Assessing Agrarian Reform as a Structural Solution to Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java and Bengkulu, Indonesia

Assessing Agrarian Reform as a Structural Solution to Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java and Bengkulu, Indonesia | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Assessing Agrarian Reform as a Structural Solution to Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java and Bengkulu, Indonesia Trie Sakti, Intan Hapsari Surya Putri, Septina Marryanti Prihatin, and 7 more This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7414626/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Plantations have been a cornerstone of Indonesia’s economy since the colonial era, driving economic growth while simultaneously triggering social and environmental challenges. This study examines the structural agrarian conflicts arising from plantation expansion, focusing on land disputes between communities and plantation companies in West Java and Bengkulu. Using a qualitative approach, the research employs in-depth interviews, media analysis, and document reviews to analyze the root causes and persistence of these conflicts. Findings reveal that historical land dispossession, unequal resource distribution, and weak legal recognition of customary land rights perpetuate tensions. While private plantations have adopted partnership models to mitigate conflicts, state-owned plantations (PTPN) face bureaucratic hurdles in land redistribution. The study highlights the ineffectiveness of current agrarian reform policies, particularly the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA), due to limited local government engagement and funding. Recommendations include strengthening GTRA’s role, integrating village funds for agrarian reform, and adopting restorative approaches to resolve historical injustices. This research contributes to the discourse on sustainable land governance by emphasizing the intersection of policy, corporate accountability, and community rights in Indonesia’s plantation sector. agrarian reform plantation land conflict sustainable land governance land rights Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 INTRODUCTION During the New Order era, policies such as the 1967–1968 Capital Investment Law and the Nucleus-People's Plantation (PIR) model structurally favored large corporations through the allocation of extensive Cultivation Rights (HGU), while plasma farmers became ensnared in dependency relationships and exploitative contractual arrangements that systematically disadvantaged them (Lucas & Warren, 2003; McCarthy, 2010). The centralization of power and systematic repression systematically marginalized indigenous communities' land rights, triggering agrarian conflicts that remained unresolved without equitable solutions. Despite the decentralization of power during the Reform era, problems intensified due to economic liberalization and "rent-seeking" practices at the regional government level. Regents competed to issue plantation permits, often disregarding environmental and social impact assessments, as well as community rights (Pelusso et al., 2008). Meanwhile, agrarian reform programs remained stagnant (Bachriadi & Wiradi, 2011 ; Casson, 2000). The dramatic surge in global palm oil demand drove massive expansion that became the primary source of agrarian conflicts and deforestation, with small communities frequently falling victim to systematic land-grabbing practices (Gaveau et al., 2016 ). Central government policies, such as accelerating the licensing process and providing tax relief, still favor large companies, while sustainability regulations, such as ISPO, actually make it more difficult for small farmers to obtain certification (Jelsma et al., 2017 ; Pacheco et al., 2020 ; Purnomo et al., 2020 ). Independent farmers faced structural constraints, including limited access to subsidized inputs, financing, fair markets, and technical knowledge, resulting in significantly lower productivity and incomes compared to their corporate counterparts (Brandi et al., 2015; Euler et al., 2016 ). Plantation workers, especially women, experience appalling working conditions with low wages and inadequate social protection, while traditional communities continue to lose their residential territories (Li, 2018 ). This bias stems from an extractive policy paradigm that prioritizes macroeconomic growth and large-scale investment, coupled with asymmetrical power relations where corporations maintain privileged access to political and bureaucratic spheres oligarchy (Li, 2018 ; McCarthy, 2010a ; Winters, 2011 ). Weak agrarian governance characterized by overlapping regulations, corrupt licensing practices, and inequitable law enforcement further deepened existing injustices (Bachriadi & Wiradi, 2011 ; Hall et al., 2012 ). Fundamental transformation toward justice requires genuine agrarian reform, robust corporate law enforcement, empowerment of farmers and workers, paradigmatic policy shifts, and meaningful participation of local communities (Li, 2018 ). Plantations have played a pivotal role in Indonesia's economy since the Dutch colonial period in the 17th century. As in many developing countries, commercial plantations play an important role by providing economic and social benefits (Carle & Holmgren, 2009 ). Likewise, smallholder plantations are a strategic aspect in achieving sustainable development (Mulyasari et al., 2023 ). However, the plantation sector has a significant impact on social structures, land use patterns, and the environment. The industry presents a dual challenge: fostering economic growth while also managing the environmental and sustainability issues associated with such expansion. Plantations have transformed vast areas into a 'green mine’, capable of providing a source of economy and becoming a foreign exchange mainstay (Sembiring, 2006 ). Plantations in Indonesia have been successful over time, from the colonial period to the present. Compared to other commodities, palm plantations have been significantly more successful economically (Iddris et al., 2023 ; Nugroho & Dayanti, 2023 ). In Indonesia, palm oil already covers 11 million hectares, and 10 to 20 million more hectares are planned, most of it in plantation style (Xu et al., 2020 ). The land dimensions of renewed plantation expansion were thrust into public debate in 2008-9 when there was a spike in transnational land acquisitions widely described as a “global land grab”. The polemical term "grab" usefully drew attention to what was being taken away: customary land rights, diverse farming systems, and ecological balance (Gyapong, 2021 ). While the economic benefits of plantations in Indonesia are