitional issues border on political authority, the autonomy of territorial jurisdictions, and citizens’ rights within the jurisdictions within a democratic framework (Akov, 2017 ; Olayode, 2013 ). These concerns stem from the inadequacy of the constitution in addressing these critical issues (Akov, 2017 ; Olayode, 2013 ). The 1999 constitution failed to properly address these “foundational issues” of political authority, the autonomy of territorial jurisdictions, and who are citizens’ of territorial jurisdictions and their rights leading to dissatisfaction and violence among the people (Akov, 2017 ; Olayode, 2013 ). Against this backdrop, farmers and herders use selective memories and historical narratives to claim indigeneity. This practice of farmers and herders of using selective memories and historical narratives is akin to Huening’s ( 2013 ) conclusion that selective memories, claims, and mythical-historical visions of the past shape identity formation and tensions from conflicting identities. In Agatu, for instance, riverine communities straddling the bank of the Benue River on the Agatu-Doma border have attempted to evict the minority Fulani herders using indigeneity claims. The communities claim the Fulani do not originate from Agatu in Benue State. Farmers, mostly in Benue State, alleged that the herders maintain that the Nasarawa Emirate’s influence extended to the bank of the Benue River and across and that it is recognised in the current Nasarawa State’s territory (e.g., Interview A44, A45, A50). The Fulani-led jihad peaked in the Benue Valley after establishing the Lafia and Nasarawa Emirates (Ochonu, 2015 ). The collaboration between the emirs of Lafıa and Nasarawa in the 1880s led to attacks on the Tiv people, creating a new trade route along the Benue River (Sciortino, 2010). It resulted in the influx of Hausa and Fulani immigrants, leading to a shift in the population from the first settlers (indigenous non-Muslims Idoma, Eggon, Mada, Aro, Etulo) to a mix of Hausa/Fulani Muslims and indigenous groups (Sciortino, 2010; Wall, 1988). Thus, both groups have histories of the area but are selective when claiming indigeneity. After the separation of Benue-Plateau State, the tension between indigenous groups and the Hausa/Fulani heightened as this Tiv farmer noted: Since I was born, I understand that during British rule, they demarcated the land; this place was in Benue province, which they used to call Benue Province. So, we felt that we had no problem with land until the creation of states. When states were created, we started having a land problem here (Interview A12). Similarly, some Idoma villages that claim their land is on Benue side on the border and attempt to evict the Fulani herders: This my island; the Fulani live there; their grand-grandfather lived there; after the grandfather died, another grandfather came, their father died, and their son is already here with us. Right from the beginning, they are here with us. You know, where they have lived for more than 20 years, they make that place their place because they cannot go anywhere again. We are now driving them to go; they say no, this is their house, they cannot go anywhere, and we cannot drive them. When we say we force them to go, we cause another problem for ourselves again (Interview A50 [Idoma Chief in Agatu]). The herders claim that they reside in Nasarawa State, not Benue. As such, they argued that the Idoma who want to evict them do not have the locus standi to do that since they are not indigenes of Nasarawa. This kind of indigeneity politics plays out regularly regarding access to land between a supposed non-indigenous and indigenous group who can also be minority and majority, respectively, in these border areas. The emergence of the FPC in this Benue-Nasarawa border is through the interaction between this boundary dispute and indigeneity, which are products of jurisdictional partitioning. 4.3 Interaction between the informal border dispute, indigeneity and FPCs As already noted, the informal border dispute and indigeneity tensions are interacting. As they were heightened, they spill over into FPCs and are particularly fierce between the Tiv farmers and Fulani herders. After the partitioning of Benue-Plateau State, some Tiv communities in Guma and Logo LGAs of Benue State started having the perception that Benue State is not a Fulani state: “Like we in Benue State, we stay in our State doing our farm. So, Fulani kuma [too] have their State, and they should have to go and stay in their State and do animal farm there” (Interview A2, Tiv farmer in Iorza area, Logo LGA). The conflict between the Tiv and Fulani pastoralists is brutal on the Awe-Guma border. The first escalation occurred in the 1980s. In 1985, about a decade after the separation of Benue and Plateau States, the Tiv who had lived with the Fulani herders already saw the herders as not indigenous to Benue State since the Tiv considered the area under Benue State. Disputes over crop damage would cause the Tiv farmers to prevent the herders from grazing on the lands across River Bakebo, which they thought was the boundary between Awe LGA of Nasarawa State and Guma LGA of Benue State. The herders dispute the boundary and resist their exclusion by the Tiv, which leads to their first violent battle. This tension stemmed from the adjustment of the boundary following the separation of Benue-Plateau State into Benue State and Plateau State. You know we are in the boundary of Nasarawa and Benue States, so these Fulani people sit in Nasarawa State and come and destroy our property in Benue State. Then they say where Iyode is residing is their land. They can do anything they want; it is because of boundary adjustment that these crises started. There is no pure demarcation, but we know the demarcation because our demarcation is River Bakebo, which we call Zango near Awe. If you cross that river, you enter Awe. That is our demarcation, but they refuse (Interview A19, Tiv chief in Guma). Indigeneity invokes in the villages the notion of the difference between those in Nasarawa and Benue. Many farmers in these border areas think that herders from various parts of Nasarawa State and other northern states are not indigenes of Benue State. Notably, the farming villagers consider the pastoralists in Benue State to have no land rights as the farmers who claim to be indigenes, which has led to various kinds of marginalisation. Thus, this represents how jurisdictional partitioning produced new territorial identities that villagers identified with, reinforcing indigeneity claims used to exclude the pastoralists. Conflict broke out following this disagreement over the boundary between Guma LGA and Awe LGA in which the herders killed the Tiv chief, the District Head of Nzorov named Yawude, in 1989. The conflict started when the pastoralists refused to pay compensation for crop damage because they considered that the Tiv in Iyode village were on their land, which they argued was in Nasarawa State at that time Plateau State: If they destroy our farm, they will not even pay because they claim it is their land; it is their power. Anything they want, they will do. Our former district head, Yawude, told them we should sit amicably to change our behaviours. Even the Tiv people, it is not good if they farm and touch Fulani cattle; if the Fulani cattle touch our farm, it is not good. From there, they [Fulani herders] are angry. They planned and brought the fight and killed him in 1989 (Interview A19, Tiv chief). The leader of the herders in Awe also mentioned this event when narrating the stories of the development of the FPC in the Benue Valley. He mentioned the death of Yawude in particular: “There is one crisis, during which Yawude was killed. There is somebody called Yawude, this is one of the traditional rulers called Yawude in Guma local government” (Interview B26(b)). The killing of Yawude angered the Tiv farmers in this area, leading to the fight between Tiv, Hausa and Fulani in Gbajimba Town of Guma LGA. The farmers and the herdsmen this crisis started in the 1989. The crisis started for the reason that em farmers and herdsmen, herdsmen have their cows and farmers has their own farm. So beside this, herdsmen are destroying farmers’ crops. So, the Yawude tried to stop them, they killed him. As a result of the farmers eh, they were very-very annoyed with herdsmen and tried to make them that they should stop destroying their farms and farms’ crop. Unfortunate, the herdsmen did not stop. So, that is why the annoyance come between the two parties (Interview A19, Tiv chief). Many pastoralists fled to Daudu and Yelwata in the same Guma LGA. Following the death of Yawude, the Tiv farmers have always suspected the Fulani herders as causing other various havocs such as killing, raping and robbery of traders crossing the border to sell farm harvests in Awe market (Interview A20, Tiv farmer). Subsequently, the Tiv farmer began to see herders’ movement from Nasarawa or Taraba into Benue State as an intrusion which must be stopped. It was an informal enforcement of the border by the Tiv villagers. The farmers also see Awe as herders’ gateway into Benue State, which must be stopped, whereas it was not seen as such when the states were together as Benue-Plateau State: The issue is that their boundary, you know, those people [herders] when they come, they base in Nasarawa State, and we are sharing boundary. So, it is easier for them to enter our land because if you go to some other places to enter, it is not easy. After all, if we hear they are coming, we block them, but here it is just crossing. Just a second, they jump onto our land (Interview A21, Tiv farmer and Commander of Volunteer Guard in Guma LGA in Benue State). Indeed, as Table 2 (supplementary file) and Fig. 1 show the LGAs with the highest incidence of conflict are border LGAs. In Benue State, 31% of the conflict occurred in Guma, 21.1% in Logo, 10.2% in Gwer West and 7.75% in Agatu representing approximately 70%. These are LGAs sharing boundaries with Nasarawa State. Similarly, in Nasarawa State nearly 70% of the conflict occurred LGAs bordering Benue State; 27.08% in Keana, 16.67% in Doma, 14.58% in Obi and 10.42% in Awe. Plessis ( 2020 , p. 347) argues that border enforcement (albeit by the state) perpetuates “violence towards nomadic forms of life” Sámi reindeer herder because it striates the pastoralists’ smooth space–having no delimited boundary. It perpetuates violence towards the herders because the “closure of the Norwegian-Finnish border in 1852, and the closure of the Finnish-Swedish border in 1889, cut off migration routes that had shaped Sámi life for two centuries” (Lehtola 2002 cited in Plessis 2020 , p. 352). Similarly, Galaty ( 2016 ) argues that boundary-making stimulates contestation and can exacerbate conflict among pastoralists who resist being confined by territorial fences. Efforts to stop the herders from grazing in the area and passage (i.e., informal border enforcement by Tiv villagers) thus engendered further conflicts between the Tiv farmers and pastoralists. The tensions remained even after the creation of the Nasarawa State in 1996 and gradually grew as claims of indigenous belonging and exclusion heightened (Interview B26 (b), Fulani herder). They became brutal in the last decade as the new territorial identities produced by the new states concretised, confirming Agnew’s ( 2008 ) argument that territorial identities change with the spatial delineation of boundaries. 5.0 The vicious cycle of farmer-herder-indigeneity conflicts and formal boundary dispute intensification 5.1 Farmer-herder conflict reinforcing indigeneity crisis. In the previous section, I noted that the FPC interconnects with informal border disputes and indigeneity crises, creating a web of crises. In this section, the “vicious circle” concept, previously mentioned in the theoretical section, helps to show that not only does indigeneity tension associated with the informal border dispute result in FPCs, but the FPC further reinforces the indigeneity conflict. This interaction further led to the state governments joining the boundary dispute formally. To illustrate how the FPC reinforced the indigeneity crisis, let us look at Gbajimba, the headquarters of Guma LGA. The FPC has led to severe tensions between the Tiv majority and minority groups, such as Jukun, Fulani, and Hausa, regarding Gbajimba ownership. Since 2013, the FPC has led Fulani herders to attack and displace Tiv interior villages near Iyode and those close to the Benue River near Gbajimba town. Consequently, many displaced villagers seek shelter in the internally displaced person’s camp. In one of the attacks, the herders razed the governor’s house in May 2016 (Ozogwu, 2016), potentially provoking a response. The Benue State governor accused former president Muhammadu Buhari of favouring his kinsmen, the pastoralists, by refusing to take action against their attacks on Benue communities, especially the Tiv. As the conflicts escalated between 2015 and 2016, the governor of Benue State, who is from Gbajimba, decided to enforce a ban on open grazing through the “Benue State Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017.” This law aimed to restrict livestock movement and open grazing practices formally. However, Fulani pastoralists argued that the law targeted them: The government’s only target is Fulani cattle, which greatly worries us because we do not have land. They even described us as non-indigenes, but those who are owners of the land do not practice ranching; their cattle do open grazing. So, there is a question mark there (Risku Mohammed, cited in Charles, 2022, Benue State Chairman of the MACBAN). Thus, the law is tool for territoriality, which a deliberate effort by the Benue State Government to influence, control, or affect the pastoralists’ lives and also their relationship with farmers in the Benue State territory. As the law came into force in November 2017, mobilised by groups like Miyeti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), the herders attacked Tiv villages from the western flank near Agatu eastward toward Wukari in Taraba State. The Tiv retaliated by attacking and displacing the Fulani and Hausa communities in Gbajimba. Tiv villages in Guma and neighbouring Logo LGA, plus those in Nasarawa and Taraba borders with Benue State, suffered greatly from the herders’ attacks: The anti-grazing law makes us all [herder] out of Benue State. For us to live in Benue now, there is no way. Why? Because of the anti-grazing law, which chased us outside of the state. That is why the thing [conflict] became worse than what happened some years ago. (Interview B26(b), Fulani herder in Keana, Nasarawa State, interpreted from Hausa). The Fulani pastoralists interviewed all mentioned that the law escalated their conflict with Tiv farmers as the Tiv retaliated by evicting the Fulani from towns such as Gbajimba, Yelwata, and Dausu, and the Hausa communities fled. In Gbajimba, as the conflicts subsided in 2021, the Hausa community was allowed to return. Given this condition, the Jukun-led minority “indigenous” groups in Gbajimba began to challenge the authenticity of the Tiv people’s claim of ownership of the area. The claim and counter-claim of who are indigenes and non-indigence between the Tiv, Jukun and Hausa in Guma have become intense and the crisis that it generates can best be illustrated with the case of Gbajimba. As narrated, Gbajimba, known as “ba ji ba,” was renamed for easier pronunciation by the Tiv. According to oral history, Jukun fishers lived on river sandbanks, moving to higher ground during floods. Eventually, they settled there alongside a Hausa hunter. Due to the language barrier, the hunter often responds to the Tiv’s greetings by saying “ba ji ba”, which is “I do not understand” in the Hausa language. Subsequently, Tiv started referring to the meeting place as “gba jim-ba”. The origins of the Tiv people in Nzorov, the core of Gbajimba, remain unknown, but the Tiv, Hausa, and Jukun communities claim the area (Interview A27). The Hausa in the area proclaim their belonging in Gbajimba by emphasising that they are the descendants of the hunter whose words were used. The Tiv claim they are the original indigenes, having named the place “Gbajimba”, and the Jukun emphasise that they were already fishing in the area before the hunter and Tiv arrived. Regardless, the Tiv have dominated the area and control most institutions of power such that the minority Jukun and Hausa cannot mount an upset against the Tiv hegemony, especially in this democratic dispensation. Thus, they have pitched tents with the Fulani pastoralists, heightening the indigeneity conflict there. 