Administrative coordination and integrative policy capacities: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Administrative coordination and integrative policy capacities: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Administrative coordination and integrative policy capacities: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis Francesco Sarti This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7473913/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The literature has gone to great lengths to describe the administrative coordination mechanisms that support climate policy implementation. Yet few studies have adopted an actor-oriented perspective to understand which capacities actors perceive as necessary or sufficient to effectively engage in administrative coordination for climate policy implementation. This paper addresses this gap by examining five integrative policy capacities and their role in enabling administrative coordination. Analyzing a dataset comprising thirty-one bureaucrats implementing climate plans in four cities (Bologna, Lausanne, Padua, Zurich) and across various policy sectors, this Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) confirms findings in the literature that identify integrated policy design as a necessary condition for effective administrative coordination. Furthermore, the paper found that bureaucratic autonomy, as well as the availability of human and financial resources, are also important enabling conditions, insofar as they reduce coordination transaction costs and enhance actors’ agency in pursuing policy integration. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the integrative policy capacities needed to foster the ecological transition at the local level. Climate policy implementation Administrative coordination Integrative policy capacities Qualitative comparative analysis Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Introduction Implementing climate plans requires collective climate actions (Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017 ). However, the integration of climate goals (mitigation or adaptation) into sector-specific implementation practices can be highly conflictual because different policy subsystems with different priorities are involved (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016 ; Cejudo & Michel, 2017 ; Cejudo & Trein, 2023 ). At the level of the local public administration, conflict between bureaucrats can emerge over implementing decisions such as public space usage or the prioritization and the scheduling of interventions. For example, balancing ecological and socio-spatial priorities, or aligning economic growth with environmental objectives, poses significant challenges. The policy integration literature has especially explored the determinants of policy coordination and integration reforms (Trein & Maggetti, 2020 ; Trein et al., 2021b ; Domorenok et al., 2021 ), while neglecting the conditions for their actual unfolding (Trein et al., 2023 ; Sarti, 2023 ). Furthermore, while the literature has extensively described coordination activities that are associated with successful implementation of cross-cutting policies - such as interdepartmental decision-making (Peters, 1998 ; Hustedt & Danken, 2017 ) and whole-of-government approaches (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007 ) -, there remains limited understanding of how individual actors perceive the requirements for coordination. This paper addresses these gaps in the literature and investigates the necessary and sufficient conditions for actors’ perceptions of effective coordination (during the implementation of climate plans). Individual bureaucrats in the cities of Bologna, Padua, Lausanne and Zürich who are responsible for implementing climate goals across local departments are taken as the unit of analysis to investigate their resources and their coordination practices in climate policy implementation. The following question guides the empirical investigation: Under what configuration of capacities do bureaucrats evaluate administrative coordination as effective? The paper firstly, reviews public administration literature to conceptualize (effective) administrative coordination. Secondly, it develops a theoretical framework with expectations regarding how ‘policy capacities’ are associated with effective policy coordination (Wu et al., 2015 ; Peters, 2018). Five capacities are considered, namely: highly integrated policy design, bureaucratic autonomy, qualified and sufficient personnel, available finances, and strong use of external expertise. Third, it applies Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) for sufficiency and necessity analysis (Ragin, 2000 ; 2008 ), analysing responses of thirty-one bureaucrats in the four different cities and several policy sectors (see Annex 1 in the Supplementary Material). Controlling for political conditions (through case selection), the study found that when actors perceive the city’s climate plan as an integrative capacity and when they can mobilize other policy capacities - and especially bureaucratic autonomy, finances, and personnel – they more efficiently coordinate for putting climate policies into practice. Empirical findings, thus, indicate the development of an integrated policy strategy as a key factor to establish policy integration (Howlett & Rayner, 2007 ; Rayner & Howlett, 2009 ). In addition, they point to the importance for local governments to focus on capacity building and especially hiring qualified human resources and investing in property and authority, which could increase local governments’ autonomy. From a theoretical perspective, this paper contributes to the current debates regarding the integrative policy capacities that actors need to implement climate policies. It does so by, first, employing an actor-centred approach, as recently demanded by Trein et al. ( 2023 ). Secondly, by supporting extant theoretical claims regarding the importance of policy capacities for policy integration (Howlett & Seguin, 2018; Candel, 2019 ; Domorenok et al., 2021 ; Vince et al., 2024 , Dorado‑Rubín et al., 2025a, 2025b) with empirical knowledge developed through a formalize method such as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Thirdly, and most importantly, by specifying the interplay of specific policy capacities that together, rather than in isolation, enhance actors’ agency in pursuing policy integration processes. Policy coordination Administrative or policy coordination refers to the procedural, organizational, and government-centered dimensions of policy integration (Tosun & Lang, 2017 ; Cejudo & Michel, 2017 ; Trein & Maggetti, 2020 ; Trein et al., 2021a , b ). It addresses challenges arising from the fragmentation and functional specialization of public administrations (Bouckaert et al., 2010 ; Peters, 2015b ). The key focus is on the horizontal relationships between public sector organizations, here local departments. This includes the exchange of information, the production of intermediary outputs, as well as joint implementation and evaluation of actions. The literature has extensively examined coordination activities that enhance implementation performance (Peters, 2015b ). Coordination mechanisms are essential for fostering synergies among administrative structures throughout the policy integration process (Domorenok et al., 2021 ). For instance, the establishment of inter-departmental committees is often cited as a means of mitigating turf wars that arise when departments prioritize their own sectoral interests (Peters, 1998 ; Hustedt & Danken, 2017 ). Overall, effective coordination is achieved when bureaucratic actors across organizational boundaries collaborate rather than compete for political attention or pursue narrow sectoral objectives. This outcome is here measured at the individual level through perceptions and evaluations gathered systematically from interview respondents 1 (see methodology for further information). Policy capacity for effective coordination This paper explores the configurations of “policy capacities” (Wu et al., 2015 ) that may facilitate effective administrative coordination, with a particular focus on integrative capacities . Integrative capacity is defined as “the capacity of agencies involved in the coordination of the policy process to deliver successful implementation” (Vince & Day, 2020 , pp.318). Integrative policy capacities not only enable but also keep coordination active over time during implementation (Dorado-Rubín et al., 2025a ). While there is growing recognition of the need to understand what combination of abilities, skills, and resources actors require to coordinate across sectors (Vince et al., 2024 ), the concept of integrative capacity remains underdeveloped in policy integration studies. A number of competing conceptualizations have emerged in recent years (see Howlett & Seguin, 2018; Domorenok et al., 2021 ; Vince et al., 2024 ; Fudge et al., 2025 ; Dorado-Rubín et al., 2025a , b ). Some scholars have adapted Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett’s ( 2015 ) general policy capacity framework to theorize integrative capacities. For example, Domorenok et al. ( 2021 ) distinguish between systemic, organizational, and individual integration capacities referring, respectively, to ‘comprehensive norms and rules,’ ‘vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms,’ and ‘knowledge, competence, and skills.’ Others conceptualize capacity building as an outcome rather than a prerequisite of the policy integration process. Cejudo and Trein ( 2023 ), for instance, argue that the success of policy integration becomes apparent through the creation of integration capacities, although they do not elaborate further. A more comprehensive view was recently developed by Vince and colleagues ( 2024 ). Drawing on a review of variables that explain policy integration, they organize integrative capacities into a matrix that distinguishes programmatic, processual, and political elements, offering an encompassing view of the set of skills and resources that must be mobilised for policy integration (Vince et al., 2024 ; Fudge et al., 2025 ). In this paper, I focus specifically on the local and individual level of analysis (local bureaucrats) and consider only the organizational aspects of policy integration (administrative coordination). Furthermore, I adopt a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach, which requires the selection of a limited number of conditions (see methodology). For all these reasons, not all the integrative capacities identified by Domorenok et al. ( 2021 ) and Vince et al. ( 2024 ) can be included in the analysis. To inform the selection of relevant integrative capacities, I consider the “public action resources” which have proved to be essential for policy implementation (Hood & Margetts, 2007 ; Knoepfel, 2018; Lambelet, 2019 ). Administrative coordination is an implementation activity that is often described by the literature as an administrative burdensome process as it requires time, skills and resources. It often risks being perceived by bureaucrats as an extra task. In other words, faced with limited resources, bureaucrats may choose to focus on their primary tasks and forgo policy coordination. In addition, resource-related heuristics can generate cognitive feedback loops that impact the perceived complexity of policy issues and, in turn, the perceived need for coordination. This paper examines five policy resources: integrated climate plan ( INT ), bureaucratic autonomy ( AUT ), finances ( FIN ), personnel ( PER ), and use of experts ( EXP ). Each of these is treated as a distinct condition (and analysed separately) possibly associated with the outcome. However, consistent with the logic of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the general expectation is that the simultaneous presence of multiple conditions - i.e., a comprehensive configuration of resources - is more likely to enable effective coordination than the presence of any single resource in isolation. In other words, it is the interaction and combination of these conditions, rather than their individual effects, that are expected to be most explanatory. Integrated climate plans as systemic capacities Many political scientists view policy not merely as an outcome to be explained, but as a causal force in its own right. For instance, scholars of the historical institutionalism tradition have long analysed the effect of policies (e.g. Pierson, 1993 ; Thelen, 1999 ), for instance theorizing self-reinforcing and self-undermining mechanisms that polices have (Jacobs & Weaver, 2015 ; Skogstad, 2017 ; Béland & Schlager, 2019 ). Others have even argued that policies have become the primary instruments of governance, replacing earlier governing practices and fundamentally reshaping the functioning of the state (Orren & Skowronek, 2017 ). This paper builds on the argument whereby policies, among other effects, can mitigate or reinforce conflicts (Hinterleitner & Sager, 2022 ). More specifically, conflicts between policy subsystems can be mitigated by integrated climate plans. The literature tells us that policies have material effects - distributing benefits and burdens among policy subsystems - as well as interpretive effects - influencing actors’ perceptions regarding inter-subsystem conflict, that is, those actors they perceive as opponents in the process of policy integration (Hinterleitner & Sager, 2022 ; Sarti, 2023 ). The policies under analysis here, i.e., the climate plans of the cities of Lausanne, Zurich, Bologna and Padua, are more than tools for governing; they are also tools for arbitration between policy subsystems. If well designed, they set priorities and minimize conflicts (or on the contrary, they can fuel conflict when poorly designed). This issue has been extensively explored in the literature on policy design (Howlett & Rayner, 2007 ; Rayner & Howlett, 2009 ). This literature defines “integrated policy strategies” as policies that display coherent policy goals and consistent policy means 2 . The key design question is what goals, tools and policy communities are included in the integrated program, and what logic justifies design choices (Sarti, 2023 ). For example, Hustedt and Danken ( 2017 ) discuss how the logic beneath coordination committees’ creation affect actors’ behaviour and orientation towards policy coordination. They found that the prevailing logic that motivates the creation of inter-departmental committees - powering or puzzling (Heclo, 1974 ) – determined whether members coordinated successfully. The logic of integration, thus, informs us of ‘what’ will be integrated and of ‘how’ coordination will take place (Sarti, 2023 ). Climate plans can thus act as “systemic integrative capacities” (Domorenok et al., 2021 ) that actors can mobilize for facilitating coordination during policy implementation 3 . The expectation is that the more actors will perceive a climate plan as an integrative capacity, i.e., coherently integrating all relevant sectors, the more able they will be to accomplish effective administrative coordination. Bureaucratic autonomy Autonomy here refers to the ability of bureaucrats to take decision autonomously from other levels of government and service providers. By contrast, lack of autonomy occurs when bureaucrats must await the authorization of regulators located in other levels of government and/or private actors to act. This conceptualisation implies that autonomy stems from two main sources, i.e., “law” and “property” (cf. Knoepfel, 2018). In the legal sense, I refer to the authority to regulate and impose a behavior on another actor, a right that is generally conferred or not on cities by the constitution (ibidem). To mention some relevant examples, spatial planning or land protection rules dictate if and where local authorities can implement densification policies; cultural heritage authorities give permission to the installation of solar panels in the roofs of historical buildings or can stop the construction of underground infrastructures (district heating, metro lines, water systems, etc.) in the case of archaeological discoveries; speed limits for cars can be implemented only if cities have the regulatory authority over the streets. Regarding autonomy generated by property rights , I refer especially to assets at disposal of the municipality that owns them or hold rights for their use in policy implementation (Knoepfel, 2018) – for example, common-pool resources (land, water, forests), buildings (e.g., administrative offices, social houses, schools), and institutional and