Does Trust Matters in Lending Decision? A Systematic Literature Review and Research Agendas for Future Studies

Does Trust Matters in Lending Decision? 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A Systematic Literature Review and Research Agendas for Future Studies Nieldya Nofandrilla, Ibrahim Fatwa Wijaya, Bambang Setiaji This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-4602286/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 02 Dec, 2024 Read the published version in International Review of Economics → Version 1 posted 7 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The carte di commenda and the business activities in the Islamic world demonstrate the reliance of the Middle Ages financing system on trust. Trust has been thoroughly analysed thus far in the context of the interaction between buyers and sellers, as well as in alliances. However, there is still a lack of study undertaken on the relationship between trust and loan (in Islamic term is financing) decision-making. The first objective of this Systematic Literature Review (SLR) is to analyse previous research on the relationship between trust and lending decisions, specifically focusing on bank lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The second aim of this SLR is to establish research agendas for future studies. SLR is selected in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the matter at hand. This synthesis focusses around three main themes: the building of trust, the concept of trust, and the impact of trust on lending outcomes. There are significant opportunities for more study in the areas of trust, bank lending, and SMEs. We offer a suggestion of future research for enhancing our understanding of trust and lending decision. Systematic Literature Review Trust loan Bank Islamic bank SMEs relationship lending Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 1. Introduction In the 13th century, Italian trade mostly relied on "carte di commenda," which involved traders gathering funds from wealthy people to purchase goods in Europe. These goods were then sold in the Middle East, and the profits were reinvested in new products that would be traded upon the traders' return to Europe. Interestingly, the wealthy financier lacked genuine or efficient authority over the dealer or the trade, and the "partnership" relied solely on trust. Similarly, in the 7th century Islamic world, a system of financing based on trust, known as profit-loss sharing ( Mudharaba or Musharaka ) contract, was employed to provide financial support to tribes and wealthy entrepreneurs. These individuals engaged in international trade and required substantial funds for purchasing commodities to be exported and imported, as well as for financing their difficult commercial ventures (Chapra, 2000 ). The reliance on trust remained significant for Maghribi traders, who were representative of the Islamic world during the 13th century (Greif, 1994 ). The use of “carte di commenda” and the influence of the Islamic world all demonstrate the significant reliance on trust in the financing systems of the Middle Ages. There were not many significant changes in the world during the subsequent centuries. In the present day, the financial and banking system still depends on trust (Lipartito, 2013 ; Wijaya, Moro, & Belghitar, 2023 ). The primary reasons for the capital markets freezing in September 2008, which led to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, were the complete absence of trust among banks. They refused to lend to each other because they doubted the ability of their counterparts to repay the borrowed money. To mitigate the issue of borrowers' dishonesty/moral hazard, one possible solution is to require borrowers to provide collateral as a guarantee (Benston & Smith, 1976 ). Nevertheless, small businesses may have challenges in meeting this requirement (World Bank, 2010 ). Furthermore, the assessment and retrieval of collateral in a lacking law enforcement setting may pose challenges for bank managers. The bank, acting as a financial middleman, may gather data regarding their borrowers. These actions may be facilitated by doing financial statement analysis, as suggested by Benston and Smith ( 1976 ). However, these lending technologies may not be appropriate for opaque borrowers. Various categories of borrowers may exhibit varying levels of accounting information quality. According to Danos, Holt, & Imhoff ( 1989 ), audited financial statements from large borrowers tend to contain high-quality accounting information. Medium-sized borrowers generally give acceptable accounting information, while the quality of accounting information from small borrowers is uneven. In addition, small borrowers may fail to distinguish their income and expenses from their personal endeavours. Therefore, lenders may employ alternative lending technologies to cater to small borrowers, including credit scoring, asset-based lending, factoring, fixed-asset lending, leasing, and relationship lending (Berger & Udell, 2002 , 2006 ). However, in order to gain a thorough assessment of the opaque borrowers, it is necessary to complement the objective evaluation with a subjective evaluation. The reason for this is because objective evaluation is unable to reveal the borrowers' personality traits, such as their motivation and competency, which can have an impact on the success of their business. This evaluation includes a subjective assessment that takes into account informal relationships built on trust (Ferrary, 2003 ). Therefore, the utilisation of relationship lending, a lending technology that incorporates soft information about borrowers, has the potential to mitigate credit rationing (Petersen & Rajan, 1994 ). Some borrowers are prepared to apply for loans from banks, even if banks charge higher interest rates compared to other investment schemes (Fama, 1985 ). In addition, they are willing to let lenders access to their information in order to secure a loan. Applying appropriate lending technology to borrowers can effectively reduce information asymmetry, hence increasing the likelihood of success (Ferri & Murro, 2015 ). Interestingly, an increasing amount of research aims to enhance the existing research on relationship lending by specifically examining trust. Overall, history indicates that trust plays a crucial role in the financial industry as a whole, and specifically in the relationship lending. Therefore, it is crucial to thoroughly examine the limited existing research on the subject to gain a more precise understanding of its function in relationship lending and provide research agenda for future studies. Furthermore, it is crucial to investigate if trust plays distinct roles when considering cultural factors that influence the development of the financial system. To best of our knowledge, this study is the first systematic literature review (SLR) that focuses on analysing the existing body of research on trust in the context of bank lending and SMEs. We assess prior research on the role of trust by reviewing studies that have investigated the relationship between trust and variables such as credit amount, interest rates, and collateral requirements. We also examine literature that explains the development of trust in lending relationships, encompassing its establishment, growth, and potential dissolution. The primary inquiry of this study is: Does trust have any influence in contemporary lending relationships? The subsequent research topics served as the guiding framework for our Systematic Literature Review (SLR): (1) How can bank managers and borrowers build trust in diverse cultural and lending environments? (2) Which dimensions of trust are analysed in the lending decision? (3) What is the influence of the borrowers' trustworthiness on lending outcomes? Interesting enough we discover that research focused on trust as a determinant of lending decision: if the provider of funds trust the counterpart, it will be likely that the counterpart will be successful in securing the funds. There are many potential areas for future research to enhance our understanding in trust, bank lending, and SMEs literature such as: (1) We suggest that a comparative study should be conducted to explore the role of trust/trust building process in different cultural contexts, such as comparing high power distance vs low power distance or comparing high uncertainty avoidance vs low uncertainty avoidance; (2) Insufficient focus has been given to the process of restoring trust in bank lending and the impact of excessive trust on lending outcomes; (3) Our systematic literature review (SLR) also indicated a lack of research that specifically investigates the process of trust building, the role of trust on financing outcomes, and the concept of trust in Islamic banks; (4) We propose that an important area for additional investigation is the examination of trust as a moderating factor, in addition to its direct impact on access to credit; (5) Future research should also consider the utilisation of suitable dimensions of trust at various levels of trust and circumstance; and (6) All the research conducted on our systematic literature review (SLR) consistently emphasise the positive impact of trust on the lending decision. Therefore, it is necessary for future research to investigate the consequences of excessive (blind) trust in borrowers or the negative aspects of trust in bank lending. The present systematic literature review is arranged as follows. The first section provides an introduction to the study. The second section provides a methodology and an analysis of the systematic literature review approach. The third section analyses the findings based on the main themes. The fourth component pertains to the topic of future research, while the final section encompasses the conclusion. 2. Methodology 2.1. Study design We follow Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart ( 2003 ) when performing this SLR. We perform three main stages: (1) We formulate the research questions; (2) We identify relevant literature that needs to be included in the review; and (3) We perform SLR and we summarize the main themes of the relevant literature and we suggest future research agenda. We rely on Scopus database to find relevant literature in trust and bank lending. 2.2. Data selection strategy We began our SLR by identifying keywords and search terms. For this purpose, we conducted a thorough analysis of literature in two primary domains, namely bank lending and trust, and discussed on the potential keywords. Using this information, we determine a set of search terms that can be used to locate publications that are relevant to the issue at hand. Table 1 presents the combination of search strings that we used. Table 1 Search string for Systematic Literature Review Main Term Additional Terms Lend Lend* OR loan* OR credit* OR financ* SME Sme* OR "small medium size* enterprise*" OR "small medium enterprise*" OR "small business" OR "small firm*" OR "small enterprise*" OR "small company*" OR "micro enterprise*" OR "micro firm*" OR "micro business" OR “entrepreneur*” Bank Bank* OR "small bank*" OR "rural bank*" OR "islam* bank*" OR "cooperative* bank*" Trust Trust* OR distrust OR mistrust Keywords enterred in Scopus Database TITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( lend* OR loan* OR credit* OR financ* ) AND ( sme* OR "small medium size* enterprise*" OR "small medium enterprise*" OR "small business" OR "small firm*" OR "small enterprise*" OR "small company*" OR "micro enterprise*" OR "micro firm*" OR "micro business" OR "entrepreneur*" ) AND ( bank* OR islamic AND bank* ) AND ( trust* OR distrust OR mistrust ) ) ------- Table 1 HERE ------- There are other explanations for our choice of this combination. First, there are mainly two ways to obtain information from borrowers: utilising information gathering technologies and establishing an intimate and ongoing business relationship with borrowers, as suggested by (Lummer & McConnell, 1989 ). The proponent of the latter strategy, (Fama, 1985 ), highlighted that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) choose to share information with their banks through personal interaction as it is a more cost-effective alternative compared to sharing information with the public as a whole. Important aspects of the interaction between SMEs and their banks include the duration of the relationship, the usage of different products by borrowers, and the concentration of borrowing. These characteristics were highlighted by Petersen and Rajan in 1994. Relationship lending is a lending method that can effectively address the issue of opaqueness for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Berger & Udell, 2006 ; Petersen & Rajan, 1994 ). Relationship lending can facilitate lending decisions by allowing bank managers to acquire soft information about borrowers and evaluate their creditworthiness (Berger & Udell, 1995 ). Transferring information obtained by bank managers is a challenging task (Stein, 2002 ). Small banks typically opt for qualitative criteria or the "character" approach when working with SMEs (Cole, Goldberg, & White, 2004 ). Furthermore, the subjective assessment derived from the informal relationship between bank managers and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) could support the lending decision (Ferrary, 2003 ). Second, in order to enhance comprehension of the concepts of trust and bank lending, we include the term "Islamic bank" as a supplementary term for the term "bank". The justifications for integrating this sequence are: (1) Islamic banks should adhere to Islamic principles in their operations; (2) Islamic banks provide distinct financing schemes compared to conventional banks; and (3) Islamic banks encounter unique risks that differ from those faced by conventional banks (Hassan & Aliyu, 2018 ; Kabir Hassan, Khan, & Paltrinieri, 2018 ; Khan & Ahmed, 2001 ). Thirdly, we broaden the scope of the SME concept by including the terms "micro" and "entrepreneur." The reasons are as follows: Firstly, we acknowledge that the issue of trust in relation to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is a novel and emerging concern. Therefore, we may anticipate producing a restricted quantity of literature. (2) We are interested in studying literature on microfinance because it can offer valuable insights into the importance of trust. (3) The classification of micro and small firms may vary among different studies and nations. Zambaldi et al. ( 2011 , p. 311) defined the small business credit segment as the sector that deals with providing modest loans to customers with low annual revenues. Their investigation did not employ precise figures to elucidate the reasons behind the low annual revenues. According to Beck et al. ( 2011 , p. 38), banks often categorise small enterprises as those with annual sales ranging from $ 200,000 to $ 4 million, and medium-sized firms as those with revenues between $ 2 million and $ 16 million. According to the Commission of the European Union (Recommendation 2003/361/EC), a micro-firm is defined as a company that has an annual turnover of no more than EUR 2 million or employs fewer than ten people. A small firm, on the other hand, is defined as an enterprise that has an annual revenue between EUR 2 million and EUR 10 million or employs fewer than 50 people. An SME, as defined by the US Government, is a business that employs less than 500 individuals (USITC, 2010). In Indonesia, firms with annual sales below 22,000 US dollars are categorised as microenterprises, while those with annual sales between 22,000 US dollars and 185,000 US dollars are classified as small enterprises, according to Law 20/2008. Overall, there is no universally accepted definition for tiny or micro enterprises. Fourth, in the field of trust study, the prior engagement between the one placing trust (trustor) and the person being trusted (trustee) holds significance as it allows the trustor to assess the level of trustworthiness of the trustee (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995 ). Moreover, prior experience can facilitate the sharing of information between two persons, which in turn can foster trust (Gulati, 1995 ). Finally, with the integration of SMEs and trust, we can establish the parameters for our literature search. We broaden the concept of trust to include both distrust and mistrust. Distrust and mistrust are the opposite meanings of trust, as defined by Merriam-Webster ( www.merriam-webster.com ). Trust and distrust can coexist within the continuum, as discussed by (Lewicki et al., 1998 ). We do not include the dimensions of trust in any additional terms in our search queries. Interestingly, the word "trust" has multiple connotations, including its use as a psychological statement (Mayer et al., 1995 ), an expectation (Deutsch, 1958), or a reliance (Hosmer, 1995 ). Nevertheless, trust does not have the same meaning as cooperation (Rousseau et al., 1998), risk (Roger C. Mayer, Davies, & Schoorman, 1995 ), and confidence (Luhmann, 2000 ; Tinsley, 1996 ). The search query was inputted into the Scopus database. The initial inclusion criteria for our database search is the paper must be published in a peer-reviewed publication. A total of 152 items were discovered. We use the Scopus database, a widely used database for rigorous scientific production in social science (PEREZ et al 2020). In addition, Google Scholar has many unaudited articles of low quality or lacking scientific measures. Title and abstract screening have been performed to determine whether papers necessitate a more comprehensive assessment of the full text. The criteria for inclusion at this stage are as follows: (1) The paper examines trust in various types of relationships, such as interpersonal trust, inter-organizational trust, and organisational trust. However, we exclude paper that discusses general trust; (2) The paper considers theoretical, conceptual, review, and empirical studies, both quantitative and qualitative; and (3) The article adopts an approach to understand the lending (in Islamic term is “financing”) relationship between borrowers and lenders. This approach considers the perspectives of the lenders, the standpoint of the borrowers, or both. Upon conducting an analysis of 152 titles and abstracts, a total of 61 papers that were relevant to the study were discovered. Appendix 1 provides more details on 91 papers that were excluded, along with the primary reason for their exclusion. The comprehensive evaluation comprises 61 papers that majority focus on the topics of trust in bank lending. Appendix 2 displays a total of 61 articles that were utilised for additional evaluation of their full-text content. Out of the 61 papers that were analysed, we identified only 20 articles that were relevant to the topics of trust, bank lending, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Based on our analysis, we have determined that 41 articles are not relevant for inclusion in the next phase. The articles primarily covered the following topics: (1) the relationship between trust and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) but in the context of relationship marketing; (2) macroeconomic issues; (3) discouraged borrowers; (4) credit rationing; (5) law; (6) network and financing; (7) general trust and financing; (8) multiple banking relationships; (9) trust restoration within the framework of relationship marketing; (10) cognitive bias in financing decisions; (11) trust and financial inclusion; (12) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS); and (13) trust and informal loans. Additionally, we eliminate four items from the total of 40 articles due to their non-English language. In addition, we assessed the quality of the pertinent papers and made the decision to exclude several articles. Given the scarcity of relevant articles, it was decided that all articles, regardless of whether they are indexed in ABS journals, would be included in the analyses if they fulfil our qualitative requirements. To summarise, we broaden our inclusion criteria in order to acquire a maximum amount of pertinent information. Overall, our final collection comprises 20 publications that examine the topics of trust, bank lending, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Table 2 displays 20 sets of publications utilised in the systematic literature review (SLR), categorised by journal ranking, methodology, sample, and primary findings. Table 2 20 Selected Articles No Author and Publication Title ABS Stars SCI- MAGO Methodology Sample Result 1 Howorth and Moro ( 2012 ) Small Business Economics Trustworthiness and interest rates: an empirical study of Italian SMEs 3 Q1 survey, factor analysis and OLS regression Survey to loan managers; 308 in South Tyrol and 57 in Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy More trust less interest rate charged 2 Howorth and Moro ( 2006 ) Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice Trust within entrepreneur bank relationships: Insights from Italy 4 Q1 Interview 20 entrepreneurs 6 bank managers in Italy 1. The authors propose 11 propositions examples: bank manager trust (+) credit availability bank manager trust (-) loan default bank manager trust (-) request for collateral bank manager trust (-) cost of finance 2. Both parties, bank managers and small business, use ability, benevolence and integrity to asses other trustworthiness 3. information from third parties is a powerful influences to the bank managers 3 Nguyen, LE, and Freeman ( 2006 ) Asia Pacific Business Review Trust and Uncertainty: A Study of Bank Lending to Private SMEs in Vietnam 2 Q2 Interview 23 credit officers and senior managers from 11 different banks (State and private banks), located in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam 1. bank managers find difficulty when lending to SME, 2. bank managers' strategies : short term lending, carefully lending procedure, commitment from borrower, order from customers, rely on trust. 3. bank managers gathering information by developing their own information network and by directly interacting with firms’ managers 4. state-owned banks rely on inherited trust more frequently than do private banks. 4 Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano ( 2010 ) Small Business Economics Relationship lending and SME financing in the continental European bank-based system 3 Q1 Regression 182 SME in Murcia, Spain The impact of trust on credit renewal is positive 5 Sengupta ( 2011 ) The Journal of Entrepreneurship Network Strategy and Access to Business Finance: Indian Entrepreneurs in the Information and Communication Technology Industry 1 n/a case studies with in depth interview 30 entrepreneurs From 4 cities In India 1. In general, trust play important role. Individual willingness to finance entrepreneur is beyond creditworthiness. 2. Network play role in asses trustworthiness and creditworthiness of organization/person. 6 Harper ( 1994 ) Small Enterprise Development Musharaka partnership financing - an approach to venture capital for microenterprise n/a Q4 conceptual paper/descriptive no sample 1. Problem on microfinance a. Individual failure. b. Inflation. 2. Musharaka a. musharaka may overcome inflation problem b. Successful community banking depends on openness and sharing. 7 Moro and Fink ( 2013 ) Journal of Banking & Finance Loan managers' trust and credit access for SMEs 3 Q1 factor analysis regression 9 Banks participated. 6 in South Tyrol (298 observations) and 3 in Friuli (151 observations). Final sample 449 bank-firm relationship Trust (+) amount credit granted When separate: Ability (+) amount credit granted Ben/Integrity (+) amount credit granted 8 Hanif and Iqbal ( 2010 ) European Journal of Social Sciences Islamic financing and business framework: A survey n/a Q4 survey correlation 68 respondents 30 top or middle level finance prof 17 islamic banking professional 15 entrepreneurs 6 academicians Pakistan Hurdles of Musharaka: 1. Lack of trust and confidence in Musharaka partner 2. Outcome is unknown. Risk is difficult to be managed 9 Lehmann and Neuberger ( 2001 ) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Do lending relationships matter? Evidence from bank survey data in Germany 3 Q1 survey regression 1200 questionnaire sent to loan managers. 3 banks: big private banks, state-owned saving banks and cooperative banks N: 354 in Germany 1. In general: The empirical analysis of bank lending to small and medium-sized firms in Germany has confirmed that availability and terms of loans are influenced by social interactions between loan officer and bank manager. 10 Kautonen T.; Fredriksson A.; Minniti M.; Moro A. ( 2020 ) Journal of Business Venturing Insights Trust-based banking and SMEs’ access to credit 2 Q1 Survey Confirmatory factor analysis Regression Interviews Survey to 433 SMEs (CEO, CFO, or equivalent) (first wave) and for the second wave, survey to 203 firms that self-reported having positive bank debt in wave 1 (second wave) And Interview with 15 SME managers that participated in the survey and 10 loan officers from commercial and cooperative banks 1. Perceived trustworthiness (+) credit access 2. Information accuracy (+) credit access 3. perceived trustworthiness has a stronger effect on credit access when information accuracy is low 11 Palazuelos E.; Herrero Crespo Á.; Montoya del Corte J. (2020) Managerial Auditing Journal Auditing and credit granting to SMEs: an integrative perceptual model 2 Q1 Interviews Survey SEM Survey to 471 bank loan officers 1. Loan officers’ perceived trust has a direct positive influence on their willingness to provide access to credit to SMEs 2. Loan officers’ perceived trust has a direct positive influence on their willingness to apply3favourable conditions to SMEs. 12 Moro A.; Fink M.; Maresch D.; Fredriksson A. ( 2018 ) Entrepreneurship and Regional Development Loan managers’ decisions and trust in entrepreneurs in different institutional contexts 3 Q1 Survey Survey to 450 loan managers 1. Trust affects the amount of credit obtained differently according to the local normative institutions 2. TRUST is significant at p < 0.01 in the case of small banks, but it is not significant in the case of large banks 13 Hirsch B.; Nitzl C.; Schoen M. ( 2018 ) Journal of Banking and Finance Interorganizational trust and agency costs in credit relationships between savings banks and SMEs 3 Q1 Survey SEM - PLS Survey to 17 relationship managers and 16 credit risk officers. 162 questionnaires collected 1. Habitualization is negatively associated with the importance of hard information 2. Habitualization is positively associated with the reliability of hard information3. 14 Tang Y.; Moro A.; Sozzo S.; Li Z. ( 2018 ) Financial Innovation Modelling trust evolution within small business lending relationships n/a Q1 Simulation - 1. Where the bank trusts a small business and the small business rewards the endowed trust, then the mutual trust level of both the bank and the small business increases along with their mutual interactions. 