5.2 Formalisation of informal border enforcement and escalation of the indigeneity crisis Raineri and Strazzari (2019, p. 545) argue that formal “rules and institutions” result from “informal habits” and everyday interactions. It is also the case that the informal border enforcement against pastoralists practised by the Tiv in the area, although without success for the last three decades, has been incorporated into formal practice through the anti-open grazing law. The enactment of the anti-grazing law generated heated indigeneity tensions between the Tiv and ethnic groups sympathetic to the Fulani pastoralists across the Nasarawa side of the borderland, where there is a substantial population of Tiv. In Awe LGA of Nasarawa State, the Hausa, who support Fulani pastoralists, are the majority, unlike in Guma LGA, where the Tiv are the majority. The division of the Benue-Plateau state into Benue and Plateau came with boundary adjustment. Previously, Guma, Keana, Awe, and the current Makurdi LGA were part of a larger Makurdi LGA within former Benue-Plateau State. The portioning of the larger Makurdi LGA into the current Keana, Awe, new Makurdi, Doma, Gwer West and Guma LGAs made Tiv a majority in Guma but a minority in Keana and Awe. This majority/minority status stems from the concentration of the Tiv in areas that fall under the Guma LGA more than Keana and Awe. This situation portends potentials for the mistreatment of Tiv farmers by the Hausa and Alago communities in Awe and Keana, who supported the Fulani pastoralists. The tension about who are the indigenes or non-indigenes among these groups in these LGAs is not new. However, enacting the anti-grazing law in Benue State heightened the tensions and fuelled claims of indigeneity to marginalise the Tiv farmers in the Nasarawa State. This informs the self-reinforcing nature of interconnected issues and implies that if border dispute interconnects with indigeneity crisis and FPCs, they can reinforce each other, creating a vicious circle of crises. While the Tiv have used the institution of the state (legislation) to enforce their “border” against open grazing, the Fulani pastoralists have allied with neighbouring groups in Nasarawa State, such as Alago, Jukun, Hausa, Beri-Beri and Eggon, to evict the Tiv through indigeneity claims. Most of these groups have had tensions with the Tiv over land tenure, and their alliance with the pastoralists is thus to pursue their interests. Where it is impossible to evict the Tiv farmers in Nasarawa using the authority of the traditional rulers based on indigeneity claims, the pastoralists have used armed attacks. The Hausa allege that the Tiv are not indigenous to Awe to justify their confiscation of Tiv lands in response to the pastoralists’ exclusion in Benue State. The Hausa have reportedly confiscated Tiv lands and given them to Fulani pastoralists, including areas where Tiv villages had established schools and amenities: “They have collected Tiv land and give it to Fulani…there was a school here, this building here, but they came and pursue us they carry it and give Fulani people” (Interview B24, female Tiv farmer). So, when I was growing up, I could not see like that, but this time around, these Hausa are collecting our land, saying that we are visitors…So, other places they give Fulani to stay on for our farm. As I am talking to you here, if you go there, you will see them sitting there for our places (Interview B30, Tiv farmer and primary healthcare support worker in Awe). Like the case of Awe, some Tiv lands in Keana have been allocated to pastoralists, leading to Tiv farmers versus Fulani herders’ conflict. First, the herders attacked the Tiv farmers and displaced them before settling on the land. By the time the Tiv would return from IDP camps, the pastoralists would claim the land was sold to them by the traditional authorities. Although the traditional authorities would deny it, there has not been an effort to ask the pastoralists to vacate the land. Efforts to make the pastoralists vacate by the Tiv farmers then escalate the violence: So, when we came back, they almost inherited our lands. When we ask them, they will tell us that they bought it from the owners of the land, telling us that we are strangers here. They bought the land from the owner, like some Royal Highnesses, maybe the Osechi of Aloshi and the Osana of Keana. However, when we meet them [traditional rulers], they will tell us there is nothing like that, and you know they have the powers. As you say, no name is mentioned; I want to clarify that they have the powers now (Interview B22, Tiv farmer in Aloshi, Keana). 5.3 Indigeneity crisis, FPC and territorial politics The indigeneity claims alone is insufficient for concrete exclusion or eviction of groups without violence. The Tiv minority in Awe lacks proper representation in the local government, resulting in marginalisation similar to the Hausa-Fulani in Benue State. Although the Tiv challenged this in court and won, the Awe Traditional Council has appealed the case, but a judgement has yet to be made. In Keana, especially in the Giza district, the story is similar. The status of these groups as a minority is a consequence of partitioning. Thus, jurisdictional partitioning shapes power dynamics in the Benue Valley and power influences the practice of indigeneity but can be mutually reinforcing, intensifying the indigeneity crisis in this region. Therefore, it is not just the case that jurisdictional partitioning of territory bred various forms of exclusion because of horizontal inequalities (Nnabuihe, 2019). Horizontal inequalities (i.e., the minority/majority status because of partitioning) interact with claims of indigeneity and the exclusion associated with the claims. This interaction can fuel violent inter-group hostilities in neighbouring territorial jurisdictions where the majority group who maltreated the minority are minority resulting from attempts to retaliate the maltreatment of the minority group in the other jurisdiction. Farmers and herders in the study area deeply understand how the creation of states has affected them, with this knowledge passed down across generations. The division of Benue and Plateau States has caused tensions between Tiv farmers and other groups especially the Fulani herders. In Nasarawa State, the Tiv are seen as non-indigenous by Alago and Hausa communities. The Tiv farmers assert their belonging to the land based on ancestral graves and a long history: “If you walk round, you will see the grave of our grandparents. We were here for donkey years, but now they say it is not our place; we should find our places” (Interview B24, female Tiv farmer). They do not feel the need to return to Benue State, emphasising that Nasarawa State does not belong to any particular ethnic group. The conflict between Tiv farmers and Fulani herders in the Nasarawa frontier has exacerbated issues related to indigeneity and led to the displacement of Tiv villages. Anderson’s (1983) concept of imagined communities indicates that individuals within a nation, regardless of size, develop a sense of shared identity through imagination rather than personal interactions. Thus, the concept helps explain how cultural and historical affinities influence the perceptions of different groups in the region. The historical partitioning of the Benue Province has reinforced the of perception groups as outsiders based on indigeneity claims associated with the territorial jurisdictions. This division of Benue-Plateau State led to the Tiv becoming the majority ethnic group in Benue State, further reinforcing the notion that the Tiv belonged to Benue State rather than Nasarawa. Those not directly involved in the FPCs know the tensions between Tiv farmers and other ethnic groups in Nasarawa State. In Awe, a non-Tiv and non-Fulani restaurant owner reported that the Awe Traditional Council, led by the Hausa, supported the Fulani pastoralists against the Tiv farmers, claiming that the Tiv do not belong in Nasarawa State: Fulani are the majority in Nasarawa State, and they claim Nasarawa State as their state. They said that Nasarawa State belongs to them, and you know Tiv people, too, are here in Nasarawa State. So, most of the time, they used to do something as they wanted because the state belonged to them, and when we began to complain, problems would start. They are doing it because Nasarawa State is their state. They claim it is their state and that “we are strangers”. So, whatever they do, we should not complain. If we do, the problem will start; that is why there are always crises (Interview B24, restaurant owner). The interviewee uses “Fulani” to mean Hausa/Fulani and those backing the pastoralists such as Gwandara and, in some cases, Alago, e.g., in Keana because the Fulani are minority in Nasarawa State. So, the Fulani cannot claim Nasarawa State but because of their close ties with the Hausa, many people would conflate the Fulani and Hausa as one group. The enforcement of the anti-grazing law in Benue State has contributed to heightened tensions and conflicts between farmers and herders, particularly along the Benue-Nasarawa borderlands. The lack of a clear boundary exacerbates this situation, as clashes occur when Benue State Livestock Guards enforcing the anti-grazing law arrest Fulani pastoralists’ cattle in areas the herders believe belong to Nasarawa State. This boundary dispute has been brought into the national political arena, with politicians from both states debating the extent of their boundaries at the National Assembly (Odekina, 2020), thus intertwining local indigeneity conflicts with national politics. The National Boundary Commission has been tasked with demarcating the boundary between Benue and Nasarawa State, and the survey was completed in 2022. However, the results of this demarcation exercise have yet to be communicated. Overall, this paper demonstrates how territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning can fuel informal boundary disputes and related indigeneity tensions. This indigeneity tension led to FPCs resulting in informal border enforcement at the local level. The FPC and the border dispute in turn, reinforce the indigeneity crisis. The reinforced indigeneity crisis further intensified the FPC which led to formal boundary disputes and territorial politics between Benue and Nasarawa States. Thus, conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Benue Valley, including other crises, are an interconnected web of crises reinforcing each other, creating a vicious circle of conflicts. 6.0 Discussion The paper has shown that the partitioning of Benue-Plateau State into separate Benue and Plateau State in 1970 generated a border dispute between villagers and the current Benue-Nasarawa border after Nasarawa State was created from Plateau in 1996. The dispute developed from farming villagers attempting to enforce borders (through arresting cattle trespassing into areas they considered Benue State) against pastoralists perceived as in direct competition for access to and control over resources. This everyday border dispute heightens indigeneity tensions, leading to FPCs. This finding supports the claims that territorial fragmentation heightens indigeneity and reinforces ethno-religious conflicts in the Middle Belt (Harnischfeger, 2004; Adebanwi, 2009; Angerbrandt, 2011, 2015; Kraxberger, 2005). Also, it supports some studies suggesting that indigeneity shapes land disputes and FPCs in various parts of Nigeria (Arowosegbe, 2019; NOAK, 2021, 2022). The Benue State government intervened by formalising the villagers’ everyday border practices into formal institutions by enacting an anti-open grazing law that indirectly excluded the pastoralists from grazing. This formalisation of the informal border practice heightened the indigeneity tensions, leading to exclusion and counter-exclusion between farmers and herders in jurisdictions where each group and their backers have majority populations or better political representation. Thus, partitioning increases horizontal inequalities and breeds exclusion (Nnabuihe, 2019). However, when horizontal inequalities interact with indigeneity and exclusion, it can fuel violent inter-group hostilities in neighbouring territorial jurisdictions having similar social groups but in unequal numerical proportions. Thus, exclusion from land and resources emanating from territorial fragmentation and identity at the local level does not only develop through the interaction of formal and informal institutions (Lund, 2008; Sikor & Lund, 2009) or hybrid political orders (Boege et al., 2008), informal practices of pastoralists exclusion can be transformed into formal institutions (Raineri & Strazzari, 2019) triggering violent responses. The complications from this mutual reinforcement of indigeneity conflict and FPC over the formalisation of everyday border practice in a jurisdiction led to a formal dispute between the Benue and Nasarawa States in an attempt to demarcate their boundary. This supports the claim that concurrent disputes over sub-national boundaries, political identities, and the exercise of power trigger territorial politics (Sjögren, 2015). Thus, the relationship between indigeneity and conflicts is not linear as implied in earlier studies (e.g., Arowosegbe, 2019; Adebanwi, 2009; Angerbrandt, 2011, 2015; Harnischfeger, 2004; Kraxberger, 2005; NOAK, 2021, 2022). Fragmentation does not just reproduce or transform social divisions, such as indigeneity, that influence conflicts. Conflicts (e.g., border disputes) produced through partitioning can reinforce indigeneity, leading to other conflicts like FPCs, reinforcing indigeneity conflicts again, and even influencing formal disputes between sub-national states. Thus, like geopolitics studies on conflicts in African borderlands (e.g., Berg, 2008; Carmody, 2009; Dal Santo & van der Heide, 2018), the crisis in the Benue Valley borderlands is an interconnected web of crises that reinforce each other creating a vicious circle (Collier, 2003; Menkhaus, 2004) of crises. Conclusion Therefore, the paper argues that jurisdictional partitioning can lead to border conflicts reinforcing indigeneity, producing FPCs. The interaction between indigeneity and FPCs can be mutually reinforcing, leading to a vicious cycle of violence, suggesting that armed mobilisation and territorial politics are contingent and reciprocal. The formalisation of the informal practices engendered by partitioning can reinforce the indigeneity crisis, escalating farmer-herder tensions that led to exclusion, counter-exclusion, and violent confrontations between the groups in neighbouring jurisdictions. The mutual reinforcement of indigeneity and FPCs eventually led to formal territorial politics and state disputes. Thus, boundary disputes, indigeneity crisis and FPCs in Benue Valley are highly connected and mutually reinforcing each other in diverse ways. These processes show how the FPC has been shaped and shapes everyday and formal geopolitical practices. Policies and conflict management mechanisms should consider the interactions between these conflicts, especially how attempts at solving or intervening in one can reinforce others. Sub-national jurisdictional partitioning as a way of homogenising national territory and resolving conflicts can be fruitful. It has significantly reduced the propensity of any part of Nigeria from seceding and also to some extent reduced the regional ethnic minority movement as seen in the agitation for a Middle Belt Region between the 1940s and 1960s. However, it has created ground-level tensions as the struggles shifted to minorities versus majority within states. Thus, the partitioning only significantly paralysed the regional coalition that is strong enough to confront the national state, only for it to resurface at the sub-national level with indigeneity as its fuel. However, the story does not end there. This indigeneity tension now interacts with the FPC because the farmers and herders belong to different ethnicities whose majority populations are associated with specific states. In contrast, they are also in other states because of the partitioning that divided members of the same ethnic groups into different states unequally, as seen in Benue and Nasarawa States. The interaction of these crises has led to formal border disputes between Benue and Nasarawa States. Thus, while these findings, to some extent, support the idea of partition as a majority/minority conflict resolution strategy, it does not solve the problem entirely. It only limited the possibility of the minority groups forming a coalition to confront the federal state. Thus, partitioning can breed further ground-level tensions in highly ethnic heterogeneous areas like the Benue Valley, which can interact with other issues like the FPCs, further creating tensions between the sub-national states. References Adebanwi, W. (2009). Terror, territoriality and the struggle for indigeneity and citizenship in northern Nigeria. Citizenship Studies , 13 (4), 349–363. Agnew J (2003) Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics. New York: Routledge. Agnew, J. (2008). Borders on the mind: re-framing border thinking. Ethics & global politics , 1 (4), 175–191. Akov, E. T. (2017). The resource-conflict debate revisited: Untangling the case of farmer–herdsman clashes in the North Central region of Nigeria. African Security Review , 26 (3), 288–307. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism . London: Verso books. Anderson, J., & Shuttleworth, I. (1998). Sectarian demography, territoriality and political development in Northern Ireland. Political Geography , 17 (2), 187-208. Angerbrandt, H. (2015). Religion, ethnicity and citizenship: demands for territorial self-determination in southern Kaduna, Nigeria. Journal of Contemporary African Studies , 33 (2), 232-250. Arowosegbe, J. O. (2019). Hausa-Fulani pastoralists and resource conflicts in Yorubaland. Interventions , 21 (8), 1157-1187. Bello, I., & Kazibwe, S. (2022). Pastoralist, farmers and desertification induced conflict in North Central and Southern Nigeria. Small Wars & Insurgencies , 1-15. Belloni, R. (2007). The trouble with humanitarianism. Review of International Studies , 451-474. Berg, P. (2008). A crisis-complex, not complex crises: conflict dynamics in the Sudan, Chad, and Central African Republic tri-border area. Central African Conflict Dynamics. IPG , p. 4 . Carmody, P. (2009). Cruciform sovereignty, matrix governance and the scramble for Africa’s oil: Insights from Chad and Sudan. Political Geography , 28 (6), 353–361. Charmaz, K. (2020). “With constructivist grounded theory you can’t hide”: Social justice research and critical inquiry in the public sphere. Qualitative Inquiry , 26 (2), 165–176. Christopher, A. J. (1994). South Africa: the case of a failed state partition. Political Geography , 13 (2), 123-136. Collier, P. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy (Vol. 41181, No. 4). Washington DC: The World Bank and Oxford University Press. Cormack, Z. (2016). Borders are galaxies: Interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan. Africa , 86 (3), 504–527. Dal Santo, E., & van der Heide, E. J. (2018). Escalating complexity in regional conflicts: connecting geopolitics to individual pathways to terrorism in Mali. African security , 11 (3), 274-291. De Waal, A. (2005). Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Elden S (2013a) The Birth of Territory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Emmanuel, J. C., & Tari, V. A. (2015). The myth and reality of Middle Belt geopolitics in Nigeria: A discourse. Journal of Culture, Society and Development , 10 , 1-9. Galaty, J. (2016). Boundary-making and pastoral conflict along the Kenyan–Ethiopian Borderlands. African Studies Review , 59 (1), 97–122. Harnischfeger, J. (2004). Sharia and control over territory: conflicts between ‘settlers’ and ‘indigenes’ in Nigeria. African Affairs , 103 (412), 431-452. Huening, L. C. (2013). Making use of the past: the Rwandophone question and the ‘Balkanisation of the Congo’. Review of African Political Economy , 40 (135), 13-31. Jenne, E. K. (2012). When will we part with partition theory? Flawed premises and improbable longevity of the theory of ethnic partition. Ethnopolitics , 11 (3), 255-267. Kabra, A., Das, B., & Bathla, C. (2023). Indigenous tree tenure in the times of charismatic carnivore conservation: Territoriality and property in the forests of central India. Political Geography , 101 , 102841. Klieman, A. S. (1980). The resolution of conflicts through territorial partition: the Palestine experience. Comparative Studies in Society and History , 22 (2), 281-300. Kraxberger, B. (2005). Strangers, indigenes and settlers: Contested geographies of citizenship in Nigeria. Space and Polity , 9 (1), 9-27. Lund, C. (2008). Local Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa. Cambridge and New York NY: Cambridge University Press. Maiangwa, B. (2017). “Conflicting indigeneity” and farmer–herder conflicts in post-colonial Africa. Peace Review , 29 (3), 282–288. Menkhaus, K. (2004). Vicious circles and the security development nexus in Somalia. Conflict, Security & Development , 4 (2), 149–165. Newman, D. (2002). The geopolitics of peacemaking in Israel–Palestine. Political Geography , 21 (5), 629-646. Nnabuihe, O. E. (2019). Horizontal inequalities and ethno-religious conflicts in Jos metropolis, North-Central Nigeria. Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines , 53 (2), 273-294. Ó Dochartaigh, N. (2011). Territoriality and Order in the North of Ireland. Irish Political Studies , 26 (3), 313-328. O’Leary, B. (2007). Analysing partition: Definition, classification and explanation. Political Geography , 26 (8), 886-908. Ochonu, M. (2015). Caliphate expansion and sociopolitical change in nineteenth-century lower Benue hinterlands. Journal of West African History , 1 (1), 133–178. Odekina, G. C. (1 October 2020). Reps ask boundary commission to demarcate Nasarawa, Benue states. Available at: https://authorityngr.com/2020/10/01/reps-ask-boundary-commission-to-demarcate-nasarawa-benue-states/ Accessed 27 May 2023. Olaniyi, R. O. (2015). Bororo fulani pastoralists and yoruba farmers’ conflicts in the upper ogun river, oyo state nigeria, 1986–2004. Journal of Asian and African studies , 50 (2), 239-252. Olayode, K. (2013). Democratisation and the national question in Nigeria (1999-2007). Contemporary Journal of African Studies , 1 (2), 65–92. Ozogwu, Y. (May 27, 2016). Fulani Herdsmen Kill 50, Destroy Ortom’s Ancestral Home, 200 Hectares of Rice Farm. https://thewhistler.ng/fulani-herdsmen-kill-50-destroy-ortom-s-ancestral-home-200-hectares-of-rice-farm/ Accessed 29 May 2023. Paasi, A. (1998). Boundaries as social processes: Territoriality in the world of flows. Geopolitics , 3 (1), 69-88. Plessis, G. (2020). Killing reindeer: A spatial analysis of Nordic states and nomadic forms of life in the Arctic. International Political Sociology , 14 (4), 347–365. Pruitt, D. G., & Kim, S. H. (2004). Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement . Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill. Rankin, K. J. (2007). Deducing rationales and political tactics in the partitioning of Ireland, 1912–1925. Political geography , 26 (8), 909-933. Sack, R. D. (1983). Human territoriality: A theory. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73 (1), 55–74. Sack, R. D. (1986). Human territoriality: Its theory and history . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sambanis, N., & Schulhofer-Wohl, J. (2009). What's in a line? Is partition a solution to civil war?. International Security , 34 (2), 82-118. Schetter, C. (2005). Ethnoscapes, national territorialisation, and the Afghan war. Geopolitics , 10 (1), 50-75. Sjögren, A. (2015). Territorialising identity, authority and conflict in Africa: an introduction. Journal of Contemporary African Studies , 33 (2), 163–170. Ukase, P. I. (2013). JS Tarka and Ethnic Minority Agitations and Struggles in Nigeria, 1960-1980: An Eulogy Revisited. Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria , pp. 82–111. Vela-Almeida, D. (2018). Territorial partitions, the production of mining territory and the building of a post-neoliberal and plurinational state in Ecuador. Political Geography , 62 , 126-136. Supplementary file Supplementary file is not available with this version Additional Declarations The authors declare no competing interests. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6968058","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":475900333,"identity":"d07417bb-a734-478f-9d0f-617637728acb","order_by":0,"name":"Cletus Famous Nwankwo","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0071-4903","institution":"University of Nigeria","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Cletus","middleName":"Famous","lastName":"Nwankwo","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-06-24 17:25:58","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":{"humanSubjects":true,"vertebrateSubjects":false,"conflictsOfInterestStatement":false,"humanSubjectEthicalGuidelines":true,"humanSubjectConsent":true,"humanSubjectClinicalTrial":false,"humanSubjectCaseReport":false,"vertebrateSubjectEthicalGuidelines":false},"doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6968058/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6968058/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":85572935,"identity":"a169f330-db6a-4dfd-8b6f-f877c8dd0b29","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-27 17:03:36","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":296432,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eBenue-Nasarawa borderland and the spatial distribution of FPC incidence in the study area\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6968058/v1/bf6e15c39ba2067744e1889d.png"},{"id":85573462,"identity":"c486953d-8ec1-4d75-b2c1-9b85a9765379","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-06-27 17:19:36","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1109906,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6968058/v1/1b66042e-8972-4a81-bf0c-814233ca3a92.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"The authors declare no competing interests.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTerritorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning: Interaction between indigeneity crisis, farmer-pastoralist conflicts and Benue-Nasarawa border dispute\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"1.0 Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThroughout its history, modern Nigeria has witnessed several phases of jurisdictional partitioning, that is, the partition of the internal territory of Nigeria in the process of creating regions, provinces and divisions in the colonial period and states and local government areas in the post-colonial period. Africa\u0026rsquo;s colonial and post-colonial boundary-making process has been closely tied to conflicts, exacerbating tensions related to ethnicity, indigeneity, and other social identities (Sj\u0026ouml;gren, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). In Nigeria, colonial and post-colonial territorialisation processes have contributed to ethno-religious conflicts, resource allocation and land disputes tied to identity and belonging, especially in the Middle Belt region (Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Arowosegbe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Kraxberger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e; Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Practices of ethnolinguistic classification have perpetuated the idea of strangers or non-indigenes, influencing resource distribution, particularly land, between majority and minority groups (Arowosegbe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn brief, partitioning refers to dividing a geographical area, formerly a single administrative unit, into several units (Klieman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1980\u003c/span\u003e) for strategic reasons such as to weaken a country\u0026rsquo;s regions, prevent them from seceding, which is \u003cem\u003eterritorial homogenisation\u003c/em\u003e (Schetter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). Indigeneity is primarily defined through ancestors of original state inhabitants who have privileges that non-indigenes do not enjoy within that territorial jurisdiction (Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Hence, indigeneity is defined by a sense of geographical attachment and belonging, leading to practices of privileging certain groups based on territorial identity and ancestral roots (Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). In Nigeria, the intersection of territory and identity is laid bare in \u0026ldquo;indigeneship\u0026rdquo; or indigeneity. Indigeneity is based on ancestral ties to land but has been extended to territorial jurisdiction, becoming a source of tension in Nigeria (Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Decentralisation efforts to manage minorities\u0026rsquo; agitations for autonomous jurisdictions can also create tensions, influencing demographic changes and competition for power and resources based on group identities (Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJurisdictional partitioning resulting from decentralisation intensifies the indigeneity crisis and further exacerbates conflicts, as seen in Kaduna, Jos and other parts of the Middle Belt (Angerbrandt, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Harnischfeger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Territorial partitioning has significant implications for pastoralism, inhibiting nomadic life and creating tensions between sedentary farmers and mobile herders (Plessis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Identity plays a critical role in FPCs because they are shaped by social identities, e.g., ethnic, cultural, religious and indigeneity (Akov, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Maiangwa, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; NOF, 2020; NOAK, 2021, 2022). For example, the perception of Fulani pastoralists as \u0026ldquo;settlers\u0026rdquo; has been identified as contributing to the tensions and discrimination experienced by Fulani herders (Akov, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Arowosegbe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe existing literature on FPCs has addressed identity and resource competition (Bello \u0026amp; Kazibwe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; MADNK, 2021) but needs a comprehensive exploration of the interplay between territorialisation, indigeneity, and conflict dynamics in West Africa. Research in other regions, such as northern Kenya, southern Ethiopia, and South Sudan\u0026rsquo;s Gogrial region, explored conflicts relating to and among herders over territorial boundaries (Cormack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Galaty, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). These studies have not focused explicitly on FPCs. Also, they did not consider the interaction of the local border disputes between ethnic groups, identity tensions and the FPCs. Further, they did not consider how border disputes between the pastoralists result in boundary disputes between sub-national states. Thus, what distinguishes my paper from Cormack (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) and Galaty (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) is its focus on the interaction between communal disputes from administrative boundary changes, identity crises, and FPCs and how this results in territorial boundary disputes between sub-national states.