significant, the environmental consequences of their expansion are often overlooked. In Indonesia, the net present value (an aggregate measure of the returns from a plantation over its productive life) runs at US $ 10,000 per hectare (Cramb & McCarthy, 2016 ). However, these economic gains are often overshadowed by the long-term environmental costs, such as deforestation, soil degradation, and loss of biodiversity. Southeast Asia has experienced some of the highest annual deforestation rates in the world between 1990 and 1997 (Achard et al., 2002 ; Mayaux et al., 2005 ; Sodhi et al., 2010 )), with deforestation continuing at an accelerated pace since 2000 (Miettinen et al., 2011 ). The environmental consequences of plantation activities are far-reaching. The consequences of such rapid deforestation include the destruction of vital ecosystems and a significant contribution to global climate change, as tropical rainforests act as carbon sinks (Wilcove et al., 2013 ). As in developing countries, the significant growth economy economic growth shows another face: centers of poverty. Driven by population growth, economic development, and global demand for natural resources such as timber, rubber, and palm oil (Laurance, 2007 ; Sodhi et al., 2010 ; Wilcove et al., 2013 ). Despite the wealth generated by plantations, many plantation workers live in poverty, and local communities often face land dispossession, exclusion from decision-making processes, and inadequate compensation (Sodhi et al., 2010 ). Many plantation conflicts in Indonesia stem from the socio-economic gap between plantation companies and surrounding communities (Muadi, 2010 ). Although the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning (ATR/BPN) has issued Regulation No. 21 of 2020 to address land disputes, agrarian reform in Indonesia continues to face major challenges. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and political resistance have slowed the resolution of plantation-related land conflicts. Through its programs, ATR/BPN plays a key role in providing land legality via redistribution, certification of Agrarian Reform Objects (TORA) from released forest areas, and management of transmigration lands (Raturandang & Tjempaka, 2025; Salim et al., 2021). These efforts are further mandated by Presidential Regulation No. 86 of 2018, which calls for accelerated land redistribution. However, implementation has been hampered by structural obstacles, including overlapping claims, vague land boundaries, unresolved disputes, and resistance from vested interests (Amaliyah et al., 2021). As a result, the gap between policy goals and on-the-ground realities has generated persistent dissatisfaction among affected communities. Agrarian reform, therefore, must be seen not just as a legal process, but as a continuous realignment of land control, ownership, and access—aimed at fostering legal certainty, equity, and sustainable development for all Indonesians (Lu et al., 2015). This research addresses the critical issue of the complex relationship between plantation expansion, land conflicts, and agrarian reform. This study aims to critically examine the effectiveness of agrarian reform policies, particularly the role of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA), in resolving structural land conflicts in Indonesia's plantation sector. By focusing on conflict cases in West Java and Bengkulu, the research investigates how historical injustices, unequal land tenure systems, and weak institutional responses contribute to the persistence of disputes between local communities and plantation companies. The study offers a comprehensive analysis that integrates both community and corporate perspectives to assess the practical implementation of land reform on the ground. Through this multidimensional approach, the research seeks to propose a holistic agrarian reform framework that addresses not only legal ownership but also issues of access, justice, and sustainable rural transformation. LITERATURE REVIEW Agrarian Key Concept Social Welfare Agrarian reform serves as a fundamental conceptual framework that advocates systemic transformation in land distribution and control patterns to realize social equality and mitigate disparities in agricultural-based communities (Jacobs, 2013 ). The essence of this theoretical perspective lies in the equitable reallocation of land from power holders or agrarian elites to small-scale farmers and historically marginalized segments of society. Through agrarian architectural reform, conflicts rooted in imbalances in land tenure can be significantly reduced. In addition to the redistribution dimension, the conceptualization of agrarian reform also identifies structural obstacles originating from political dominance and vested economic interests that have the potential to hinder the optimal implementation of reform. Consequently, this paradigm emphasizes the urgency of just and transparent governance and the consolidation of grassroots institutions as integral components of the reform agenda. This framework is strengthened by studies that explore the link between agrarian redistribution and sustainable development, and social justice (Sachs, 2015 ). For sustainable agrarian reform, a holistic approach is necessary, combining asset and access reforms. This includes providing capital, technical skills, infrastructure, and market access to the poor (Kartodihardjo & Cahyono, 2021 ; Widodo, 2017 ). Strengthening governance through corruption prevention programs, public information disclosure, and reducing clientelism is crucial for effective agrarian reform (Kartodihardjo & Cahyono, 2021 ). Involving local communities and social movements in the reform process can help ensure that policies are more inclusive and address the needs of marginalized groups(Lee, 2022 ). Theories of agrarian conflict: Structural and Plantation Agrarian conflict arises from contradictions in claims over agrarian resources, which can involve social groups, corporations, or the state (Antoro, 2013 ), The components of the subject matter of conflicting claims over the control of agrarian resources are summarized as internal and external conflicts (Rilus, 2007 ). Rilus defines internal conflict as a conflict of power nature arises in society. Fisher & Kartikasari ( 2001 ) mention that conflict generally involves a relationship between two or more parties who have or feel they have source power, where the parties have goals that are not in line with each other. Plantation conflict arises because of the system of capitalism that drives the system of production. The system most original production is a close relationship among public farmers (or workers) with the means of