economic assets (e.g., public agencies and service providers). Most policies are endowed with assets. Environmental ones are for instance highly dependent of public ownership relating to spatial planning, transport and energy (Ibidem). But not always such assets are owned by the cities themselves as private actors have penetrated local service delivery (Galanti, 2016 ). Complexity and extent of property rights regimes highly affect policy integration processes due to increased transaction costs for policy coordination and less room for manoeuvring integration processes (Gerber et al., 2009; Bolognesi et al., 2021). Fragmentation of property and authority paves the way to unclear distribution of responsibilities and conflictual logic of public actions (profit/private vs. climate/public). I expect that, due to the resulting increase in coordination costs, the absence of bureaucratic autonomy can hinder effective coordination among local bureaucrats. Conversely, bureaucratic autonomy from other levels of government and private actors is expected to facilitate administrative coordination. Finances Finances refers to the money at disposal throughout the policy implementation process. Financial resources firstly stem from the ability to levy taxes, which varies greatly across institutional contexts. For example, Swiss cities have very high ability to levy taxes and decide tax rates in comparison to italian cities (Ladner et al., 2019 ). In this sense, financial considerations are also linked to the abovementioned definition of autonomy. There are important differences in budgetary capacities across local departments which often depends on property ownership (see above). For example, in Switzerland some municipal department generates revenues and manages money independently (e.g., industrial services sell energy or waste disposal departments benefit from own systems of tax collection). This gives them higher fiscal capacity in deciding subsidies and public acquisitions (Knoepfel, 2018). Yet money at disposal for public policies can also come from other venues. The Italian cities, for example, rely heavily on regional, national and European transfers. Private actors can also co-partecipate in public policy in the case of public-private partnerships. Overall, availability of finances is here considered as another potential integrative capacity, which facilitates intersectoral negotiations. For Vince et al. ( 2024 ) financial capacities help to make the processes of resources’ allocation and optimisation (across policy subsystems) during policy implementation less conflictual (Ibidem) I expect that when a high level of financial resources is available, bureaucrats across policy sectors have more flexibility to negotiate compromises over conflicting goals. They are also more willing to coordinate in implementing integrated climate policies, as they perceive the integration process as an opportunity to advance their own sectoral objectives. Conversely, when resources are limited, I expect increased competition among bureaucrats, with a tendency to hoard funds for their specific sectoral priorities (at the expenses of the policy integration process). Personnel Personnel refers to the number and the qualification of the human resources operating in public organizations that implement climate policies. Available and qualified bureaucratic staff is key for coordination because this is a human activity, requiring a large amount of people specialized in different sectors who are open to collectively think about climate change as a common problem requiring cross-sectoral solutions and/or to climate-proof their activities. “Insufficient personnel is one of the most common arguments used by the public sector to reject attempts to allocate new tasks to existing services” (Knoepfel, 2018, p.137). Empirical research on policy integration that compared cases with different degree of human resources found that qualified staff capable of designing and implementing cross sectoral linkages is a key integrative capacity (Domorenok et al., 2021 ). A city department that can dedicate staff and time to coordination activities (e.g., forming a cross-sectoral working groups with other departments), while also continuing performing standard activities within their sector, will likely not consider coordination as an extra effort. By contrast, if a city department lacks personnel, it will likely prioritize business-as-usual (implementation in siloes) to administrative coordination. I expect that availability of qualified internal staff at disposal will provide more time, knowledge and energy for coordination, while the absence of human resources will be associated with less time, knowledge and energy dedicated to coordination activities. External expertise Expertise (EXP) refers to the use of knowledge produced by external experts and fed back into the policy implementation process. For example, expertise produced by academics, epistemic communities, architectural and mobility firms, NGOs and associations, and target groups or lay knowledge. Bureaucratic expertise (internal) is not part of this resource but rather of the condition “personnel” (see above). Expertise refers to the link between State and society (Peters, 2015a ). It is the extent to which the knowledge of clients and experts operating in the policy subsystem where street-level bureaucrats serve can penetrate into public bureaucracies and inform implementation. In this sense, the way I interpret this resource is closer to the definition of “nodality” in Hood and Margetts ( 2007 ) or of “informational resources” in Knoepfel (op.cit). Lack of knowledge within the administration may be compensated through the commissioning of private consultancies, increasing local dependency on the expertise of private actors (Knoepfel, 2018). Furthermore, public sector organizations have political connections of their own with clientele groups that provide them with support in their battles. Clientele groups highly inform each department feeding information that are used to facilitate the coordination effort. Elaborating the direction of the expectation regarding the use of expertise is not straightforward as with other resources considered above. On the one hand, feeding external knowledge into the administrative process may facilitate coordination, as it allows to bring into the discussion alternative perspectives and solutions that would not be considered otherwise or to compensate for lacking personnel. Yet exactly such new inclusion of external inputs into the process may complexify the process, i.e., require an additional administrative effort because the new inputs that are fed into bureaucratic decisions require to be discussed and accepted by local actors. In addition, experts might enter into conflict with internal expertise generating increasing transaction costs for coordination. In this sense, I prefer not to formulate an expectation and let the data speak (in QCA terms, I do not inject theoretical knowledge on the selection of logical reminders for the condition ‘use of experts). Table 1 below summarizes the direction of expectations. The capital letter in the table is used to identify the presence of a condition ; the lowecase for the absence of the condition. Table 1 : Direction of expectations Conditions Direction of expectations General expectations Integrated program (INT) Not integrated program (int) INT -> COORD; int -> coord The simultaneous presence of multiple conditions, enables effective coordination (COORD); The simoultaneous absence of multiple conditions hinders effective coordination (coord) Strong bureaucratic autonomy (AUT) Weak bureaucratic autonomy (aut) AUT -> COORD; aut -> coord Availability of finances (FIN) Not available finances (fin) FIN -> COORD; fin -> coord Qualified/sufficient staff (PER) Not qualified/insufficient staff (per) PER -> COORD; per -> coord Strong use of expertise (EXP) Weak use of expertise (exp) No expectations Methodology and data Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) QCA offers both a research approach and a data analysis technique for navigating complex causation and conducting multiple cross-case comparisons (Ragin, 2000 ; Schneider & Wagemann 2012 ; Rihoux, 2017 ). This set-theoretic method helps answer causes-of-effect types of questions (Mahoney & Goertz, 2006 ), and particularly suits this research, which aim at explaining (in)effective coordination. The initial step in the QCA protocol is called ‘calibration’. This is a process in which researchers draw upon empirical information from cases to assign membership scores for each condition and outcome under investigation. For crispy sets, a 0 value is generally assigned for the absence of a condition or outcome, while the 1 value displays the presence of the condition or the outcome (see calibration of ‘EXP’ below). In fuzzy sets, researchers are able to quantitatively distinguish between degrees of membership. Hence, also values such as 0.3 or 0.7 are possible (see below calibrations of ‘COORD’, ‘INT’, ‘AUT’, ‘PER’, and ‘FIN’). After calibrating, researchers seek to identify subset and superset relationships, i.e., the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome. For the analysis, I use the packages ‘QCA’ (Duşa, 2018 ) and ‘SetMethods’ (Oana & Schneider, 2018 ) in R. Among other features, the software helps generate truths tables (the basis for sufficiency analysis), presenting data as configurations of conditions and outcomes (see truth tables in Annex 2 in the Supplementary Material). Subsequently, QCA employs minimization algorithms based on Boolean algebra to identify what combinations of conditions are sufficient for the presence of the outcome. The process of Boolean minimization consists in a comparison of the cases’ causal paths displayed in the truth table, and the elimination of redundancies. Researchers can follow different strategies to minimize the truth table, creating conservative, parsimonious, or intermediate solutions (see alternative solutions in Annex 3/Supplementary Material). In this research, I opted for an intermediate solution formula. As I had formulated theory-driven expectations, the latter allowed me to inject theoretical knowledge into the selection of logical remainders 4 , and ‘direct’ expectations (as displayed in Table 1 above). To maintain diversity among possible combinations of conditions, the number of conditions (potential explanatory factors) must be kept parsimonious. For instance, in an intermediate-N analysis (e.g., up to 40 cases), it is common practice to select four to six or seven conditions (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009 , pp. 28). This article compares 31 cases and selected five conditions (see above). Case selection Cases are thirty-one bureaucrats implementing climate policies in four cities (and two countries): Bologna (Italy) – Lausanne (Switzerland) – Padova (Italy) – Zurich (Switzerland). They are administrative actors, who are only involved in the administrative process of climate policy integration and implementation. The interview partners work in different policies domains which are relevant for climate policy implementation, such as mobility, energy, urbanism, housing, waste, water and climate (see Annex 1/ Supplementary Material). This ensures variations in the conditions under analysis. Diversity of cases is a crucial requirement for QCA, which is very sensitive to the issue of limited diversity (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012 ). The political context constitutes the key scope condition for generalizing the findings (Goertz & Mahoney, 2009). All four cities are governed by left-leaning majorities, which the literature identifies as proponents of policy integration and coordination (Maggetti & Trein, 2021 ; Dorado-Rubín et al., 2025b ). This suggests a shared political willingness to implement climate policies and integrate goals across sectors (an assumption that was confirmed during the interviews). In particular, all four cities are implementing ambitious climate plans that integrate several policy sectors, and which seeks to adapt to climate change and reach climate neutrality by 2030 (in the case of Bologna and Padua) or 2040 (in the case of Zurich and Lausanne). Data collection and calibration During interviews, I asked participants to evaluate the effectiveness of administrative coordination in their city for the implementation of climate plans. The following question was used for this measurement: How well do you personally feel the coordination between different departments for climate policy implementation works in your city? Please give a score from ‘0’ (not effective) to ‘10’ (very effective). What ‘effective’ means against the collected raw data needs to be further specified during the stage of calibration in QCA. This requires imposing a qualitative threshold to assess memberships (who is ‘in’ and ‘out’ of each set), and it is a fundamental choice which will crucially influence the results (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012 ). Threshold-setting should rely on “informed judgement” and when possible, “within-case knowledge” (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009 , pp. 223). As the questions were posed during face-to-face interviews in most of the cases, respondents could elaborate on their evaluations – meaning that personal knowledge of each case was available. When respondents described administrative coordination as not effective, they usually evaluated it as 5 or below. Scores of 6 or 7 were usually justified as coordination mechanisms with large margins of improvement. Finally, the scores of 8, 9 and 10 were usually associated with excellent evaluations of coordination. Based on this insight, I set the crossover point (the membership score of 0.5) for ‘effectiveness’ at 5.9 5 and then used the algorithm in the QCA package to distribute cases before and after the threshold, as in applied QCA research (Duşa, 2019). The same logic was applied to measure and calibrate membership for the condition ‘integrated climate plan’ (INT).The questionnaire included the following question: “ How ‘integrated’ across sectors do you personally consider your city's climate strategy to be? Please give a score from ‘0’ (few sectors integrated) to ‘10’ (many sectors integrated) ”. Regarding three of the other conditions, this research also employs a fuzzy-set methodology for calibration. I calibrated the sets for “AUT” (autonomy), “PER” (personnel), and “FIN” (finances) based on participants’ responses to three questions in which I asked them to express agreement or disagreement with statements concerning the level of autonomy, human resources and finances they can mobilise in climate policy implementation. For each statement, there were four possible responses, each possibility reflecting one membership score: completely disagree (0), disagree (0.3), agree (0.7), and fully agree (1): AUT : “ Your office has sufficient autonomy from other actors (e.g., other levels of government or service providers) to implement climate policies in your city ”. PER : “ Your office has sufficient and qualified personnel to implement climate policies in your city” . FIN : “ Your office has sufficient financial resources to implement climate policies in your city ”. Finally, regarding the condition “strong use of experts” (EXP), I provided them with the following statement : “ external expertise is very important for the implementation of climate policies in your city ”. Even in this case, there were four possible responses: completely disagree, disagree, agree, and fully agree. Yet, this time I used a crisp method of calibration: I coded ‘1’ answers that “fully agreed”, and ‘0’ for all other answers 6 . Overall, the calibrated dataset includes thirty-one cases, one outcome and five conditions. Figure 1 below displays the distribution of cases regarding the outcome and the five conditions. Having a balanced distribution, as the one ensured by the method of calibration adopted for this research, is a key requirement for QCA (Oana et al., 2021 ). Whereas the majority of the respondents perceive administrative coordination as effective in climate policy implementation in their respective city, there are many cases who judge it as not. Hence, there is variation in the outcome under investigation, which justifies the QCA approach used in this paper. The large majority of respondents also perceived climate plans as integrative capacities. This represents a methodological challenge for QCA (limited diversity), as few are the cases in which INT scores less than 0.5. Therefore, an alternative calibration of this set was