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, paper focuses on the politics linked to the historical partitioning of Nigerian internal territory and how village-based border disputes which interacts with indigeneity crisis and interacts with conflicts over crop damage between farmers and herders in the Benue-Nasarawa border in the last three decades. It also considers how the FPC developing from this process further amplify the indigeneity crisis leading to territorial politics between sub-national states. This paper employs a qualitative research design that uses ethnographic interviews and observation for data collection and grounded theory to analyse the data. Concerning the research question, the finding reported in this paper is unanticipated. It emerged from the opinions of the interviewees when asked, \u0026ldquo;What is the origin of the FPC?\u0026rdquo;. Although their answers usually begin with the issue of crop damage by cattle, as claimed by the farmers and cattle theft by pastoralists, one of the several issues they mentioned is the partitioning of states and the boundary disputes that emerged from it. During the interviews, these issues were retold as stories by the participants, and they relied mostly on individual and collective political memories of this border. A careful analysis of this aspect of the interviews shows two major interrelated issues:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eJurisdictional partitioning engendered border disputes between villagers and indigeneity crises at the Benue-Nasarawa border.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe border dispute and indigeneity crisis engendered FPC and reinforced the indigeneity crisis, eventually triggering territorial politics between the Benue and Nasarawa states.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, this article shows how the partitioning of what was Benue Province into several territorial jurisdictions from the colonial to post-colonial period produced boundary disputes between villagers at the Benue-Nasarawa border without the government involvement at this stage. The border dispute between the villagers reinforced indigeneity tensions, leading to FPCs. The interaction between indigeneity crisis and FPCs can be reciprocally reinforcing, leading to a rancorous cycle of violence. The formalisation (through legislation) of the practices of pastoralists exclusion by farming villagers stemming from the border dispute further reinforced the indigeneity crisis, leading to counter-exclusion in neighbouring jurisdictions where the pastoralists have representation in government. Thus, this further intensifies the farmer-herder violence in those jurisdictions leading to formal territorial politics and boundary disputes between Benue and Nasarawa States. The paper argues that these processes show how the FPC has been shaped and shapes everyday and formal geopolitical practices.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheoretically, the paper uses an incorporation of theoretical lenses viz. territoriality, particularly the idea of territorialisation through partitioning, identity conflicts, spiral model of conflicts (Motitz, 2010; Pruitt \u0026amp; Kim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e) and the vicious circle of violence (Collier, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e; Menkhaus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). Territoriality, which, as defined by Sack (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1983\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1986\u003c/span\u003e), involves the deliberate effort by individuals or groups to influence, control, or affect various aspects of territory, such as objects, people, and relationships, within a defined geographic area, termed the \u0026ldquo;territory.\u0026rdquo; It brings this in productive dialogues with studies of identity conflicts in Africa particularly those focusing on the majority/minority and indigene/settler conundrum in relation to territoriality (Arowosegbe, 2017; Mamdani, 2001; Angerbrandt, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Harnischfeger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e; Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). It builds further on literature on the geopolitics of African conflicts, especially at borderlands that frame ethnic conflict in Africa as interacting crises (Berg, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Carmody, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Dal Santo \u0026amp; van der Heide, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIt also uses the spiral model of conflicts which emphasises the interaction between the conflicting parties, particularly the cycle of their actions and reactions involving retaliation and deterrence, creating a vicious circle (Motitz, 2010; Pruitt \u0026amp; Kim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). It uses the spiral model of conflicts to emphasises the interaction between the FPC, indigeneity crisis and border disputes showing how it creates the cycle of actions and reactions involving retaliation and deterrence, creating a vicious circle. Then it weaves this around the \u0026ldquo;vicious circle\u0026rdquo; concept from the security-development nexus literature that suggests that insecurity impedes economic recovery and, in turn, economic stagnation reinforces conflict and criminality (Collier, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e; Menkhaus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom this perspective, it frames the FPC as part of interacting web of conflicts reinforcing each other, creating a vicious circle of violence in the Benue-Nasarawa border. Thus, it deviates from political ecology analysis that focuses on the marginalisation and exclusion of pastoralists in access to land through government land use policies (e.g., Benjaminsen \u0026amp; Ba, 2009; Benjaminsen et al., 2009; Walwa, 2020) and the environmental security perspective (e.g., Homer-Dixon, 1999; Belo \u0026amp; Kazibwe, 2022). It argues that sub-national jurisdictional partitioning as a way of homogenising national territory and resolving conflicts can be fruitful as it significantly paralysed the regional coalition strong enough to confront the national state. However, tensions resurfaced at the sub-national level with indigeneity as its fuel. Thus, partitioning can breed further ground-level tensions in highly ethnic heterogeneous areas like the Benue-Nasarawa border, which can interact with other issues like the FPCs, further creating tensions between the sub-national states. The paper is organised as follows. This first section introduces the paper. The second section presents the theories, and a discussion of the methods is done in section three. The presentation of the results is done in sections four and five. Sections six gives the discussion and conclusion.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2.0 Theoretical approach","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe conceptual entry point for understanding territorial struggles is territoriality. Territoriality, as defined by Sack (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1983\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1986\u003c/span\u003e), involves the deliberate effort by individuals or groups to influence, control, or affect various aspects, such as objects, people, and relationships, within a defined geographic area, termed the \u0026ldquo;territory.\u0026rdquo; Territorialisation serves as a valuable framework for understanding FPC in the study area, especially in the context of territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning. Territorial homogenisation refers to territorial strategies such as partitioning to keep the state as one entity (Schetter, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e), asserting exclusive territorial sovereignty by homogenising internal space (\u0026Oacute; Dochartaigh, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Jurisdictional partitioning involves partitioning a sovereign state into sub-states with no sovereign authority, like the nation-state (Klieman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1980\u003c/span\u003e) with distinct meanings, constituting acts of territorialisation. The partitions can be made within the sub-state territories for further local administrative jurisdictions (Klieman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1980\u003c/span\u003e). Nigerian internal territory has been partitioned in this sense to create various sub-national states and local jurisdictions. Thus, as O\u0026rsquo;Leary (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) explained, this kind of partitioning does not connote secession, which denotes transforming internal borders into sovereign demarcations. Beyond keeping the country united, the partitioning of Nigeria\u0026rsquo;s internal territory was also a product of minority agitations, especially in the Middle Belt of the northern region (Ukase, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe significance of territorial partition in conflicts has been investigated, particularly highlighted in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Newman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e), in South Africa (Christopher \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e) and Northern Ireland (Anderson \u0026amp; Shuttleworth, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e; Rankin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) among other areas. Advocates of partition argue that it effectively prevents the recurrence of war when it involves the physical separation of different ethnic groups (Sambanis \u0026amp; Schulhofer-Wohl, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). It has been argued that partition overlooks the possibility of reconciliation and offering political cover for ethnic cleansers (Jenne, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Newman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e) suggest that partitioning contributes to the perpetuation of conflict by reinforcing ethnic divisions as it often led to further separation, contributing to and reinforcing conflict and mutual antagonism. Using Ireland serves as a case study Rankin (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) argues that while partition may aim to resolve conflict, it often introduces new complexities and can perpetuate existing tensions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTerritory, including property, jurisdictions, and borders, forms the foundation of state power and sovereignty (Elden, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013a\u003c/span\u003e; Kabra, Das \u0026amp; Bathla, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Vela-Almeida (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) emphasizes that territory is essential for the state as it provides opportunities to materialize national interests through processes of state territorialization. State territorialization involves the state's strategies to regulate socio-spatial relations within a specific area such as through jurisdictional partitioning. These strategies redefine the meaning of territory, establish new identities, land use regimes, and socio-economic relations (Kabra, Das \u0026amp; Bathla, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). State territoriality can involve partitioning to excluding specific uses and users from territorial land partitions. In pastoral frontiers, these exclusions can be contested, often leading to violent conflicts and this is particularly pronounced at the boundaries of newly established jurisdictions, where conflicts revolve around defining spatial units and determining who belongs and who is excluded (Vela-Almeida, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) based on indigeneity. Thus, indigeneity and territoriality can influence power dynamics and exclusion, contributing to FPCs.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eOf web of interacting crisis: intersection of territorialisation and identity crisis\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn Nigeria, the practice of indigenship aims to achieve a balanced federation at the national level, ensuring the representation of indigenes from all states in federal appointments and the federal government (Kraxberger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). However, it often leads to local tensions and disagreements over who should be considered indigenous in states and LGAs (Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Kraxberger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). This indigeneity question is even more serious in the Middle Belt region that is home to many ethnic minorities who have constructed political identities based on their experiences within the Nigerian state, particularly the northern region (Egwu, 2011; Ochonu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Tensions related to the indigene/settler or non-indigene identity rooted in their fears of domination, exclusion from power and resources and respect for their culture and language (Egwu, 2011; Ochonu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Crucial to this process, however, is the colonial and post-colonial territorialisation pursued through jurisdictional partitioning.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTonwe and Eke (2016) suggest that the fragmentation of regions in Nigeria into smaller states has led to the emergence of majorities and minorities, creating identity-based conflicts such as indigene/settler conflict resulting from the overlapping boundaries of ethnic and religious identities. This has resulted in struggles over territory and land such as the Tiv-Jukun conflict, the Jos and Kaduna crisis (Adebanwi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Angerbrandt, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Harris, 2013; Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Angerbrandt (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) jurisdictional partitioning of the Nigerian federating units (states), has led to alienation as individuals who used to claim indigeneity but have now found themselves in the \"wrong\" state because of the jurisdictional partitioning (Angerbrandt, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, indigeneity has been a source of conflicts and this has been more vigorous since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 (Akov, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Maiangwa, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). Studies emphasize power dynamics between indigenes and settlers and often escalate due to ethnic tensions that shape FPC (Akov, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Bukari \u0026amp; Kuusaana, 2018; Maiangwa, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Olaniyi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Ogundairo \u0026amp; Ijimakinwa, 2021; Nwankwo \u0026amp; Okafor, 2021; Anonymous, 2024a, 2024b) and also relating to majority/minority status (Arowosegbe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). However, the interaction and mutual reinforcement of jurisdictional partitioning, indigeneity crisis and FPCs and this leads to territorial politics between sub-national states has not been explored in the literature.