production, land. Initially, agricultural production systems are centered around subsistence farming, but the entry of capitalism disrupts this, separating farmers from the land. Capitalism accelerates by separating farmers from their means of production: the land. Before the market system, agriculture had a strong connection between farmers and the land. So, it is very accurate if (Fine, 2001 ) shows that the easiest way to create a system of capitalism is to deprive master farmers or public farmers of the land. Rachman ( 2013 ) explains that structural agrarian conflict involves several interconnected components: causes, effects, and conditions that preserve the conflict. These components help explain how agrarian conflicts persist across generations, especially when land ownership and control are concentrated within a small elite, while local communities continue to face exclusion. Structural agrarian conflicts, particularly in plantation areas, are often chronic, systemic, and widespread, impacting not just the immediate parties involved but also shaping broader socio-economic conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the systemic roots of plantation land conflicts. Access and Exclusion to Agrarian Sources Theories of access to land have been developed by scholars such as Ribot & Peluso ( 2003 ) and Schlager & Ostrom ( 1992 ). Schlager & Ostrom's property rights regimes theory views land rights as a "bundle of rights" that determine how resources are accessed and used. In contrast, Ribot & Peluso define access as the "ability to benefit from something," which emphasizes control over land access rather than just legal ownership (Hall et al., 2011 ). This framework recognizes that real power lies in the ability to derive benefits from the land, which is particularly relevant in plantation conflicts where local communities may lack formal ownership but have de facto access, making them vulnerable to displacement. METHODS The research will use a descriptive-qualitative methodology to explain the chain of structural agrarian conflicts in plantation areas. The "Structural Agrarian Conflicts Explanation Chain" framework, developed by Rachman ( 2013 ), is used to define the root problems of these conflicts in order to find appropriate solutions. A study of conflict plantation is a type of descriptive-qualitative study. A qualitative study was used to look for influencing factors of a conflict plantation. The qualitative method allows for a comprehensive examination of the underlying causes and dynamics of these conflicts, as well as the socio-cultural context in which they occur. The research locations were selected based on two main criteria: 1) they are designated as Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform (LPRA) currently being addressed by the government through the Acceleration Team Solution Conflict Agrarian and Strengthening Policy Agrarian 2021; 2) they have chronic plantation conflicts that have resulted in significant socio-agrarian and ecological crises. The chosen locations are in four districts across two provinces: West Java and Bengkulu. Data collection was carried out using three primary methods: 1) in-depth interviews, 2) online mass media analysis, and 3) document analysis and associated observation. Interviews were conducted with a diverse range of subjects, including farmer groups, private and state-owned companies, central and local government officials, and national and local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Online mass media analysis was performed on leading outlets such as Tempo and Kompas, as well as various local media, to understand the public narrative and discourse surrounding the conflicts. Ethical considerations are a crucial part of this research, prioritizing participant welfare and data integrity. All participants were informed of the study's purpose and their voluntary involvement. Informed consent was obtained, and participants were made aware of their rights, including confidentiality and the ability to withdraw at any time. Data was anonymized to protect privacy and stored securely. Extra care was taken to prevent harm, retaliation, or misrepresentation, especially for those discussing sensitive issues. Finally, the objectivity of the analysis was maintained by using the most up-to-date and reliable scientific literature to ensure the findings accurately reflect the facts on the ground. RESULTS Typology of Plantation Land Conflict This study identifies plantation land conflicts based on the subject of the conflict: between communities and holders of Cultivation Rights (HGU), which include both private companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like state-owned plantations (PTPN/ PT. Perkebunan Nusantara) as shown in Table 1. This grouping aims to find innovative solutions for each typology. A key difference is the land status when an HGU expires; unproductive land can become state land and potentially be redistributed to the public. However, resolving conflicts on PTPN land is complex because the HGU land is a state asset, requiring approval from the Minister of SOEs and the Minister of Finance. Table 1 Typology of Conflict Subjects Business Entities Holding HGU Plantations State-owned enterprises Private Owned Enterprise A. West Java Province 1. PTPN VIII Kertamanah Garden in Margamukti Village, Canning District, Bandung 1. PT. Havea Indonesia (Havindo) B. Bengkulu Province 1. PTPN VIII in North Bengkulu Regency 1.PT Ika Hasfarm in Central Bengkulu Regency Source: Processed data, 2021 This dynamic aligns with what Ribot & Peluso (2003) describe as "access", the actual ability to benefit from resources, which often conflicts with formal ownership regimes Schlager & Ostrom (1992). The communities' historical ties to the land, based on centuries of cultivation and occupation, underscore a deeper socio-economic reality: the current legal framework does not always account for local populations' lived experiences and rights. Therefore, the conflict is not merely about land ownership but involves broader issues of social justice, resource access, and historical reparation. Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java Province 1) Land Conflict between the community and the Indonesian Veterans Legion (LVRI) and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah Table 2 summarizes the key aspects of the land conflict between the community, LVRI, and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah. The conflict stems from the LVRI's claim to land in the PTPN VIII HGU area, based on historical permissions. However, the Ministry of ATR/BPN clarifies that no such land grant was ever made to LVRI. This issue was brought to light when three farmers were arrested for working on the plantation's land, accused of damaging crops and occupying the area. The farmers subsequently issued statements denying involvement with the HGU land. This case illustrates how historical land claims, complicated by outdated legal frameworks and government policies, continue to affect local communities. The long-standing nature of these disputes highlights the need for clearer land rights recognition and resolution mechanisms. Table 2 LVRI Vs. PTPN VIII Plantation Land Conflict Profile Summary ROOT OF THE PROBLEM HOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS IMPACT AND CONFLICT 1. Dutch colonial heritage plantation. 2. PTPN VIII does not recognize partnerships or plasma. 3. Inequality of land tenure and people's need for arable land. 1. To work on PTPN VIII HGU land with horticultural commodities, especially potatoes, carrots, etc. 2. Revoke the main plant of PTPN VIII, cloves. 3. The demonstration conveyed the demand for the release of 3 farmers from prison. 4. LVRI demands that ATR/BPN recognize their rights to land in the PTPN VIII HGU area. 1. Farmers with horticultural commodities cultivate many HGU areas. 2. Landslide-prone area. 3. The uncertainty of PTPN's business and the protection (legality) of farmers' land is not guaranteed. 4. Damage the crops of land cultivators. 5. The police were deployed, and three farmers were arrested. This case illustrates a classic conflict of overlapping claims: formal legal ownership versus moral-historical access. While PTPN VIII holds legal HGU status, farmers and the Indonesian Veterans Legion (LVRI) assert historical and patriotic legitimacy over the land. The state's refusal to recognize LVRI's claim and the criminalization of farmers exemplify Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) concept of access being denied despite long-term usage. The power asymmetry is reinforced through state instruments (e.g., police), validating Rachman’s (2013) description of structural agrarian conflict: enduring, systemic, and politically protected. 2) Plantation land conflicts between communities in Margamukti Village, Pengalengan District, Bandung, and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah This conflict is motivated by the inequality of land tenure felt by farmers (see Table 3). Farmers have started working on the land since 1998, which is more massive in the post-reform era. The farmers consider that the PTPN VIII HGU area is the right of the farmers. Table 3 Summary of Land Conflict Profile of Margamukti Village Farmers Vs. PTPN VIII ROOT OF THE PROBLEM HOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS IMPACT AND CONFLICT 1. Most of the village area is HGU land and sub holding PTPN/Perhutani area (pine/protected company class) 2. Dutch colonial heritage plantation. 3. PTPN VIII does not recognize partnerships or plasma. 4. Inequality of land tenure and the people's need for arable land. 1. To work on PTPN VIII HGU land with horti commodities, especially potatoes, carrots, etc. 2. Revoke the main plant of PTPN VIII, cloves. 3. Demonstrations convey demands. 4. Propose as the object of agrarian reform. 1. Farmers with horticultural commodities cultivate many HGU areas. 2. Landslide-prone area. 3. The uncertainty of PTPN's business and the protection (legality) of farmers' land is not guaranteed. 4. Mobilize employees to occupy farmers' land. 5. Deploy the police; three farmers were arrested. The argument is due to the government's current agrarian reform program. Farmers consider that they have worked on PTPN VIII's land for an extended period and are allowed to propose it as a land object of agrarian reform (TORA). Existing land is cultivated by farmers in the form of horticultural commodity crops such as carrots, tomatoes, potatoes, and others. 3) Conflicts over plantation land between communities in three villages in the District of Nanggung, Bogor Regency, and PT. Havea Indonesia (Havindo) This conflict began with the issuance of a plantation concession right (HGU) for PT Cengkeh Zanzibar (PT CZ) in 1988 (see Table 4). In the previous few years, ownership rights had been issued for the community, namely Prona, in 1981, and the redistribution program, as many as 282 fields in 1983. This conflict is a prime example of how state intervention and policies have created historical entanglements. In many instances, government programs such as Prona and land redistribution have not fully compensated or recognized local communities' long-standing occupancy and land rights. As a result, the land intended for the community’s benefit is instead controlled by plantation companies, leaving farmers to assert their rights through protest and occupation. Table 4 Summary Profile of Plantation Land Conflict, AMANAT Vs. PT Havindo ROOT OF THE PROBLEM HOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS IMPACT AND CONFLICT 1. The arable lands and settlements in the three villages of the Nanggung sub-district were unilaterally included in the HGU area. The HGU was published in 1988. 2. In 1983/4, a citizen's certificate was issued in the redistribution program. 3. Inequality of land tenure and the need for arable land. 4. Since the 1990s, the company has abandoned its HGU land. 1. Continue to work on the land that is included in the HGU. 2. The community works on the abandoned land of the company. 3. Most of the HGU land, 95 percent, is controlled by the community. 4. 2013 Demonstration against the extension of the HGU. 5. Regent Cancels the recommendation letter for HGU extension. 6. Propose as the object of agrarian reform. 1. Farmers cultivate many HGU areas with seasonal agriculture or fast-growing timber. 2. Landslide-prone area. 3. Business uncertainty for the company (the company only controls land with an area of 15 hectares) and the protection (legality) of the farmers' land is not guaranteed. 4. Paying thugs or champions to destroy and burn community gardens or crops. This case demonstrates how abandoned corporate land (HGU) becomes a de facto communal resource. The state’s failure to monitor and redistribute abandoned land aligns with Rachman’s idea of chronic conflict: unresolved for decades despite clear community claims and historical redistribution programs (Prona 1983). The fact that 95% of the land is worked by communities yet still claimed by the corporation underscores the failure of formal agrarian governance and validates the need for access-based legal recognition. Plantation Land Conflict in Bengkulu Province Conflicts in Bengkulu were often triggered by the "October Package" (PAKTO) policy of the 1980s, which eased HGU issuance without proper consultation or compensation for local communities. This policy has implications for accelerating the issuance of permits and HGUs. As a result, the term 'Conditional HGU' appears, namely HGU, which has been granted but must be followed by proof of settlement of sale and purchase or compensation for community land in the area. The PAKTO policy has created land use conflicts, particularly by prioritizing the issuance of HGU to plantation companies without proper consultation or compensation for the local communities that have lived and worked the land for generations. 