2. Where a bank trusts a small business and the small business takes opportunistic behaviour without repaying the loan, the altruism propensity of both the bank and the small business endures a gradual drop. 15 Palazuelos E.; Crespo Á.H.; del Corte J.M. (2018) Small Business Economics Accounting information quality and trust as determinants of credit granting to SMEs: the role of external audit 3 Q1 Survey 471 respondents (bank loan officers) 1. Loan officer-perceived SME’shonesty hasa positive effect on the willingness to grant credit.(only in non-audited SMEs) 2. Loan officer-perceived SME’s competence has a positive effect on the willingness to grant credit (in both audited and non-audited SMEs) 16 Okello Candiya Bongomin G.; Malinga C.A.; Amani A.M.; Balinda R. (2024) International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy The role of trust as an informal social mechanism for contract enforcement among young women microenterprises in financial markets in sub-Saharan Africa 1 Q1 Survey SEM 395 respondents (young women owners/managers of the MSMEs) Trust significantly and positively promote access to microcredit by young women microenterprises in sub-Saharan Africa 17 Bika Z.; Subalova M.; Locke C. ( 2022 ) Journal of Development Studies Microfinance and Small Business Development in a Transitional Economy: Insights from Borrowers’ Relations with Microfinance Organisations in Kazakhstan 3 Q1 Interviews Semi-structured interviews Survey 6 interviews (founding members of the Association of MFOs of Kazakhstan) 23 loan evaluation officers 151 entrepreneurial borrowers 1. Trust is the most crucial thing in relationship lending. 2. The Private MFOs valued more personalised relationships with their clients because they enabled them to access soft information from their borrowers. 18 Talaulikar H.; Hegde Desai P.; Borde N. (2022) Managerial Finance Do risk attitude and trust moderate bank managers' risk perceptions in lending to micro, small, medium enterprises? 1 Q3 Survey Exploratory factor analysis regression 218 bank managers The higher the trust and more positive is the risk taking attitude, the lower will be the bank managers’ risk perception in financing MSMEs, despite the presence of information asymmetry 19 Boutillier S. ( 2020 ) European Journal of Innovation Management The economics of the entrepreneur and the banker historical roots and contributions to the management of innovation 1 Q1 Conceptual paper - One of the propositions is Entrepreneurs and bank managers develop social relationships to manage uncertainty and reduce risk by creating a relationship of trust. The entrepreneur is looking for investment opportunities and the banker is looking for innovative entrepreneurs who offer strong repayment guarantees. 20 Wijaya, IF ; Moro, A., (2022) Borsa Istanbul Review Trustworthiness and margins in Islamic small business financing: Evidence from Indonesia n/a Q1 Survey Exploratory factor analysis regression Survey to Islamic Banks Managers in Indonesia. 520 observations Trust is negatively associated with the margins charged to small businesses --------- Table 2 HERE --------- 3. Findings 3.1. Descriptive Findings The majority of the articles are categorized as empirical studies. We can only found two conceptual paper which discussed trust in the conventional bank, and it was published in 4 stars and 1 star journal. We also find one conceptual paper which discussed musharaka and Islamic microfinance but with a very little discussion on the trust issue. In the SMEs and bank relationship, we found four articles contributed from Italy, two from Germany, three from Spain, two from India, and one each from Indonesia, Pakistan, Finland, Uganda, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam. Hence, most research in trust and bank-lending context appears to have been conducted in developed countries. In term of the age of the publication, overall there is an increasing trend from 1994 (the first article that discussed trust and bank lending) to 2024. Also, we found that 17 articles discussing trust in the conventional bank's context and three that deal with trust in the context of Islamic banks. As far as the methodology used is concerned, we found that majority of the papers incorporate survey and regression. Saparito et al. ( 2013 ) state that there are three approaches to comprehending the correlation between banks and SMEs: examining the viewpoint of banks as lenders, examining the viewpoint of borrowers, and considering both perspectives simultaneously. Within the framework of trust and bank lending, our research identified 9 papers that utilised the bank managers as a primary source of information to investigate the connection between the bank and SMEs. The relationship is examined from the viewpoint of SMEs in 6 articles, while in the other 3 articles, information is gathered from both perspectives. Arguably, due to the subjective and complicated nature of trust, as well as its multidimensional aspects, it may be less reliable to ask SMEs about whether they gained trust from bank managers. Instead, it would be more reliable to directly ask the loan managers themselves (Seppänen, Blomqvist, & Sundqvist, 2007 ; Tyler & Stanley, 2007 ). Lehmann & Neuberger ( 2001 ) highlight the distinction between their research and the study conducted by Harhoff & Körting ( 1998 ) by emphasising their preference for surveying loan managers. Interestingly, managers in small banks are more motivated to conduct research on their borrowers because they possess greater autonomy in allocating resources compared to managers in large banks (Stein, 2002 ). Moreover, the lack of transparency in small businesses makes relationship lending an effective approach for giving financing to them. Bank managers collect soft information about borrowers over the course of their relationship (Berger & Udell, 2002 ). 3.2. Thematic analysis The analysis of the 20 selected articles differs based on the specific circumstances and approach used. Quantitative analysis studies mostly focus on assessing the influence of trust on lending outcomes. Qualitative studies delve into the process of trust-building through in-depth discussions. After analysing these 20 papers, three main themes emerged: the process of building trust, the concept of trust, and the role of trust on lending outcomes. The trust building process involves the use of the SLR to emphasise the tactics employed by bank management in managing risk and uncertainty across diverse cultural and lending contexts. In addition to this method, bank managers must collect qualitative information on borrowers to assist in their lending decisions. Subsequently, the dimensions of trust and methods for measuring trust can be determined. Finally, our SLR investigates the influence of trust on the lending outcomes. --------- Figure 1 Here -------- 3.2.1. Trust Building Process The process of building trust might be highlighted in relation to the lenders' approach for dealing with challenges in acquiring official data, managing risk and uncertainty, and navigating local cultures. Bank managers in Vietnam face challenges when it comes to evaluating financial performance, conducting asset assessment for collateral purposes, and obtaining credit history, credit rating, and information about the financial environment. Therefore, they must depend on trust to uphold their lending judgements, both on an individual and institutional basis. Bank managers have a preference for providing loans that have a short-term duration. They also tend to follow more strict lending procedures and may ask for sales orders from customers as extra proof to manage the levels of risk and uncertainty involved (Nguyen, Le, & Freeman, 2006 ). However, the latter approach incurs significant transaction costs. Trust-based loans cannot fully substitute non-trust strategies due to their inherent subjectivity. Banks in India demonstrate a willingness to assume more risks by providing loans to IT entrepreneurs without requiring collateral. This phenomenon is facilitated via networking. Networking can facilitate the evaluation of the reliability and financial credibility of potential borrowers (Sengupta, 2011 ). In highly developed countries such as the UK, trust is not relied upon in situations that involve a significant level of risk. Bank managers are willing to permit shortcuts only when there is a minimal amount of risk and uncertainty (Tyler & Stanley, 2007 ). While in Kazahkstan, trust is the most crucial thing in the relationship lending (Bika, Subalova, & Locke, 2022 ). Within the European Union, loan managers could potentially benefit from the utilisation of empirical data obtained from external sources. Chambers of Commerce may offer companies' annual financial statements. The central bank database of a country may also supply credit records. In addition, the Central Bank also offers insights into the financial environment through the utilisation of a survey (Moro & Fink, 2013 ). Banks should also establish an internal system for assessing the creditworthiness of their borrowers (Hirsch, Nitzl, & Schoen, 2018 ; Lehmann & Neuberger, 2001 ). Nevertheless, the establishment of trust is also heavily influenced by external sources of information and the perception of one's reputation (Howorth & Moro, 2006 ). Italian loan managers concur that insights from fellow customers, suppliers, and the community yield superior quality evaluations for clients. This gossip and information will become particularly significant in situations when bank managers lack direct access to information. The local community may potentially penalise present borrowers for engaging in opportunistic behaviour in the future (Carnevali, 1996 ). The borrowers' reputation is readily accessible within the local community, which is why this is the case. Bank managers in Vietnam employ strategies such as constructing their own information network and establishing direct communication with corporate managers to acquire information about their borrowers (Nguyen et al., 2006 ). The networks comprise individuals from the banking sector, government officials, business professionals, acquaintances, and family members. However, unlike Italian bank managers, Vietnamese bank managers emphasise that the primary source of information is the relationship with the small business's manager. During the interaction, lenders may evaluate the firm's management quality, integrity, and competency. Bank managers rely on intuition to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers, and this assessment holds greater significance than the financial data (Nguyen et al., 2006 ). An alternative approach to fostering trust in Vietnam is through the utilisation of an inherited mechanism (Nguyen et al., 2006 ). Bank managers place their trust in clients who have a history of loyalty, a referral from a credible organisation or respected individuals, and a personal relationship with the bank managers. In the same vein, according to bank managers in Finland, the most crucial information comes from discussions with small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) managers. This knowledge is unique and cannot be found in written documents (Kautonen, Fredriksson, Minniti, & Moro, 2020 ). Furthermore, bank managers in Finland place significant emphasis on the necessity of soft information in order to have a more profound understanding of both clients and their businesses. The readily available information might be advantageous for both borrowers and lenders. Bank managers can gain a better level of trust by gathering more information from both third parties and the firm, especially when the duration of the relationship is longer (Howorth & Moro, 2006 ). Obtaining and monitoring information can be made more cost-effective by including input from the local community (Carnevali, 1996 ). Bank managers may lower the interest rate imposed on SMEs if the expenses associated with collecting information and monitoring may be minimised. Furthermore, varying regions within the country can lead to differing role of trust. In regions such as South Tyrol, where there is a language barrier, a tight local community has emerged, characterised by a high level of familiarity among its members. Research has demonstrated that close-knit communities have a significant role in fostering the establishment of trust (Moro, Fink, Maresch, & Fredriksson, 2018 ). Conversely, in situations where there is no language barrier, such as in Friuli, it can have a negative impact on the likelihood of a loan manager forming a good relationship with a customer (Moro et al., 2018 ). Overall, variations in the normative institutional environment that is specific to each region might impact the capacity of loan managers to effectively utilise trust. In this regard, Friuli is at a disadvantage when compared to South Tyrol. Finally, the simulation finding presented by Tang, Moro, Sozzo, & Li ( 2018 ) offers valuable insights on trust building process. When a bank trusts a small business and the small business reciprocates, both parties experience an increase in their tendency to reciprocate and act altruistically. This inclination continues to build as they engage repeatedly. 3.2.2. The concept of Trust 3.2.2.1. T rust Dimension Two studies of trust, bank lending, and SMEs use direct, unidimensional measurement of trust by asking SMEs, “When granting finance, do the financial institutions take their trust in the firm’s managers into account?” (Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010 ). Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano ( 2010 ) do not provide a clear and detailed definition of trust, nor does they elaborate on the various aspects or components of trust. In fact, Harhoff & Körting ( 1998 ), also employed a direct measurement by inquiring with bank managers on the presence of mutual trust between the enterprise and the bank. In the case of developing countries, bank managers in Vietnam prioritise assessing the capabilities (resources and knowledge) as well as the integrity (benevolence, intention, and motivation) of the borrowers (Nguyen et al., 2006 ). In India, the trustworthiness of the borrowers is assessed by considering their reputation and historical track record. The trustworthiness elements in this relationship refer to the entrepreneurs' competence and the individual's expertise in this field (Sengupta, 2011 ). Both Hirsch, Nitzl, & Schoen ( 2018 ) and Wijaya & Moro ( 2022 ) use two dimensions of trust from organizationl literature i.e., habitualisation and institutionalisation (Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997 ). Habitualisation reflects benevolence and institutionalisation corresponds to integrity. The research conducted by Howorth & Moro ( 2006 ), Howorth & Moro ( 2012 ) and Moro & Fink ( 2013 ) demonstrated a thorough assessment of trust. These studies make a clear distinction between trust and trustworthiness based on Mayer et al., ( 1995 ) study. Trustworthiness is the antecedent of trust. There are three trustworthiness factors used in these studies, i.e., ability, benevolence, and integrity. However, based on factor analysis, benevolence and integrity are difficult to separate (Moro & Fink, 2013 ; Wijaya et al., 2023 ). Both of these dimensions have ethical connotations (Tinsley, 1996 ) and, thus, ability should be separated. Another study categorize trust as a single concept (Howorth & Moro, 2012 ). Hence, trust contains ability, benevolence, and integrity. Lehmann & Neuberger ( 2001 ) introduce four variables as proxies of trust; they are experience in the past (inspired by (Blois, 1999 ) study), the obligation to the partner (inspired by (Fisman & Khanna, 1999 ) study), the impression of the stability of the relationship (deterrence-based trust – (R. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996 ) and the flow of information (knowledge-based trust - Lewicki and Bunker, 1996 ). Talaulikar, Hegde Desai, & Borde (2022) and Kautonen et al. ( 2020 ) adopt trustworthiness factors from (Roger C. Mayer et al., 1995 ) they are ability, benevolence and integrity. Okello Candiya Bongomin, Malinga, Amani, & Balinda ( 2024 ) use 10 questions to measure trust inspired from previous studies. Another study incorporates three dimensions of trust i.e., honesty, competence, and benevolence (Palazuelos, Crespo, & Del Corte, 2018 ). Table 3 shows the dimension of trust used by the authors. Table 3 Dimension of Trust Author Dimension Nguyen, LE, and Freeman ( 2006 ) Trust in person Capability Relevant background and education Experience in the field of business Strong personal network Positive referral on expertise Positive impression with bank managers – demonstrate business knowledge and skills Positive learning in working with banks’ procedure Integrity Positive referral on integrity Positive impression with bank managers – demonstrate cooperative attitude Willingness to share sensitive and real information with the banks Positive experience in working with banks Trust in the firm Capability Resources (office, plant, car, managers, etc.) Management system (strategy, structure, culture, formalized policies) Clear, professional account- ing system and reports Promising businesses (products and markets) Good performance Positive referral or reputation Integrity Number of services the firm used from the bank (the more the better) Number of banks the firm has a relationship with Howorth and Moro ( 2012 ), Moro and Fink ( 2013 ) Ability “Has very good knowledge of the market in which they operate” “Is able in identifying the needed resources” “Is able in managing the resources” “Understands the changing market conditions” Benevolence “Adapts their interests to fit those of commercial partners” “Pays attention to the needs of the employees” “Is very involved in the community” Integrity “Is totally honest in negotiations with commercial partners” “Is consistent in his decisions and behavior” “You would be happy to recommend the firm to a female friend to work there” Tang, Deng, and Moro (2016) Ability (trust from SMEs to Loan manager) The loan manager is highly capable of doing their job I am very confident about the loan manager’s abilities to take care of our bank matters The loan manager strives to be fair in dealing with our firm Benevolence The loan manager would not knowingly act against our firm’s interests The bank is interested in the success of our firm The bank considers our firm’s interests in addition to its own interests Integrity The bank keeps the promises it makes to our firm The loan manager’s behaviour has been consistent in our dealings with them The bank is trustworthy Lehmann and Neuberger ( 2001 ) Experience We made positive experience in the past Obligation We are obliged to the borrower Information The borrower informs us immediately about problems Stability Our relationship is stable under pressure Hirsch, Nitzl, & Schoen (2018) Interpersonal Habitualisation (benevolence) My contact person has always been evenhanded in negotiations with me I know how my contact person is going to act. She can always be counted on to act as I expect My contact person has been frank in dealing with us Institutionalisation (integrity) I have faith in my contact person to look out for my interests even when it is costly to do so I would feel a sense of betrayal if my contact person's performance was below my expectations My contact person seems to be concerned with our needs Talaulikar, Hegde, & Borde (2022) MSME entrepreneur knows very well the market in which she/he operates MSME entrepreneur is able in selecting the needed resources MSME entrepreneur is able in managing the resources MSME entrepreneur is able in understanding market evolution MSME entrepreneur adapts his interests to suit those of commercial partners MSME entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of the employees MSME entrepreneur is totally honest in negotiations with commercial partners MSME entrepreneur is consistent in his decisions and behavior Bongomin et al. (2023) The group members are trusted while borrowing from the microfinance The group members always stick to their promises while borrowing from the microfinance The group members always share information while borrowing from the microfinance We are always confident among ourselves while borrowing from the microfinance We are always have high believes amongst ourselves while borrowing from the microfinance We have no fear amongst ourselves while borrowing from the microfinance All members are always concerned about group interest while borrowing from the microfinance The group members do not take advantage of each other while borrowing from the microfinance The group members are always alert with each other while borrowing from the microfinance The group members are always willing to help each while borrowing from the microfinance Palazuelos et al. ( 2018 ) In general, SMEs… Honesty Are transparent Provide sincere and honest information Are reliable in keeping their promises Will probably fulfil their commitments Competence Provide gurantess about their skills to carry out their activities Have the ability/skills to fulfil their commitments Have sufficient experience in the activity performed Are managed by competent and diligent staff Benevolence Take into action the impact that the actions have on the bank Seek to establish relationships with the bank in which mutual benefit is a priority Make efforts/sacrifies to fulfil their obligations with the bank Are concerned about the interest and needs of the bank --------------- Table 3 HERE --------------- 3.2.2.2. Measurement The measuring of trust in bank lending can be based on three levels: interpersonal, organisational, and inter-organisational. Furthermore, there exist three distinct sorts of measurements: the positive expectation scale, the willingness to be vulnerable scale, and the direct measure (Colquitt et al., 2007 ). Most of the research on bank lending has focused on measuring interpersonal trust. Howorth and Moro ( 2012 ) and Moro and Fink ( 2013 ) use ten items to measure trustworthiness inspired from management literature (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995 ; Currall & Judge, 1995 ; Roger C Mayer & Davis, 1999 ). Lehmann & Neuberger ( 2001 ) propose four proxies to measure mutual trust. Hirsch et al. ( 2018 ) measure trust from two levels, interpersonal and inter-organisational. They employ a combination of the positive expectation scale and willingness to be vulnerable scale, which have been developed based on prior studies by Doney & Cannon ( 1997 ) and Zaheer et al. ( 1998 ). Other study incorporates positive expectation scale (Palazuelos et al., 2018 ). 3.2.3. Trust and Lending Outcomes The majority of articles in the field of trust, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and bank lending primarily examine the influence of interpersonal trust on the outcomes of lending. As trust increases, bank managers' perception of risk in financing MSMEs decreases (Talaulikar et al., 2022 ). The research undertaken found a positive correlation between trust and credit renewal, as trust is associated with a perception of low risk) (Badulescu, Simut, & Smes, 2012 ; Hernández-Cánovas & Martínez-Solano, 2010 ). Additionally, trust is found to have a negative link with interest rates (Harhoff & Körting, 1998 ; Howorth & Moro, 2012 ; Lehmann & Neuberger, 2001 ) and margins charged to the small business managers in Islamic banks (Wijaya & Moro, 2022 ), trust is positively associated with credit availability (Kautonen et al., 2020 ; Moro & Fink, 2013 ; Moro et al., 2018 ; Palazuelos et al., 2018 ), trust reduces collateralization (Harhoff & Körting, 1998 ) and trust (habitualization) reduces the importance of hard information but trust increases the reliability of hard information (Hirsch et al., 2018 ). In the same vein, perceived trustworthiness has a stronger effect on credit access when information accuracy is low (Kautonen et al., 2020 ). More specifically, loan officer-perceived SME’s competence has a positive effect on the willingness to grant credit (in both audited and non-audited SMEs) (Palazuelos et al., 2018 ). Interestingly, trust is positively associated with the amount credit granted in the case of small banks, but not large banks (Moro et al., 2018 ). In the same vein, Okello Candiya Bongomin, Malinga, Amani, & Balinda ( 2024 ) found that trust significantly and positively promote access to microcredit by young women microenterprises. Loan officers’ perceived trust has a direct positive influence on their willingness to apply favourable conditions to SMEs (Palazuelos, Herrero Crespo, & Montoya del Corte, 2020). All in all, previous empirical studies confirmed conceptual framework proposed by Howorth & Moro ( 2006 ) and Boutillier ( 2020 ) that trust is positively associated with credit availability but negatively associated with loan default, request for collateral, and cost of finance. Two articles pertaining to Islamic banks provide an inadequate discussion of the concept of trust (Hanif & Iqbal, 2010 ; Harper, 1994 ). Bank managers may have two primary challenges when providing loans to micro entrepreneurs, namely inflation and borrower default (Harper, 1994 ). Musharaka financing scheme in Islamic banks has the potential to mitigate inflation by determining the bank's return based on a pre-agreed fraction of the profit between the two parties. Nevertheless, establishing trust and fostering mutual understanding between bank managers and the business community should be the fundamental basis for financing through musharaka . In addition, bank managers must possess a thorough understanding of the partner's business. Therefore, the inclusion of openness is a crucial element in the Musharaka . One of the limitations of the Musharaka in Pakistan is the absence of trust and confidence in the partner's competence (Hanif & Iqbal, 2010 ). Additional obstacles in Musharaka include the partner's uncertainty regarding the return and the partner's manipulation of the profit (Hanif & Iqbal, 2010 ). Wijaya & Moro ( 2022 ) argues that in Murabaha , the most popular financing scheme in Islamic banks, trust reduces transactions cost of economics which in turn reduces margins charged to small business managers. This is because the expectations of opportunistic behavior can be reduced by bank managers’ high levels of perceived habitualization and institutionalization by small business managers. It can be inferred that both conventional and Islamic banks rely on more than just transactional characteristics while engaging in lending (financing) activities. They also take into consideration the social interaction element, specifically the trustworthiness of the borrowers. 4. Discussion of Future Directions Following to the analysis of the results pertaining to three key themes, we proceed to examine the research gaps and propose opportunities for further study concerning the following: (1) the process of building trust, (2) the dimension and measurement of trust, and (3) the lending outcomes. 