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStudies of geopolitics of African conflicts, especially borderlands, have framed them as interacting crises. Berg (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) argued that the conflicts in Chad and the Central African Republic that have escalated since 2005 are interconnected, forming an interacting system with ethnic groups, including nomadic populations living across the current borders, crucial in intertwining these conflicts. Belloni (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e), who cited De Waal (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e) to state that the conflict in Darfur is \"ultimately\" a fight to control productive agricultural land between pastoralists and settled farmers that has been growing over the years and connected to the five-decades-old civil war that overwhelmed Sudan. Dal Santo and van der Heide (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) call the 2012 conflict in northern Mali, which involves nomadic groups are an \u0026ldquo;escalating complexity\u0026rdquo; that spilled over from neighbouring Sahel countries inadvertently exacerbating other conflicts. These studies demonstrate that conflicts involving nomadic groups like pastoralists and sedentary farmers can be interacting with other issues (Belloni, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Berg, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Dal Santo \u0026amp; van der Heide, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Potteck et al., 2015).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurthermore, the interaction is supported by the conflict spiral model of conflicts which emphasises the interaction between the conflicting parties, particularly the cycle of actions and reactions involving retaliation and deterrence, creating a vicious circle (Motitz, 2010; Pruitt \u0026amp; Kim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). This spiral model highlights the reciprocal and escalating nature of conflict dynamics (Pruitt \u0026amp; Kim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). This model is valuable for explaining the mutual reinforcement of indigeneity crisis, FPC, boundary dispute, and territorial politics as a vicious circle. The \u0026ldquo;vicious circle\u0026rdquo; concept, suggests that insecurity impedes economic recovery and, in turn, economic stagnation reinforces conflict and criminality (Collier, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e; Menkhaus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). The \u0026ldquo;vicious circle\u0026rdquo; concept is well-established in political economy and development studies, which have been applied to explain the self-reinforcing nature of poverty in poor and affluent countries (Menkhaus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). This idea can be applied to explore the interaction of and linkages of conflicts that reinforce each other. It is a powerful approach as it provides a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted causes of conflicts and their interactions compared to linear approaches (Menkhaus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, these perspectives offer a framework to think that the FPC in the study area is as interconnected with informal border disputes between villagers, the indigeneity crisis and territorial politics reinforcing each other. Informal exclusion of specific minority groups from the border disputes between villagers when formalised into rules and institutions (Raineri \u0026amp; Strazzari, 2019) prompts counter-exclusions in other jurisdictions. This process is influenced by the fragmentation of social groups across jurisdictional territories and the majority/minority and indigene/settler conundrum resulting from partitioning (Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Thus, mutual reinforcement between FPCs and indigeneity crises can lead to counter-exclusion in other jurisdictions. The complications arising from these mutually reinforcing conflicts lead to territorial politics and disputes between sub-notational states, creating a vicious circle of interacting conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFragmentation of groups (i.e., the splitting of an ethnic group into different territories) because of jurisdictional partitioning can result in horizontal inequalities between groups and exacerbate conflicts (Nnabuihe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). These conflicts can stem from the fact that ethnic groups that have been split into different sub-national territories are still attached to their previous territory. If a segment of a group becomes a minority in a newly created territory, they may face discrimination in land access which creates tension between claims of indigenous land ownership and the control over land through state authority usually controlled by the majority group. Thus, because territoriality satisfies material and emotional needs and plays a role in maintaining control over collective and individual lives, the attempt to use state power to control access to lands where group(s) claimed to the indigenous can spark brutal conflicts. In this process, stories of the past are connected to the present to reconstruct land ownership through indigeneity and breeds conflicts and perpetuating further divisions between groups in territorial jurisdictions, shaping collective identity and shaping social interactions, exclusions and entwining with other conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3.0 Methods","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe larger study from which this paper is derived used a combination of ethnography, discourse analysis and constructivist grounded theory. The aspect discussed in this paper uses ethnographic interviews and grounded theory to analyse the interviews. The larger study adopted an ethnographic sensibility akin to Anna Tsing\u0026rsquo;s (2015) discussion of \u0026lsquo;noticing\u0026rsquo; as part of the multi-sited ethnography in \u003cem\u003eThe Mushroom at the End of the World\u003c/em\u003e. Tsing writes that \u0026ldquo;[t]o learn anything we must revitalise arts of noticing and include ethnography and natural history\u0026rdquo; (p. 37). Thus, observations and noticing ethnographies help to deeply explore the material worlds of farmers and herders and territorialisation processes. It enables better comprehension of the worlds, meanings, preferences, and behaviours of farmers, herders, and other actors linked to the FPCs vis-\u0026agrave;-vis territorialisation. The larger study conducted 93 interviews with 128 participants from diverse backgrounds, primarily farmers and herders, including village heads, traditional rulers, security agencies, NGOs, and socio-cultural groups.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDuring the interviews, participants struggled with discussing the conflicts in the context of the research objectives. However, when the researcher asked them to narrate their stories of the conflict from the past as far as they could remember, it became easy for them to discuss their experiences. This storytelling and/or memory approach is useful because as Paasi (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e) asserts, boundaries reflect power dynamics between societies and boundary can be deconstructed through narratives. They represent power flows, transforming memories into present and future realities (Paasi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e). Stories are imperative as an investigative and analytical tool as \u0026ldquo;language, narratives, dialects, and accents\u0026rdquo; can be vital spots of \u0026ldquo;geopolitical voice and agency\u0026rdquo; (Jackman et al., 2020, p. 5). They are \u0026ldquo;bordered by the structures of power in which they are articulated\u0026rdquo; (Jackman et al., 2020, p. 5). Analysing the emergence, evolution, and impact of rituals, symbols, discourses, and power practices on political decisions requires a contextually, culturally, and historically sensitive approach to boundary studies (Paasi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e). In discussing their experiences, especially on the origin of the conflict, farmers and herders often narrate stories of how the dispute started from boundary adjustment because of partitioning. Partitioning creates new boundaries, leading to a shift in previous boundaries. The memory of where previous boundaries was located can thus be a source of contestation when new boundaries are created following jurisdictional partitioning, especially where there is no physical demarcation. Thus, the study involved observations and mixed in-depth interviews (unstructured and semi-structured) that incorporated storytelling as a tool for data collection.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe study period was six months (January to July 2022). The research was conducted in Central Nigeria in Benue and Nasarawa in local government areas (LGAs) where the FPCs have been intense. These LGAs form the border of these three neighbouring states (i.e., they are the LGAs bordering the opposite state). In Benue State, the LGAs are Agatu, Gwer West, Guma and Logo are opposite the LGAs of Nasarawa, Doma, Keana and Awe in Nasarawa State, nearly respectively. The communities where the conflicts manifest and intensify are at the boundaries between the states and fall within the area called the Benue Valley or Benue Trough in Nigerian geography. The author\u0026rsquo;s University\u0026rsquo;s appropriate committee ethically approved the research. Standard ethical practices of informed consent, confidentiality, voluntary participation and withdrawal were adhered to in the study. The constructivist grounded theory research design was adopted. It incorporates constructivist epistemology into the grounded theory. The grounded theory is an approach developed through the works of Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss (Glaser \u0026amp; Strauss, 1967). It focuses on producing a theoretical explanation of issues through an inductive collection and analysis of data without a predetermined hypothesis to accept or jettison. The explanation is made through the people\u0026rsquo;s stories and accounts of the issue of concern (Glaser \u0026amp; Strauss, 1967). The difference between the grounded theory and constructivist grounded theory is that while both focus on developing theoretical concepts from data to explain a phenomenon, constructivist grounded theory adds an extra analysis. constructivist grounded theory also considers how meanings of the phenomenon are socially constructed and how they are linked to history, culture, and power relations (Charmaz, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe analysis involved coding the interviews\u0026rsquo; transcripts and notes and constantly comparing the data to seek connections and divergences from which theoretical explanation is made but ensuring that the participant\u0026rsquo;s voices and meaning are retained in the final theoretical framing (Charmaz, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). The constructivist grounded theory emphasises reflexivity, which directs researchers to reflect on their position in the study context and how they use grounded theory strategies to make claims about the results of their inquiry (Charmaz, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Through this strategy, the concepts of territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning and indigeneity emerged to be vital to explaining how territory is implicated in the FPCs in Central Nigeria. The analysis shows that these conflicts are interconnected and mutually reinforcing each other. The following section discusses how territory is conceptualised based on the findings.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"4.0 Jurisdictional partitioning and boundaries dispute: Indigeneity and FPCs","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1 Brief history of the partitioning\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eBefore the analysis, a brief historical background to the partitioning leading to the creation of Benue and Nasarawa States is provided. This history is connected to colonial territorialisation in making the Nigerian state through the agglomeration of precolonial kingdoms into a series of territorially bounded administrative units. Following British colonial control in 1900, what became the northern protectorate was partitioned into various provinces, as shown in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e (see also the supplementary file). The province of interest is the Benue Province, created in 1900 but divided into two in the same year. The idea of state creation with the Westphalian notion of fixed bounded territory in Nigeria can be traced to these earliest colonial partitioning. Within these provinces, non-Islamic chiefs in the northern protectorate sought autonomy and restoring indigenous control and cultural identity within their respective areas from 1908 rather than a distinct Middle Belt identity or creation of states (Emmanual \u0026amp; Tari, 2015; Ochonu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Further partitioning of the Benue Province was made in 1903 to create the Nasarawa Province. In 1926 the Muri and Nasarawa Provinces were merged. Since the British Colonial Residents ruled indirectly through the traditional authorities, the ethnic minorities were under the control of Hausa-Fulani aristocracy. A new Plateau Province was carved out from Bauchi Province in an attempt to give some ethnic minorities a separate province to reduced tensions between the Hausa-Fulani and the minority ethnic groups. The Richard\u0026rsquo;s Constitution of 1946 divided Nigeria into three regions: Eastern, Western, and Northern. All the provinces in the northern protectorate in 1900 were subsumed into the Northern Region Authority in 1946, bringing all the ethnic minorities back into Hausa/Fulani control.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEthnic minorities in the northern region felt marginalised by the Hausa/Fulani, leading to demands for creating the Middle Belt region since the 1940s. United Middle Belt Congress, led by late Senator Joseph S. Tarka, played a significant role in mobilising support for these movements (Ukase, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e), making it more organised than the earlier demand for indigenous autonomy (Emmanuel \u0026amp; Tari, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). The Willink Commission of 1957 recommended the creation of an autonomous region for the Middle Belt. It was rejected by the colonial administration to maintain the North\u0026rsquo;s dominance in Nigeria. After independence in 1960, the Eastern Region attempted to secede as the Biafra Republic in 1967, creating a war. At this time, the movement by the ethnic minorities in the Middle Belt to create states of their own become appreciated as it was then seen as a solution to an impending breakup of Nigeria. The attempt to prevent Nigeria\u0026rsquo;s breakup and also address the demand for states of their own by minorities in Middle Belt led to the creation of Benue-Plateau State in 1967 and later their separation into Benue and Plateau States in 1976 and separation of Nasarawa from Plateau in 1996 (Ukase, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTimeline of jurisdictional partitioning of the vital area of Northern Nigeria\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePeriod\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTerritorial jurisdiction\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNew territorial jurisdiction\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRemark\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJan 1900\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNorthern Protectorate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBritish colonial administration controlled a restricted territory of Kabba and Ilorin, \u0026ldquo;together with a strip on either side of the river Niger and Benue\u0026rdquo; (Kirk Greene, Mss Afr. S. 1452). The remaining parts of the Northern Protectorate were outside British control.