included as a robustness check (see Annex 3/ Supplementary Material). Interestingly, there is not a large difference between the Swiss and italian respondents when it comes to evaluate the use of experts in climate policy implementation. By contrast, the dataset displays the expected variance between Italian and Swiss respondents regarding human and financial resources. Autonomy varies from office to office, with the Swiss cases particularly displaying strong variation (but generally declaring high autonomy). The more analytical results of the QCA analysis are presented in the following order : Firstly, the paper discusses necessity analysis, then sufficiency analysis. Secondly, for each analysis it presents results for the presence of the outcome, while the results for the absence of the outcome are reported in the Supplementary Material. Thirdly, I use parameters of fits to evaluate necessity and sufficiency relations. ‘Parameters of fits’ are metrics that range from 0 to 1 and are used in applied QCA to numerically assess the validity of necessity and sufficiency relations. Current standards in applied QCA research (Oana et al., 2021 ) have been regarded to evaluate the parameters of fit correctly: For a condition to be necessary, the “consistency of necessity” (Cons.Nec.) must at least be 0.9, while the “coverage” (Cov.Nec) and “relevance of necessity” (RoN) must at least be 0.6. In the construction of the truth table for sufficiency analysis, the “consistency of sufficiency” (Incl) is set at 0.81, the “Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency” (PRI) score is set at 0.51, and each raw of the truth table must contain at least 1 case not to be considered a logical reminder (n.cut = 1). No threshold exist for the coverage scores (CovU and CovS). Fourthly, if there are deviant cases, they are described so as to illustrate possible alternative explanations which are not grasped by the QCA solution. While parameters of fit are important, the QCA should always be complemented by an in-depth focus on cases (Oana et al., 2021 ). Finally, several robustness checks are run to validate results (see Annex 3/ Supplementary Material), following the protocol by Oana and Schneider ( 2024 ). All the analyses illustrated in this paper are thus supported by these checks (see Annex 3/ Supplementary Material). Results QCA analysis Climate plans as arbitration tools A necessity relation occurs when a necessary set X is a superset of an outcome set Y, which means X is present in all instances where Y happens (Duşa, 2018 ). This analysis found one necessary condition for effective coordination 7 : the existence of a highly integrated climate plan (INT <- COORD 8 ). This statement of necessity covers most of the cases (Cov.Nec = 0.811) and it is very consistent (Con. Nec. = 0.933) - even if there are instances of Y scoring higher than X leading to an imperfect superset relation, as visible in Fig. 2 below 9 . Overall, the parameters of fit indicate that a necessary relation is highly likely but should be verified by an in-depth focus on cases. Most of the interviewed discussed their cities climate plans as arbitration tools, i.e., not just as strategic or guiding documents, but as mechanisms to mediate, balance, or resolve competing interests or priorities between policy sectors. Yet, there is one case (7) that is located in the upper-left quadrant of the XY plot (Fig. 2 ). This means that membership in the set ‘efficient administrative coordination’ is slightly higher than membership in the set ‘highly integrated climate plan’. In order to validate the necessity relation, thus, one must scrutinize this deviant case in-kind, which seems contradicting the statement of necessity. This bureaucrat working in the water department of the city of Lausanne during the interview distanced himself/herself from everyone else because he/she minimized the importance of the city’s climate plan. He/she also evaluated the degree of integration of the climate plan as low (score of 5) and coordination as just above the threshold I set for effectiveness (score of 6): I think it's important to act in each sector, but not necessarily to integrate everything ... there is the climate plan, which allows things to be integrated, but after that, everyone has autonomy and objectives. It's not the climate that will do everything; it can set objectives and verify them … (but) integration in practice, i.e., coordination, is not yet optimal ... we (the water department) are participating, but I think there is still a lot to be done to make it work well and to really develop projects where water issues are properly integrated The interview partner assesses both the degree of integration of the climate plan and the effectiveness of coordination as relatively low. The scores given (respectively, 5 and 6 out of 10) and the reasoning provided in the citation, reveal a general scepticism on the policy integration process. Thus, he/she does not contradict the statement of necessity: The interviewed do not give precise indication against the necessary relationship, yet the insight inform on the sufficiency relationship when it is contended that the ‘climate will not do everything’, i.e., having top-down steering mechanism is not a sufficient condition for coordination. Overall, this first analysis confirms the exepectation whereby integrated policies can act as important arbitration tools between policy subsystems (Domorenok et al., 2021 ; Hinterleitner & Sager, 2022 ). Sufficiency analysis: Alternative paths to policy coordination This section presents the results of the process of minimization of the truth table, i.e., the sufficiency analysis, which is the core of QCA. Only findings from the intermediate solution formulas are discussed here. The truth tables and the alternative solutions (conservative and parsimonious) are analysed in the Annex. The results are also complemented by robustness checks (see Supplementary Material). Local actors must possess different policy capacities simultaneously for effectively engaging in policy coordination Table 2 presents the solutions formula associated with effective coordination. The solution formula identifies four paths leading to positive evaluation of administrative coordination among the cases. Each path comprises the intersection of different integrative capacities as sufficient for the outcome. It can be summarized as follows: AUT*INT + PER*INT + EXP*INT + AUT*FIN*PER*~EXP ->COORD 10 Table 2 Sufficiency, Intermediate solution, presence of the outcome Paths inclS PRI covS covU cases AUT*INT 0.897 0.833 0.749 0.070 1,2,6; 11,17,20; 4,26; 15,22,24,25; 3,5,9,10,14,23,28,30 PER*INT 0.874 0.795 0.879 0.089 12,13,19; 8,27; 31; 11,17,20; 15,22,24,25; 3,5,9,10,14,23,28,30 EXP*INT 0.796 0.702 0.450 0.049 16,18,21; 31 ; 11,17,20; 3,5,9,10,14,23,28,30 AUT*FIN*PER*~EXP 0.942 0.877 0.289 0.008 7 ; 15, 22, 24, 25 Solution 0.828 0.738 0.927 Legend : Bologna (cases 1–4), Lausanne (cases 5–14), Padua (cases 15–21), Zurich (cases 22–31) A subset relation (sufficiency) signifies that for each case, the membership in X (solution formula) is smaller or equal to membership in Y (outcome). In my case, the solution formula indicates an imperfect consistency value, yet just above the threshold to be considered as a subset relation (inclS = 0.828). Furthermore, the second parameter (‘coverage’ abbreviated in covS in Table 2 above) indicates the very strong empirical relevance of the solution. It numerically expresses the fact that more than 90% of the cases are covered by the solution (covS = 0.927). Most cases, indeed, represent typical cases of the relation (both X and Y are above 0.5). Some other cases deviate from the subset relation only in-degree. These cases do not contradict the statement of sufficiency because they display a situation in which both X and Y are present, i.e., higher than 0.5 (for more details see Fig. 6 in the Supplementary Material). Finally, there are five deviant cases in-kind, namely cases 6, 10, 11, 13, 31. These cases evaluated coordination as ineffective (Y 0.5). We must then analyse qualitatively each of these cases to complement the QCA analysis because they can illustrate alternative explanations which are not grasped by the solution formula. Three of these deviant cases are working in the city of Lausanne. Case 10 deals with forests, case 11 with educational infrastructures, case 6 with housing refurbishment. During the interviews the cases evaluated coordination as ineffective due to the following reasons: (a) the climate office lacks steering capacity; (b) the building permit and authorisation procedures are slow; (c) the working routines are still organised in siloes and the offices are highly specialized, which complicates the sequencing of interventions; (d) lack of time to perform policy coordination. Similar points have been raised by case 13 in the climate department of the city of Padua and case 31, in the urban development department of the city of Zurich. For instance case 13 nicely elaborated on points (c) and (d) above when he/she discusses the need for a ‘cross-sectoral management of personnel’: The thing that is most lacking is perhaps a different cross-sectoral management of personnel … everyone tends to continue working in silos … each of us actually struggles to find the time to work with others because that space is not recognised as a kind of extra work … everyone tends to define their own activities very narrowly … It is also very difficult to organise in practice, because an employee formally belongs to one sector, so when they work for other sectors or with other sectors, they enter a sort of grey area ... Who is the head of the sector at that point? Who is the person in charge of managing that group of people who formally belong to different sectors? … It is really a way of organising work in general, that is what is missing The four altrenative factors identified by deviant cases can be considered “organizational integrative capacities” (Domorenok et al., 2021 ). These cases do not contradict the general expectation tested in this study whereby a simultaneous presence of multiple capacities would enable effective coordination, while a simultaneous absence of integrative capacities would be associated with the absence of effective coordination. On the contrary, these cases help us refine the analysis and understand what other integrative capacities must be present for effective coordination, namely a cross-sctoral management of personnel and an appropriate organization of the coordination activity. To sum up, this anaylsis found that local actors must possess different policy capacities simultaneously for effectively engaging in policy coordination . Finally, Table 2 disaggregates the solution formula in its four minimal expressions, revealing the four specific paths to effective coordination and how each configuration of capacities contributes to explaining the subset relation. Such an exercise reveals that all paths are also in line with the direction of expectations suggested by the theories (see Table 1 above). In particular, the intersection of bureaucratic autonomy and integrated norms (AUT*INT) as well as the intersection of human resources and integrated norms (PER*INT) are particularly explanatory of effective coordination based on the parameters of fit. Autonomy is considered a key resource because it expands the room for action and reduce overlap of responsibilities as well as administrative redundancies (e.g., Case 5). Most interview partners noted that in areas where their office or city operates with full autonomy from higher levels of government and private actors (e.g., private service providers, land owners, etc.), implementation tends to be faster and coordination costs are reduced (e.g., Case 14). In sectors such as urbanism, for instance, respondents emphasized that ownership of and authority over public space is essential. For instance, Case 14 highlighted the significant difference between coordination meetings involving only public actors (less conflictual) and those requiring negotiations with private landowners (very conflictual). However, deviant cases - such as the abovementioned Case 11 - pointed out that autonomy can also become an obstacle for policy coordination. In particular, the autonomy of implementing agencies can lead to coordination challenges and free-riding behavior when no mechanisms are in place to guide the process. In this context, the simultaneous presence of bureaucratic autonomy and a well-integrated climate plan helps minimize the risk of free-riding. The climate plan clearly defines the responsibilities of each implementing actor and helps avoid overlaps and conflicts, while autonomy leaves actors room for manouvering. In other words, it is the interplay between top-down steering, ensured by climate plans, and bottom-up action by integrative agents that leads to effective administrative coordination. The importance of staffing alongside the climate plan is instead well illustrated in Case 8. The interviewee from the energy department of the City of Lausanne described the process of hiring new qualified personnel specifically to support coordination with the climate office, while the latter was still finalizing its climate plan: “ We didn't know exactly what form the climate action plan would take, but I expanded and transformed the technical office from a simple office that monitors work to a real engineering office ... I told my asset manager: now you need to get along with the climate office, understand their objectives, and make sure we are all on the same page ” (Case 8). In this case, two capacity-building processes - staffing and integrated planning - unfolded in parallel, ultimately enabling effective coordination between the city’s energy and climate departments. Again, the analysis shows that it is precisly the co-occurrence of enabling conditions that facilitates administrative coordination. The last two paths in Table 2 retain less explanatory power, based on parameters of fits, because either inconsistent (path 3) or with little coverage (path 4). However, when comparing these cases, it is interesting to note that the role of the condition ‘strong use of expertise’ in administrative coordination appears ambiguous: Path 3 (i.e., EXP*INT) would suggest that external expertise contributes to efficient coordination, while path 4 (AUT*FIN*PER*~EXP) provides instances of cases in which external expertise must be absent for effective coordination to occur. This last path, more specifically, illustrates the fact that the inclusion of external inputs into a context in which actors already possess autonomy, finances and personnel for coordination may complexify rather than help the process (particularly for cases located in the city of Zurich). When all resources are already available, reliance on external experts might enter into conflict with internal expertise generating increasing transaction costs for coordination. During the interviews in Zurich, for instance, some argued that experts are very important (e.g., case 30) while others disagreed (e.g., case 29). Experts are often consulted by administrators only to legitimize decisions that were already proposed by politicians (e.g., case 31). I contend that the involvement of external experts may depend on the availability of internal expertise as well as the degree of politicization of issues requiring coordination. Expertise may be strategically (mis)used to depoliticize negotiations and legitimize decisions that are already made or subject to contestation. Yet, I leave to future research to clarify how external experts facilitate or hinder coordination for climate policy implementation. Conclusion This paper investigated the integrative policy capacities associated with effective administrative coordination. Combining different strands of literature, it conceptualized integrative policy capacities (e.g., Domorenok et al., 2021 ; Vince et al., 2024 ) as resources that local actors can mobilize in policy implementation (Hood & Margetts, 2007 ; Knoepfel, 2018; Lambelet, 2019 ) to integrate (and keep integrated) policy subsystems in the quest for collective climate action (Tosun & Schoenefeld, 2017 ). The study employed a QCA approach, which allowed for a systematic comparison of thirty-one cases - i.e., local bureaucrats working in different cities (Lausanne, Zurich, Bologna, and Padua) and across various policy sectors (climate, environmental protection, energy, mobility, urban development, etc.). Notably, this method allowed for the detection of conjunctural causation - that is, different paths that equally explain the outcome (and its