A bad apple may not spoil the barrel: Mechanisms of trust formation under misinformation exposure

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Abstract

Under widespread misinformation, deciding which news sources to trust is consequential. Here, we examine the mechanisms people use to form trust in news sources. Across 8 experiments, participants continuously evaluated a sequence of news posts that included one piece of misinformation. Then, they indicated trust in the source. For neutral content (Experiments 1-5), trust tracked the average reliability of the reports, whether the source was a news channel (Experiments 1-3) or an individual (Experiments 4-5). Despite clear detection of misinformation, there was no evidence for a “one strike and you’re out” mechanism. In contrast, for politically charged content (Experiments 6-7), Republicans continued to rely on averaging, whereas Democrats shifted to a mechanism that heavily penalized misinformation, differences that we discuss further. These findings suggest that, for neutral content, trust judgments follow equal-weighting strategy, but political priors can shape not only belief in specific reports, but the process of trusting news.

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last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00