Afraid or angry? It does not matter: Neither angry nor fearful future thoughts affect discounting or risk propensity
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Abstract
Our decisions are partly shaped by thoughts about our own future. For example, engaging in episodic simulation, where we imagine our own, specific futures, may influence our choices by changing how we expect to feel and how we feel in the present. We conducted three experiments to assess whether the impact of episodic simulation on delay discounting, probability discounting, and risk propensity would change depending on whether the thoughts about the future evoked the discrete emotions anger or fear. In the pilot study (N = 164), we reliably induced these emotions with episodic simulation. In Experiment 1 (N = 454), participants were randomly assigned to an anger, fear, or a neutral condition, and we measured their degree of discounting. Delay and probability discounting did not differ between the conditions. In Experiment 2 (N = 450), participants were randomly assigned to the same conditions as in Experiment 1, and we measured their risk propensity. Risk propensity did not differ between conditions. Our studies do not show any differential effect of angry and fearful future thoughts on decisions. We provide explanations and suggestions for future research into the intersection between future thoughts, specific emotions, and decisions about time and risk.
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- europepmc
- last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00