absence). The semi-structured interviews complemented the QCA analysis by identifying the mechanisms that explained the necessity and sufficiency relationships. In this sense, employing a QCA offered a formalized methodological approach that allowed to detect conjunctural causation, i.e., relationships where the outcome is produced by a specific combination of multiple conditions, rather than by a single cause acting in isolation. Overall, the study provided strong support for the hypothesis that the simultaneous presence of multiple integrative capacities facilitates coordination, whereas their absence impedes it. More precisely, the necessity analysis found that having an highly integrated climate plan is necessary for efficient administrative coordination. This result aligns with the policy design literature (Howlett & Rayner, 2007 ; Rayner & Howlett, 2009 ), which describes how conflicts between policy subsystems can be mitigated by integrated norms acting as systemic capacities (Domorenok et al., 2021 ; Hinterleitner & Sager, 2022 ). The more a plan is perceived by actors as an integrative capacity that can be mobilized to facilitate (steer) cooperation with other departments, the more effective administrative coordination will be (Vince et al., 2024 ). The sufficiency analysis then found four paths to effective coordination: (a) combining bureaucratic autonomy with an integrated climate plan; (b) having qualified staff along with an integrated climate plan; (c) using external experts heavily together with an integrated climate plan; and (d) combining funding, staffing, and autonomy with limited use of external experts. These results tell us that co-occurrence of policy resources - and especially bureaucratic autonomy, human resources, and finances - are associated with effective coordination. When actors can simoultaneusly mobilize different set of resources they also establish efficient coordination mechanisms. Policy resources make coordination easier : when they are available, bureaucrats seems to stop perceiving coordination as an extra task and, on the contrary, realize that by coordinating with their colleagues they can achieve better results. Building on this paper’s findings, I argue that integrated climate plans - now being developed by cities worldwide to align policy sectors - are critically important and indeed a necessary condition for effective coordination. However, they are not sufficient on their own. Local administrations also require additional integrative policy capacities (in line with recent results by DoradoRubín et al., 2025a, 2025b), especially qualified human resources who are both capable and willing to bridge the boundaries between policy subsystems, as well as local autonomy - through legal authority and property ownership - which provides space for maneuvering and compromise. Effective administrative coordination thus results from the interplay between top-down steering, provided by climate plans, and bottom-up action from integrative agents who possess capacities. This insight highlights the importance of investing in capacity building for collective climate action alongside top-down integration efforts. Only then can climate policy implementation shift in the eyes of street-level bureaucrats - from a competitive struggle to a cooperative effort where cross-sectoral synergies are both possible and encouraged. The study as the following shortcoming: First, it does not clarify if the use of external expertise faciliates or hinders policy coordination. Secondly, the in-depth analysis of cases that followed the QCA revealed that some organizational factors (steering capacities, silo routines, lenght of procedures, cross-sectoral management of personnel, etc.) equally possess strong explanatory power and should have been integrated in the QCA design more sistematically (i.e., in data collection and analysis). Third, these results are only generalizable to local bureaucracies operating within contexts that share similar scope conditions than the cities under analysis in this study (Goertz & Mahoney, 2009) - i.e., cities governed by left-leaning majorities implementing climate plans. Finally, another limitation stems from the limited diversity observed in the condition ‘integrated climate plan’, which might have overemphasised its importance. 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Footnotes Success is always a subjective concept (McConnell, 2010 ), and self-assessments from individual actors are often used in public policy analysis for measurement purposes (e.g., Ramesh, Howlett & Saguin, 2016 , p.26). Nonetheless, I acknowledge that whereas subjective perceptions of coordination are key analytical elements to grasp the outcome condition, they represent proxies rather than measurements of ‘reality’. For the authors, integration is the “the replacement of specific elements of existing policy ‘mixes’ or ‘regimes’… by a new policy mix, in the expectation of avoiding the counterproductive or sub-optimal policy outcomes that arise from treating interrelated policy regimes and components in isolation from one another” (Rayner & Howlett, 2009 ; pp.100). Systemic integrative capacities are defined as “comprehensive system of norms and rules aimed at the attainment of coherent boundary spanning policy regimes” (Domorenok et al., 2021 , pp.8). Logical remainders refer to the combinations of conditions (or truth table rows) that lack enough empirical evidence to be subjected to a test of sufficiency. Researchers might decide to include those logical remainders when they are relevant, by making ‘plausible assumptions’. As a robustness check, I set the threshold at 6.9, which helped resolve the problem of limited diversity/skewness. Again, this was done to avoid limited diversity and skewness. While it did not find any necessary condition (or combination of conditions that are necessary) for ineffective coordination. In QCA, the lowercase indicates absence of the condition (e.g., coord means ineffective coordination), while capital letter indicates presence of the condition (e.g., COORD means effective coordination). Alternatevely also the tilde (~) indicates absence of the condition (e.g., ~COORD means absence of effective coordination). The symbol <- indicates a necessary relation. Another issue with this analysis is that there are few instances of cases where climate plans were evaluated as poorly integrated (limited diversity of the set INT). This is indicated by the RoN score (relevance of necessity), which is just above the threshold of 0.6. * Indicates a logical AND, + indicates a logical OR ; ~ indicates absence of the condition, ->indicates a sufficiency relation. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files SupplementaryMaterial.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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form\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7473913/v1/1c44cb2391128fcb6dabe9f9.jpg"},{"id":91086557,"identity":"522ccaed-a67f-43bf-9a1e-0246df803b97","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-11 12:25:57","extension":"jpg","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":81398,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSufficiency plot for the intersection AUT*INT (X) and the presence of the outcome (Y)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLegend\u003c/em\u003e: Bologna (cases 1-4), Lausanne (cases 5-14), Padua (cases 15-21), Zurich (cases 22-31)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"4.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7473913/v1/2897183deddd4cdf0804cae3.jpg"},{"id":91086567,"identity":"977f60c5-bfe6-44e8-b2c3-c5949b0a2a24","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-11 12:25:58","extension":"jpg","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":58859,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSufficiency plot for the intersection PER*INT (X) and the presence of the outcome (Y)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLegend\u003c/em\u003e: Bologna (cases 1-4), Lausanne (cases 5-14), Padua (cases 15-21), Zurich (cases 22-31)\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"5.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7473913/v1/dd49e6abccc975215d5520b6.jpg"},{"id":91088789,"identity":"0c8e8c75-4afe-42f2-bd39-a423f54f60c4","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-11 12:49:58","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1208162,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7473913/v1/d93b6277-b31b-4bdc-8231-48e21102ce9f.pdf"},{"id":91088477,"identity":"493a9eae-17b1-4a7c-9761-ec920d92bbed","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-11 12:41:57","extension":"docx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":453694,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"SupplementaryMaterial.docx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7473913/v1/75a6f1bdfe9064c4d6efbb97.docx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Administrative coordination and integrative policy capacities: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eImplementing climate plans requires collective climate actions (Tosun \u0026amp; Schoenefeld, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR88\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). However, the integration of climate goals (mitigation or adaptation) into sector-specific implementation practices can be highly conflictual because different \u003cem\u003epolicy subsystems\u003c/em\u003e with different priorities are involved (Candel \u0026amp; Biesbroek, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Cejudo \u0026amp; Michel, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Cejudo \u0026amp; Trein, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). At the level of the local public administration, conflict between bureaucrats can emerge over implementing decisions such as public space usage or the prioritization and the scheduling of interventions. For example, balancing ecological and socio-spatial priorities, or aligning economic growth with environmental objectives, poses significant challenges.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe policy integration literature has especially explored the determinants of policy coordination and integration \u003cem\u003ereforms\u003c/em\u003e (Trein \u0026amp; Maggetti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR90\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Trein et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021b\u003c/span\u003e; Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e), while neglecting the conditions for their actual unfolding (Trein et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR95\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Sarti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Furthermore, while the literature has extensively described coordination activities that are associated with successful implementation of cross-cutting policies - such as interdepartmental decision-making (Peters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e; Hustedt \u0026amp; Danken, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) and whole-of-government approaches (Christensen \u0026amp; L\u0026aelig;greid, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) -, there remains limited understanding of how individual actors perceive the requirements for coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper addresses these gaps in the literature and investigates the necessary and sufficient conditions for actors\u0026rsquo; perceptions of effective coordination (during the implementation of climate plans). Individual bureaucrats in the cities of Bologna, Padua, Lausanne and Z\u0026uuml;rich who are responsible for implementing climate goals across local departments are taken as the unit of analysis to investigate their resources and their coordination practices in climate policy implementation. The following question guides the empirical investigation: Under what configuration of capacities do bureaucrats evaluate administrative coordination as effective?\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe paper firstly, reviews public administration literature to conceptualize (effective) administrative coordination. Secondly, it develops a theoretical framework with expectations regarding how \u0026lsquo;policy capacities\u0026rsquo; are associated with effective policy coordination (Wu et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR101\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Peters, 2018). Five capacities are considered, namely: highly integrated policy design, bureaucratic autonomy, qualified and sufficient personnel, available finances, and strong use of external expertise. Third, it applies Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) for sufficiency and necessity analysis (Ragin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e), analysing responses of thirty-one bureaucrats in the four different cities and several policy sectors (see Annex 1 in the Supplementary Material).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eControlling for political conditions (through case selection), the study found that when actors perceive the city\u0026rsquo;s climate plan as an integrative capacity and when they can mobilize other policy capacities - and especially bureaucratic autonomy, finances, and personnel \u0026ndash; they more efficiently coordinate for putting climate policies into practice. Empirical findings, thus, indicate the development of an integrated policy strategy as a key factor to establish policy integration (Howlett \u0026amp; Rayner, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Rayner \u0026amp; Howlett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). In addition, they point to the importance for local governments to focus on capacity building and especially hiring qualified human resources and investing in property and authority, which could increase local governments\u0026rsquo; autonomy.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrom a theoretical perspective, this paper contributes to the current debates regarding the integrative policy capacities that actors need to implement climate policies. It does so by, first, employing an actor-centred approach, as recently demanded by Trein et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR95\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Secondly, by supporting extant theoretical claims regarding the importance of policy capacities for policy integration (Howlett \u0026amp; Seguin, 2018; Candel, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Vince et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e, Dorado‑Rub\u0026iacute;n et al., 2025a, 2025b) with empirical knowledge developed through a formalize method such as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Thirdly, and most importantly, by specifying the \u003cem\u003einterplay\u003c/em\u003e of specific policy capacities that together, rather than in isolation, enhance actors\u0026rsquo; agency in pursuing policy integration processes.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePolicy coordination\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAdministrative or policy coordination refers to the procedural, organizational, and government-centered dimensions of policy integration (Tosun \u0026amp; Lang, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR86\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Cejudo \u0026amp; Michel, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Trein \u0026amp; Maggetti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR90\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Trein et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR92\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021a\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e). It addresses challenges arising from the fragmentation and functional specialization of public administrations (Bouckaert et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Peters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015b\u003c/span\u003e). The key focus is on the horizontal relationships between public sector organizations, here local departments. This includes the exchange of information, the production of intermediary outputs, as well as joint implementation and evaluation of actions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe literature has extensively examined coordination activities that enhance implementation performance (Peters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015b\u003c/span\u003e). Coordination mechanisms are essential for fostering synergies among administrative structures throughout the policy integration process (Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). For instance, the establishment of inter-departmental committees is often cited as a means of mitigating turf wars that arise when departments prioritize their own sectoral interests (Peters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1998\u003c/span\u003e; Hustedt \u0026amp; Danken, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, effective coordination is achieved when bureaucratic actors across organizational boundaries collaborate rather than compete for political attention or pursue narrow sectoral objectives. This outcome is here measured at the individual level through perceptions and evaluations gathered systematically from interview respondents\u003csup\u003e1\u003c/sup\u003e (see methodology for further information).