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"4\" rowspan=\"5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1900\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"4\" rowspan=\"5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNorthern Protectorate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMiddle Niger Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"4\" rowspan=\"5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNorthern Protectorate was partitioned into five provinces: Middle Niger, Benue, and Kano, which were designated as \u0026ldquo;civil provinces\u0026rdquo;, and Borgu and Borno as military \u0026ldquo;provinces\u0026rdquo; (Colonial Office Record 586/1, 1900).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eKano Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBorgu Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBorno Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eAugust 1900\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUpper Benue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province was divided into Upper Benue Province and Lower Benue Province.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLower Benue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1903\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBassa\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province was divided into Bassa, Muri and Nasarawa.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMuri\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNasarawa\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1926\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMuri\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMuri and Nasarawa Provinces merged to create Benue Province, with the northeastern section of Muri cut to join Adamawa Province and some northern parts of Nasarawa carved out to join the new Plateau Province. There was internal partitioning within the provinces into divisions, such as the Idoma Division, and districts, such as Wukari and Katsina-Ala.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNasarawa\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIt was created from southwestern Bauchi Province, southeastern Zaria Province and northeastern Nasarawa Province.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1946\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNorthern Region\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau Province and Plateau Province subsumed into the Northern Region.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1967\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue-Plateau State\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe northwestern section of Benue Province cut to join the large North Western State. The rest of Benue Province and Plateau Province merged to form the Benue-Plateau State.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau Province\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1976\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue-Plateau State\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue State\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenue-Plateau State was divided to create separate Benue and Plateau State.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau State\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1996\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau State\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePlateau State is divided into Plateau and Nasarawa State.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNasarawa\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, the study area has experienced significant boundary-making during the colonial and post-colonial periods, creating new territorial identities and exacerbating tensions related to indigeneity. The former Benue and Plateau Provinces of 1926 are crucial in understanding FPCs in the Benue-Nasarawa border. The main ethnic groups involved in these conflicts are the Tiv, Hausa, Idoma, Jukun, and Fulani, with smaller groups present. Specific LGAs in Benue State (Guma, Logo, Agatu, Gwer West, Makurdi) and Nasarawa State (Awe, Keana, Doma) play a significant role in FPCs at the Benue-Nasarawa border. The Tiv are significant in most Benue LGAs, while the Fulani and Hausa dominate Awe, and the Alago dominate Keana and Doma. The next section discusses how the boundary dispute among villagers from these ethnic groups developed from jurisdictional partitioning.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2 Informal boundary disputes between villagers\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe formalisation of indigeneity in Nigeria lacks clarity in constitutional provisions. While the constitution defines citizenship based on birth or descent from indigenous communities, it does not specify the indigenes or non-indigenes within each state or local government area. However, indigeneity has been institutionalised through the issuance of indigeneity certificates by local government authorities, which may provide certain benefits (Kraxberger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e) but do not guarantee land access. Given that there are no physical markers indicating the boundary between Benue State and Nasarawa State because there was no proper demarcation, claims of indigeneity based on the territorial extent of the states became tense in Guma, Makurdi, Gwer West and Agatu LGAs of Benue State and Doma, Awe and Keana LGAs of Nasarawa State. These LGAs form the Benue-Nasarawa borderlands (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). The indigeneity tensions that the boundary dispute generated get translated into FPCs between the Tiv and Fulani herders and between Alago farmers and Fulani herders who are struggling with one another to have better access to land. This tension also manifests when the majority groups marginalise the minorities in jurisdictions where, because of stronger voting strength, the majority can win more elective positions (Interview A26).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, the FPCs since 1999 can be argued to have entangled with post-transitional issues in Nigeria because of the question of indigeneity with territorial jurisdictions. The post-transitional issues border on political authority, the autonomy of territorial jurisdictions, and citizens\u0026rsquo; rights within the jurisdictions within a democratic framework (Akov, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Olayode, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). These concerns stem from the inadequacy of the constitution in addressing these critical issues (Akov, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Olayode, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). The 1999 constitution failed to properly address these \u0026ldquo;foundational issues\u0026rdquo; of political authority, the autonomy of territorial jurisdictions, and who are citizens\u0026rsquo; of territorial jurisdictions and their rights leading to dissatisfaction and violence among the people (Akov, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Olayode, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Against this backdrop, farmers and herders use selective memories and historical narratives to claim indigeneity. This practice of farmers and herders of using selective memories and historical narratives is akin to Huening\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) conclusion that selective memories, claims, and mythical-historical visions of the past shape identity formation and tensions from conflicting identities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn Agatu, for instance, riverine communities straddling the bank of the Benue River on the Agatu-Doma border have attempted to evict the minority Fulani herders using indigeneity claims. The communities claim the Fulani do not originate from Agatu in Benue State. Farmers, mostly in Benue State, alleged that the herders maintain that the Nasarawa Emirate\u0026rsquo;s influence extended to the bank of the Benue River and across and that it is recognised in the current Nasarawa State\u0026rsquo;s territory (e.g., Interview A44, A45, A50). The Fulani-led jihad peaked in the Benue Valley after establishing the Lafia and Nasarawa Emirates (Ochonu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). The collaboration between the emirs of Lafıa and Nasarawa in the 1880s led to attacks on the Tiv people, creating a new trade route along the Benue River (Sciortino, 2010). It resulted in the influx of Hausa and Fulani immigrants, leading to a shift in the population from the first settlers (indigenous non-Muslims Idoma, Eggon, Mada, Aro, Etulo) to a mix of Hausa/Fulani Muslims and indigenous groups (Sciortino, 2010; Wall, 1988). Thus, both groups have histories of the area but are selective when claiming indigeneity. After the separation of Benue-Plateau State, the tension between indigenous groups and the Hausa/Fulani heightened as this Tiv farmer noted:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSince I was born, I understand that during British rule, they demarcated the land; this place was in Benue province, which they used to call Benue Province. So, we felt that we had no problem with land until the creation of states. When states were created, we started having a land problem here (Interview A12).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimilarly, some Idoma villages that claim their land is on Benue side on the border and attempt to evict the Fulani herders:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis my island; the Fulani live there; their grand-grandfather lived there; after the grandfather died, another grandfather came, their father died, and their son is already here with us. Right from the beginning, they are here with us. You know, where they have lived for more than 20 years, they make that place their place because they cannot go anywhere again. We are now driving them to go; they say no, this is their house, they cannot go anywhere, and we cannot drive them. When we say we force them to go, we cause another problem for ourselves again (Interview A50 [Idoma Chief in Agatu]).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe herders claim that they reside in Nasarawa State, not Benue. As such, they argued that the Idoma who want to evict them do not have the \u003cem\u003elocus standi\u003c/em\u003e to do that since they are not indigenes of Nasarawa. This kind of indigeneity politics plays out regularly regarding access to land between a supposed non-indigenous and indigenous group who can also be minority and majority, respectively, in these border areas. The emergence of the FPC in this Benue-Nasarawa border is through the interaction between this boundary dispute and indigeneity, which are products of jurisdictional partitioning.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.3 Interaction between the informal border dispute, indigeneity and FPCs\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs already noted, the informal border dispute and indigeneity tensions are interacting. As they were heightened, they spill over into FPCs and are particularly fierce between the Tiv farmers and Fulani herders. After the partitioning of Benue-Plateau State, some Tiv communities in Guma and Logo LGAs of Benue State started having the perception that Benue State is not a Fulani state: \u0026ldquo;Like we in Benue State, we stay in our State doing our farm. So, Fulani kuma [too] have their State, and they should have to go and stay in their State and do animal farm there\u0026rdquo; (Interview A2, Tiv farmer in Iorza area, Logo LGA). The conflict between the Tiv and Fulani pastoralists is brutal on the Awe-Guma border. The first escalation occurred in the 1980s. In 1985, about a decade after the separation of Benue and Plateau States, the Tiv who had lived with the Fulani herders already saw the herders as not indigenous to Benue State since the Tiv considered the area under Benue State. Disputes over crop damage would cause the Tiv farmers to prevent the herders from grazing on the lands across River Bakebo, which they thought was the boundary between Awe LGA of Nasarawa State and Guma LGA of Benue State. The herders dispute the boundary and resist their exclusion by the Tiv, which leads to their first violent battle. This tension stemmed from the adjustment of the boundary following the separation of Benue-Plateau State into Benue State and Plateau State.\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYou know we are in the boundary of Nasarawa and Benue States, so these Fulani people sit in Nasarawa State and come and destroy our property in Benue State. Then they say where Iyode is residing is their land. They can do anything they want; it is because of boundary adjustment that these crises started. There is no pure demarcation, but we know the demarcation because our demarcation is River Bakebo, which we call Zango near Awe. If you cross that river, you enter Awe. That is our demarcation, but they refuse (Interview A19, Tiv chief in Guma).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndigeneity invokes in the villages the notion of the difference between those in Nasarawa and Benue. Many farmers in these border areas think that herders from various parts of Nasarawa State and other northern states are not indigenes of Benue State. Notably, the farming villagers consider the pastoralists in Benue State to have no land rights as the farmers who claim to be indigenes, which has led to various kinds of marginalisation. Thus, this represents how jurisdictional partitioning produced new territorial identities that villagers identified with, reinforcing indigeneity claims used to exclude the pastoralists. Conflict broke out following this disagreement over the boundary between Guma LGA and Awe LGA in which the herders killed the Tiv chief, the District Head of Nzorov named Yawude, in 1989. The conflict started when the pastoralists refused to pay compensation for crop damage because they considered that the Tiv in Iyode village were on their land, which they argued was in Nasarawa State at that time Plateau State:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIf they destroy our farm, they will not even pay because they claim it is their land; it is their power. Anything they want, they will do. Our former district head, Yawude, told them we should sit amicably to change our behaviours. Even the Tiv people, it is not good if they farm and touch Fulani cattle; if the Fulani cattle touch our farm, it is not good. From there, they [Fulani herders] are angry. They planned and brought the fight and killed him in 1989 (Interview A19, Tiv chief).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe leader of the herders in Awe also mentioned this event when narrating the stories of the development of the FPC in the Benue Valley. He mentioned the death of Yawude in particular: \u0026ldquo;There is one crisis, during which Yawude was killed. There is somebody called Yawude, this is one of the traditional rulers called Yawude in Guma local government\u0026rdquo; (Interview B26(b)). The killing of Yawude angered the Tiv farmers in this area, leading to the fight between Tiv, Hausa and Fulani in Gbajimba Town of Guma LGA.\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe farmers and the herdsmen this crisis started in the 1989. The crisis started for the reason that em farmers and herdsmen, herdsmen have their cows and farmers has their own farm. So beside this, herdsmen are destroying farmers\u0026rsquo; crops. So, the Yawude tried to stop them, they killed him. As a result of the farmers eh, they were very-very annoyed with herdsmen and tried to make them that they should stop destroying their farms and farms\u0026rsquo; crop. Unfortunate, the herdsmen did not stop. So, that is why the annoyance come between the two parties (Interview A19, Tiv chief).