4.1. Trust building process 4.1.1. Different culture and different environmental setting One of the main investigations that directed this Systematic Literature Review (SLR) relates to the process of building trust. Since trust is not the same with risk but trust inextricable linked with risk, research on different social settings with varying methods for managing risk could potentially influence the process of building trust (Das & Teng, 2001b ; Roger C Mayer, Davies, & Schoorman, 1995 ). The comparative study of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) finance in Germany and Britain might provide significant insights into the influence of social factors on risk management and trust building process (Lane & Quack, 1999 ). They focused on the sociological factors that influence loan decisions. Germany and the UK exhibit distinct socioeconomic characteristics that have implications for the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In Germany, a country with a social market economy, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are recognised as a crucial factor in maintaining economic stability, a characteristic that is not present in Britain. Germany has a more precise approach to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) since it is tailored to their specific needs. The incorporation of federal and regional governmental agencies, development and loan guarantee institutions, commercial banks, and chambers of industry has led to the formulation of policies aimed at providing financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). While in Britain, these groups play a less influential role in financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Regarding competency, the owner/manager of SMEs in Germany possess universally strong skills (Lane & Quack, 1999 ). Lane and Quack ( 1999 ) observed that German banks exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion compared to British banks. This can be attributed to the presence of a more stable economic climate and stricter regulatory measures. German saving and cooperative banks engage in risk sharing through the exchange of significant and important information, as well as mutual support, in order to mitigate risk. Regarding collateralization, German banks solely necessitate commercial assets as collateral, but British banks require personal assets as collateral (Lane & Quack, 1999 ). The results of our systematic literature review (SLR) indicate that the process for building trust may depend on information obtained from external sources (Carnevali, 1996 ; Howorth & Moro, 2006 ; Nguyen et al., 2006 ). Bank managers may evaluate the trustworthiness and creditworthiness of borrowers by collecting information from chambers. In Germany and France, chambers offer training and services for business registration. In the Netherlands, chambers may enact measures to decrease the prevalence of dishonest and incompetent individuals in various trades or industries, sometimes referred to as 'cowboys' (Bennett, 1995 ). This organisation could potentially decrease the likelihood of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) experiencing failure. Consequently, it has the potential to decrease the credit risk faced by banks. In contrast, the influence of chambers and trade associations in the UK in supporting SME funding is significantly limited (Lane & Quack, 1999 ). Furthermore, bank managers in Britain have diminished the advantage of personal trust and the significance of gossip information obtained from external sources (Lane & Quack, 1999 ). Therefore, while comparing Germany and Britain, it can be observed that the interaction between bank managers and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Britain primarily involves shorter-term loans (Lane and Quack, 1999 ). The data obtained from third parties indicates that the borrowers' reputation plays a crucial role in determining whether or not to grant a loan, particularly in cases when the bank managers lack familiarity with the borrowers. Hence, the borrowers' reputation can assist bank managers in avoiding sole reliance on expensive and inadequate contracts (Blois, 1999 ). Nevertheless, Blois ( 1999 ) contended that there exists a significant distinction between possessing a favourable reputation and being seen as trustworthy. The trustor may anticipate that the one they trust will demonstrate their sincerity and benevolent intentions. Although borrowers may have a positive reputation, this does not necessarily mean that the trustor will have high expectations. The absence of accurate data, possible risks, and uncertainty could emerge as a significant concern in a developing country. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that financing in developing countries has a greater level of risk and uncertainty. Our SLR has demonstrated that the lending environment in Vietnam poses significantly higher risks compared to developed countries. Guseva & Rona-Tas ( 2001 ) employ Knight's argumentation ([1921] 1957) to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. In addition, they suggest that three characteristics must be fulfilled in order to decrease uncertainty and risk: similarity among cases, similarity over time, and a sufficiently high number of past observations. Furthermore, the issue of asymmetric information is particularly challenging in emerging nations (Akerlof, 1970 ; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981 ). Therefore, in a circumstance characterised by risk and uncertainty, lenders should employ several measures to mitigate the presence of asymmetric information. In the Russian credit card industry, there was a lack of credit bureaus and collection agencies, making it challenging to recover damages (Guseva & Rona-Tas, 2001 ). Consequently, implementing sanctions was not the optimal approach for maintaining the provision of credit card loans in Russia. In order to operate in this uncertain environment, credit card providers in Russia depend on trust. In Russia, there are several strategies that can be employed to decrease uncertainty. Firstly, one can reduce the time gap between purchase and payment. Secondly, uncertainty can be managed by carefully analysing the application form, observing the applicant's visual impression, and utilising informal recommendations. Lastly, trust can be established by leveraging the customers' networks to enhance the accountability of cardholders (Guseva & Rona-Tas, 2001 ). The trust-building process may be influenced by the national culture (Patrica M. Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998 ). The authors use the term "national" to refer not to physical boundaries, but rather to a culture comprised of groups or subgroups that share comparable life experiences, education, and background. Therefore, they suggest that individuals who live in distinct cultural dimensions as outlined by Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov ( 2010 ), such as individualism, collectivism, masculinity, femininity, high power distance, low power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, and low uncertainty avoidance, may undergo diverse processes in building trust (such as calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability, and transference). In Vietnam, banks establish trust with their clients through the use of transference or inherited trust building (Nguyen et al., 2006 ). This trust building is more likely to happen in the collectivist or high uncertainty avoidance situation (Doney et al., 1998 ). In nations with a majority of Muslims with a strong sense of collectivism, such as Indonesia, trust based on shared values (values-based trust) or benevolence-integrity is more significant in business-to-business relationships than trust based only on competence (competence-based trust) (Wijaya et al., 2023 ). However, building trust in a collectivistic society requires repeated interactions to thoroughly examine the values of the business actors, resulting in a narrower radius of trust compared to an individualistic culture (Hofstede et al., 2010 ; Wijaya et al., 2023 ). Bank managers living in environments characterised by low uncertainty avoidance and high power distance, where the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is significant and the cost of behavior are low, may establish trust based on a calculative approach. (R. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996 ) stated that calculus-based trust is established through a system of rewards and punishments. However, the impact of punishment is more substantial than that of rewards. At this point, trust is fragile and so requires supervision. In the context of bank lending, if borrowers default on their loan, the collateral they provided may be seized. Collateral serves as a form of punishment to motivate borrowers to exert more effort and adhere to the agreement (P. A. Saparito & Gopalakrishnan, 2009 ). This scenario could potentially occur in Vietnam, where banks exclusively engage in short-term lending and require borrowers to provide further evidence. According to Lehmann & Neuberger ( 2001 ), short-term or volume-oriented lending is primarily defined by the transactional aspects of contract design or bargaining power, such as loan rates, collateralization, and switching costs. Chapra ( 2000 ), an Islamic economist, stated that with short-term financing, the lender is more inclined to depend on the collateral rather than the project itself. On the other hand, long-term relationships are influenced to a greater extent by social interactions between the parties involved in the bargaining process. In the German context, the relationship between banks and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is typically characterised by long-term durations. This system is referred to as a "Hausbank." This link could potentially impact the dissemination of information accessible to the bank. Banks may collect extensive data on the operational aspects and future potential of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Therefore, banks possess knowledge of the requirements of their borrowers. Similarly, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may also acquire information about their banks over their business relationship. The duration of the relationship between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and banks is directly correlated with knowledge-based trust (P. Saparito & Colwell, 2010 ). In knowledge-based trust, trust is built based on the flow of information (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996 ). Regular communication is important at this stage. Finally, the strongest tie is found on identification-based trust since each party understands the needs, preference, and choices of other parties (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996 ). Therefore, monitoring is unnecessary. This results in a decrease in the interest rate for the borrowers. Indeed, the presence of accurate and reliable information facilitates the process of obtaining credit (Chen et al., 2014 ); voluntarily disclosed information increases perceived competence and reduces interest risk charged to the borrowers (Moro et al., 2014 ); and the use of rich communication modes (face to face and telephone) in communicating with the bank will increase the bank's knowledge about firms (Saparito & Gopalakrishnan, 2009 ). In conclusion, there is a need for further research to investigate the impact of trust and the process of building trust in bank lending, particularly in various environmental contexts. For instance, it is important to examine the role of trust and trust building in bank lending within settings characterised by weak rule of law. Additionally, a comparative study should be conducted to explore the role of trust and trust building in different cultural contexts, such as comparing high power distance vs low power distance or comparing high uncertainty avoidance vs low uncertainty avoidance. 4.1.2. Trust violation and trust repair All the studies to date focus only on explaining the trust building process. The study on how to repair trust in bank lending has not been conducted yet. Trust violation and trust restoration process vary based on the trust development stage (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996 ): in calculus-based trust, the progress on building trust is slow however when there is a trust violation the relationship might be broken; in knowledge-based trust, the parties involved in the relationship might have a high degree of tolerance for other's inconsistency behaviour and this aspect is stronger in identification based trust. The decline of trust occurs in two form (1) trust elimination in a single violation event and (2) gradual erosion of trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996 ). Interestingly, borrower default on a loan can happen due to various reasons: the firm may have made errors in assessing the project, or they may have mishandled it, indicating inadequate ability. The borrower may have misled the lender in their lending decision by providing the loan manager with incorrect information or withholding relevant information, resulting in the bank granting a loan that they would not have approved if they had received accurate information. This indicates that the borrower demonstrated a lack of integrity. The borrower may possess undisclosed pertinent information regarding the underperformance of the project, resulting in the lender's delayed response to recoup the loan, indicating a lack of goodwill on the part of the borrower. Future study on trust and bank lending should investigate the responses of bank managers and borrowers in various scenarios and in relation to reciprocal behaviour when trust is violated. Additionally, it should explore strategies for repairing trust at different stages of trust development. 4.1.3. Trust building process in Islamic Banks Our SLR also indicated a lack of research that specifically investigates the process of trust building in Islamic banks. Islamic banks have unique characteristics in comparison to their counterparts. Islamic banks need to adhere to Islamic principles in their daily activities. Islamic banks should incorporate social objectives in addition to their business objectives (Chapra, 2000 ; Dusuki, 2008). Due to the prohibition of interest in Islamic banks, the financing system in these banks relies on set mark-up profit ( murabaha ), rental charge ( ijara ), or profit-loss sharing ( mudharaba or musharaka ). Islamic banks possess inherent risks that are distinct from those of conventional banks (Ariffin et al., 2009 ; Khan & Ahmed, 2001 ). Several research have attempted to compare Islamic banks and conventional banks on many issues such as risk and performances (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013 ; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Merrouche, 2013 ; Čihák & Hesse, 2010 ). The issue of trust in Islamic banks is typically limited and primarily focuses on the challenges associated with profit-loss sharing financing schemes. In Mudharaba , an Islamic bank typically contributes 100% of the capital while the customers ( mudharib ) merely contribute their ideas and efforts. The profit is then dispersed to the partners based on a pre-determined proportion. If customers experience a loss (not due to their own negligence), the bank will assume full responsibility for covering 100% of the loss. The banks regard this contract to be high-risk. Thus, it is imperative for Islamic banks to demonstrate solid confidence and trust in their investees (Abdalla, 1999 ). Trust is established in a mudharaba contract by the capital owner's understanding of the moral values and personality of the investee, as stated by (Abdul-Rahman et al., 2014 ). Furthermore, in the implementation of the Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) plan, Islamic banks should prioritise the assessment of the project's feasibility, the partner's character and history, and the partner's skill level (Ahmed, 2008). Personal qualities are seen as intangible guarantees (Ahmed, 2008). To address the limitations of musharaka , Islamic banks should select a trustworthy mudharib , seek recommendations from existing clients with a proven track record, and assess the reliability of potential consumers through the implementation of a murabaha scheme (Abdul-rahman & Nor, 2016 ; Abdalla, 1999 ). With regard to the trust building process, in Islam, it is emphasised that individuals should evaluate the trustworthiness of others rather than blindly trusting them (Eggen, 2011 ). Interestingly, the Quran acknowledges that the matter of trust is one of the pertinent subjects in Islam. The Quran addresses the notion of trust in three distinct levels: divine ethics, the appropriate conduct individuals should have towards Allah, and the appropriate behaviour and interactions they should have towards others (Eggen, 2011 ). These conceptual framework from Quran could be used as a starting point to explore the trust building process in Islamic banking. Furthermore, it is important for future research to investigate the process of creating trust in the different types of financing offered by Islamic banks, considering their distinct financing scheme characteristics. 4.2. The concept of trust The second inquiry our study aims to investigate pertains to the dimension of trust in the lending decision. Trust, in the context of bank lending, is a notion that has multiple dimensions. Various study contexts in diverse environments employs distinct dimensions. The dimension of trust should vary based on specific requirements, circumstances, and surroundings (Roger C Mayer & Davies, 1999 ; Tyler & Stanley, 2007 ). For instance, in a study by Howorth & Moro ( 2012 ), trust was treated as a singular entity when examining its impact on interest rates. However, the concept of capacity was distinct from benevolence-integrity when it was employed to forecast credit availability (Moro & Fink, 2013 ). Nevertheless, we can deduce that the dimensions of trust primarily encompass two aspects: the trustee's competence and values (Das & Teng, 2001a ; Wijaya et al., 2023 ). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between trust and confidence as they carry distinct meanings (Tinsley, 1996 ). The ethical virtue of the trustee can be characterised by benevolence, integrity, honesty, and mutuality. It signifies that his behaviour will not result in any harm to the person who has placed their faith in him (Hosmer, 1995 ). Our SLR uncovered a significant lack of attention to the conceptualization of trust in the Islamic banking. However, we are aware of the study conducted in a different field, specifically business ethics in Islam, which explores several aspects of moral principles in business from an Islamic perspective. We can obtain the dimension of trust that is relevant for Islamic banking from this literature (Wijaya et al., 2023 ). The concept of trust ( amana ) in Islam can be understood by referring to the Quran (Eggen, 2011 ). Amana encompasses three concepts: safety, which is the antithesis of fear; trust, which is the antithesis of betrayal; and faith, which is the antithesis of denial (Ibnu Manzur as cited by Eggen, 2011 ). The primary opposite of trust is betrayal ( khiyana ), which refers to a decrease in loyalty or the act of abandoning or failing in one's responsibility ( amana ) when entrusted with anything (Eggen, 2011 ). In Islam, trust is defined in alignment with Rotter's (1967, p.651) definition, which describes trust as the "expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon." The notion and dimension of trust can be developed from the ethical values of business in Islam. Islamic values are based on the teachings of the Quran, which is the book revealed by God to Muhammad (p), and the Sunnah, which consists of the recorded words, actions, and approval of Muhammad (p) (Abuznaid, 2009 ; Beekun & Badawi, 2005 ; Rice, 1999 ; Uddin, 2003a ). Many authors have chosen certain verses from the Qur'an and Sunnah and applied them to a commercial context. Undoubtedly, these Islamic ethical ideals also hold great significance in Islamic banking. These dimensions include oneness, fairness and balance, freedom, productive activity, compassion, and trusteeship (Abuznaid, 2009 ; Beekun & Badawi, 2005 ; Rice, 1999 ; Uddin, 2003a ). The unity dimension explores the interconnections between humans and God, humans and the universe, and among humans themselves. Humans ought to submit themselves to the divine will, and individuals are equal collaborators; therefore, in the realm of commerce, this translates to collaboration. Therefore, this concept aligns with the viewpoint of (Kee & Knox, 1970 ), who regard trust as a form of collaboration. Islam not only stresses the importance of collaboration, but also advocates for justice, denounces inequity, oppression, and exploitation, and encourages individuals to assist those who are in need or poor (Rice, 1999 ). The Quran defines justice as 'adl and qist , which entails consistently treating others justly in all aspects of life and acting in a balanced and proportionate manner (Beekun & Badawi, 2005 ). Benevolence is a quality that pertains to both kindness and excellence. Benevolence is defined as an action that benefits others other than the ones who perform the action, without any sense of duty (Beekun & Badawi, 2005 ). This concept aligns with the research conducted by (R. C. Mayer et al., 1995 ), which suggests that benevolence is one of the dimension that contribute to trustworthiness. The notion of trusteeship has emerged as the central tenet of Islamic ethical principles in the realm of business. Humans are entrusted by God to be caretakers of the Earth. Consequently, humans are obligated to assume accountability for all of their acts (Beekun and Badawi, 2015). Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that God is the ultimate owner of all resources in the universe. However, this does not imply the elimination of private property. Instead, resources should be utilised for the well-being of all individuals. It is crucial for humans to avoid wastefulness and refrain from consuming resources in a conspicuous or excessive manner (Wilson, 2006 ; Chapra, 2000 ; Rice, 1999 ). Moreover, in the trusteeship notion, individuals are motivated to use their utmost efforts in order to construct the world and make use of its resources (Uddin, 2003b ). The concept of trusteeship in Islam is arguably connected to the concept of trust in organisational literature. As custodians of God, humans have a duty to be accountable for all of their activities. This value may be associated with the notion of integrity as suggested by (R. C. Mayer et al., 1995 ). The advice to use resources efficiently and maximise their utility is closely connected to the concept of ability. It may be inferred that the notion of trust in Islam aligns with past research conducted in other fields. Finally, within the trustor-trustee relationship, the dimensions of trust might vary in terms of interpersonal and inter-organizational levels. This notion is supported by an empirical research conducted by Ganesan & Hess ( 1997 ). (Ganesan & Hess, 1997 ) categorised the degree of relationship into four distinct groups: interpersonal, inter-organizational, organisational, and intra-organizational. The authors present the premise that purchasers differentiate between two levels of trust: interpersonal and organisational. This study suggests that the buyer's commitment is influenced by the interpersonal credibility, which includes the qualities of honesty and competence, exhibited by the sales representative. In addition, the buyer's commitment is influenced by the organization's benevolence. Zaheer et al., ( 1998 ) address the complexity of trust by distinguishing between interpersonal trust and inter-organizational trust. Indeed, it is important to be precise about the source and recipient of trust, or in other words, "who trusts whom" (Zaheer et al., 1998 ). Therefore, future research should assign the appropriate trust dimension at varying levels of trust. 4.3. Trust and Lending Outcomes Now, we can finally conclude that the third question at the beginning of this study, which pertains to the influence of trust on lending outcomes, has been addressed. All the research conducted on our SLR consistently emphasise the positive impact of trust on the lending decision. Therefore, it is necessary for future research to investigate the consequences of excessive (blind) trust in borrowers or the negative aspects of trust in bank lending. Zahra, Yavuz, & Ucbasaran ( 2006 ) conducted a study to investigate the impact of relational trust on the establishment of new businesses, focusing on both positive and negative effects. Despite the differences in the setting of new business creation with bank loans, both face the common challenge of asymmetric knowledge between the involved parties. This includes disregarding the external environment, making significant judgement errors, lacking effective control, and individuals acting opportunistically. Excessive trust, in particular, may have a detrimental impact on bank lending. Although not extensively discussed, a study conducted in Vietnam has stated that relying solely on trust can potentially lead to issues, as trust is a subjective concept (Nguyen et al., 2006 ). Excessive trust on borrowers can arise at various points in the relationship, such as when evaluating new loan applications from borrowers who have previously proven themselves to be trustworthy. This lack of objectivity may develop. Furthermore, bank management may reduce their level of oversight towards reliable applicants once a loan has been approved. This could potentially encourage opportunistic behavior among the borrowers. Excessive trust may have a similar impact as the concept of a lazy bank model suggested by Manove, Padilla, & Pagano ( 2001 ). Conversely, in the absence of regulations that safeguard creditors by requiring collateral, banks are motivated to engage in more thorough screening of their borrowers. In addition, banks possess superior knowledge and expertise in the specific industry or venture that the borrowers intend to undertake. Consequently, conducting a screening process could help avoid making an unwise investment. Monitoring is a crucial aspect of banking operations and incurs cost for the bank. Trustors can benefit from working with trustworthy individuals, as they would require less time and resources to ensure that other parties comply with the agreement (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995 ; Dyer & Chu, 2003 ). Monitoring expense is positively correlated with the interest rate imposed to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Excessive trust can lead to insufficient monitoring and ineffective control (Zahra et al., 2006 ). Consequently, this can encourage opportunistic behavior and, in the context of bank lending, lead to a decrease that jeopardises the bank's profitability. Indeed, this negative cycle may be more probable and pose a higher risk in developing nations, where the absence of observation due to challenges in collecting data and information could encourage moral hazard among borrowers. Finally, trust and opportunistic behaviour may exhibit a non-linear connection due to the presence of an optimal degree of monitoring activity. Therefore, we anticipate that future study will delve into the correlation between trust and monitoring. Second, study is required to investigate the impact of trust as a moderating factor on bank lending. Almost all the research we identified investigate the impact of trust on lending outcomes as a direct factor. Trust can function as a moderator in the context of bank lending (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001 ). An approach used by bank managers in Vietnam to establish trust is through the practice of inherited trust. A current client may refer a prospective client to the banker for assistance in obtaining a loan. This suggestion could help the bank conserve resources by streamlining the process of screening and monitoring a new client who has no prior history with the bank. Nevertheless, this impact could be enhanced by a moderating element, specifically, the level of trustworthiness of the current consumer who provides the suggestion. Third, with the exception of the study conducted by Kautonen et al. ( 2020 ), nearly all of the survey-based studies included in our systematic literature review employ cross-sectional data gathering methods. Subsequent investigations on bank lending and trust ought to examine the longitudinal correlation between trust and lending outcomes. The duration of the connection is a crucial factor in establishing trust. Bank managers may be able to gain a better level of trust if they have a longer amount of experience (Howorth & Moro, 2006 ). This is due to the beneficial learning impact of the period. It is worth mentioning that the duration of a relationship and inter-organizational trust follows an inverted U-shaped pattern (Zhong, Su, Peng, & Yang, 2017 ). The trustor may initially profit from the relationship, but as the relationship progresses, familiarity might lead to opportunistic behaviour due to the trustor becoming less vigilant in monitoring. In addition, the development and violation of trust are dynamic processes (R. Lewicki & Bunker, 1996 ). Trust can be divided into three phases: building, stability, and declining (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998b ). Therefore, it is important to compare the role of trust in new borrowers, where banks have no historical information or experience, with existing customers, where banks have gathered information through repeated interactions. Fourth, it may be concluded that prior studies on trust and bank lending, encompassing both conventional and Islamic banks, have not provided a thorough analysis of risk. Undoubtedly, different products in bank lending, whether in Islamic banks or conventional banks, vary in terms of risk levels. Therefore, the potential risk that a bank faces with different products can impact the trust, as well as the bank's decision to provide financing for a particular product over another. Furthermore, our knowledge regarding the influence of trustworthiness on lending outcomes in Islamic banks is currently lacking. Although an empirical study on Islamic banks has demonstrated a negative correlation between the trustworthiness of financing customers and the margin charged (Wijaya & Moro, 2022 ), further research should be conducted to empirically investigate this relationship. Various institutional aspects inherent in Islamic banks may potentially impact risk management techniques, as well as the importance of trust in these banks. 