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePolicy capacity for effective coordination\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper explores the configurations of \u0026ldquo;policy capacities\u0026rdquo; (Wu et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR101\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) that may facilitate effective administrative coordination, with a particular focus on \u003cem\u003eintegrative capacities\u003c/em\u003e. Integrative capacity is defined as \u0026ldquo;the capacity of agencies involved in the coordination of the policy process to deliver successful implementation\u0026rdquo; (Vince \u0026amp; Day, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR99\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e, pp.318). Integrative policy capacities not only enable but also keep coordination active over time during implementation (Dorado-Rub\u0026iacute;n et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025a\u003c/span\u003e). While there is growing recognition of the need to understand what combination of abilities, skills, and resources actors require to coordinate across sectors (Vince et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), the concept of integrative capacity remains underdeveloped in policy integration studies. A number of competing conceptualizations have emerged in recent years (see Howlett \u0026amp; Seguin, 2018; Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Vince et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Fudge et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Dorado-Rub\u0026iacute;n et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025a\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e). Some scholars have adapted Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR101\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) general policy capacity framework to theorize integrative capacities. For example, Domorenok et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) distinguish between systemic, organizational, and individual integration capacities referring, respectively, to \u0026lsquo;comprehensive norms and rules,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms,\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;knowledge, competence, and skills.\u0026rsquo; Others conceptualize capacity building as an outcome rather than a prerequisite of the policy integration process. Cejudo and Trein (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e), for instance, argue that the success of policy integration becomes apparent through the creation of integration capacities, although they do not elaborate further. A more comprehensive view was recently developed by Vince and colleagues (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Drawing on a review of variables that explain policy integration, they organize integrative capacities into a matrix that distinguishes programmatic, processual, and political elements, offering an encompassing view of the set of skills and resources that must be mobilised for policy integration (Vince et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Fudge et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this paper, I focus specifically on the local and individual level of analysis (local bureaucrats) and consider only the organizational aspects of policy integration (administrative coordination). Furthermore, I adopt a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach, which requires the selection of a limited number of conditions (see methodology). For all these reasons, not all the integrative capacities identified by Domorenok et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) and Vince et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) can be included in the analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo inform the selection of relevant integrative capacities, I consider the \u0026ldquo;public action resources\u0026rdquo; which have proved to be essential for policy implementation (Hood \u0026amp; Margetts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Knoepfel, 2018; Lambelet, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Administrative coordination is an implementation activity that is often described by the literature as an administrative burdensome process as it requires time, skills and resources. It often risks being perceived by bureaucrats as an extra task. In other words, faced with limited resources, bureaucrats may choose to focus on their primary tasks and forgo policy coordination. In addition, resource-related heuristics can generate cognitive feedback loops that impact the perceived complexity of policy issues and, in turn, the perceived need for coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper examines five policy resources: integrated climate plan (\u003cem\u003eINT\u003c/em\u003e), bureaucratic autonomy (\u003cem\u003eAUT\u003c/em\u003e), finances (\u003cem\u003eFIN\u003c/em\u003e), personnel (\u003cem\u003ePER\u003c/em\u003e), and use of experts (\u003cem\u003eEXP\u003c/em\u003e). Each of these is treated as a distinct condition (and analysed separately) possibly associated with the outcome. However, consistent with the logic of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the general expectation is that the simultaneous presence of multiple conditions - i.e., a comprehensive configuration of resources - is more likely to enable effective coordination than the presence of any single resource in isolation. In other words, it is the interaction and combination of these conditions, rather than their individual effects, that are expected to be most explanatory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eIntegrated climate plans as systemic capacities\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eMany political scientists view policy not merely as an outcome to be explained, but as a causal force in its own right. For instance, scholars of the historical institutionalism tradition have long analysed the effect of policies (e.g. Pierson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1993\u003c/span\u003e; Thelen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e), for instance theorizing self-reinforcing and self-undermining mechanisms that polices have (Jacobs \u0026amp; Weaver, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Skogstad, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR82\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; B\u0026eacute;land \u0026amp; Schlager, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). Others have even argued that policies have become the primary instruments of governance, replacing earlier governing practices and fundamentally reshaping the functioning of the state (Orren \u0026amp; Skowronek, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). This paper builds on the argument whereby policies, among other effects, can mitigate or reinforce conflicts (Hinterleitner \u0026amp; Sager, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). More specifically, conflicts between policy subsystems can be mitigated by integrated climate plans.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe literature tells us that policies have material effects - distributing benefits and burdens among policy subsystems - as well as interpretive effects - influencing actors\u0026rsquo; perceptions regarding inter-subsystem conflict, that is, those actors they perceive as opponents in the process of policy integration (Hinterleitner \u0026amp; Sager, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Sarti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). The policies under analysis here, i.e., the climate plans of the cities of Lausanne, Zurich, Bologna and Padua, are more than tools for governing; they are also \u003cem\u003etools for arbitration between policy subsystems.\u003c/em\u003e If well designed, they set priorities and minimize conflicts (or on the contrary, they can fuel conflict when poorly designed). This issue has been extensively explored in the literature on policy design (Howlett \u0026amp; Rayner, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Rayner \u0026amp; Howlett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). This literature defines \u0026ldquo;integrated policy strategies\u0026rdquo; as policies that display coherent policy goals and consistent policy means\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe key design question is what goals, tools and policy communities are included in the integrated program, and what logic justifies design choices (Sarti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). For example, Hustedt and Danken (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) discuss how the logic beneath coordination committees\u0026rsquo; creation affect actors\u0026rsquo; behaviour and orientation towards policy coordination. They found that the prevailing logic that motivates the creation of inter-departmental committees - powering or puzzling (Heclo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1974\u003c/span\u003e) \u0026ndash; determined whether members coordinated successfully. The logic of integration, thus, informs us of \u0026lsquo;what\u0026rsquo; will be integrated and of \u0026lsquo;how\u0026rsquo; coordination will take place (Sarti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eClimate plans can thus act as \u0026ldquo;systemic integrative capacities\u0026rdquo; (Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) that actors can mobilize for facilitating coordination during policy implementation\u003csup\u003e3\u003c/sup\u003e. The expectation is that the more actors will perceive a climate plan as an integrative capacity, i.e., coherently integrating all relevant sectors, the more able they will be to accomplish effective administrative coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eBureaucratic autonomy\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAutonomy here refers to the ability of bureaucrats to take decision autonomously from other levels of government and service providers. By contrast, lack of autonomy occurs when bureaucrats must await the authorization of regulators located in other levels of government and/or private actors to act. This conceptualisation implies that autonomy stems from two main sources, i.e., \u0026ldquo;law\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;property\u0026rdquo; (cf. Knoepfel, 2018). In the legal sense, I refer to the \u003cem\u003eauthority\u003c/em\u003e to regulate and impose a behavior on another actor, a right that is generally conferred or not on cities by the constitution (ibidem). To mention some relevant examples, spatial planning or land protection rules dictate if and where local authorities can implement densification policies; cultural heritage authorities give permission to the installation of solar panels in the roofs of historical buildings or can stop the construction of underground infrastructures (district heating, metro lines, water systems, etc.) in the case of archaeological discoveries; speed limits for cars can be implemented only if cities have the regulatory authority over the streets.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRegarding autonomy generated by \u003cem\u003eproperty rights\u003c/em\u003e, I refer especially to assets at disposal of the municipality that owns them or hold rights for their use in policy implementation (Knoepfel, 2018) \u0026ndash; for example, common-pool resources (land, water, forests), buildings (e.g., administrative offices, social houses, schools), and institutional and economic assets (e.g., public agencies and service providers). Most policies are endowed with assets. Environmental ones are for instance highly dependent of public ownership relating to spatial planning, transport and energy (Ibidem). But not always such assets are owned by the cities themselves as private actors have penetrated local service delivery (Galanti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Complexity and extent of property rights regimes highly affect policy integration processes due to increased transaction costs for policy coordination and less room for manoeuvring integration processes (Gerber et al., 2009; Bolognesi et al., 2021). Fragmentation of property and authority paves the way to unclear distribution of responsibilities and conflictual logic of public actions (profit/private vs. climate/public). I expect that, due to the resulting increase in coordination costs, the absence of bureaucratic autonomy can hinder effective coordination among local bureaucrats. Conversely, bureaucratic autonomy from other levels of government and private actors is expected to facilitate administrative coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eFinances\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinances refers to the money at disposal throughout the policy implementation process. Financial resources firstly stem from the ability to levy taxes, which varies greatly across institutional contexts. For example, Swiss cities have very high ability to levy taxes and decide tax rates in comparison to italian cities (Ladner et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). In this sense, financial considerations are also linked to the abovementioned definition of autonomy. There are important differences in budgetary capacities across local departments which often depends on property ownership (see above). For example, in Switzerland some municipal department generates revenues and manages money independently (e.g., industrial services sell energy or waste disposal departments benefit from own systems of tax collection). This gives them higher fiscal capacity in deciding subsidies and public acquisitions (Knoepfel, 2018).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eYet money at disposal for public policies can also come from other venues. The Italian cities, for example, rely heavily on regional, national and European transfers. Private actors can also co-partecipate in public policy in the case of public-private partnerships.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, availability of finances is here considered as another potential integrative capacity, which facilitates intersectoral negotiations. For Vince et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) financial capacities help to make the processes of resources\u0026rsquo; allocation and optimisation (across policy subsystems) during policy implementation less conflictual (Ibidem)\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI expect that when a high level of financial resources is available, bureaucrats across policy sectors have more flexibility to negotiate compromises over conflicting goals. They are also more willing to coordinate in implementing integrated climate policies, as they perceive the integration process as an opportunity to advance their own sectoral objectives. Conversely, when resources are limited, I expect increased competition among bureaucrats, with a tendency to hoard funds for their specific sectoral priorities (at the expenses of the policy integration process).