1) Conflict over plantation land between communities in Central Bengkulu Regency and PT Ika Hasfarm. In 1993, PT Ika Hasfarm (PT IH) obtained Land Use Rights (HGU) from the Head of BPN Number 20/HGU/BPN/92 for a land area of 1,400 hectares. The HGU is a plantation area for cocoa commodities. During 1993-1998, the HGU land was not used by PT IH. During this period, there was no cacao planting or cultivation activity. The company also does not show activities, such as an office building or foreman employees operating (see Table 5). Table 5 Summary Profile of Plantation Land Conflict Central Bengkulu Rural Farmers with PT Ika Farm ROOT OF THE PROBLEM HOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS IMPACT AND CONFLICT 1. Most of the compensation has not been carried out by the company after the issuance of the HGU in 1993. The company suffered losses and was entangled in bank loans. 2. Until 1998 there was no company activity, either cultivation or management. 3. The land is included in the abandoned database. Moreover, the community considers the company to have abandoned the land. 4. There is little inequality in land tenure and availability for the community. As a result, people work on plantation land. 1. The community continues to work on PT Ika Hisfarm's HGU land. 2. The farmers planted 577 hectares of rubber, 420 hectares of oil palm, and 45 hectares of upland rice. 3. 500 families are working on the land 4. It was proposed as TOL (Land Reform Object) in 2008 and TORA during the government of President Joko Widodo. 1. Farmers cultivate many HGU areas. 2. The uncertainty of PTPN's business and the protection (legality) of farmers' land is not guaranteed. In 2008, the Secretary General of the Bengkulu Farmers Union (STaB) requested the revocation of PT IH's HGU and made the HGU land a Land Reform Object (TOL). According to factual information, PT IH, in the early 2000s, had applied for the release of HGU land. The application failed because the HGU land became abandoned land. After all, the company was entangled in bank credit. The land is indicated as abandoned and included in the abandoned land database. To apply for the release of HGU must be removed from the database and can become the object of land redistribution. 2) Plantation land conflicts between communities and PTPN VII The plantation land conflict in Air Sekamanak Village, Pinang Raya District, North Bengkulu Regency, was triggered by the community's plan to participate in a plantation replanting program (Table 6). When the community participates in the program, there is one prerequisite to issuing a Certificate that the community land area of the Sumber Rezeki Air Sekamanak Farmer Group is free from the PTPN VII Business Use Rights (HGU) area (Prerequisites for Replanting Gardens). Table 6 Summary Profile of Plantation Land Conflict Water Sekamanak Village Farmers Vs. PTPN VII ROOT OF THE PROBLEM HOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS IMPACT AND CONFLICT 1. PTPN VII does not want to issue a certificate that the plantation/farmer's land is not included in the PTPN VII HGU area. 2. The certificate is a prerequisite for participating in the garden replanting program. 1. Through the Village Head, the community sent a letter to the PTPN VII Ketahun unit manager. 2. The community, through the village, asked the Head of the North Bengkulu Regency Land Office to mediate in this case. 3. The research results and verification of the Land Office that the community lands totaling 79 plots (in total) are outside the HGU. However, eight plots are directly adjacent to the HGU land. 1. PTPN VII is unwilling to state that the community land is not or is free from HGU land. The results of the study conducted by the Land Office of North Bengkulu Regency are lands that members of the farmer group have cultivated are not or outside the PTPN VII HGU land, namely HGU Nos. 63 and No. 08's. PTPN VII. Based on these findings, farmer groups can continue to apply for a plantation replanting program. In this case, the conflict revolves around administrative obstruction, where farmers' eligibility for a replanting program is hindered by PTPN’s refusal to issue a non-HGU certificate. Although the land lies outside the HGU boundaries, the company’s reluctance to formally acknowledge this keeps farmers in legal limbo. This reflects how power operates through bureaucratic ambiguity, sustaining conflict. Ultimately, these plantation land conflicts reveal how land is not only a physical resource but also a site of power, identity, and struggle. The tension between formal land rights held by corporations and the historical presence of farming communities reflects a broader contestation over who truly has the right to benefit from land. As seen across the cases, from West Java to Bengkulu, the persistence of conflict is less about legal ambiguity and more about systemic exclusion, where bureaucratic procedures and institutional interests maintain the status quo. In this context, land becomes a battleground where communities assert not only their economic needs but also their dignity and historical claims, challenging a system that continues to privilege legality over legitimacy. EFFORTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF PLANTATION LAND CONFLICT BY VARIOUS PARTIES Settlement of Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java This research has identified the root causes and conditions that perpetuate plantation land conflicts in two districts, namely Bandung Regency and Bogor Regency. The Data and Information Centre stated that the area of Cultivation Rights (HGU) in Bandung Regency reached 35,015.55 hectares, with the HGU unit reaching 287 HGU. The number of Cultivation Rights in Bogor Regency has reached 395 HGU (covering an area of 17,487.25 hectares). This research was conducted in HGU plantation areas in Bandung Regency (Kecamatan Pengalengan) and the Regency of Bogor (District of Nanggung). Local populations who have historically lived on, worked, and cultivated these HGU lands are frequently marginalized. They are excluded from legal land ownership and deprived of access to land. These tensions are further exacerbated by ongoing economic inequality and the unmet demand for agricultural land