5. Conclusion This particular SLR has generated the first synthesis of bank lending, trust, and SMEs literature. We have extracted information from 20 papers by focusing on three primary themes: the trust building process, the concept of trust, and the lending outcomes. Emerging countries exhibit distinct characteristics compared to developed countries in terms of their lending infrastructure and societal cultural aspects. Lenders are likely to encounter increased information asymmetry, more risk, and greater uncertainty. As we have not come across a multi-national study on the relationship between trust and financing decisions, we have identified the investigation of trust's role in loan availability in developed and developing nations as an extra key issue. We also suggest that a comparative study should be conducted to explore the role of trust/trust building process in different cultural contexts, such as comparing high power distance vs low power distance or comparing high uncertainty avoidance vs low uncertainty avoidance. Insufficient focus has been given to the process of restoring trust in bank lending and the impact of excessive trust on lending outcomes. Furthermore, future research should investigate the impact of trust on bank lending during various stages, such as establishment, stability, or termination. Also, future study on trust and bank lending should investigate the responses of bank managers and borrowers in various scenarios and in relation to reciprocal behaviour when trust is violated. Additionally, it should explore strategies for repairing trust at different stages of trust development. Our systematic literature review (SLR) also indicated a lack of research that specifically investigates the process of trust building, the role of trust on financing outcomes, and the concept of trust in Islamic banks. Undoubtedly, the characteristics of the products in Islamic banking vary from those of conventional banking, especially in terms of risk. Therefore, Islamic banks may necessitate varying levels of trust. Although risk is a crucial factor in the trust model, there has been no research conducted on the correlation between risk and trust in various lending products. The majority of the articles analysed in this study focus solely on the direct impact of trust on financing decisions, such as interest rates, collateralization, and loan availability. Therefore, we propose that an important area for additional investigation is the examination of trust as a moderating factor, in addition to its direct impact on access to credit. Trust can be understood in terms of two primary dimensions: competence or skill or ability and values (ethical aspects). Indeed, research on trust and bank lending has been implemented and measured at both the individual and organisational levels. Future research should also consider the utilisation of suitable dimensions at various levels of trust and circumstance. All the research conducted on our SLR consistently emphasise the positive impact of trust on the lending decision. Therefore, it is necessary for future research to investigate the consequences of excessive (blind) trust in borrowers or the negative aspects of trust in bank lending It can be argued that this SLR may have limitation. Our review does not include unpublished work, conference papers, or books. Nevertheless, this SLR has the potential to make a substantial addition to our understanding. Initially, we have categorised the trust, bank lending and SMEs literature into three primary themes. Furthermore, we have proposed a recommendation for future research to augment our comprehension of trust and lending decision-making. We have no conflicts of interest to disclose. Declarations Author Contribution N.N. and I.F.W and B.S decide the keywords combination that will be used in Scopus database. N.N. and I.F.W wrote the main manuscript text. N.N. and I.F.W prepared the figure and tables. 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J Manag 43:1050–1075 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files Appendix.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Published Journal Publication published 02 Dec, 2024 Read the published version in International Review of Economics → Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 18 Aug, 2024 Reviews received at journal 18 Aug, 2024 Reviewers agreed at journal 08 Jul, 2024 Reviewers invited by journal 02 Jul, 2024 Editor assigned by journal 28 Jun, 2024 Submission checks completed at journal 28 Jun, 2024 First submitted to journal 18 Jun, 2024 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-4602286","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":323947453,"identity":"e4b29f40-b6f4-49c1-a561-042a524a1c55","order_by":0,"name":"Nieldya Nofandrilla","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Nieldya","middleName":"","lastName":"Nofandrilla","suffix":""},{"id":323947454,"identity":"d5ca41d4-4fcd-490d-a65e-68e7bc32736e","order_by":1,"name":"Ibrahim Fatwa Wijaya","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Sebelas Maret University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Ibrahim","middleName":"Fatwa","lastName":"Wijaya","suffix":""},{"id":323947455,"identity":"c1c8540f-5991-413a-b367-10a2477cf146","order_by":2,"name":"Bambang Setiaji","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Bambang","middleName":"","lastName":"Setiaji","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2024-06-18 23:59:07","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4602286/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4602286/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[{"content":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-024-00477-4","type":"published","date":"2024-12-02T15:57:18+00:00"}],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":60847926,"identity":"8278a535-9f88-4414-b34d-5425801defe1","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-07-22 19:45:00","extension":"jpeg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":436563,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eUnnumbered image in the Methodology section.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4602286/v1/606e0198665b6968e82ba5fe.jpeg"},{"id":60847927,"identity":"8148957f-4d08-480f-9aa4-533ae9f19d76","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-07-22 19:45:00","extension":"jpeg","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":141744,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFigure 1. The Identification of Key Themes in The Articles.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage2.jpeg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4602286/v1/0eb4c9f8bb5f14fcfb4a777c.jpeg"},{"id":70965451,"identity":"3edee826-9b5d-426a-a1bb-14b7c3eeafa8","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-12-09 16:19:55","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1573243,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4602286/v1/7d32731f-4b5f-4202-aa13-cb9ce18ddb68.pdf"},{"id":60847925,"identity":"1adf944d-e26e-4c37-8f77-eec146ef7887","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-07-22 19:45:00","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":48094,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Appendix.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4602286/v1/3157f22126ada8d8ce6020ad.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Does Trust Matters in Lending Decision? A Systematic Literature Review and Research Agendas for Future Studies","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn the 13th century, Italian trade mostly relied on \"carte di commenda,\" which involved traders gathering funds from wealthy people to purchase goods in Europe. These goods were then sold in the Middle East, and the profits were reinvested in new products that would be traded upon the traders' return to Europe. Interestingly, the wealthy financier lacked genuine or efficient authority over the dealer or the trade, and the \"partnership\" relied solely on trust. Similarly, in the 7th century Islamic world, a system of financing based on trust, known as profit-loss sharing (\u003cem\u003eMudharaba\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003eMusharaka\u003c/em\u003e) contract, was employed to provide financial support to tribes and wealthy entrepreneurs. These individuals engaged in international trade and required substantial funds for purchasing commodities to be exported and imported, as well as for financing their difficult commercial ventures (Chapra, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e). The reliance on trust remained significant for \u003cem\u003eMaghribi\u003c/em\u003e traders, who were representative of the Islamic world during the 13th century (Greif, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e). The use of \u0026ldquo;carte di commenda\u0026rdquo; and the influence of the Islamic world all demonstrate the significant reliance on trust in the financing systems of the Middle Ages. There were not many significant changes in the world during the subsequent centuries. In the present day, the financial and banking system still depends on trust (Lipartito, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Wijaya, Moro, \u0026amp; Belghitar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). The primary reasons for the capital markets freezing in September 2008, which led to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, were the complete absence of trust among banks. They refused to lend to each other because they doubted the ability of their counterparts to repay the borrowed money.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo mitigate the issue of borrowers' dishonesty/moral hazard, one possible solution is to require borrowers to provide collateral as a guarantee (Benston \u0026amp; Smith, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1976\u003c/span\u003e). Nevertheless, small businesses may have challenges in meeting this requirement (World Bank, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, the assessment and retrieval of collateral in a lacking law enforcement setting may pose challenges for bank managers. The bank, acting as a financial middleman, may gather data regarding their borrowers. These actions may be facilitated by doing financial statement analysis, as suggested by Benston and Smith (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1976\u003c/span\u003e). However, these lending technologies may not be appropriate for opaque borrowers. Various categories of borrowers may exhibit varying levels of accounting information quality. According to Danos, Holt, \u0026amp; Imhoff (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1989\u003c/span\u003e), audited financial statements from large borrowers tend to contain high-quality accounting information. Medium-sized borrowers generally give acceptable accounting information, while the quality of accounting information from small borrowers is uneven. In addition, small borrowers may fail to distinguish their income and expenses from their personal endeavours. Therefore, lenders may employ alternative lending technologies to cater to small borrowers, including credit scoring, asset-based lending, factoring, fixed-asset lending, leasing, and relationship lending (Berger \u0026amp; Udell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, in order to gain a thorough assessment of the opaque borrowers, it is necessary to complement the objective evaluation with a subjective evaluation. The reason for this is because objective evaluation is unable to reveal the borrowers' personality traits, such as their motivation and competency, which can have an impact on the success of their business. This evaluation includes a subjective assessment that takes into account informal relationships built on trust (Ferrary, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, the utilisation of relationship lending, a lending technology that incorporates soft information about borrowers, has the potential to mitigate credit rationing (Petersen \u0026amp; Rajan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR83\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e). Some borrowers are prepared to apply for loans from banks, even if banks charge higher interest rates compared to other investment schemes (Fama, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1985\u003c/span\u003e). In addition, they are willing to let lenders access to their information in order to secure a loan. Applying appropriate lending technology to borrowers can effectively reduce information asymmetry, hence increasing the likelihood of success (Ferri \u0026amp; Murro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Interestingly, an increasing amount of research aims to enhance the existing research on relationship lending by specifically examining trust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOverall, history indicates that trust plays a crucial role in the financial industry as a whole, and specifically in the relationship lending. Therefore, it is crucial to thoroughly examine the limited existing research on the subject to gain a more precise understanding of its function in relationship lending and provide research agenda for future studies. Furthermore, it is crucial to investigate if trust plays distinct roles when considering cultural factors that influence the development of the financial system.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo best of our knowledge, this study is the first systematic literature review (SLR) that focuses on analysing the existing body of research on trust in the context of bank lending and SMEs. We assess prior research on the role of trust by reviewing studies that have investigated the relationship between trust and variables such as credit amount, interest rates, and collateral requirements. We also examine literature that explains the development of trust in lending relationships, encompassing its establishment, growth, and potential dissolution. The primary inquiry of this study is: Does trust have any influence in contemporary lending relationships? The subsequent research topics served as the guiding framework for our Systematic Literature Review (SLR): (1) How can bank managers and borrowers build trust in diverse cultural and lending environments? (2) Which dimensions of trust are analysed in the lending decision? (3) What is the influence of the borrowers' trustworthiness on lending outcomes?\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInteresting enough we discover that research focused on trust as a determinant of lending decision: if the provider of funds trust the counterpart, it will be likely that the counterpart will be successful in securing the funds. There are many potential areas for future research to enhance our understanding in trust, bank lending, and SMEs literature such as: (1) We suggest that a comparative study should be conducted to explore the role of trust/trust building process in different cultural contexts, such as comparing high power distance vs low power distance or comparing high uncertainty avoidance vs low uncertainty avoidance; (2) Insufficient focus has been given to the process of restoring trust in bank lending and the impact of excessive trust on lending outcomes; (3) Our systematic literature review (SLR) also indicated a lack of research that specifically investigates the process of trust building, the role of trust on financing outcomes, and the concept of trust in Islamic banks; (4) We propose that an important area for additional investigation is the examination of trust as a moderating factor, in addition to its direct impact on access to credit; (5) Future research should also consider the utilisation of suitable dimensions of trust at various levels of trust and circumstance; and (6) All the research conducted on our systematic literature review (SLR) consistently emphasise the positive impact of trust on the lending decision. Therefore, it is necessary for future research to investigate the consequences of excessive (blind) trust in borrowers or the negative aspects of trust in bank lending.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe present systematic literature review is arranged as follows. The first section provides an introduction to the study. The second section provides a methodology and an analysis of the systematic literature review approach. The third section analyses the findings based on the main themes. The fourth component pertains to the topic of future research, while the final section encompasses the conclusion.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003e2.1. Study design\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe follow Tranfield, Denyer, \u0026amp; Smart (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR98\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e) when performing this SLR. We perform three main stages: (1) We formulate the research questions; (2) We identify relevant literature that needs to be included in the review; and (3) We perform SLR and we summarize the main themes of the relevant literature and we suggest future research agenda. We rely on Scopus database to find relevant literature in trust and bank lending.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.2. Data selection strategy\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe began our SLR by identifying keywords and search terms. For this purpose, we conducted a thorough analysis of literature in two primary domains, namely bank lending and trust, and discussed on the potential keywords. Using this information, we determine a set of search terms that can be used to locate publications that are relevant to the issue at hand. Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e presents the combination of search strings that we used.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSearch string for Systematic Literature Review\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMain Term\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdditional Terms\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLend\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLend* OR loan* OR credit* OR financ*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSME\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSme* OR \"small medium size* enterprise*\" OR \"small medium enterprise*\" OR \"small business\" OR \"small firm*\" OR \"small enterprise*\" OR \"small company*\" OR \"micro enterprise*\" OR \"micro firm*\" OR \"micro business\" OR \u0026ldquo;entrepreneur*\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank* OR \"small bank*\" OR \"rural bank*\" OR \"islam* bank*\" OR \"cooperative* bank*\"\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust* OR distrust OR mistrust\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eKeywords enterred in Scopus Database\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"2\"\u003eTITLE-ABS-KEY ( ( lend* OR loan* OR credit* OR financ* ) AND ( sme* OR \"small medium size* enterprise*\" OR \"small medium enterprise*\" OR \"small business\" OR \"small firm*\" OR \"small enterprise*\" OR \"small company*\" OR \"micro enterprise*\" OR \"micro firm*\" OR \"micro business\" OR \"entrepreneur*\" ) AND ( bank* OR islamic AND bank* ) AND ( trust* OR distrust OR mistrust ) )\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e-------\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e HERE\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e-------\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThere are other explanations for our choice of this combination. First, there are mainly two ways to obtain information from borrowers: utilising information gathering technologies and establishing an intimate and ongoing business relationship with borrowers, as suggested by (Lummer \u0026amp; McConnell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1989\u003c/span\u003e). The proponent of the latter strategy, (Fama, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1985\u003c/span\u003e), highlighted that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) choose to share information with their banks through personal interaction as it is a more cost-effective alternative compared to sharing information with the public as a whole. Important aspects of the interaction between SMEs and their banks include the duration of the relationship, the usage of different products by borrowers, and the concentration of borrowing. These characteristics were highlighted by Petersen and Rajan in 1994. Relationship lending is a lending method that can effectively address the issue of opaqueness for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Berger \u0026amp; Udell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e; Petersen \u0026amp; Rajan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR83\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e). Relationship lending can facilitate lending decisions by allowing bank managers to acquire soft information about borrowers and evaluate their creditworthiness (Berger \u0026amp; Udell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). Transferring information obtained by bank managers is a challenging task (Stein, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e). Small banks typically opt for qualitative criteria or the \"character\" approach when working with SMEs (Cole, Goldberg, \u0026amp; White, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, the subjective assessment derived from the informal relationship between bank managers and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) could support the lending decision (Ferrary, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, in order to enhance comprehension of the concepts of trust and bank lending, we include the term \"Islamic bank\" as a supplementary term for the term \"bank\". The justifications for integrating this sequence are: (1) Islamic banks should adhere to Islamic principles in their operations; (2) Islamic banks provide distinct financing schemes compared to conventional banks; and (3) Islamic banks encounter unique risks that differ from those faced by conventional banks (Hassan \u0026amp; Aliyu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Kabir Hassan, Khan, \u0026amp; Paltrinieri, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Khan \u0026amp; Ahmed, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e Thirdly, we broaden the scope of the SME concept by including the terms \"micro\" and \"entrepreneur.\" The reasons are as follows: Firstly, we acknowledge that the issue of trust in relation to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is a novel and emerging concern. Therefore, we may anticipate producing a restricted quantity of literature. (2) We are interested in studying literature on microfinance because it can offer valuable insights into the importance of trust. (3) The classification of micro and small firms may vary among different studies and nations. Zambaldi et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR108\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e, p. 311) defined the small business credit segment as the sector that deals with providing modest loans to customers with low annual revenues. Their investigation did not employ precise figures to elucidate the reasons behind the low annual revenues. According to Beck et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e, p. 38), banks often categorise small enterprises as those with annual sales ranging from \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e200,000 to \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e4\u0026nbsp;million, and medium-sized firms as those with revenues between \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e2\u0026nbsp;million and \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e16\u0026nbsp;million. According to the Commission of the European Union (Recommendation 2003/361/EC), a micro-firm is defined as a company that has an annual turnover of no more than EUR 2\u0026nbsp;million or employs fewer than ten people. A small firm, on the other hand, is defined as an enterprise that has an annual revenue between EUR 2\u0026nbsp;million and EUR 10\u0026nbsp;million or employs fewer than 50 people. An SME, as defined by the US Government, is a business that employs less than 500 individuals (USITC, 2010). In Indonesia, firms with annual sales below 22,000 US dollars are categorised as microenterprises, while those with annual sales between 22,000 US dollars and 185,000 US dollars are classified as small enterprises, according to Law 20/2008. Overall, there is no universally accepted definition for tiny or micro enterprises.