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMany pastoralists fled to Daudu and Yelwata in the same Guma LGA. Following the death of Yawude, the Tiv farmers have always suspected the Fulani herders as causing other various havocs such as killing, raping and robbery of traders crossing the border to sell farm harvests in Awe market (Interview A20, Tiv farmer). Subsequently, the Tiv farmer began to see herders\u0026rsquo; movement from Nasarawa or Taraba into Benue State as an intrusion which must be stopped. It was an informal enforcement of the border by the Tiv villagers. The farmers also see Awe as herders\u0026rsquo; gateway into Benue State, which must be stopped, whereas it was not seen as such when the states were together as Benue-Plateau State:\u003cdiv class=\"BlockQuote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe issue is that their boundary, you know, those people [herders] when they come, they base in Nasarawa State, and we are sharing boundary. So, it is easier for them to enter our land because if you go to some other places to enter, it is not easy. After all, if we hear they are coming, we block them, but here it is just crossing. Just a second, they jump onto our land (Interview A21, Tiv farmer and Commander of Volunteer Guard in Guma LGA in Benue State).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndeed, as Table\u0026nbsp;2 (supplementary file) and Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e show the LGAs with the highest incidence of conflict are border LGAs. In Benue State, 31% of the conflict occurred in Guma, 21.1% in Logo, 10.2% in Gwer West and 7.75% in Agatu representing approximately 70%. These are LGAs sharing boundaries with Nasarawa State. Similarly, in Nasarawa State nearly 70% of the conflict occurred LGAs bordering Benue State; 27.08% in Keana, 16.67% in Doma, 14.58% in Obi and 10.42% in Awe. Plessis (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e, p. 347) argues that border enforcement (albeit by the state) perpetuates \u0026ldquo;violence towards nomadic forms of life\u0026rdquo; S\u0026aacute;mi reindeer herder because it striates the pastoralists\u0026rsquo; smooth space\u0026ndash;having no delimited boundary. It perpetuates violence towards the herders because the \u0026ldquo;closure of the Norwegian-Finnish border in 1852, and the closure of the Finnish-Swedish border in 1889, cut off migration routes that had shaped S\u0026aacute;mi life for two centuries\u0026rdquo; (Lehtola 2002 cited in Plessis \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e, p. 352). Similarly, Galaty (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e) argues that boundary-making stimulates contestation and can exacerbate conflict among pastoralists who resist being confined by territorial fences.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEfforts to stop the herders from grazing in the area and passage (i.e., informal border enforcement by Tiv villagers) thus engendered further conflicts between the Tiv farmers and pastoralists. The tensions remained even after the creation of the Nasarawa State in 1996 and gradually grew as claims of indigenous belonging and exclusion heightened (Interview B26 (b), Fulani herder). They became brutal in the last decade as the new territorial identities produced by the new states concretised, confirming Agnew\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) argument that territorial identities change with the spatial delineation of boundaries.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5.0 The vicious cycle of farmer-herder-indigeneity conflicts and formal boundary dispute intensification","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003e5.1\u0026nbsp;Farmer-herder conflict reinforcing indigeneity crisis.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn the previous section, I noted that the FPC interconnects with informal border disputes and indigeneity crises, creating a web of crises. In this section, the “vicious circle” concept, previously mentioned in the theoretical section, helps to show that not only does indigeneity tension associated with the informal border dispute result in FPCs, but the FPC further reinforces the indigeneity conflict. This interaction further led to the state governments joining the boundary dispute formally. To illustrate how the FPC reinforced the indigeneity crisis, let us look at Gbajimba, the headquarters of Guma LGA. The FPC has led to severe tensions between the Tiv majority and minority groups, such as Jukun, Fulani, and Hausa, regarding Gbajimba ownership. Since 2013, the FPC has led Fulani herders to attack and displace Tiv interior villages near Iyode and those close to the Benue River near Gbajimba town.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConsequently, many displaced villagers seek shelter in the internally displaced person’s camp. In one of the attacks, the herders razed the governor’s house in May 2016 (Ozogwu, 2016), potentially provoking a response. The Benue State governor accused former president Muhammadu Buhari of favouring his kinsmen, the pastoralists, by refusing to take action against their attacks on Benue communities, especially the Tiv. As the conflicts escalated between 2015 and 2016, the governor of Benue State, who is from Gbajimba, decided to enforce a ban on open grazing through the “Benue State Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Law, 2017.” This law aimed to restrict livestock movement and open grazing practices formally. However, Fulani pastoralists argued that the law targeted them:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe government’s only target is Fulani cattle, which greatly worries us because we do not have land. They even described us as non-indigenes, but those who are owners of the land do not practice ranching; their cattle do open grazing. So, there is a question mark there (Risku Mohammed, cited in Charles, 2022, Benue State Chairman of the MACBAN).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThus, the law is tool for territoriality, which a deliberate effort by the Benue State Government to influence, control, or affect the pastoralists’ lives and also their relationship with farmers in the Benue State territory. As the law came into force in November 2017, mobilised by groups like Miyeti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), the herders attacked Tiv villages from the western flank near Agatu eastward toward Wukari in Taraba State. The Tiv retaliated by attacking and displacing the Fulani and Hausa communities in Gbajimba. Tiv villages in Guma and neighbouring Logo LGA, plus those in Nasarawa and Taraba borders with Benue State, suffered greatly from the herders’ attacks:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe anti-grazing law makes us all [herder] out of Benue State. For us to live in Benue now, there is no way. Why? Because of the anti-grazing law, which chased us outside of the state. That is why the thing [conflict] became worse than what happened some years ago. (Interview B26(b), Fulani herder in Keana, Nasarawa State, interpreted from Hausa).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Fulani pastoralists interviewed all mentioned that the law escalated their conflict with Tiv farmers as the Tiv retaliated by evicting the Fulani from towns such as Gbajimba, Yelwata, and Dausu, and the Hausa communities fled. In Gbajimba, as the conflicts subsided in 2021, the Hausa community was allowed to return. Given this condition, the Jukun-led minority “indigenous” groups in Gbajimba began to challenge the authenticity of the Tiv people’s claim of ownership of the area. The claim and counter-claim of who are indigenes and non-indigence between the Tiv, Jukun and Hausa in Guma have become intense and the crisis that it generates can best be illustrated with the case of Gbajimba. As narrated, Gbajimba, known as “ba ji ba,” was renamed for easier pronunciation by the Tiv. According to oral history, Jukun fishers lived on river sandbanks, moving to higher ground during floods. Eventually, they settled there alongside a Hausa hunter. Due to the language barrier, the hunter often responds to the Tiv’s greetings by saying “ba ji ba”, which is “I do not understand” in the Hausa language.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSubsequently, Tiv started referring to the meeting place as “gba jim-ba”. The origins of the Tiv people in Nzorov, the core of Gbajimba, remain unknown, but the Tiv, Hausa, and Jukun communities claim the area (Interview A27). The Hausa in the area proclaim their belonging in Gbajimba by emphasising that they are the descendants of the hunter whose words were used. The Tiv claim they are the original indigenes, having named the place “Gbajimba”, and the Jukun emphasise that they were already fishing in the area before the hunter and Tiv arrived. Regardless, the Tiv have dominated the area and control most institutions of power such that the minority Jukun and Hausa cannot mount an upset against the Tiv hegemony, especially in this democratic dispensation. Thus, they have pitched tents with the Fulani pastoralists, heightening the indigeneity conflict there.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003e5.2\u0026nbsp;Formalisation of informal border enforcement and escalation of the indigeneity crisis\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRaineri and Strazzari (2019, p. 545) argue that formal “rules and institutions” result from “informal habits” and everyday interactions. It is also the case that the informal border enforcement against pastoralists practised by the Tiv in the area, although without success for the last three decades, has been incorporated into formal practice through the anti-open grazing law. The enactment of the anti-grazing law generated heated indigeneity tensions between the Tiv and ethnic groups sympathetic to the Fulani pastoralists across the Nasarawa side of the borderland, where there is a substantial population of Tiv. In Awe LGA of Nasarawa State, the Hausa, who support Fulani pastoralists, are the majority, unlike in Guma LGA, where the Tiv are the majority.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe division of the Benue-Plateau state into Benue and Plateau came with boundary adjustment. Previously, Guma, Keana, Awe, and the current Makurdi LGA were part of a larger Makurdi LGA within former Benue-Plateau State. The portioning of the larger Makurdi LGA into the current Keana, Awe, new Makurdi, Doma, Gwer West and Guma LGAs made Tiv a majority in Guma but a minority in Keana and Awe. This majority/minority status stems from the concentration of the Tiv in areas that fall under the Guma LGA more than Keana and Awe. This situation portends potentials for the mistreatment of Tiv farmers by the Hausa and Alago communities in Awe and Keana, who supported the Fulani pastoralists. The tension about who are the indigenes or non-indigenes among these groups in these LGAs is not new. However, enacting the anti-grazing law in Benue State heightened the tensions and fuelled claims of indigeneity to marginalise the Tiv farmers in the Nasarawa State. This informs the self-reinforcing nature of interconnected issues and implies that if border dispute interconnects with indigeneity crisis and FPCs, they can reinforce each other, creating a vicious circle of crises.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhile the Tiv have used the institution of the state (legislation) to enforce their “border” against open grazing, the Fulani pastoralists have allied with neighbouring groups in Nasarawa State, such as Alago, Jukun, Hausa, Beri-Beri and Eggon, to evict the Tiv through indigeneity claims. Most of these groups have had tensions with the Tiv over land tenure, and their alliance with the pastoralists is thus to pursue their interests. Where it is impossible to evict the Tiv farmers in Nasarawa using the authority of the traditional rulers based on indigeneity claims, the pastoralists have used armed attacks. The Hausa allege that the Tiv are not indigenous to Awe to justify their confiscation of Tiv lands in response to the pastoralists’ exclusion in Benue State. The Hausa have reportedly confiscated Tiv lands and given them to Fulani pastoralists, including areas where Tiv villages had established schools and amenities: “They have collected Tiv land and give it to Fulani…there was a school here, this building here, but they came and pursue us they carry it and give Fulani people” (Interview B24, female Tiv farmer).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSo, when I was growing up, I could not see like that, but this time around, these Hausa are collecting our land, saying that we are visitors…So, other places they give Fulani to stay on for our farm. As I am talking to you here, if you go there, you will see them sitting there for our places (Interview B30, Tiv farmer and primary healthcare support worker in Awe).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLike the case of Awe, some Tiv lands in Keana have been allocated to pastoralists, leading to Tiv farmers versus Fulani herders’ conflict. First, the herders attacked the Tiv farmers and displaced them before settling on the land. By the time the Tiv would return from IDP camps, the pastoralists would claim the land was sold to them by the traditional authorities. Although the traditional authorities would deny it, there has not been an effort to ask the pastoralists to vacate the land. Efforts to make the pastoralists vacate by the Tiv farmers then escalate the violence:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSo, when we came back, they almost inherited our lands. When we ask them, they will tell us that they bought it from the owners of the land, telling us that we are strangers here. They bought the land from the owner, like some Royal Highnesses, maybe the Osechi of Aloshi and the Osana of Keana. However, when we meet them [traditional rulers], they will tell us there is nothing like that, and you know they have the powers. As you say, no name is mentioned; I want to clarify that they have the powers now (Interview B22, Tiv farmer in Aloshi, Keana).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003e5.3\u0026nbsp;Indigeneity crisis, FPC and territorial politics \u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe indigeneity claims alone is insufficient for concrete exclusion or eviction of groups without violence. The Tiv minority in Awe lacks proper representation in the local government, resulting in marginalisation similar to the Hausa-Fulani in Benue State. Although the Tiv challenged this in court and won, the Awe Traditional Council has appealed the case, but a judgement has yet to be made. In Keana, especially in the Giza district, the story is similar. The status of these groups as a minority is a consequence of partitioning. Thus, jurisdictional partitioning shapes power dynamics in the Benue Valley and power influences the practice of indigeneity but can be mutually reinforcing, intensifying the indigeneity crisis in this region. Therefore, it is not just the case that jurisdictional partitioning of territory bred various forms of exclusion because of horizontal inequalities (Nnabuihe, 2019). Horizontal inequalities (i.e., the minority/majority status because of partitioning) interact with claims of indigeneity and the exclusion associated with the claims. This interaction can fuel violent inter-group hostilities in neighbouring territorial jurisdictions where the majority group who maltreated the minority are minority resulting from attempts to retaliate the maltreatment of the minority group in the other jurisdiction.