among rural communities. The parties involved in resolving land conflicts between rural community groups and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah are land cultivators, the head of Kertamanah Village, the Bandung Regency Land Office, and PTPN VIII. In 2019, the land cultivators proposed their land as the object of agrarian reform. This proposal was not accepted by the Head of the West Java Province ATR/BPN Regional Office because the object is PTPN VIII HGU land. This rejection highlights the tension between formal legal ownership (through HGU) and the traditional or customary claims by farmers who have worked the land for decades. The consequence of this denial is that farmers continue to face legal exclusion, while the company gains control of land that local communities have long depended upon. This fuels social unrest and increased demands for land reform as local communities seek to regain access to the land they consider integral to their livelihood and culture. Seeing the struggle of the farmers, the company made an offer. PTPN VIII took a humanist approach; farmers were allowed to work on the company's land by implementing a partnership program or cooperation. The company innovates by implementing the "Land Asset Utilization Program for Village Community Empowerment Around Gardens, " called PMDK. 17 farmer groups and 400 farmers attended the program. The land area in this program reaches 360 hectares. This initiative by PTPN VIII is a positive example of corporate social responsibility aimed at addressing some of the root causes of conflict, mainly the lack of opportunities for local communities. The consequence, however, is that this solution is not permanent; it still requires careful monitoring to ensure that the rights and benefits of farmers are protected and that the partnerships are truly equitable. There is a difference in the settlement efforts carried out by farmer groups from three villages in Nanggung District, Bogor Regency. Farmer groups build networks of struggle by cooperating with agrarian and environmental activists, academic activists, and officials at the district to central levels. The network that has been made has paid off with the Regent's commitment to cancel the technical recommendation letter for the extension of PT Havea Indonesia's HGU. The network to the central government seems to have been successfully carried out by farmer groups. It was proven by a visit from the Presidential Staff Office (KSP) to review the conflict locations and the object of the community's proposed TORA. The Regent formed a committee in the Bogor Regency Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) team. GTRA involves various Regional Work Units (SKPD) to accelerate land redistribution. In addition, GTRA is also fully supported by the Bogor Regency Land Office. Civil organizations' participation aims to maintain the farmer groups' spirit in fighting for their rights. Currently, the Bogor Regency GTRA team is prioritizing the redistribution plan on the ex-HGU land of PT Havea, Indonesia. In the past, the Land Office has conducted research to obtain a social map for the community of potential recipients of land redistribution. Looking at the two cases above, the case in Bandung Regency can be solved by empowering rural communities, while in the case of Bogor Regency, GTRA initiation is needed. Settlement of Plantation Land Conflicts in Bengkulu The total HGU in Bengkulu Province is 361,379.68 hectares, and 247 HGU. North Bengkulu Regency has an area of Cultivation Right (HGU) reaching 58,106.72 hectares, with several HGU getting 48 HGU. Meanwhile, Central Bengkulu Regency has an area of 15,299.37 hectares of HGU land, totaling 16 HGU. Conflicts in the two districts occurred between communities and private plantation HGU holders. Until 2021, several potential objects will become Land Objects for Agrarian Reform (TORA). From transmigration and 5,039.17 hectares of HGU and the release of forest areas, there are 4,900.3 hectares. TORA potential from the abandoned land of PT. Purwanira Dharma Efforts in North Bengkulu covering an area of 2,188.95 hectares, from PT. Bumi Rafflesia Indah in Bengkulu Tengah is 564.96 hectares from PT. Asririmba Wira Bhakti Mukomuko has an area of 1,046.31, and PT Bukit Daun Mas Mukomuko has 24.35 hectares. As for the former HGU lands that were successfully granted certificates to the community through TORA in 2021, there were 1,621 plots (765,5737 ha) for 1,315 families. DISCUSSION The Role of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) in Plantation Conflict Resolution From the four research districts, the role of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) has not been running well. The local government has not utilized this institution in resolving plantation land conflicts or in proposing the objectives of agrarian reform. The utilization is quite good, although not optimal, namely Bogor Regency. GTRA Bogor Regency has been running to handle several cases of plantation land conflicts and has proposed it as TORA. There are two main reasons why GTRA at the district and provincial levels is not working well. First , the local government assumes that agrarian reform is the domain of the Ministry of ATR/BPN. As a result, local governments are not very active in driving GTRA as a motor for land redistribution for the community. Second , the regional government does not yet have a special budget for GTRA activities. Such an assumption shows that local governments do not yet have complete information, nor do they share experiences from other local governments in implementing GTRA at the regional level. These findings resonate with the principal-agent theory in governance. The Ministry of ATR/BPN (the principal) may have delegated the responsibility for agrarian reform to local governments (the agents), but the agents are not fully executing this responsibility, either due to lack of resources, knowledge, or political will. According to Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, local governments may lack the necessary institutional arrangements to facilitate the smooth implementation of land reforms. Without effective vertical integration of governance, wherein local, regional, and central authorities work collaboratively, the implementation of GTRA will continue to face significant challenges. Luthfi (2018) highlights Sigi Regency as a model for effective GTRA implementation, supported by academics, civil society, and local stakeholders. The Regent issued a policy allowing the use of village funds for resolving land conflicts, exemplifying discretionary innovation. Similarly, in Bogor Regency, the Regent mobilized various regional agencies (SKPDs) to support