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFourth, in the field of trust study, the prior engagement between the one placing trust (trustor) and the person being trusted (trustee) holds significance as it allows the trustor to assess the level of trustworthiness of the trustee (Bromiley \u0026amp; Cummings, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, prior experience can facilitate the sharing of information between two persons, which in turn can foster trust (Gulati, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). Finally, with the integration of SMEs and trust, we can establish the parameters for our literature search. We broaden the concept of trust to include both distrust and mistrust. Distrust and mistrust are the opposite meanings of trust, as defined by Merriam-Webster (\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"http://www.merriam-webster.com\" target=\"_blank\"\u003ewww.merriam-webster.com\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"http://www.merriam-webster.com\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e). Trust and distrust can coexist within the continuum, as discussed by (Lewicki et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e). We do not include the dimensions of trust in any additional terms in our search queries. Interestingly, the word \"trust\" has multiple connotations, including its use as a psychological statement (Mayer et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e), an expectation (Deutsch, 1958), or a reliance (Hosmer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). Nevertheless, trust does not have the same meaning as cooperation (Rousseau et al., 1998), risk (Roger C. Mayer, Davies, \u0026amp; Schoorman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e), and confidence (Luhmann, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; Tinsley, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe search query was inputted into the Scopus database. The initial inclusion criteria for our database search is the paper must be published in a peer-reviewed publication. A total of 152 items were discovered. We use the Scopus database, a widely used database for rigorous scientific production in social science (PEREZ et al 2020). In addition, Google Scholar has many unaudited articles of low quality or lacking scientific measures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTitle and abstract screening have been performed to determine whether papers necessitate a more comprehensive assessment of the full text. The criteria for inclusion at this stage are as follows: (1) The paper examines trust in various types of relationships, such as interpersonal trust, inter-organizational trust, and organisational trust. However, we exclude paper that discusses general trust; (2) The paper considers theoretical, conceptual, review, and empirical studies, both quantitative and qualitative; and (3) The article adopts an approach to understand the lending (in Islamic term is \u0026ldquo;financing\u0026rdquo;) relationship between borrowers and lenders. This approach considers the perspectives of the lenders, the standpoint of the borrowers, or both. Upon conducting an analysis of 152 titles and abstracts, a total of 61 papers that were relevant to the study were discovered. Appendix 1 provides more details on 91 papers that were excluded, along with the primary reason for their exclusion. The comprehensive evaluation comprises 61 papers that majority focus on the topics of trust in bank lending. Appendix 2 displays a total of 61 articles that were utilised for additional evaluation of their full-text content.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOut of the 61 papers that were analysed, we identified only 20 articles that were relevant to the topics of trust, bank lending, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Based on our analysis, we have determined that 41 articles are not relevant for inclusion in the next phase. The articles primarily covered the following topics: (1) the relationship between trust and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) but in the context of relationship marketing; (2) macroeconomic issues; (3) discouraged borrowers; (4) credit rationing; (5) law; (6) network and financing; (7) general trust and financing; (8) multiple banking relationships; (9) trust restoration within the framework of relationship marketing; (10) cognitive bias in financing decisions; (11) trust and financial inclusion; (12) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS); and (13) trust and informal loans. Additionally, we eliminate four items from the total of 40 articles due to their non-English language. In addition, we assessed the quality of the pertinent papers and made the decision to exclude several articles.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGiven the scarcity of relevant articles, it was decided that all articles, regardless of whether they are indexed in ABS journals, would be included in the analyses if they fulfil our qualitative requirements. To summarise, we broaden our inclusion criteria in order to acquire a maximum amount of pertinent information. Overall, our final collection comprises 20 publications that examine the topics of trust, bank lending, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e displays 20 sets of publications utilised in the systematic literature review (SLR), categorised by journal ranking, methodology, sample, and primary findings.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e20 Selected Articles\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"8\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNo\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor and Publication\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTitle\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eABS \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eStars\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSCI-\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMAGO\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMethodology\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSample\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eResult\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHoworth and Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e) \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSmall Business Economics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrustworthiness and interest rates: an empirical study of Italian SMEs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003esurvey, factor analysis and OLS regression\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey to loan managers; 308 in South Tyrol and 57 in Friuli Venezia Giulia, Italy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMore trust less interest rate charged\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHoworth and Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust within entrepreneur bank relationships: Insights from Italy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterview\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e20 entrepreneurs\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 bank managers\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ein Italy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. The authors propose 11 propositions\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eexamples: \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ebank manager trust (+) credit availability\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ebank manager trust (-) loan default\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ebank manager trust (-) request for collateral\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ebank manager trust (-) cost of finance\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Both parties, bank managers and small business, use ability, benevolence and integrity to asses other trustworthiness\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. information from third parties is a powerful influences to the bank managers\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNguyen, LE, and Freeman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAsia Pacific Business Review\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust and Uncertainty: A Study of Bank Lending to Private SMEs in Vietnam\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterview\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e23 credit officers and senior managers from 11 different banks (State and private banks), located in both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. bank managers find difficulty when lending to SME,\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. bank managers' strategies : short term lending, carefully lending procedure, commitment from borrower, order from customers, rely on trust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. bank managers gathering information by developing their own information network and by directly interacting with firms\u0026rsquo; managers\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e4. state-owned banks rely on inherited trust more frequently than do private banks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHern\u0026aacute;ndez-C\u0026aacute;novas and Mart\u0026iacute;nez-Solano (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSmall Business Economics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRelationship lending and SME financing in the continental European bank-based system\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegression\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e182 SME in Murcia, Spain\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe impact of trust on credit renewal is positive\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSengupta (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR91\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Journal of Entrepreneurship\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNetwork Strategy and Access to Business Finance: Indian Entrepreneurs in the Information and Communication Technology Industry\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003en/a\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ecase studies with in depth interview\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e30 entrepreneurs\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom 4 cities\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn India\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. In general, trust play important role. Individual willingness to finance entrepreneur is beyond creditworthiness. \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Network play role in asses trustworthiness and creditworthiness of organization/person.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHarper (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e) \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSmall Enterprise Development\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMusharaka partnership financing - an approach to venture capital for microenterprise\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003en/a\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003econceptual paper/descriptive\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eno sample\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Problem on microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ea. Individual failure. \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eb. Inflation. \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Musharaka\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ea. musharaka may overcome inflation problem\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eb. Successful community banking depends on openness and sharing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoro and Fink (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJournal of Banking \u0026amp; Finance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLoan managers' trust and credit access for SMEs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003efactor analysis\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eregression\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9 Banks participated. 6 in South Tyrol (298 observations) and 3 in Friuli (151 observations). \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinal sample 449 bank-firm relationship\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust (+) amount credit granted \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhen separate:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbility (+) amount credit granted\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBen/Integrity (+) amount credit granted\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHanif and Iqbal (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Journal of Social Sciences\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIslamic financing and business framework: A survey\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003en/a\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003esurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ecorrelation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e68 respondents \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e30 top or middle level finance prof\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e17 islamic banking professional\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e15 entrepreneurs\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 academicians \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePakistan\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHurdles of Musharaka:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Lack of trust and confidence in Musharaka partner\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Outcome is unknown. Risk is difficult to be managed\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehmann and Neuberger (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJournal of Economic Behavior \u0026amp; Organization\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDo lending relationships matter? Evidence from bank survey data in Germany\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003esurvey \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eregression\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1200 questionnaire sent to loan managers. 3 banks: big private banks, state-owned saving banks and cooperative banks\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eN: 354\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ein Germany\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. In general: The empirical analysis of bank lending to small and medium-sized firms in Germany has confirmed that availability and terms of loans are influenced by social interactions between loan officer and bank manager.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eKautonen T.; Fredriksson A.; Minniti M.; Moro A. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJournal of Business Venturing Insights\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust-based banking and SMEs\u0026rsquo; access to credit\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConfirmatory factor analysis\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegression\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterviews\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey to 433 SMEs (CEO, CFO, or equivalent) (first wave) and for the second wave, survey to 203 firms that self-reported having positive bank debt in wave 1 (second wave)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnd\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterview with 15 SME managers that participated in the survey and 10 loan officers from commercial and cooperative banks\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Perceived trustworthiness (+) credit access\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Information accuracy (+) credit access\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e3. perceived trustworthiness has a\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003estronger effect on credit access when information accuracy is low\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePalazuelos E.; Herrero Crespo \u0026Aacute;.; Montoya del Corte J. (2020)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagerial Auditing Journal\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuditing and credit granting to SMEs: an integrative perceptual model\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterviews\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSEM\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey to 471 bank loan officers\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Loan officers\u0026rsquo; perceived trust has a direct positive influence on their willingness to provide access to credit to SMEs\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Loan officers\u0026rsquo; perceived trust has a direct positive influence on their willingness to apply3favourable conditions to SMEs.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoro A.; Fink M.; Maresch D.; Fredriksson A. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEntrepreneurship and Regional Development\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLoan managers\u0026rsquo; decisions and trust in entrepreneurs in different institutional contexts\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey to 450 loan managers\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Trust affects the amount of credit obtained differently according to the local normative institutions\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. TRUST is significant at p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01 in the case of small banks, but it is not significant in the case of large banks\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e13\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHirsch B.; Nitzl C.; Schoen M. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJournal of Banking and Finance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterorganizational trust and agency costs in credit relationships between savings banks and SMEs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSEM - PLS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey to 17 relationship managers and 16 credit risk officers. 162 questionnaires collected\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Habitualization is negatively associated with the importance of hard information\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Habitualization is positively associated with the reliability of hard information3.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTang Y.; Moro A.; Sozzo S.; Li Z. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR96\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinancial Innovation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eModelling trust evolution within small business lending relationships\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003en/a\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimulation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Where the bank trusts a small business and the small business rewards the endowed trust, then the mutual trust level of both the bank and the small business increases along with their mutual interactions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Where a bank trusts a small business and the small business takes opportunistic behaviour without repaying the loan, the altruism propensity of both the bank and the small business endures a gradual drop.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePalazuelos E.; Crespo \u0026Aacute;.H.; del Corte J.M. (2018) \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSmall Business Economics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAccounting information quality and trust as determinants of credit granting to SMEs: the role of external audit\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e471 respondents (bank loan officers)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Loan officer-perceived SME\u0026rsquo;shonesty hasa positive effect on the willingness to grant credit.(only in non-audited SMEs)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. Loan officer-perceived SME\u0026rsquo;s competence has a positive effect on the willingness to grant credit (in both audited and non-audited SMEs)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOkello Candiya Bongomin G.; Malinga C.A.; Amani A.M.; Balinda R. (2024)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternational Journal of Sociology and Social Policy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe role of trust as an informal social mechanism for contract enforcement among young women microenterprises in financial markets in sub-Saharan Africa\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSEM\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e395 respondents (young women owners/managers of the MSMEs)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust significantly and positively promote access to microcredit by young women microenterprises in sub-Saharan Africa\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e17\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBika Z.; Subalova M.; Locke C. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJournal of Development Studies\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMicrofinance and Small Business Development in a Transitional Economy: Insights from Borrowers\u0026rsquo; Relations with Microfinance Organisations in Kazakhstan\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterviews\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSemi-structured interviews\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6 interviews (founding members of the Association of MFOs of\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKazakhstan)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e23 loan evaluation officers\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e151\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eentrepreneurial borrowers\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1. Trust is the most crucial thing in relationship lending.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2. The Private MFOs valued more personalised relationships with their clients because they enabled\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ethem to access soft information from their borrowers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTalaulikar H.; Hegde Desai P.; Borde N. (2022)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagerial Finance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDo risk attitude and trust moderate bank managers' risk perceptions in lending to micro, small, medium enterprises?\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExploratory factor analysis\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eregression\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e218 bank managers\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe higher the trust and more positive is the risk taking attitude, the lower will be the bank managers\u0026rsquo; risk perception in financing MSMEs,\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003edespite the presence of information asymmetry\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoutillier S. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEuropean Journal of Innovation Management\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe economics of the entrepreneur and the banker historical roots and contributions to the management of innovation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConceptual paper\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne of the propositions is Entrepreneurs and bank managers develop social relationships to manage uncertainty and reduce risk by creating a relationship of trust. The entrepreneur is looking for\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003einvestment opportunities and the banker is looking for innovative entrepreneurs\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ewho offer strong repayment guarantees.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e20\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWijaya, IF ; Moro, A., (2022)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBorsa Istanbul Review\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrustworthiness and margins in Islamic small business financing: Evidence from Indonesia\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003en/a\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eExploratory factor analysis\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eregression\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSurvey to Islamic Banks Managers in Indonesia.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e520 observations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust is negatively associated with the margins charged to small businesses\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e---------\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e HERE\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e---------\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3. Findings","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1. Descriptive Findings\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe majority of the articles are categorized as empirical studies. We can only found two conceptual paper which discussed trust in the conventional bank, and it was published in 4 stars and 1 star journal. We also find one conceptual paper which discussed \u003cem\u003emusharaka\u003c/em\u003e and Islamic microfinance but with a very little discussion on the trust issue. In the SMEs and bank relationship, we found four articles contributed from Italy, two from Germany, three from Spain, two from India, and one each from Indonesia, Pakistan, Finland, Uganda, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam. Hence, most research in trust and bank-lending context appears to have been conducted in developed countries. In term of the age of the publication, overall there is an increasing trend from 1994 (the first article that discussed trust and bank lending) to 2024. Also, we found that 17 articles discussing trust in the conventional bank's context and three that deal with trust in the context of Islamic banks. As far as the methodology used is concerned, we found that majority of the papers incorporate survey and regression.