Evolutionary Game Analysis on Cooperative Behavior of Major Projects’ Technology Innovation Subjects under General Contracting Mode

Under the development mode of deep blending of emerging technologies, major projects are important for enhancing China's comprehensive national strength and independent innovation capability. Based on the social benefits of major projects, and considering the influence of reputation factors, an evolutionary game model composed of a general contractor and subcontractor of major projects is established. This paper studies the influence of various factors including the income distribution coefficient of collaborative innovation, and MATLAB simulation software is analyzed the influence of factors on an evolutionary path. The results show that a reasonable income distribution coefficient can promote the game behavior of both parties to the direction of active collaborative innovation; The reduction of innovation cost and the improvement of spillover technology absorption capacity can make innovation subjects tend to choose active collaborative innovation strategies. In addition, reputation loss above a specific threshold can effectively inhibit free-riding behavior and encourage innovation subjects to choose active collaborative innovation strategies. The research results provide reference for promoting major projects' technology innovation.