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003ePersonnel\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ePersonnel refers to the number and the qualification of the human resources operating in public organizations that implement climate policies. Available and qualified bureaucratic staff is key for coordination because this is a human activity, requiring a large amount of people specialized in different sectors who are open to collectively think about climate change as a common problem requiring cross-sectoral solutions and/or to climate-proof their activities. \u0026ldquo;Insufficient personnel is one of the most common arguments used by the public sector to reject attempts to allocate new tasks to existing services\u0026rdquo; (Knoepfel, 2018, p.137). Empirical research on policy integration that compared cases with different degree of human resources found that qualified staff capable of designing and implementing cross sectoral linkages is a key integrative capacity (Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). A city department that can dedicate staff and time to coordination activities (e.g., forming a cross-sectoral working groups with other departments), while also continuing performing standard activities within their sector, will likely not consider coordination as an extra effort. By contrast, if a city department lacks personnel, it will likely prioritize business-as-usual (implementation in siloes) to administrative coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI expect that availability of qualified internal staff at disposal will provide more time, knowledge and energy for coordination, while the absence of human resources will be associated with less time, knowledge and energy dedicated to coordination activities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eExternal expertise\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eExpertise (EXP) refers to the use of knowledge produced by \u003cem\u003eexternal experts\u003c/em\u003e and fed back into the policy implementation process. For example, expertise produced by academics, epistemic communities, architectural and mobility firms, NGOs and associations, and target groups or lay knowledge. Bureaucratic expertise (internal) is not part of this resource but rather of the condition \u0026ldquo;personnel\u0026rdquo; (see above). Expertise refers to the link between State and society (Peters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015a\u003c/span\u003e). It is the extent to which the knowledge of clients and experts operating in the policy subsystem where street-level bureaucrats serve can penetrate into public bureaucracies and inform implementation. In this sense, the way I interpret this resource is closer to the definition of \u0026ldquo;nodality\u0026rdquo; in Hood and Margetts (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) or of \u0026ldquo;informational resources\u0026rdquo; in Knoepfel (op.cit). Lack of knowledge within the administration may be compensated through the commissioning of private consultancies, increasing local dependency on the expertise of private actors (Knoepfel, 2018). Furthermore, public sector organizations have political connections of their own with clientele groups that provide them with support in their battles. Clientele groups highly inform each department feeding information that are used to facilitate the coordination effort.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eElaborating the direction of the expectation regarding the use of expertise is not straightforward as with other resources considered above. On the one hand, feeding external knowledge into the administrative process may facilitate coordination, as it allows to bring into the discussion alternative perspectives and solutions that would not be considered otherwise or to compensate for lacking personnel. Yet exactly such new inclusion of external inputs into the process may complexify the process, i.e., require an additional administrative effort because the new inputs that are fed into bureaucratic decisions require to be discussed and accepted by local actors. In addition, experts might enter into conflict with internal expertise generating increasing transaction costs for coordination. In this sense, I prefer not to formulate an expectation and let the data speak (in QCA terms, I do not inject theoretical knowledge on the selection of logical reminders for the condition \u0026lsquo;use of experts).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e below summarizes the direction of expectations. The capital letter in the table is used to identify the presence of a condition ; the lowecase for the absence of the condition.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTable 1\u003c/em\u003e: Direction of expectations\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"604\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConditions\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDirection of expectations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 170px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eGeneral expectations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIntegrated program (INT)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot integrated program (int)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eINT -\u0026gt; COORD; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eint -\u0026gt; coord\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"5\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 170px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe simultaneous presence of multiple conditions, enables effective coordination (COORD);\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThe simoultaneous absence of multiple conditions hinders effective coordination (coord)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eStrong bureaucratic autonomy (AUT)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWeak bureaucratic autonomy (aut)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAUT -\u0026gt; COORD; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eaut -\u0026gt; coord\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAvailability of finances (FIN)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot available finances (fin)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFIN -\u0026gt; COORD; \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003efin -\u0026gt; coord\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eQualified/sufficient staff (PER)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNot qualified/insufficient staff (per)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePER -\u0026gt; COORD;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eper -\u0026gt; coord\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 236px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eStrong use of expertise (EXP)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWeak use of expertise (exp)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNo expectations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e"},{"header":"Methodology and data","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eQualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eQCA offers both a research approach and a data analysis technique for navigating complex causation and conducting multiple cross-case comparisons (Ragin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e; Schneider \u0026amp; Wagemann \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e; Rihoux, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). This set-theoretic method helps answer causes-of-effect types of questions (Mahoney \u0026amp; Goertz, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e), and particularly suits this research, which aim at explaining (in)effective coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe initial step in the QCA protocol is called ‘calibration’. This is a process in which researchers draw upon empirical information from cases to assign membership scores for each condition and outcome under investigation. For crispy sets, a 0 value is generally assigned for the absence of a condition or outcome, while the 1 value displays the presence of the condition or the outcome (see calibration of ‘EXP’ below). In fuzzy sets, researchers are able to quantitatively distinguish between degrees of membership. Hence, also values such as 0.3 or 0.7 are possible (see below calibrations of ‘COORD’, ‘INT’, ‘AUT’, ‘PER’, and ‘FIN’).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAfter calibrating, researchers seek to identify subset and superset relationships, i.e., the necessary and sufficient conditions for an outcome. For the analysis, I use the packages ‘QCA’ (Duşa, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) and ‘SetMethods’ (Oana \u0026amp; Schneider, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) in R. Among other features, the software helps generate truths tables (the basis for sufficiency analysis), presenting data as configurations of conditions and outcomes (see truth tables in Annex 2 in the Supplementary Material). Subsequently, QCA employs minimization algorithms based on Boolean algebra to identify what combinations of conditions are sufficient for the presence of the outcome. The process of Boolean minimization consists in a comparison of the cases’ causal paths displayed in the truth table, and the elimination of redundancies. Researchers can follow different strategies to minimize the truth table, creating conservative, parsimonious, or intermediate solutions (see alternative solutions in Annex 3/Supplementary Material). In this research, I opted for an intermediate solution formula. As I had formulated theory-driven expectations, the latter allowed me to inject theoretical knowledge into the selection of logical remainders\u003csup\u003e4\u003c/sup\u003e, and ‘direct’ expectations (as displayed in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e above).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo maintain diversity among possible combinations of conditions, the number of conditions (potential explanatory factors) must be kept parsimonious. For instance, in an intermediate-N analysis (e.g., up to 40 cases), it is common practice to select four to six or seven conditions (Rihoux \u0026amp; Ragin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 28). This article compares 31 cases and selected five conditions (see above).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eCase selection\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eCases are thirty-one bureaucrats implementing climate policies in four cities (and two countries): Bologna (Italy) – Lausanne (Switzerland) – Padova (Italy) – Zurich (Switzerland). They are administrative actors, who are only involved in the administrative process of climate policy integration and implementation. The interview partners work in different policies domains which are relevant for climate policy implementation, such as mobility, energy, urbanism, housing, waste, water and climate (see Annex 1/ Supplementary Material). This ensures variations in the conditions under analysis. Diversity of cases is a crucial requirement for QCA, which is very sensitive to the issue of limited diversity (Schneider \u0026amp; Wagemann, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe political context constitutes the key scope condition for generalizing the findings (Goertz \u0026amp; Mahoney, 2009). All four cities are governed by left-leaning majorities, which the literature identifies as proponents of policy integration and coordination (Maggetti \u0026amp; Trein, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Dorado-Rubín et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025b\u003c/span\u003e). This suggests a shared political willingness to implement climate policies and integrate goals across sectors (an assumption that was confirmed during the interviews). In particular, all four cities are implementing ambitious climate plans that integrate several policy sectors, and which seeks to adapt to climate change and reach climate neutrality by 2030 (in the case of Bologna and Padua) or 2040 (in the case of Zurich and Lausanne).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData collection and calibration\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eDuring interviews, I asked participants to evaluate the effectiveness of administrative coordination in their city for the implementation of climate plans. The following question was used for this measurement: \u003cem\u003eHow well do you personally feel the coordination between different departments for climate policy implementation works in your city? Please give a score from ‘0’ (not effective) to ‘10’ (very effective).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhat ‘effective’ means against the collected raw data needs to be further specified during the stage of calibration in QCA. This requires imposing a qualitative threshold to assess memberships (who is ‘in’ and ‘out’ of each set), and it is a fundamental choice which will crucially influence the results (Schneider \u0026amp; Wagemann, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Threshold-setting should rely on “informed judgement” and when possible, “within-case knowledge” (Rihoux \u0026amp; Lobe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 223). As the questions were posed during face-to-face interviews in most of the cases, respondents could elaborate on their evaluations – meaning that personal knowledge of each case was available. When respondents described administrative coordination as not effective, they usually evaluated it as 5 or below. Scores of 6 or 7 were usually justified as coordination mechanisms with large margins of improvement. Finally, the scores of 8, 9 and 10 were usually associated with excellent evaluations of coordination. Based on this insight, I set the crossover point (the membership score of 0.5) for ‘effectiveness’ at 5.9\u003csup\u003e5\u003c/sup\u003e and then used the algorithm in the QCA package to distribute cases before and after the threshold, as in applied QCA research (Duşa, 2019).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe same logic was applied to measure and calibrate membership for the condition ‘integrated climate plan’ (INT).The questionnaire included the following question: “\u003cem\u003eHow ‘integrated’ across sectors do you personally consider your city's climate strategy to be? Please give a score from ‘0’ (few sectors integrated) to ‘10’ (many sectors integrated)\u003c/em\u003e”.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRegarding three of the other conditions, this research also employs a fuzzy-set methodology for calibration. I calibrated the sets for “AUT” (autonomy), “PER” (personnel), and “FIN” (finances) based on participants’ responses to three questions in which I asked them to express agreement or disagreement with statements concerning the level of autonomy, human resources and finances they can mobilise in climate policy implementation. For each statement, there were four possible responses, each possibility reflecting one membership score: completely disagree (0), disagree (0.3), agree (0.7), and fully agree (1):\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eAUT : “\u003cem\u003eYour office has sufficient autonomy from other actors (e.g., other levels of government or service providers) to implement climate policies in your city\u003c/em\u003e”.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003ePER : “\u003cem\u003eYour office has sufficient and qualified personnel to implement climate policies in your city”\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eFIN : “\u003cem\u003eYour office has sufficient financial resources to implement climate policies in your city\u003c/em\u003e”.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, regarding the condition “strong use of experts” (EXP), I provided them with the following statement : “\u003cem\u003eexternal expertise is very important for the implementation of climate policies in your city\u003c/em\u003e”. Even in this case, there were four possible responses: completely disagree, disagree, agree, and fully agree. Yet, this time I used a crisp method of calibration: I coded ‘1’ answers that “fully agreed”, and ‘0’ for all other answers\u003csup\u003e6\u003c/sup\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the calibrated dataset includes thirty-one cases, one outcome and five conditions. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e below displays the distribution of cases regarding the outcome and the five conditions. Having a balanced distribution, as the one ensured by the method of calibration adopted for this research, is a key requirement for QCA (Oana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhereas the majority of the respondents perceive administrative coordination as effective in climate policy implementation in their respective city, there are many cases who judge it as not. Hence, there is variation in the outcome under investigation, which justifies the QCA approach used in this paper. The large majority of respondents also perceived climate plans as integrative capacities. This represents a methodological challenge for QCA (limited diversity), as few are the cases in which INT scores less than 0.5. Therefore, an alternative calibration of this set was included as a robustness check (see Annex 3/ Supplementary Material). Interestingly, there is not a large difference between the Swiss and italian respondents when it comes to evaluate the use of experts in climate policy implementation. By contrast, the dataset displays the expected variance between Italian and Swiss respondents regarding human and financial resources. Autonomy varies from office to office, with the Swiss cases particularly displaying strong variation (but generally declaring high autonomy).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe more analytical results of the QCA analysis are presented in the following order : Firstly, the paper discusses necessity analysis, then sufficiency analysis. Secondly, for each analysis it presents results for the presence of the outcome, while the results for the absence of the outcome are reported in the Supplementary Material. Thirdly, I use parameters of fits to evaluate necessity and sufficiency relations. ‘Parameters of fits’ are metrics that range from 0 to 1 and are used in applied QCA to numerically assess the validity of necessity and sufficiency relations. Current standards in applied QCA research (Oana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) have been regarded to evaluate the parameters of fit correctly:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor a condition to be necessary, the “consistency of necessity” (Cons.Nec.) must at least be 0.9, while the “coverage” (Cov.Nec) and “relevance of necessity” (RoN) must at least be 0.6.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the construction of the truth table for sufficiency analysis, the “consistency of sufficiency” (Incl) is set at 0.81, the “Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency” (PRI) score is set at 0.51, and each raw of the truth table must contain at least 1 case not to be considered a logical reminder (n.cut = 1). No threshold exist for the coverage scores (CovU and CovS).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFourthly, if there are deviant cases, they are described so as to illustrate possible alternative explanations which are not grasped by the QCA solution. While parameters of fit are important, the QCA should always be complemented by an in-depth focus on cases (Oana et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Finally, several robustness checks are run to validate results (see Annex 3/ Supplementary Material), following the protocol by Oana and Schneider (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). All the analyses illustrated in this paper are thus supported by these checks (see Annex 3/ Supplementary Material).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Results QCA analysis","content":"\u003ch2\u003eClimate plans as arbitration tools\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eA necessity relation occurs when a necessary set X is a superset of an outcome set Y, which means X is present in all instances where Y happens (Duşa, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). This analysis found one necessary condition for effective coordination\u003csup\u003e7\u003c/sup\u003e: the existence of a highly integrated climate plan (INT \u0026lt;- COORD\u003csup\u003e8\u003c/sup\u003e). This statement of necessity covers most of the cases (Cov.Nec = 0.811) and it is very consistent (Con. Nec. = 0.933) - even if there are instances of Y scoring higher than X leading to an imperfect superset relation, as visible in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e below\u003csup\u003e9\u003c/sup\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the parameters of fit indicate that a necessary relation is highly likely but should be verified by an in-depth focus on cases. Most of the interviewed discussed their cities climate plans as arbitration tools, i.e., not just as strategic or guiding documents, but as mechanisms to mediate, balance, or resolve competing interests or priorities between policy sectors. Yet, there is one case (7) that is located in the upper-left quadrant of the XY plot (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e). This means that membership in the set ‘efficient administrative coordination’ is slightly higher than membership in the set ‘highly integrated climate plan’. In order to validate the necessity relation, thus, one must scrutinize this deviant case in-kind, which seems contradicting the statement of necessity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis bureaucrat working in the water department of the city of Lausanne during the interview distanced himself/herself from everyone else because he/she minimized the importance of the city’s climate plan. He/she also evaluated the degree of integration of the climate plan as low (score of 5) and coordination as just above the threshold I set for effectiveness (score of 6):\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eI think it's important to act in each sector, but not necessarily to integrate everything ... there is the climate plan, which allows things to be integrated, but after that, everyone has autonomy and objectives. It's not the climate that will do everything; it can set objectives and verify them … (but) integration in practice, i.e., coordination, is not yet optimal ... we (the water department) are participating, but I think there is still a lot to be done to make it work well and to really develop projects where water issues are properly integrated\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe interview partner assesses both the degree of integration of the climate plan and the effectiveness of coordination as relatively low. The scores given (respectively, 5 and 6 out of 10) and the reasoning provided in the citation, reveal a general scepticism on the policy integration process. Thus, he/she does not contradict the statement of necessity: The interviewed do not give precise indication against the necessary relationship, yet the insight inform on the sufficiency relationship when it is contended that the ‘climate will not do everything’, i.e., having top-down steering mechanism is not a sufficient condition for coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, this first analysis confirms the exepectation whereby integrated policies can act as important arbitration tools between policy subsystems (Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Hinterleitner \u0026amp; Sager, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eSufficiency analysis: Alternative paths to policy coordination\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis section presents the results of the process of minimization of the truth table, i.e., the sufficiency analysis, which is the core of QCA. Only findings from the intermediate solution formulas are discussed here. The truth tables and the alternative solutions (conservative and parsimonious) are analysed in the Annex. The results are also complemented by robustness checks (see Supplementary Material).\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eLocal actors must possess different policy capacities simultaneously for effectively engaging in policy coordination\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e presents the solutions formula associated with effective coordination. The solution formula identifies four paths leading to positive evaluation of administrative coordination among the cases. Each path comprises the intersection of different integrative capacities as sufficient for the outcome. It can be summarized as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAUT*INT + PER*INT + EXP*INT + AUT*FIN*PER*~EXP -\u0026gt;COORD\u003csup\u003e10\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSufficiency, Intermediate solution, presence of the outcome\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePaths\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003einclS\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePRI\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ecovS\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ecovU\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ecases\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAUT*INT\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.897\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.833\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.749\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.070\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,2,6; 11,17,20; 4,26; 15,22,24,25; 3,5,9,10,14,23,28,30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePER*INT\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.874\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.795\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.879\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.089\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e12,13,19; 8,27; 31; 11,17,20; 15,22,24,25; 3,5,9,10,14,23,28,30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEXP*INT\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.796\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.702\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.450\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.049\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e16,18,21; 31\u0026nbsp;; 11,17,20; 3,5,9,10,14,23,28,30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAUT*FIN*PER*~EXP\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.942\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.877\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.289\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.008\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7\u0026nbsp;; 15, 22, 24, 25\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSolution\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e0.828\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e0.738\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e0.927\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"6\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eLegend\u003c/em\u003e: Bologna (cases 1–4), Lausanne (cases 5–14), Padua (cases 15–21), Zurich (cases 22–31)\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cp\u003eA subset relation (sufficiency) signifies that for each case, the membership in X (solution formula) is smaller or equal to membership in Y (outcome). In my case, the solution formula indicates an imperfect consistency value, yet just above the threshold to be considered as a subset relation (inclS = 0.828).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, the second parameter (‘coverage’ abbreviated in covS in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e above) indicates the very strong empirical relevance of the solution. It numerically expresses the fact that more than 90% of the cases are covered by the solution (covS = 0.927). Most cases, indeed, represent typical cases of the relation (both X and Y are above 0.5).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSome other cases deviate from the subset relation only in-degree. These cases do not contradict the statement of sufficiency because they display a situation in which both X and Y are present, i.e., higher than 0.5 (for more details see Fig.\u0026nbsp;6 in the Supplementary Material). Finally, there are five deviant cases in-kind, namely cases 6, 10, 11, 13, 31. These cases evaluated coordination as ineffective (Y \u0026lt; 0.5) in spite of their positive assessment of integrative capacities (X \u0026gt; 0.5). We must then analyse qualitatively each of these cases to complement the QCA analysis because they can illustrate alternative explanations which are not grasped by the solution formula. Three of these deviant cases are working in the city of Lausanne. Case 10 deals with forests, case 11 with educational infrastructures, case 6 with housing refurbishment. During the interviews the cases evaluated coordination as ineffective due to the following reasons: (a) the climate office lacks steering capacity; (b) the building permit and authorisation procedures are slow; (c) the working routines are still organised in siloes and the offices are highly specialized, which complicates the sequencing of interventions; (d) lack of time to perform policy coordination. Similar points have been raised by case 13 in the climate department of the city of Padua and case 31, in the urban development department of the city of Zurich. For instance case 13 nicely elaborated on points (c) and (d) above when he/she discusses the need for a ‘cross-sectoral management of personnel’:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe thing that is most lacking is perhaps a different cross-sectoral management of personnel … everyone tends to continue working in silos … each of us actually struggles to find the time to work with others because that space is not recognised as a kind of extra work … everyone tends to define their own activities very narrowly … It is also very difficult to organise in practice, because an employee formally belongs to one sector, so when they work for other sectors or with other sectors, they enter a sort of grey area ... Who is the head of the sector at that point? Who is the person in charge of managing that group of people who formally belong to different sectors? … It is really a way of organising work in general, that is what is missing\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe four altrenative factors identified by deviant cases can be considered “organizational integrative capacities” (Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). These cases do not contradict the general expectation tested in this study whereby a simultaneous presence of multiple capacities would enable effective coordination, while a simultaneous absence of integrative capacities would be associated with the absence of effective coordination. On the contrary, these cases help us refine the analysis and understand what other integrative capacities must be present for effective coordination, namely a cross-sctoral management of personnel and an appropriate organization of the coordination activity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo sum up, \u003cem\u003ethis anaylsis found that local actors must possess different policy capacities simultaneously for effectively engaging in policy coordination\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e disaggregates the solution formula in its four minimal expressions, revealing the four specific paths to effective coordination and how each configuration of capacities contributes to explaining the subset relation. Such an exercise reveals that all paths are also in line with the direction of expectations suggested by the theories (see Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e above). In particular, the intersection of bureaucratic autonomy and integrated norms (AUT*INT) as well as the intersection of human resources and integrated norms (PER*INT) are particularly explanatory of effective coordination based on the parameters of fit.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAutonomy is considered a key resource because it expands the room for action and reduce overlap of responsibilities as well as administrative redundancies (e.g., Case 5). Most interview partners noted that in areas where their office or city operates with full autonomy from higher levels of government and private actors (e.g., private service providers, land owners, etc.), implementation tends to be faster and coordination costs are reduced (e.g., Case 14). In sectors such as urbanism, for instance, respondents emphasized that ownership of and authority over public space is essential. For instance, Case 14 highlighted the significant difference between coordination meetings involving only public actors (less conflictual) and those requiring negotiations with private landowners (very conflictual). However, deviant cases - such as the abovementioned Case 11 - pointed out that autonomy can also become an obstacle for policy coordination. In particular, the autonomy of implementing agencies can lead to coordination challenges and free-riding behavior when no mechanisms are in place to guide the process. In this context, \u003cem\u003ethe simultaneous presence\u003c/em\u003e of bureaucratic autonomy and a well-integrated climate plan helps minimize the risk of free-riding. The climate plan clearly defines the responsibilities of each implementing actor and helps avoid overlaps and conflicts, while autonomy leaves actors room for manouvering. In other words, \u003cem\u003eit is the interplay between top-down steering, ensured by climate plans, and bottom-up action by integrative agents that leads to effective administrative coordination.