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSaparito et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR90\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) state that there are three approaches to comprehending the correlation between banks and SMEs: examining the viewpoint of banks as lenders, examining the viewpoint of borrowers, and considering both perspectives simultaneously. Within the framework of trust and bank lending, our research identified 9 papers that utilised the bank managers as a primary source of information to investigate the connection between the bank and SMEs. The relationship is examined from the viewpoint of SMEs in 6 articles, while in the other 3 articles, information is gathered from both perspectives.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eArguably, due to the subjective and complicated nature of trust, as well as its multidimensional aspects, it may be less reliable to ask SMEs about whether they gained trust from bank managers. Instead, it would be more reliable to directly ask the loan managers themselves (Sepp\u0026auml;nen, Blomqvist, \u0026amp; Sundqvist, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR92\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Tyler \u0026amp; Stanley, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR99\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehmann \u0026amp; Neuberger (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) highlight the distinction between their research and the study conducted by Harhoff \u0026amp; K\u0026ouml;rting (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e) by emphasising their preference for surveying loan managers. Interestingly, managers in small banks are more motivated to conduct research on their borrowers because they possess greater autonomy in allocating resources compared to managers in large banks (Stein, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, the lack of transparency in small businesses makes relationship lending an effective approach for giving financing to them. Bank managers collect soft information about borrowers over the course of their relationship (Berger \u0026amp; Udell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2. Thematic analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe analysis of the 20 selected articles differs based on the specific circumstances and approach used. Quantitative analysis studies mostly focus on assessing the influence of trust on lending outcomes. Qualitative studies delve into the process of trust-building through in-depth discussions. After analysing these 20 papers, three main themes emerged: the process of building trust, the concept of trust, and the role of trust on lending outcomes. The trust building process involves the use of the SLR to emphasise the tactics employed by bank management in managing risk and uncertainty across diverse cultural and lending contexts. In addition to this method, bank managers must collect qualitative information on borrowers to assist in their lending decisions. Subsequently, the dimensions of trust and methods for measuring trust can be determined. Finally, our SLR investigates the influence of trust on the lending outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e---------\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFigure \u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e Here\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e--------\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.1. Trust Building Process\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe process of building trust might be highlighted in relation to the lenders' approach for dealing with challenges in acquiring official data, managing risk and uncertainty, and navigating local cultures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank managers in Vietnam face challenges when it comes to evaluating financial performance, conducting asset assessment for collateral purposes, and obtaining credit history, credit rating, and information about the financial environment. Therefore, they must depend on trust to uphold their lending judgements, both on an individual and institutional basis. Bank managers have a preference for providing loans that have a short-term duration. They also tend to follow more strict lending procedures and may ask for sales orders from customers as extra proof to manage the levels of risk and uncertainty involved (Nguyen, Le, \u0026amp; Freeman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). However, the latter approach incurs significant transaction costs. Trust-based loans cannot fully substitute non-trust strategies due to their inherent subjectivity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBanks in India demonstrate a willingness to assume more risks by providing loans to IT entrepreneurs without requiring collateral. This phenomenon is facilitated via networking. Networking can facilitate the evaluation of the reliability and financial credibility of potential borrowers (Sengupta, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR91\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). In highly developed countries such as the UK, trust is not relied upon in situations that involve a significant level of risk. Bank managers are willing to permit shortcuts only when there is a minimal amount of risk and uncertainty (Tyler \u0026amp; Stanley, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR99\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). While in Kazahkstan, trust is the most crucial thing in the relationship lending (Bika, Subalova, \u0026amp; Locke, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWithin the European Union, loan managers could potentially benefit from the utilisation of empirical data obtained from external sources. Chambers of Commerce may offer companies' annual financial statements. The central bank database of a country may also supply credit records. In addition, the Central Bank also offers insights into the financial environment through the utilisation of a survey (Moro \u0026amp; Fink, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Banks should also establish an internal system for assessing the creditworthiness of their borrowers (Hirsch, Nitzl, \u0026amp; Schoen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Lehmann \u0026amp; Neuberger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eNevertheless, the establishment of trust is also heavily influenced by external sources of information and the perception of one's reputation (Howorth \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Italian loan managers concur that insights from fellow customers, suppliers, and the community yield superior quality evaluations for clients. This gossip and information will become particularly significant in situations when bank managers lack direct access to information. The local community may potentially penalise present borrowers for engaging in opportunistic behaviour in the future (Carnevali, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e). The borrowers' reputation is readily accessible within the local community, which is why this is the case.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank managers in Vietnam employ strategies such as constructing their own information network and establishing direct communication with corporate managers to acquire information about their borrowers (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). The networks comprise individuals from the banking sector, government officials, business professionals, acquaintances, and family members. However, unlike Italian bank managers, Vietnamese bank managers emphasise that the primary source of information is the relationship with the small business's manager. During the interaction, lenders may evaluate the firm's management quality, integrity, and competency. Bank managers rely on intuition to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers, and this assessment holds greater significance than the financial data (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). An alternative approach to fostering trust in Vietnam is through the utilisation of an inherited mechanism (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Bank managers place their trust in clients who have a history of loyalty, a referral from a credible organisation or respected individuals, and a personal relationship with the bank managers. In the same vein, according to bank managers in Finland, the most crucial information comes from discussions with small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) managers. This knowledge is unique and cannot be found in written documents (Kautonen, Fredriksson, Minniti, \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, bank managers in Finland place significant emphasis on the necessity of soft information in order to have a more profound understanding of both clients and their businesses.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe readily available information might be advantageous for both borrowers and lenders. Bank managers can gain a better level of trust by gathering more information from both third parties and the firm, especially when the duration of the relationship is longer (Howorth \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Obtaining and monitoring information can be made more cost-effective by including input from the local community (Carnevali, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e). Bank managers may lower the interest rate imposed on SMEs if the expenses associated with collecting information and monitoring may be minimised.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurthermore, varying regions within the country can lead to differing role of trust. In regions such as South Tyrol, where there is a language barrier, a tight local community has emerged, characterised by a high level of familiarity among its members. Research has demonstrated that close-knit communities have a significant role in fostering the establishment of trust (Moro, Fink, Maresch, \u0026amp; Fredriksson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Conversely, in situations where there is no language barrier, such as in Friuli, it can have a negative impact on the likelihood of a loan manager forming a good relationship with a customer (Moro et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Overall, variations in the normative institutional environment that is specific to each region might impact the capacity of loan managers to effectively utilise trust. In this regard, Friuli is at a disadvantage when compared to South Tyrol.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, the simulation finding presented by Tang, Moro, Sozzo, \u0026amp; Li (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR96\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) offers valuable insights on trust building process. When a bank trusts a small business and the small business reciprocates, both parties experience an increase in their tendency to reciprocate and act altruistically. This inclination continues to build as they engage repeatedly.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.2. The concept of Trust\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.2.2.1. T\u003cem\u003erust Dimension\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo studies of trust, bank lending, and SMEs use direct, unidimensional measurement of trust by asking SMEs, \u0026ldquo;When granting finance, do the financial institutions take their trust in the firm\u0026rsquo;s managers into account?\u0026rdquo; (Hern\u0026aacute;ndez-C\u0026aacute;novas \u0026amp; Mart\u0026iacute;nez-Solano, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Hern\u0026aacute;ndez-C\u0026aacute;novas \u0026amp; Mart\u0026iacute;nez-Solano (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e) do not provide a clear and detailed definition of trust, nor does they elaborate on the various aspects or components of trust. In fact, Harhoff \u0026amp; K\u0026ouml;rting (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e), also employed a direct measurement by inquiring with bank managers on the presence of mutual trust between the enterprise and the bank.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the case of developing countries, bank managers in Vietnam prioritise assessing the capabilities (resources and knowledge) as well as the integrity (benevolence, intention, and motivation) of the borrowers (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). In India, the trustworthiness of the borrowers is assessed by considering their reputation and historical track record. The trustworthiness elements in this relationship refer to the entrepreneurs' competence and the individual's expertise in this field (Sengupta, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR91\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBoth Hirsch, Nitzl, \u0026amp; Schoen (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) and Wijaya \u0026amp; Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR103\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) use two dimensions of trust from organizationl literature i.e., habitualisation and institutionalisation (Nooteboom, Berger, \u0026amp; Noorderhaven, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e). Habitualisation reflects benevolence and institutionalisation corresponds to integrity. The research conducted by Howorth \u0026amp; Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e), Howorth \u0026amp; Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e) and Moro \u0026amp; Fink (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrated a thorough assessment of trust. These studies make a clear distinction between trust and trustworthiness based on Mayer et al., (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e) study. Trustworthiness is the antecedent of trust. There are three trustworthiness factors used in these studies, i.e., ability, benevolence, and integrity. However, based on factor analysis, benevolence and integrity are difficult to separate (Moro \u0026amp; Fink, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Wijaya et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Both of these dimensions have ethical connotations (Tinsley, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e) and, thus, ability should be separated. Another study categorize trust as a single concept (Howorth \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Hence, trust contains ability, benevolence, and integrity. Lehmann \u0026amp; Neuberger (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) introduce four variables as proxies of trust; they are experience in the past (inspired by (Blois, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e) study), the obligation to the partner (inspired by (Fisman \u0026amp; Khanna, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e) study), the impression of the stability of the relationship (deterrence-based trust \u0026ndash; (R. Lewicki \u0026amp; Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e) and the flow of information (knowledge-based trust - Lewicki and Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e). Talaulikar, Hegde Desai, \u0026amp; Borde (2022) and Kautonen et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) adopt trustworthiness factors from (Roger C. Mayer et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e) they are ability, benevolence and integrity. Okello Candiya Bongomin, Malinga, Amani, \u0026amp; Balinda (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) use 10 questions to measure trust inspired from previous studies. Another study incorporates three dimensions of trust i.e., honesty, competence, and benevolence (Palazuelos, Crespo, \u0026amp; Del Corte, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e shows the dimension of trust used by the authors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDimension of Trust\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"2\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAuthor\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDimension\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNguyen, LE, and Freeman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTrust in person\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRelevant background and education\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExperience in the field of business\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrong personal network\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive referral on expertise\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive impression with bank managers \u0026ndash; demonstrate business knowledge and skills\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive learning in working with banks\u0026rsquo; procedure\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntegrity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive referral on integrity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive impression with bank managers \u0026ndash; demonstrate cooperative attitude\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWillingness to share sensitive and real information with the banks\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive experience in working with banks\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTrust in the firm\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCapability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eResources (office, plant, car, managers, etc.)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eManagement system (strategy, structure, culture, formalized policies)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eClear, professional account- ing system and reports\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePromising businesses (products and markets)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGood performance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePositive referral or reputation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntegrity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNumber of services the firm used from the bank (the more the better)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNumber of banks the firm has a relationship with\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHoworth and Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e), Moro and Fink (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbility\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Has very good knowledge of the market in which they operate\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Is able in identifying the needed resources\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Is able in managing the resources\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Understands the changing market conditions\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenevolence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Adapts their interests to fit those of commercial partners\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Pays attention to the needs of the employees\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Is very involved in the community\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntegrity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Is totally honest in negotiations with commercial partners\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;Is consistent in his decisions and behavior\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u0026ldquo;You would be happy to recommend the firm to a female friend to work there\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTang, Deng, and Moro (2016)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbility\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e(trust from SMEs to Loan manager)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe loan manager is highly capable of doing their job\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eI am very confident about the loan manager\u0026rsquo;s abilities to take care of our bank matters\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe loan manager strives to be fair in dealing with our firm\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenevolence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe loan manager would not knowingly act against our firm\u0026rsquo;s interests\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe bank is interested in the success of our firm\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe bank considers our firm\u0026rsquo;s interests in addition to its own interests\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntegrity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe bank keeps the promises it makes to our firm\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe loan manager\u0026rsquo;s behaviour has been consistent in our dealings with them\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe bank is trustworthy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLehmann and Neuberger (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExperience\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe made positive experience in the past\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eObligation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe are obliged to the borrower\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInformation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe borrower informs us immediately about problems\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur relationship is stable under pressure\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHirsch, Nitzl, \u0026amp; Schoen (2018)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterpersonal\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHabitualisation (benevolence)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMy contact person has always been evenhanded in negotiations with me\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eI know how my contact person is going to act. She can always be counted on to act as I expect\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMy contact person has been frank in dealing with us\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutionalisation (integrity)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eI have faith in my contact person to look out for my interests even when it is costly to do so\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eI would feel a sense of betrayal if my contact person's performance was below my expectations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMy contact person seems to be concerned with our needs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTalaulikar, Hegde, \u0026amp; Borde (2022)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur knows very well the market in which she/he operates\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur is able in selecting the needed resources\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur is able in managing the resources\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur is able in understanding market evolution\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur adapts his interests to suit those of commercial partners\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur pays attention to the needs of the employees\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur is totally honest in negotiations with commercial partners\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMSME entrepreneur is consistent in his decisions and behavior\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBongomin et al. (2023)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe group members are trusted while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe group members always stick to their promises while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe group members always share information while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe are always confident among ourselves while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe are always have high believes amongst ourselves while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe have no fear amongst ourselves while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll members are always concerned about group interest while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe group members do not take advantage of each other while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe group members are always alert with each other while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe group members are always willing to help each while borrowing from the microfinance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePalazuelos et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn general, SMEs\u0026hellip;\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHonesty\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre transparent\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eProvide sincere and honest information\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre reliable in keeping their promises\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eWill probably fulfil their commitments\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCompetence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eProvide gurantess about their skills to carry out their activities\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHave the ability/skills to fulfil their commitments\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHave sufficient experience in the activity performed\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre managed by competent and diligent staff\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBenevolence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTake into action the impact that the actions have on the bank\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeek to establish relationships with the bank in which mutual benefit is a priority\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMake efforts/sacrifies to fulfil their obligations with the bank\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAre concerned about the interest and needs of the bank\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e---------------\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e HERE\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e---------------\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.2.2. Measurement\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe measuring of trust in bank lending can be based on three levels: interpersonal, organisational, and inter-organisational. Furthermore, there exist three distinct sorts of