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFarmers and herders in the study area deeply understand how the creation of states has affected them, with this knowledge passed down across generations. The division of Benue and Plateau States has caused tensions between Tiv farmers and other groups especially the Fulani herders. In Nasarawa State, the Tiv are seen as non-indigenous by Alago and Hausa communities. The Tiv farmers assert their belonging to the land based on ancestral graves and a long history: “If you walk round, you will see the grave of our grandparents. We were here for donkey years, but now they say it is not our place; we should find our places” (Interview B24, female Tiv farmer). They do not feel the need to return to Benue State, emphasising that Nasarawa State does not belong to any particular ethnic group. The conflict between Tiv farmers and Fulani herders in the Nasarawa frontier has exacerbated issues related to indigeneity and led to the displacement of Tiv villages.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAnderson’s (1983) concept of imagined communities indicates that individuals within a nation, regardless of size, develop a sense of shared identity through imagination rather than personal interactions. Thus, the concept helps explain how cultural and historical affinities influence the perceptions of different groups in the region. The historical partitioning of the Benue Province has reinforced the of perception groups as outsiders based on indigeneity claims associated with the territorial jurisdictions. This division of Benue-Plateau State led to the Tiv becoming the majority ethnic group in Benue State, further reinforcing the notion that the Tiv belonged to Benue State rather than Nasarawa. Those not directly involved in the FPCs know the tensions between Tiv farmers and other ethnic groups in Nasarawa State. In Awe, a non-Tiv and non-Fulani restaurant owner reported that the Awe Traditional Council, led by the Hausa, supported the Fulani pastoralists against the Tiv farmers, claiming that the Tiv do not belong in Nasarawa State:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFulani are the majority in Nasarawa State, and they claim Nasarawa State as their state. They said that Nasarawa State belongs to them, and you know Tiv people, too, are here in Nasarawa State. So, most of the time, they used to do something as they wanted because the state belonged to them, and when we began to complain, problems would start. They are doing it because Nasarawa State is their state. They claim it is their state and that “we are strangers”. So, whatever they do, we should not complain. If we do, the problem will start; that is why there are always crises (Interview B24, restaurant owner).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe interviewee uses “Fulani” to mean Hausa/Fulani and those backing the pastoralists such as Gwandara and, in some cases, Alago, e.g., in Keana because the Fulani are minority in Nasarawa State. So, the Fulani cannot claim Nasarawa State but because of their close ties with the Hausa, many people would conflate the Fulani and Hausa as one group. The enforcement of the anti-grazing law in Benue State has contributed to heightened tensions and conflicts between farmers and herders, particularly along the Benue-Nasarawa borderlands. The lack of a clear boundary exacerbates this situation, as clashes occur when Benue State Livestock Guards enforcing the anti-grazing law arrest Fulani pastoralists’ cattle in areas the herders believe belong to Nasarawa State. This boundary dispute has been brought into the national political arena, with politicians from both states debating the extent of their boundaries at the National Assembly (Odekina, 2020), thus intertwining local indigeneity conflicts with national politics. The National Boundary Commission has been tasked with demarcating the boundary between Benue and Nasarawa State, and the survey was completed in 2022. However, the results of this demarcation exercise have yet to be communicated.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOverall, this paper demonstrates how territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning can fuel informal boundary disputes and related indigeneity tensions. This indigeneity tension led to FPCs resulting in informal border enforcement at the local level. The FPC and the border dispute in turn, reinforce the indigeneity crisis. The reinforced indigeneity crisis further intensified the FPC which led to formal boundary disputes and territorial politics between Benue and Nasarawa States. Thus, conflicts between farmers and pastoralists in Benue Valley, including other crises, are an interconnected web of crises reinforcing each other, creating a vicious circle of conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"6.0 Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe paper has shown that the partitioning of Benue-Plateau State into separate Benue and Plateau State in 1970 generated a border dispute between villagers and the current Benue-Nasarawa border after Nasarawa State was created from Plateau in 1996. The dispute developed from farming villagers attempting to enforce borders (through arresting cattle trespassing into areas they considered Benue State) against pastoralists perceived as in direct competition for access to and control over resources. This everyday border dispute heightens indigeneity tensions, leading to FPCs. This finding supports the claims that territorial fragmentation heightens indigeneity and reinforces ethno-religious conflicts in the Middle Belt (Harnischfeger, 2004; Adebanwi, 2009; Angerbrandt, 2011, 2015; Kraxberger, 2005). Also, it supports some studies suggesting that indigeneity shapes land disputes and FPCs in various parts of Nigeria (Arowosegbe, 2019; NOAK, 2021, 2022).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Benue State government intervened by formalising the villagers’ everyday border practices into formal institutions by enacting an anti-open grazing law that indirectly excluded the pastoralists from grazing. This formalisation of the informal border practice heightened the indigeneity tensions, leading to exclusion and counter-exclusion between farmers and herders in jurisdictions where each group and their backers have majority populations or better political representation. Thus, partitioning increases horizontal inequalities and breeds exclusion (Nnabuihe, 2019). However, when horizontal inequalities interact with indigeneity and exclusion, it can fuel violent inter-group hostilities in neighbouring territorial jurisdictions having similar social groups but in unequal numerical proportions. Thus, exclusion from land and resources emanating from territorial fragmentation and identity at the local level does not only develop through the interaction of formal and informal institutions (Lund, 2008; Sikor \u0026amp; Lund, 2009) or hybrid political orders (Boege et al., 2008), informal practices of pastoralists exclusion can be transformed into formal institutions (Raineri \u0026amp; Strazzari, 2019) triggering violent responses.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe complications from this mutual reinforcement of indigeneity conflict and FPC over the formalisation of everyday border practice in a jurisdiction led to a formal dispute between the Benue and Nasarawa States in an attempt to demarcate their boundary. This supports the claim that concurrent disputes over sub-national boundaries, political identities, and the exercise of power trigger territorial politics (Sjögren, 2015).\u0026nbsp;Thus,\u0026nbsp;the relationship between indigeneity and conflicts is not linear as implied in earlier studies (e.g., Arowosegbe, 2019;\u0026nbsp;Adebanwi, 2009; Angerbrandt, 2011, 2015; Harnischfeger, 2004; Kraxberger, 2005;\u0026nbsp;NOAK, 2021, 2022).\u0026nbsp;Fragmentation does not just reproduce or transform social divisions, such as indigeneity, that influence conflicts. Conflicts (e.g., border disputes) produced through partitioning can reinforce indigeneity, leading to other conflicts like FPCs, reinforcing indigeneity conflicts again, and even influencing formal disputes between sub-national states. Thus, like geopolitics studies on conflicts in African borderlands\u0026nbsp;(e.g., Berg, 2008; Carmody, 2009; Dal Santo \u0026amp; van der Heide, 2018), the crisis in the Benue Valley borderlands is an interconnected web of crises that reinforce each other creating a vicious circle (Collier, 2003; Menkhaus, 2004) of crises.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eTherefore, the paper argues that jurisdictional partitioning can lead to border conflicts reinforcing indigeneity, producing FPCs. The interaction between indigeneity and FPCs can be mutually reinforcing, leading to a vicious cycle of violence, suggesting that armed mobilisation and territorial politics are contingent and reciprocal. The formalisation of the informal practices engendered by partitioning can reinforce the indigeneity crisis, escalating farmer-herder tensions that led to exclusion, counter-exclusion, and violent confrontations between the groups in neighbouring jurisdictions. The mutual reinforcement of indigeneity and FPCs eventually led to formal territorial politics and state disputes. Thus, boundary disputes, indigeneity crisis and FPCs in Benue Valley are highly connected and mutually reinforcing each other in diverse ways. These processes show how the FPC\u0026nbsp;has been shaped and shapes everyday and formal geopolitical practices.\u0026nbsp;Policies and conflict management mechanisms should consider the interactions between these conflicts, especially how attempts at solving or intervening in one can reinforce others.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSub-national jurisdictional partitioning as a way of homogenising national territory and resolving conflicts can be fruitful. It has significantly reduced the propensity of any part of Nigeria from seceding and also to some extent reduced the regional ethnic minority movement as seen in the agitation for a Middle Belt Region between the 1940s and 1960s. However, it has created ground-level tensions as the struggles shifted to minorities versus majority within states. Thus, the partitioning only significantly paralysed the regional coalition that is strong enough to confront the national state, only for it to resurface at the sub-national level with indigeneity as its fuel. However, the story does not end there. This indigeneity tension now interacts with the FPC because the farmers and herders belong to different ethnicities whose majority populations are associated with specific states. In contrast, they are also in other states because of the partitioning that divided members of the same ethnic groups into different states unequally, as seen in Benue and Nasarawa States. The interaction of these crises has led to formal border disputes between Benue and Nasarawa States. Thus, while these findings, to some extent, support the idea of partition as a majority/minority conflict resolution strategy, it does not solve the problem entirely. It only limited the possibility of the minority groups forming a coalition to confront the federal state. Thus, partitioning can breed further ground-level tensions in highly ethnic heterogeneous areas like the Benue Valley, which can interact with other issues like the FPCs, further creating tensions between the sub-national states.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAdebanwi, W. (2009). Terror, territoriality and the struggle for indigeneity and citizenship in northern Nigeria. \u003cem\u003eCitizenship Studies\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e13\u003c/em\u003e(4), 349\u0026ndash;363.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAgnew J (2003) Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics. New York: Routledge.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAgnew, J. (2008). 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Territorial partitions, the production of mining territory and the building of a post-neoliberal and plurinational state in Ecuador. \u003cem\u003ePolitical Geography\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e62\u003c/em\u003e, 126-136.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Supplementary file","content":"\u003cp\u003eSupplementary file is not available with this version\u003c/p\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[{"identity":"0583c7ab-4eab-4763-b03a-6d203b34f5af","identifier":"10.13039/501100000867","name":"Commonwealth Scholarship Commission","awardNumber":"NGCA-2020-76","order_by":0}],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"University of Leicester","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Border dispute, Territoriality, territorial homogenisation, partitioning, indigenous identity, farmer-herder conflicts","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6968058/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6968058/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe paper explores the interaction between village-based border disputes resulting from territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning, indigeneity crisis and farmer-pastoralist conflicts (FPCs) in the Benue-Nasarawa border and how this leads to territorial politics between Benue and Nasarawa States in Nigeria. The primary study from which this paper is derived is ethnographic fieldwork to explore the FPCs in the Benue Valley region. Emerging from the study, among other issues, is how jurisdictional partitioning resulted in an informal boundary dispute between villagers on the Benue-Nasarawa border, which interacts with the indigeneity crisis and FPCs. There is a reciprocal interaction between the informal boundary dispute, indigeneity crisis and FPCs. Formalising informal border enforcement by villagers resulting from the interaction of partitioning and indigeneity tensions reinforces the indigeneity crises, escalating tensions between farmers and herders. The results are exclusion, counter-exclusion, and violent confrontations in neighbouring jurisdictions with similar social groups but unequal proportions, leading to a formal boundary dispute between Benue and Nasarawa States. This indicates how everyday geopolitical practices lead to formal geopolitics. Thus, the FPCs in the Benue Valley, including these other crises, are an interconnected web of crises reinforcing each other, creating a vicious circle of conflicts. The article contributes to the literature by showing how the FPCs are shaped by territorial partitioning in relation to identity and also shapes territorial politics between sub-national states. This perspective has not been investigated. It argues that while partitioning can reduce regional tensions that could threaten the stability of a state, it can breed further ground-level tensions in highly ethnic heterogeneous areas like the Benue-Nasarawa border, which can interact with other issues like the FPCs, further creating tensions between the sub-national states.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Territorial homogenisation through jurisdictional partitioning: Interaction between indigeneity crisis, farmer-pastoralist conflicts and Benue-Nasarawa border dispute","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-06-27 17:03:31","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6968058/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"d4c4a936-8f98-43ef-85fd-9e5c72836b73","owner":[],"postedDate":"June 27th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":50535264,"name":"Other Political Science"},{"id":50535265,"name":"Behavioral Geography"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-06-27T17:03:31+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-06-27 17:03:31","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6968058","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6968058","identity":"rs-6968058","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}