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe importance of staffing alongside the climate plan is instead well illustrated in Case 8. The interviewee from the energy department of the City of Lausanne described the process of hiring new qualified personnel specifically to support coordination with the climate office, while the latter was still finalizing its climate plan:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e“\u003cem\u003eWe didn't know exactly what form the climate action plan would take, but I expanded and transformed the technical office from a simple office that monitors work to a real engineering office ... I told my asset manager: now you need to get along with the climate office, understand their objectives, and make sure we are all on the same page\u003c/em\u003e” (Case 8).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this case, two capacity-building processes - staffing and integrated planning - unfolded in parallel, ultimately enabling effective coordination between the city’s energy and climate departments. Again, the analysis shows that it is precisly the co-occurrence of enabling conditions that facilitates administrative coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe last two paths in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e retain less explanatory power, based on parameters of fits, because either inconsistent (path 3) or with little coverage (path 4). However, when comparing these cases, it is interesting to note that the role of the condition ‘strong use of expertise’ in administrative coordination appears ambiguous: Path 3 (i.e., EXP*INT) would suggest that external expertise contributes to efficient coordination, while path 4 (AUT*FIN*PER*~EXP) provides instances of cases in which external expertise must be absent for effective coordination to occur. This last path, more specifically, illustrates the fact that the inclusion of external inputs into a context in which actors already possess autonomy, finances and personnel for coordination may complexify rather than help the process (particularly for cases located in the city of Zurich). When all resources are already available, reliance on external experts might enter into conflict with internal expertise generating increasing transaction costs for coordination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDuring the interviews in Zurich, for instance, some argued that experts are very important (e.g., case 30) while others disagreed (e.g., case 29). Experts are often consulted by administrators only to legitimize decisions that were already proposed by politicians (e.g., case 31). I contend that the involvement of external experts may depend on the availability of internal expertise as well as the degree of politicization of issues requiring coordination. Expertise may be strategically (mis)used to depoliticize negotiations and legitimize decisions that are already made or subject to contestation. Yet, I leave to future research to clarify how external experts facilitate or hinder coordination for climate policy implementation.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis paper investigated the integrative policy capacities associated with effective administrative coordination. Combining different strands of literature, it conceptualized integrative policy capacities (e.g., Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Vince et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) as resources that local actors can mobilize in policy implementation (Hood \u0026amp; Margetts, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Knoepfel, 2018; Lambelet, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) to integrate (and keep integrated) policy subsystems in the quest for collective climate action (Tosun \u0026amp; Schoenefeld, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR88\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study employed a QCA approach, which allowed for a systematic comparison of thirty-one cases - i.e., local bureaucrats working in different cities (Lausanne, Zurich, Bologna, and Padua) and across various policy sectors (climate, environmental protection, energy, mobility, urban development, etc.). Notably, this method allowed for the detection of conjunctural causation - that is, different paths that equally explain the outcome (and its absence). The semi-structured interviews complemented the QCA analysis by identifying the mechanisms that explained the necessity and sufficiency relationships. In this sense, employing a QCA offered a formalized methodological approach that allowed to detect conjunctural causation, i.e., relationships where the outcome is produced by a specific combination of multiple conditions, rather than by a single cause acting in isolation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the study provided strong support for the hypothesis that the simultaneous presence of multiple integrative capacities facilitates coordination, whereas their absence impedes it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMore precisely, the necessity analysis found that having an highly integrated climate plan is necessary for efficient administrative coordination. This result aligns with the policy design literature (Howlett \u0026amp; Rayner, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Rayner \u0026amp; Howlett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e), which describes how conflicts between policy subsystems can be mitigated by integrated norms acting as systemic capacities (Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Hinterleitner \u0026amp; Sager, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). The more a plan is perceived by actors as an integrative capacity that can be mobilized to facilitate (steer) cooperation with other departments, the more effective administrative coordination will be (Vince et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe sufficiency analysis then found four paths to effective coordination: (a) combining bureaucratic autonomy with an integrated climate plan; (b) having qualified staff along with an integrated climate plan; (c) using external experts heavily together with an integrated climate plan; and (d) combining funding, staffing, and autonomy with limited use of external experts. These results tell us that co-occurrence of policy resources - and especially bureaucratic autonomy, human resources, and finances - are associated with effective coordination. When actors can simoultaneusly mobilize different set of resources they also establish efficient coordination mechanisms. Policy resources make coordination easier : when they are available, bureaucrats seems to stop perceiving coordination as an extra task and, on the contrary, realize that by coordinating with their colleagues they can achieve better results.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBuilding on this paper\u0026rsquo;s findings, I argue that integrated climate plans - now being developed by cities worldwide to align policy sectors - are critically important and indeed a necessary condition for effective coordination. However, they are not sufficient on their own. Local administrations also require additional integrative policy capacities (in line with recent results by DoradoRub\u0026iacute;n et al., 2025a, 2025b), especially qualified human resources who are both capable and willing to bridge the boundaries between policy subsystems, as well as local autonomy - through legal authority and property ownership - which provides space for maneuvering and compromise.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEffective administrative coordination thus results from the interplay between top-down steering, provided by climate plans, and bottom-up action from integrative agents who possess capacities. This insight highlights the importance of investing in capacity building for collective climate action alongside top-down integration efforts. Only then can climate policy implementation shift in the eyes of street-level bureaucrats - from a competitive struggle to a cooperative effort where cross-sectoral synergies are both possible and encouraged.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study as the following shortcoming: First, it does not clarify if the use of external expertise faciliates or hinders policy coordination. Secondly, the in-depth analysis of cases that followed the QCA revealed that some organizational factors (steering capacities, silo routines, lenght of procedures, cross-sectoral management of personnel, etc.) equally possess strong explanatory power and should have been integrated in the QCA design more sistematically (i.e., in data collection and analysis). Third, these results are only generalizable to local bureaucracies operating within contexts that share similar scope conditions than the cities under analysis in this study (Goertz \u0026amp; Mahoney, 2009) - i.e., cities governed by left-leaning majorities implementing climate plans. Finally, another limitation stems from the limited diversity observed in the condition \u0026lsquo;integrated climate plan\u0026rsquo;, which might have overemphasised its importance.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eFunding\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis work was supported by a salary. No external or project-specific funding was received.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eI am the only author (Francesco Sarti)\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eI would like to thank Philipp Trein and Martino Maggetti for their help in developing this paper\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eB\u0026eacute;land, D., \u0026amp; Schlager, E. (2019). Varieties of policy feedback research: Looking backward, moving forward. \u003cem\u003ePolicy Studies Journal\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e47\u003c/em\u003e(2), 184-205.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eBouckaert, G., Peters, B. G., \u0026amp; Verhoest, K. (2010). \u003cem\u003eThe coordination of public sector \u003c/em\u003e \u003cem\u003eorganizations\u003c/em\u003e. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCandel, J. J. L., \u0026amp; Biesbroek, R. (2016). 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Policy capacity: A conceptual framework for understanding policy competences and capabilities. \u003cem\u003ePolicy and society\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e34\u003c/em\u003e(3-4), 165-171.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Footnotes","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eSuccess is always a subjective concept (McConnell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e), and self-assessments from individual actors are often used in public policy analysis for measurement purposes (e.g., Ramesh, Howlett \u0026amp; Saguin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR69\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e, p.26). Nonetheless, I acknowledge that whereas subjective perceptions of coordination are key analytical elements to grasp the outcome condition, they represent proxies rather than measurements of \u0026lsquo;reality\u0026rsquo;.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e For the authors, integration is the \u0026ldquo;the replacement of specific elements of existing policy \u0026lsquo;mixes\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;regimes\u0026rsquo;\u0026hellip; by a new policy mix, in the expectation of avoiding the counterproductive or sub-optimal policy outcomes that arise from treating interrelated policy regimes and components in isolation from one another\u0026rdquo; (Rayner \u0026amp; Howlett, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; pp.100).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Systemic integrative capacities are defined as \u0026ldquo;comprehensive system of norms and rules aimed at the attainment of coherent boundary spanning policy regimes\u0026rdquo; (Domorenok et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e, pp.8).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Logical remainders refer to the combinations of conditions (or truth table rows) that lack enough empirical evidence to be subjected to a test of sufficiency. Researchers might decide to include those logical remainders when they are relevant, by making \u0026lsquo;plausible assumptions\u0026rsquo;.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e As a robustness check, I set the threshold at 6.9, which helped resolve the problem of limited diversity/skewness.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Again, this was done to avoid limited diversity and skewness.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWhile it did not find any necessary condition (or combination of conditions that are necessary) for ineffective coordination.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e In QCA, the lowercase indicates absence of the condition (e.g., coord means ineffective coordination), while capital letter indicates presence of the condition (e.g., COORD means effective coordination). Alternatevely also the tilde (~) indicates absence of the condition (e.g., ~COORD means absence of effective coordination). The symbol \u0026lt;- indicates a necessary relation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e Another issue with this analysis is that there are few instances of cases where climate plans were evaluated as poorly integrated (limited diversity of the set INT). This is indicated by the RoN score (relevance of necessity), which is just above the threshold of 0.6.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e * Indicates a logical AND, + indicates a logical OR ; ~ indicates absence of the condition, -\u0026gt;indicates a sufficiency relation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Climate policy implementation, Administrative coordination, Integrative policy capacities, Qualitative comparative analysis","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7473913/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7473913/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe literature has gone to great lengths to describe the administrative coordination mechanisms that support climate policy implementation. Yet few studies have adopted an actor-oriented perspective to understand which capacities actors perceive as necessary or sufficient to effectively engage in administrative coordination for climate policy implementation. This paper addresses this gap by examining five integrative policy capacities and their role in enabling administrative coordination. Analyzing a dataset comprising thirty-one bureaucrats implementing climate plans in four cities (Bologna, Lausanne, Padua, Zurich) and across various policy sectors, this Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) confirms findings in the literature that identify integrated policy design as a necessary condition for effective administrative coordination. Furthermore, the paper found that bureaucratic autonomy, as well as the availability of human and financial resources, are also important enabling conditions, insofar as they reduce coordination transaction costs and enhance actors\u0026rsquo; agency in pursuing policy integration. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the integrative policy capacities needed to foster the ecological transition at the local level.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Administrative coordination and integrative policy capacities: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-09-11 12:25:53","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7473913/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"0edd6941-c52c-4b5a-a683-2659299e56f6","owner":[],"postedDate":"September 11th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-05T23:23:21+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-09-11 12:25:53","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7473913","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7473913","identity":"rs-7473913","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}