measurements: the positive expectation scale, the willingness to be vulnerable scale, and the direct measure (Colquitt et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Most of the research on bank lending has focused on measuring interpersonal trust. Howorth and Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e) and Moro and Fink (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) use ten items to measure trustworthiness inspired from management literature (Bromiley \u0026amp; Cummings, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e; Currall \u0026amp; Judge, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e; Roger C Mayer \u0026amp; Davis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). Lehmann \u0026amp; Neuberger (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) propose four proxies to measure mutual trust. Hirsch et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) measure trust from two levels, interpersonal and inter-organisational. They employ a combination of the positive expectation scale and willingness to be vulnerable scale, which have been developed based on prior studies by Doney \u0026amp; Cannon (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e) and Zaheer et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR106\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e). Other study incorporates positive expectation scale (Palazuelos et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2.3. Trust and Lending Outcomes\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe majority of articles in the field of trust, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and bank lending primarily examine the influence of interpersonal trust on the outcomes of lending. As trust increases, bank managers' perception of risk in financing MSMEs decreases (Talaulikar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR95\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). The research undertaken found a positive correlation between trust and credit renewal, as trust is associated with a perception of low risk) (Badulescu, Simut, \u0026amp; Smes, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Hern\u0026aacute;ndez-C\u0026aacute;novas \u0026amp; Mart\u0026iacute;nez-Solano, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Additionally, trust is found to have a negative link with interest rates (Harhoff \u0026amp; K\u0026ouml;rting, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e; Howorth \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Lehmann \u0026amp; Neuberger, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) and margins charged to the small business managers in Islamic banks (Wijaya \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR103\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), trust is positively associated with credit availability (Kautonen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Moro \u0026amp; Fink, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Moro et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Palazuelos et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), trust reduces collateralization (Harhoff \u0026amp; K\u0026ouml;rting, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e) and trust (habitualization) reduces the importance of hard information but trust increases the reliability of hard information (Hirsch et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). In the same vein, perceived trustworthiness has a stronger effect on credit access when information accuracy is low (Kautonen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). More specifically, loan officer-perceived SME\u0026rsquo;s competence has a positive effect on the willingness to grant credit (in both audited and non-audited SMEs) (Palazuelos et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterestingly, trust is positively associated with the amount credit granted in the case of small banks, but not large banks (Moro et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). In the same vein, Okello Candiya Bongomin, Malinga, Amani, \u0026amp; Balinda (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) found that trust significantly and positively promote access to microcredit by young women microenterprises. Loan officers\u0026rsquo; perceived trust has a direct positive influence on their willingness to apply favourable conditions to SMEs (Palazuelos, Herrero Crespo, \u0026amp; Montoya del Corte, 2020). All in all, previous empirical studies confirmed conceptual framework proposed by Howorth \u0026amp; Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e) and Boutillier (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) that trust is positively associated with credit availability but negatively associated with loan default, request for collateral, and cost of finance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTwo articles pertaining to Islamic banks provide an inadequate discussion of the concept of trust (Hanif \u0026amp; Iqbal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Harper, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e). Bank managers may have two primary challenges when providing loans to micro entrepreneurs, namely inflation and borrower default (Harper, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e). \u003cem\u003eMusharaka\u003c/em\u003e financing scheme in Islamic banks has the potential to mitigate inflation by determining the bank's return based on a pre-agreed fraction of the profit between the two parties. Nevertheless, establishing trust and fostering mutual understanding between bank managers and the business community should be the fundamental basis for financing through \u003cem\u003emusharaka\u003c/em\u003e. In addition, bank managers must possess a thorough understanding of the partner's business. Therefore, the inclusion of openness is a crucial element in the \u003cem\u003eMusharaka\u003c/em\u003e. One of the limitations of the \u003cem\u003eMusharaka\u003c/em\u003e in Pakistan is the absence of trust and confidence in the partner's competence (Hanif \u0026amp; Iqbal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Additional obstacles in \u003cem\u003eMusharaka\u003c/em\u003e include the partner's uncertainty regarding the return and the partner's manipulation of the profit (Hanif \u0026amp; Iqbal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Wijaya \u0026amp; Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR103\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) argues that in \u003cem\u003eMurabaha\u003c/em\u003e, the most popular financing scheme in Islamic banks, trust reduces transactions cost of economics which in turn reduces margins charged to small business managers. This is because the expectations of opportunistic behavior can be reduced by bank managers\u0026rsquo; high levels of perceived habitualization and institutionalization by small business managers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIt can be inferred that both conventional and Islamic banks rely on more than just transactional characteristics while engaging in lending (financing) activities. They also take into consideration the social interaction element, specifically the trustworthiness of the borrowers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Discussion of Future Directions","content":"\u003cp\u003eFollowing to the analysis of the results pertaining to three key themes, we proceed to examine the research gaps and propose opportunities for further study concerning the following: (1) the process of building trust, (2) the dimension and measurement of trust, and (3) the lending outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1. Trust building process\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.1. Different culture and different environmental setting\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOne of the main investigations that directed this Systematic Literature Review (SLR) relates to the process of building trust. Since trust is not the same with risk but trust inextricable linked with risk, research on different social settings with varying methods for managing risk could potentially influence the process of building trust (Das \u0026amp; Teng, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001b\u003c/span\u003e; Roger C Mayer, Davies, \u0026amp; Schoorman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). The comparative study of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) finance in Germany and Britain might provide significant insights into the influence of social factors on risk management and trust building process (Lane \u0026amp; Quack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). They focused on the sociological factors that influence loan decisions. Germany and the UK exhibit distinct socioeconomic characteristics that have implications for the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In Germany, a country with a social market economy, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are recognised as a crucial factor in maintaining economic stability, a characteristic that is not present in Britain. Germany has a more precise approach to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) since it is tailored to their specific needs. The incorporation of federal and regional governmental agencies, development and loan guarantee institutions, commercial banks, and chambers of industry has led to the formulation of policies aimed at providing financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). While in Britain, these groups play a less influential role in financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegarding competency, the owner/manager of SMEs in Germany possess universally strong skills (Lane \u0026amp; Quack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). Lane and Quack (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e) observed that German banks exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion compared to British banks. This can be attributed to the presence of a more stable economic climate and stricter regulatory measures. German saving and cooperative banks engage in risk sharing through the exchange of significant and important information, as well as mutual support, in order to mitigate risk. Regarding collateralization, German banks solely necessitate commercial assets as collateral, but British banks require personal assets as collateral (Lane \u0026amp; Quack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe results of our systematic literature review (SLR) indicate that the process for building trust may depend on information obtained from external sources (Carnevali, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e; Howorth \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e; Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Bank managers may evaluate the trustworthiness and creditworthiness of borrowers by collecting information from chambers. In Germany and France, chambers offer training and services for business registration. In the Netherlands, chambers may enact measures to decrease the prevalence of dishonest and incompetent individuals in various trades or industries, sometimes referred to as 'cowboys' (Bennett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). This organisation could potentially decrease the likelihood of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) experiencing failure. Consequently, it has the potential to decrease the credit risk faced by banks. In contrast, the influence of chambers and trade associations in the UK in supporting SME funding is significantly limited (Lane \u0026amp; Quack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, bank managers in Britain have diminished the advantage of personal trust and the significance of gossip information obtained from external sources (Lane \u0026amp; Quack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, while comparing Germany and Britain, it can be observed that the interaction between bank managers and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Britain primarily involves shorter-term loans (Lane and Quack, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe data obtained from third parties indicates that the borrowers' reputation plays a crucial role in determining whether or not to grant a loan, particularly in cases when the bank managers lack familiarity with the borrowers. Hence, the borrowers' reputation can assist bank managers in avoiding sole reliance on expensive and inadequate contracts (Blois, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). Nevertheless, Blois (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e) contended that there exists a significant distinction between possessing a favourable reputation and being seen as trustworthy. The trustor may anticipate that the one they trust will demonstrate their sincerity and benevolent intentions. Although borrowers may have a positive reputation, this does not necessarily mean that the trustor will have high expectations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe absence of accurate data, possible risks, and uncertainty could emerge as a significant concern in a developing country. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that financing in developing countries has a greater level of risk and uncertainty. Our SLR has demonstrated that the lending environment in Vietnam poses significantly higher risks compared to developed countries. Guseva \u0026amp; Rona-Tas (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) employ Knight's argumentation ([1921] 1957) to distinguish between risk and uncertainty. In addition, they suggest that three characteristics must be fulfilled in order to decrease uncertainty and risk: similarity among cases, similarity over time, and a sufficiently high number of past observations. Furthermore, the issue of asymmetric information is particularly challenging in emerging nations (Akerlof, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1970\u003c/span\u003e; Stiglitz \u0026amp; Weiss, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR94\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1981\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, in a circumstance characterised by risk and uncertainty, lenders should employ several measures to mitigate the presence of asymmetric information.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the Russian credit card industry, there was a lack of credit bureaus and collection agencies, making it challenging to recover damages (Guseva \u0026amp; Rona-Tas, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e). Consequently, implementing sanctions was not the optimal approach for maintaining the provision of credit card loans in Russia. In order to operate in this uncertain environment, credit card providers in Russia depend on trust. In Russia, there are several strategies that can be employed to decrease uncertainty. Firstly, one can reduce the time gap between purchase and payment. Secondly, uncertainty can be managed by carefully analysing the application form, observing the applicant's visual impression, and utilising informal recommendations. Lastly, trust can be established by leveraging the customers' networks to enhance the accountability of cardholders (Guseva \u0026amp; Rona-Tas, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe trust-building process may be influenced by the national culture (Patrica M. Doney, Cannon, \u0026amp; Mullen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e). The authors use the term \"national\" to refer not to physical boundaries, but rather to a culture comprised of groups or subgroups that share comparable life experiences, education, and background. Therefore, they suggest that individuals who live in distinct cultural dimensions as outlined by Hofstede, Hofstede, \u0026amp; Minkov (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e), such as individualism, collectivism, masculinity, femininity, high power distance, low power distance, high uncertainty avoidance, and low uncertainty avoidance, may undergo diverse processes in building trust (such as calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability, and transference). In Vietnam, banks establish trust with their clients through the use of transference or inherited trust building (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). This trust building is more likely to happen in the collectivist or high uncertainty avoidance situation (Doney et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e). In nations with a majority of Muslims with a strong sense of collectivism, such as Indonesia, trust based on shared values (values-based trust) or benevolence-integrity is more significant in business-to-business relationships than trust based only on competence (competence-based trust) (Wijaya et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). However, building trust in a collectivistic society requires repeated interactions to thoroughly examine the values of the business actors, resulting in a narrower radius of trust compared to an individualistic culture (Hofstede et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Wijaya et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBank managers living in environments characterised by low uncertainty avoidance and high power distance, where the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour is significant and the cost of behavior are low, may establish trust based on a calculative approach. (R. Lewicki \u0026amp; Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e) stated that calculus-based trust is established through a system of rewards and punishments. However, the impact of punishment is more substantial than that of rewards. At this point, trust is fragile and so requires supervision. In the context of bank lending, if borrowers default on their loan, the collateral they provided may be seized. Collateral serves as a form of punishment to motivate borrowers to exert more effort and adhere to the agreement (P. A. Saparito \u0026amp; Gopalakrishnan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR88\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). This scenario could potentially occur in Vietnam, where banks exclusively engage in short-term lending and require borrowers to provide further evidence. According to Lehmann \u0026amp; Neuberger (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e), short-term or volume-oriented lending is primarily defined by the transactional aspects of contract design or bargaining power, such as loan rates, collateralization, and switching costs. Chapra (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e), an Islamic economist, stated that with short-term financing, the lender is more inclined to depend on the collateral rather than the project itself.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, long-term relationships are influenced to a greater extent by social interactions between the parties involved in the bargaining process. In the German context, the relationship between banks and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is typically characterised by long-term durations. This system is referred to as a \"Hausbank.\" This link could potentially impact the dissemination of information accessible to the bank. Banks may collect extensive data on the operational aspects and future potential of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Therefore, banks possess knowledge of the requirements of their borrowers. Similarly, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) may also acquire information about their banks over their business relationship. The duration of the relationship between small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and banks is directly correlated with knowledge-based trust (P. Saparito \u0026amp; Colwell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR89\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn knowledge-based trust, trust is built based on the flow of information (Lewicki and Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e). Regular communication is important at this stage. Finally, the strongest tie is found on identification-based trust since each party understands the needs, preference, and choices of other parties (Lewicki and Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, monitoring is unnecessary. This results in a decrease in the interest rate for the borrowers. Indeed, the presence of accurate and reliable information facilitates the process of obtaining credit (Chen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e); voluntarily disclosed information increases perceived competence and reduces interest risk charged to the borrowers (Moro et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR75\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e); and the use of rich communication modes (face to face and telephone) in communicating with the bank will increase the bank's knowledge about firms (Saparito \u0026amp; Gopalakrishnan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR88\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn conclusion, there is a need for further research to investigate the impact of trust and the process of building trust in bank lending, particularly in various environmental contexts. For instance, it is important to examine the role of trust and trust building in bank lending within settings characterised by weak rule of law. Additionally, a comparative study should be conducted to explore the role of trust and trust building in different cultural contexts, such as comparing high power distance vs low power distance or comparing high uncertainty avoidance vs low uncertainty avoidance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.2. Trust violation and trust repair\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll the studies to date focus only on explaining the trust building process. The study on how to repair trust in bank lending has not been conducted yet. Trust violation and trust restoration process vary based on the trust development stage (Lewicki and Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e): in calculus-based trust, the progress on building trust is slow however when there is a trust violation the relationship might be broken; in knowledge-based trust, the parties involved in the relationship might have a high degree of tolerance for other's inconsistency behaviour and this aspect is stronger in identification based trust. The decline of trust occurs in two form (1) trust elimination in a single violation event and (2) gradual erosion of trust (Lewicki and Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterestingly, borrower default on a loan can happen due to various reasons: the firm may have made errors in assessing the project, or they may have mishandled it, indicating inadequate ability. The borrower may have misled the lender in their lending decision by providing the loan manager with incorrect information or withholding relevant information, resulting in the bank granting a loan that they would not have approved if they had received accurate information. This indicates that the borrower demonstrated a lack of integrity. The borrower may possess undisclosed pertinent information regarding the underperformance of the project, resulting in the lender's delayed response to recoup the loan, indicating a lack of goodwill on the part of the borrower. Future study on trust and bank lending should investigate the responses of bank managers and borrowers in various scenarios and in relation to reciprocal behaviour when trust is violated. Additionally, it should explore strategies for repairing trust at different stages of trust development.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.3. Trust building process in Islamic Banks\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur SLR also indicated a lack of research that specifically investigates the process of trust building in Islamic banks. Islamic banks have unique characteristics in comparison to their counterparts. Islamic banks need to adhere to Islamic principles in their daily activities. Islamic banks should incorporate social objectives in addition to their business objectives (Chapra, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; Dusuki, 2008). Due to the prohibition of interest in Islamic banks, the financing system in these banks relies on set mark-up profit (\u003cem\u003emurabaha\u003c/em\u003e), rental charge (\u003cem\u003eijara\u003c/em\u003e), or profit-loss sharing (\u003cem\u003emudharaba\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003emusharaka\u003c/em\u003e). Islamic banks possess inherent risks that are distinct from those of conventional banks (Ariffin et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Khan \u0026amp; Ahmed, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e). Several research have attempted to compare Islamic banks and conventional banks on many issues such as risk and performances (Abedifar, Molyneux, \u0026amp; Tarazi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Beck, Demirg\u0026uuml;\u0026ccedil;-Kunt, \u0026amp; Merrouche, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e; Čih\u0026aacute;k \u0026amp; Hesse, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe issue of trust in Islamic banks is typically limited and primarily focuses on the challenges associated with profit-loss sharing financing schemes. In \u003cem\u003eMudharaba\u003c/em\u003e, an Islamic bank typically contributes 100% of the capital while the customers (\u003cem\u003emudharib\u003c/em\u003e) merely contribute their ideas and efforts. The profit is then dispersed to the partners based on a pre-determined proportion. If customers experience a loss (not due to their own negligence), the bank will assume full responsibility for covering 100% of the loss. The banks regard this contract to be high-risk. Thus, it is imperative for Islamic banks to demonstrate solid confidence and trust in their investees (Abdalla, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). Trust is established in a \u003cem\u003emudharaba\u003c/em\u003e contract by the capital owner's understanding of the moral values and personality of the investee, as stated by (Abdul-Rahman et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, in the implementation of the Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) plan, Islamic banks should prioritise the assessment of the project's feasibility, the partner's character and history, and the partner's skill level (Ahmed, 2008). Personal qualities are seen as intangible guarantees (Ahmed, 2008). To address the limitations of \u003cem\u003emusharaka\u003c/em\u003e, Islamic banks should select a trustworthy \u003cem\u003emudharib\u003c/em\u003e, seek recommendations from existing clients with a proven track record, and assess the reliability of potential consumers through the implementation of a \u003cem\u003emurabaha\u003c/em\u003e scheme (Abdul-rahman \u0026amp; Nor, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Abdalla, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWith regard to the trust building process, in Islam, it is emphasised that individuals should evaluate the trustworthiness of others rather than blindly trusting them (Eggen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Interestingly, the Quran acknowledges that the matter of trust is one of the pertinent subjects in Islam. The Quran addresses the notion of trust in three distinct levels: divine ethics, the appropriate conduct individuals should have towards Allah, and the appropriate behaviour and interactions they should have towards others (Eggen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). These conceptual framework from Quran could be used as a starting point to explore the trust building process in Islamic banking. Furthermore, it is important for future research to investigate the process of creating trust in the different types of financing offered by Islamic banks, considering their distinct financing scheme characteristics.