Carbon emission reduction strategy of manufacturer’s reciprocal preference under government subsidy

Carbon emission reduction strategy of manufacturer’s reciprocal preference under government subsidy | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Carbon emission reduction strategy of manufacturer’s reciprocal preference under government subsidy Shuyu Shao, Yaduo Li, Dan Zhu This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6875896/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract In the context of global efforts to combat climate change and promote sustainable development, this study investigates the role of government subsidies and suppliers' reciprocal preferences in enhancing carbon emission reduction within a two-echelon supply chain composed of manufacturers and suppliers. The research constructs three differential game models: one with government subsidies and no supplier reciprocal preference, another with both government subsidies and supplier reciprocal preference, and a centralized decision-making model. By analyzing these models, the study explores the dynamic impact of carbon emission reduction levels on consumer demand and identifies optimal strategies for supply chain members under different policy environments. The findings reveal that government subsidies and suppliers’ reciprocal preferences significantly enhance collaborative emission reduction efforts, with the latter fostering closer cooperation and improving supply chain efficiency. Moreover, when suppliers account for environmental sustainability costs, supply chain profits approach those achieved under centralized decision-making. The results underscore the importance of integrating government incentives with reciprocal behaviors to achieve both economic and environmental benefits, offering valuable insights for policymakers and supply chain managers aiming to promote sustainable practices. Business and commerce/Business and management Business and commerce/Operational research Social science/Environmental studies Social science/Science technology and society Supply Chain Cooperative Emission Reduction Government Subsidies Reciprocity Preference Differential Game Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files Appendix.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6875896","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":511086878,"identity":"0695f292-71a5-4a20-a255-6d62f2d68a51","order_by":0,"name":"Shuyu Shao","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Beijing Wuzi University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Shuyu","middleName":"","lastName":"Shao","suffix":""},{"id":511086880,"identity":"f2740b0d-0d50-45ad-a8c6-dfb601715731","order_by":1,"name":"Yaduo Li","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Beijing Wuzi University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Yaduo","middleName":"","lastName":"Li","suffix":""},{"id":511086881,"identity":"c598d186-c504-42ae-84bd-466ec2e59839","order_by":2,"name":"Dan Zhu","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Beijing Wuzi University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Dan","middleName":"","lastName":"Zhu","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-06-12 02:53:24","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6875896/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6875896/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":96915972,"identity":"e2b0cf40-b92c-4c15-ae07-07ef81728b4e","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-27 14:07:50","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":650135,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"BlindedManuscript2.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6875896/v1_covered_fa1fa504-9a80-4f32-b306-1ff166477833.pdf"},{"id":90836455,"identity":"f6b06021-11c2-4b1c-b452-5a12a0945a22","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-08 17:50:10","extension":"docx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":152781,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Appendix.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6875896/v1/e6765fb11a321483abe284db.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Carbon emission reduction strategy of manufacturer’s reciprocal preference under government subsidy","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Supply Chain, Cooperative Emission Reduction, Government Subsidies, Reciprocity Preference, Differential Game","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6875896/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6875896/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eIn the context of global efforts to combat climate change and promote sustainable development, this study investigates the role of government subsidies and suppliers' reciprocal preferences in enhancing carbon emission reduction within a two-echelon supply chain composed of manufacturers and suppliers. The research constructs three differential game models: one with government subsidies and no supplier reciprocal preference, another with both government subsidies and supplier reciprocal preference, and a centralized decision-making model. By analyzing these models, the study explores the dynamic impact of carbon emission reduction levels on consumer demand and identifies optimal strategies for supply chain members under different policy environments. The findings reveal that government subsidies and suppliers\u0026rsquo; reciprocal preferences significantly enhance collaborative emission reduction efforts, with the latter fostering closer cooperation and improving supply chain efficiency. Moreover, when suppliers account for environmental sustainability costs, supply chain profits approach those achieved under centralized decision-making. 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