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2. The concept of trust\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe second inquiry our study aims to investigate pertains to the dimension of trust in the lending decision. Trust, in the context of bank lending, is a notion that has multiple dimensions. Various study contexts in diverse environments employs distinct dimensions. The dimension of trust should vary based on specific requirements, circumstances, and surroundings (Roger C Mayer \u0026amp; Davies, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e; Tyler \u0026amp; Stanley, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR99\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). For instance, in a study by Howorth \u0026amp; Moro (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e), trust was treated as a singular entity when examining its impact on interest rates. However, the concept of capacity was distinct from benevolence-integrity when it was employed to forecast credit availability (Moro \u0026amp; Fink, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Nevertheless, we can deduce that the dimensions of trust primarily encompass two aspects: the trustee's competence and values (Das \u0026amp; Teng, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001a\u003c/span\u003e; Wijaya et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, it is important to distinguish between trust and confidence as they carry distinct meanings (Tinsley, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e). The ethical virtue of the trustee can be characterised by benevolence, integrity, honesty, and mutuality. It signifies that his behaviour will not result in any harm to the person who has placed their faith in him (Hosmer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur SLR uncovered a significant lack of attention to the conceptualization of trust in the Islamic banking. However, we are aware of the study conducted in a different field, specifically business ethics in Islam, which explores several aspects of moral principles in business from an Islamic perspective. We can obtain the dimension of trust that is relevant for Islamic banking from this literature (Wijaya et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe concept of trust (\u003cem\u003eamana\u003c/em\u003e) in Islam can be understood by referring to the Quran (Eggen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). \u003cem\u003eAmana\u003c/em\u003e encompasses three concepts: safety, which is the antithesis of fear; trust, which is the antithesis of betrayal; and faith, which is the antithesis of denial (Ibnu Manzur as cited by Eggen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). The primary opposite of trust is betrayal (\u003cem\u003ekhiyana\u003c/em\u003e), which refers to a decrease in loyalty or the act of abandoning or failing in one's responsibility (\u003cem\u003eamana\u003c/em\u003e) when entrusted with anything (Eggen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). In Islam, trust is defined in alignment with Rotter's (1967, p.651) definition, which describes trust as the \"expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal, or written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon.\"\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe notion and dimension of trust can be developed from the ethical values of business in Islam. Islamic values are based on the teachings of the Quran, which is the book revealed by God to Muhammad (p), and the Sunnah, which consists of the recorded words, actions, and approval of Muhammad (p) (Abuznaid, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Beekun \u0026amp; Badawi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e; Rice, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e; Uddin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR100\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003a\u003c/span\u003e). Many authors have chosen certain verses from the Qur'an and Sunnah and applied them to a commercial context. Undoubtedly, these Islamic ethical ideals also hold great significance in Islamic banking.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese dimensions include oneness, fairness and balance, freedom, productive activity, compassion, and trusteeship (Abuznaid, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Beekun \u0026amp; Badawi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e; Rice, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e; Uddin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR100\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003a\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe unity dimension explores the interconnections between humans and God, humans and the universe, and among humans themselves. Humans ought to submit themselves to the divine will, and individuals are equal collaborators; therefore, in the realm of commerce, this translates to collaboration. Therefore, this concept aligns with the viewpoint of (Kee \u0026amp; Knox, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1970\u003c/span\u003e), who regard trust as a form of collaboration.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIslam not only stresses the importance of collaboration, but also advocates for justice, denounces inequity, oppression, and exploitation, and encourages individuals to assist those who are in need or poor (Rice, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). The Quran defines justice as \u003cem\u003e'adl\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eqist\u003c/em\u003e, which entails consistently treating others justly in all aspects of life and acting in a balanced and proportionate manner (Beekun \u0026amp; Badawi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). Benevolence is a quality that pertains to both kindness and excellence. Benevolence is defined as an action that benefits others other than the ones who perform the action, without any sense of duty (Beekun \u0026amp; Badawi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). This concept aligns with the research conducted by (R. C. Mayer et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e), which suggests that benevolence is one of the dimension that contribute to trustworthiness.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe notion of trusteeship has emerged as the central tenet of Islamic ethical principles in the realm of business. Humans are entrusted by God to be caretakers of the Earth. Consequently, humans are obligated to assume accountability for all of their acts (Beekun and Badawi, 2015). Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that God is the ultimate owner of all resources in the universe. However, this does not imply the elimination of private property. Instead, resources should be utilised for the well-being of all individuals. It is crucial for humans to avoid wastefulness and refrain from consuming resources in a conspicuous or excessive manner (Wilson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR105\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e; Chapra, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; Rice, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, in the trusteeship notion, individuals are motivated to use their utmost efforts in order to construct the world and make use of its resources (Uddin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR101\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003b\u003c/span\u003e). The concept of trusteeship in Islam is arguably connected to the concept of trust in organisational literature. As custodians of God, humans have a duty to be accountable for all of their activities. This value may be associated with the notion of integrity as suggested by (R. C. Mayer et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e). The advice to use resources efficiently and maximise their utility is closely connected to the concept of ability. It may be inferred that the notion of trust in Islam aligns with past research conducted in other fields.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, within the trustor-trustee relationship, the dimensions of trust might vary in terms of interpersonal and inter-organizational levels. This notion is supported by an empirical research conducted by Ganesan \u0026amp; Hess (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e). (Ganesan \u0026amp; Hess, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e) categorised the degree of relationship into four distinct groups: interpersonal, inter-organizational, organisational, and intra-organizational. The authors present the premise that purchasers differentiate between two levels of trust: interpersonal and organisational. This study suggests that the buyer's commitment is influenced by the interpersonal credibility, which includes the qualities of honesty and competence, exhibited by the sales representative. In addition, the buyer's commitment is influenced by the organization's benevolence. Zaheer et al., (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR106\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e) address the complexity of trust by distinguishing between interpersonal trust and inter-organizational trust. Indeed, it is important to be precise about the source and recipient of trust, or in other words, \"who trusts whom\" (Zaheer et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR106\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, future research should assign the appropriate trust dimension at varying levels of trust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.3. Trust and Lending Outcomes\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eNow, we can finally conclude that the third question at the beginning of this study, which pertains to the influence of trust on lending outcomes, has been addressed. All the research conducted on our SLR consistently emphasise the positive impact of trust on the lending decision. Therefore, it is necessary for future research to investigate the consequences of excessive (blind) trust in borrowers or the negative aspects of trust in bank lending. Zahra, Yavuz, \u0026amp; Ucbasaran (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR107\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e) conducted a study to investigate the impact of relational trust on the establishment of new businesses, focusing on both positive and negative effects. Despite the differences in the setting of new business creation with bank loans, both face the common challenge of asymmetric knowledge between the involved parties. This includes disregarding the external environment, making significant judgement errors, lacking effective control, and individuals acting opportunistically. Excessive trust, in particular, may have a detrimental impact on bank lending. Although not extensively discussed, a study conducted in Vietnam has stated that relying solely on trust can potentially lead to issues, as trust is a subjective concept (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Excessive trust on borrowers can arise at various points in the relationship, such as when evaluating new loan applications from borrowers who have previously proven themselves to be trustworthy. This lack of objectivity may develop. Furthermore, bank management may reduce their level of oversight towards reliable applicants once a loan has been approved. This could potentially encourage opportunistic behavior among the borrowers. Excessive trust may have a similar impact as the concept of a lazy bank model suggested by Manove, Padilla, \u0026amp; Pagano (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e). Conversely, in the absence of regulations that safeguard creditors by requiring collateral, banks are motivated to engage in more thorough screening of their borrowers. In addition, banks possess superior knowledge and expertise in the specific industry or venture that the borrowers intend to undertake. Consequently, conducting a screening process could help avoid making an unwise investment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMonitoring is a crucial aspect of banking operations and incurs cost for the bank. Trustors can benefit from working with trustworthy individuals, as they would require less time and resources to ensure that other parties comply with the agreement (Bromiley \u0026amp; Cummings, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1995\u003c/span\u003e; Dyer \u0026amp; Chu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). Monitoring expense is positively correlated with the interest rate imposed to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Excessive trust can lead to insufficient monitoring and ineffective control (Zahra et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR107\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Consequently, this can encourage opportunistic behavior and, in the context of bank lending, lead to a decrease that jeopardises the bank's profitability. Indeed, this negative cycle may be more probable and pose a higher risk in developing nations, where the absence of observation due to challenges in collecting data and information could encourage moral hazard among borrowers. Finally, trust and opportunistic behaviour may exhibit a non-linear connection due to the presence of an optimal degree of monitoring activity. Therefore, we anticipate that future study will delve into the correlation between trust and monitoring.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecond, study is required to investigate the impact of trust as a moderating factor on bank lending. Almost all the research we identified investigate the impact of trust on lending outcomes as a direct factor. Trust can function as a moderator in the context of bank lending (Dirks \u0026amp; Ferrin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e). An approach used by bank managers in Vietnam to establish trust is through the practice of inherited trust. A current client may refer a prospective client to the banker for assistance in obtaining a loan. This suggestion could help the bank conserve resources by streamlining the process of screening and monitoring a new client who has no prior history with the bank. Nevertheless, this impact could be enhanced by a moderating element, specifically, the level of trustworthiness of the current consumer who provides the suggestion.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThird, with the exception of the study conducted by Kautonen et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e), nearly all of the survey-based studies included in our systematic literature review employ cross-sectional data gathering methods. Subsequent investigations on bank lending and trust ought to examine the longitudinal correlation between trust and lending outcomes. The duration of the connection is a crucial factor in establishing trust. Bank managers may be able to gain a better level of trust if they have a longer amount of experience (Howorth \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). This is due to the beneficial learning impact of the period. It is worth mentioning that the duration of a relationship and inter-organizational trust follows an inverted U-shaped pattern (Zhong, Su, Peng, \u0026amp; Yang, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR109\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). The trustor may initially profit from the relationship, but as the relationship progresses, familiarity might lead to opportunistic behaviour due to the trustor becoming less vigilant in monitoring. In addition, the development and violation of trust are dynamic processes (R. Lewicki \u0026amp; Bunker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e). Trust can be divided into three phases: building, stability, and declining (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, \u0026amp; Camerer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR87\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998b\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, it is important to compare the role of trust in new borrowers, where banks have no historical information or experience, with existing customers, where banks have gathered information through repeated interactions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFourth, it may be concluded that prior studies on trust and bank lending, encompassing both conventional and Islamic banks, have not provided a thorough analysis of risk. Undoubtedly, different products in bank lending, whether in Islamic banks or conventional banks, vary in terms of risk levels. Therefore, the potential risk that a bank faces with different products can impact the trust, as well as the bank's decision to provide financing for a particular product over another. Furthermore, our knowledge regarding the influence of trustworthiness on lending outcomes in Islamic banks is currently lacking. Although an empirical study on Islamic banks has demonstrated a negative correlation between the trustworthiness of financing customers and the margin charged (Wijaya \u0026amp; Moro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR103\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), further research should be conducted to empirically investigate this relationship. Various institutional aspects inherent in Islamic banks may potentially impact risk management techniques, as well as the importance of trust in these banks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis particular SLR has generated the first synthesis of bank lending, trust, and SMEs literature. We have extracted information from 20 papers by focusing on three primary themes: the trust building process, the concept of trust, and the lending outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmerging countries exhibit distinct characteristics compared to developed countries in terms of their lending infrastructure and societal cultural aspects. Lenders are likely to encounter increased information asymmetry, more risk, and greater uncertainty. As we have not come across a multi-national study on the relationship between trust and financing decisions, we have identified the investigation of trust's role in loan availability in developed and developing nations as an extra key issue. We also suggest that a comparative study should be conducted to explore the role of trust/trust building process in different cultural contexts, such as comparing high power distance vs low power distance or comparing high uncertainty avoidance vs low uncertainty avoidance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInsufficient focus has been given to the process of restoring trust in bank lending and the impact of excessive trust on lending outcomes. Furthermore, future research should investigate the impact of trust on bank lending during various stages, such as establishment, stability, or termination. Also, future study on trust and bank lending should investigate the responses of bank managers and borrowers in various scenarios and in relation to reciprocal behaviour when trust is violated. Additionally, it should explore strategies for repairing trust at different stages of trust development.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eOur systematic literature review (SLR) also indicated a lack of research that specifically investigates the process of trust building, the role of trust on financing outcomes, and the concept of trust in Islamic banks. Undoubtedly, the characteristics of the products in Islamic banking vary from those of conventional banking, especially in terms of risk. Therefore, Islamic banks may necessitate varying levels of trust. Although risk is a crucial factor in the trust model, there has been no research conducted on the correlation between risk and trust in various lending products.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe majority of the articles analysed in this study focus solely on the direct impact of trust on financing decisions, such as interest rates, collateralization, and loan availability. Therefore, we propose that an important area for additional investigation is the examination of trust as a moderating factor, in addition to its direct impact on access to credit.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTrust can be understood in terms of two primary dimensions: competence or skill or ability and values (ethical aspects). Indeed, research on trust and bank lending has been implemented and measured at both the individual and organisational levels. Future research should also consider the utilisation of suitable dimensions at various levels of trust and circumstance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll the research conducted on our SLR consistently emphasise the positive impact of trust on the lending decision. Therefore, it is necessary for future research to investigate the consequences of excessive (blind) trust in borrowers or the negative aspects of trust in bank lending\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIt can be argued that this SLR may have limitation. Our review does not include unpublished work, conference papers, or books. Nevertheless, this SLR has the potential to make a substantial addition to our understanding. Initially, we have categorised the trust, bank lending and SMEs literature into three primary themes. Furthermore, we have proposed a recommendation for future research to augment our comprehension of trust and lending decision-making.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eWe have no conflicts of interest to disclose.\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eN.N. and I.F.W and B.S decide the keywords combination that will be used in Scopus database. N.N. and I.F.W wrote the main manuscript text. N.N. and I.F.W prepared the figure and tables. 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J Manag 43:1050\u0026ndash;1075\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"international-review-of-economics","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"irec","sideBox":"Learn more about [International Review of Economics](http://link.springer.com/journal/12231)","snPcode":"12232","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/12232/3","title":"International Review of Economics","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"em","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Systematic Literature Review, Trust, loan, Bank, Islamic bank, SMEs, relationship lending","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4602286/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4602286/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe carte di commenda and the business activities in the Islamic world demonstrate the reliance of the Middle Ages financing system on trust. Trust has been thoroughly analysed thus far in the context of the interaction between buyers and sellers, as well as in alliances. However, there is still a lack of study undertaken on the relationship between trust and loan (in Islamic term is financing) decision-making. The first objective of this Systematic Literature Review (SLR) is to analyse previous research on the relationship between trust and lending decisions, specifically focusing on bank lending to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The second aim of this SLR is to establish research agendas for future studies. SLR is selected in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the matter at hand. This synthesis focusses around three main themes: the building of trust, the concept of trust, and the impact of trust on lending outcomes. There are significant opportunities for more study in the areas of trust, bank lending, and SMEs. We offer a suggestion of future research for enhancing our understanding of trust and lending decision.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Does Trust Matters in Lending Decision? A Systematic Literature Review and Research Agendas for Future Studies","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2024-07-22 19:44:55","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4602286/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2024-08-18T12:44:18+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2024-08-18T11:15:08+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"135061251332384547408246047657218201169","date":"2024-07-08T06:26:37+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2024-07-02T14:12:32+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2024-06-28T07:48:02+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2024-06-28T07:47:22+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"International Review of Economics","date":"2024-06-18T23:57:32+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"international-review-of-economics","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"irec","sideBox":"Learn more about [International Review of Economics](http://link.springer.com/journal/12231)","snPcode":"12232","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/12232/3","title":"International Review of Economics","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"em","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"c9a270c9-ea25-4fac-bbde-bd2be4f319f1","owner":[],"postedDate":"July 22nd, 2024","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"published-in-journal","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2024-12-09T16:14:23+00:00","versionOfRecord":{"articleIdentity":"rs-4602286","link":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-024-00477-4","journal":{"identity":"international-review-of-economics","isVorOnly":false,"title":"International Review of Economics"},"publishedOn":"2024-12-02 15:57:18","publishedOnDateReadable":"December 2nd, 2024"},"versionCreatedAt":"2024-07-22 19:44:55","video":"","vorDoi":"10.1007/s12232-024-00477-4","vorDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-024-00477-4","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-4602286","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-4602286","identity":"rs-4602286","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"qtupq5eGEP_6zYnWcrvyt","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}