post-redistribution access, such as in agriculture, infrastructure, and MSME development, each allocating budgets for GTRA. These cases illustrate the importance of collaborative governance involving multi-stakeholder participation in managing land reform. This study’s findings on plantation land conflicts in West Java and Bengkulu align with structural agrarian conflict theory. As Rachman ( 2013 ) notes, such conflicts persist due to unrecognized access rights, even where communities have long cultivated the land. This supports Ribot and Peluso’s ( 2003 ) concept that access is central for communities dependent on land. Although HGU holders possess legal rights, local moral and historical claims are often overlooked, fueling prolonged disputes. The colonial roots of these conflicts further affirm the views of Fine ( 2001 ) and Marx, who argue that land dispossession under capitalism drives structural inequality. This dynamic, where corporate land concentration excludes local communities, reflects a persistent and systemic conflict. Comprehensive Solutions to Mitigate Future Plantation Conflicts: A Holistic Agrarian Reform Framework Plantation conflicts stem from long-standing structural inequalities rooted in the colonial era (Karim et al., 2021 ). Today’s plantation sector is marked by concentrated land ownership, dispossession of smallholders and indigenous groups through exploitative practices (Permadi & Azizi, 2024 ), weak legal protections, and neglected productive lands—all of which fuel persistent conflict and marginalization. These tensions are exacerbated by differing conflict resolution approaches: while some private companies engage in community partnerships, most state-owned enterprises lack clear mechanisms, with PTPN VIII in Bandung being a rare example of effective intervention (Kartodihardjo & Cahyono, 2021 ). The proposed solution framework (Fig. 2 ) is grounded in the principle of holistic agrarian reform that transcends conventional land redistribution models. This approach integrates two fundamental dimensions: asset reform (redistributing ownership of productive assets) and access reform (expanding access to complementary resources essential for agricultural productivity). The framework recognizes that sustainable conflict resolution requires addressing not only the immediate issue of land ownership but also the broader ecosystem of resources, institutions, and market mechanisms that determine the viability of agricultural livelihoods. The holistic agrarian reform framework rests on four interconnected pillars that support sustainable rural transformation (Kartodihardjo & Cahyono, 2021 ). First, accessible and diversified financial capital, from microfinance to government-backed funds, to support productive land use. Second, human resource development through technical training aligned with agricultural innovation and market needs. Third, physical infrastructure such as irrigation, transport, and processing facilities that enable market connectivity. Fourth, fair market access mechanisms, including cooperatives, value chain integration, and pricing systems that ensure income stability for farmers and food security for consumers. The success of this holistic framework depends on three key strategies (Herdiansyah & Majesty, 2024 ). First, optimizing institutions by activating and strengthening GTRA at all levels with interagency coordination supported by adequate resources and enforcement mandates (Borras, 2009 ). Second, preventing land re-concentration through socialization, promotion of communal ownership, and strict post-redistribution monitoring, as illustrated by the Bogor case, where redistributed land was reabsorbed into plantation concessions. The third strategic component promotes restorative justice, particularly in resolving conflicts with indigenous communities, by restoring violated rights through dialogue, reconciliation, and recognition of customary tenure, laying the groundwork for sustainable coexistence (McCarthy, 2010b ). The implementation of this comprehensive framework aims to transform Indonesia’s agrarian system from one marked by conflict and inequality into one grounded in social justice, economic growth, and environmental sustainability (Habibi, 2023 ). It seeks to promote equitable land distribution, boost rural productivity and incomes, reduce land-related violence, and build resilient agricultural systems. By tackling the root causes of plantation conflicts, the framework positions agrarian reform as a driver of poverty reduction, food security, and sustainable rural development, offering long-term benefits for all stakeholders. Ultimately, this integrated framework underscores that resolving plantation land conflicts requires more than technical fixes, it demands a structural transformation rooted in justice, inclusivity, and sustainability. By linking the root causes of conflict with targeted interventions and long-term development goals, the framework moves beyond short-term dispute resolution toward a proactive vision of agrarian reform. It calls for a reimagining of land governance in Indonesia, where land is not monopolized by a few, but equitably accessed, productively utilized, and collectively managed for the benefit of communities, ecosystems, and future generations. CONCLUSION The study highlighted several core issues in plantation land conflicts: Plantation companies, a legacy of the colonial era, continue to claim community lands as HGU areas, resulting in land grabbing, inequality in land tenure, and abandonment of HGU lands. Communities oppose the granting or extension of HGU rights, while repressive measures are being taken to maintain control over plantation lands. A proposed solution for resolving these conflicts is through a partnership mechanism, where part of the HGU land is redistributed to the community. This approach can work well in private plantations, but state-owned plantation companies (PTPN) currently lack a clear conflict resolution mechanism, except for the efforts seen in PTPN VIII in Bandung. The study provides several key recommendations: First, the government should optimize the use of GTRA institutions at various levels to ensure bottom-up participation. Central GTRA should encourage local governments to exercise discretion and improve the effectiveness of GTRA. Collaboration with the Ministry of Villages, PDT, and Transmigration to integrate village funds for agrarian reform is also necessary. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises should be more actively involved in these efforts. Reflecting on research in Bogor Regency, which showed land reconcentration after redistribution into HGU plantations, the study recommends broader socialization of land redistribution, especially in the form of communal ownership. Finally, applying restorative justice principles is crucial for resolving conflicts with indigenous peoples and restoring their lost rights. The proposed holistic agrarian reform framework represents a paradigm shift from reactive conflict management to proactive system transformation. By integrating asset redistribution with access reform, institutional strengthening with community empowerment, and economic development with social justice, this approach offers a comprehensive solution to the persistent problem of plantation conflicts. The successful implementation of this framework requires sustained political commitment, adequate resource allocation, and collaborative efforts among government agencies, civil society organizations, and private sector stakeholders. Ultimately, the goal is to establish an agrarian system that is not only conflict-free but also economically viable, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable. Implications for the future, this study demands systemic transformation through Cultivation Rights Policy Revision that mandates conflict resolution prior to rights extension via partial land redistribution for partnerships and implementation of restorative justice for indigenous communities, with specific operational mechanisms for state-owned plantation enterprises (PTPN). Institutional strengthening of the National Land Agency (GTRA) serves as the coordination hub among ministries (Agrarian and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency, State-Owned Enterprises, Finance, Village Affairs) to integrate cross-actor collaboration through village fund schemes in participatory mapping, designing fiscal incentives (corporate income tax reductions) for redistributor companies, and preventing land reconcentration through communal certificates with non-transferability clauses. Differentiated partnership models based on equity profit-sharing (private sector) and outgrower schemes (state-owned enterprises) that guarantee permanent off-taker arrangements, alongside a multidimensional monitoring framework utilizing measurable economic-social-ecological indicators supported by GTRA's digital platform, regional task forces in acute conflict areas, and endowment funds from plantation taxation. This implementation shifts the paradigm from reactive to proactive collaboration to ensure sustainable agrarian justice. Declarations CREDIT AUTHORSHIP CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT Conceptualization: Trie Sakti, Eliana Sidipurwanty; Methodology : Nurul Hilmiati, Eliana Sidipurwanty; Formal analysis and investigation : Arditya Wicaksono, Septina Marryanti Prihatin; Writing – original draft preparation : Trie Sakti, Samuel Fery Purba, Intan Hapsari Surya Putri; Writing – review and editing : Eliana Sidipurwanty, Arditya Wicaksono, Husmiati Yusuf, Herlina Tarigan, Herma Juniarti; Supervision: Trie Sakti. DECLARATION OF INTEREST STATEMENT The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest. CONSENT TO PUBLISH No identifying information or images of individual participants are included in this article; therefore, separate consent to publish was not required. 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07:38:19","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7414626/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7414626/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":89886794,"identity":"b1979742-4712-45c6-8491-24a7e4eb8b99","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-26 06:40:44","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":110989,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSystemic Roots of Plantation Land Conflicts\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7414626/v1/68942c78263d47873aa5920c.png"},{"id":89886795,"identity":"69562315-9fcb-440b-a73d-6e1027b4adae","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-08-26 06:40:44","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":351398,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAlternative Schemes for Holistic Agrarian Reform Settlement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7414626/v1/103dc665a7a5d63741cd7832.png"},{"id":90763336,"identity":"55dc4529-3a77-427c-bd9d-4b34c71ad613","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-09-07 16:31:37","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1554958,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7414626/v1/ed93c70f-2915-4b9f-ac3c-8fa0b88ab604.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Assessing Agrarian Reform as a Structural Solution to Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java and Bengkulu, Indonesia","fulltext":[{"header":"INTRODUCTION","content":"\u003cp\u003eDuring the New Order era, policies such as the 1967\u0026ndash;1968 Capital Investment Law and the Nucleus-People's Plantation (PIR) model structurally favored large corporations through the allocation of extensive Cultivation Rights (HGU), while plasma farmers became ensnared in dependency relationships and exploitative contractual arrangements that systematically disadvantaged them (Lucas \u0026amp; Warren, 2003; McCarthy, 2010). The centralization of power and systematic repression systematically marginalized indigenous communities' land rights, triggering agrarian conflicts that remained unresolved without equitable solutions. Despite the decentralization of power during the Reform era, problems intensified due to economic liberalization and \"rent-seeking\" practices at the regional government level. Regents competed to issue plantation permits, often disregarding environmental and social impact assessments, as well as community rights (Pelusso et al., 2008). Meanwhile, agrarian reform programs remained stagnant (Bachriadi \u0026amp; Wiradi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e; Casson, 2000).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe dramatic surge in global palm oil demand drove massive expansion that became the primary source of agrarian conflicts and deforestation, with small communities frequently falling victim to systematic land-grabbing practices (Gaveau et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Central government policies, such as accelerating the licensing process and providing tax relief, still favor large companies, while sustainability regulations, such as ISPO, actually make it more difficult for small farmers to obtain certification (Jelsma et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e; Pacheco et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Purnomo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Independent farmers faced structural constraints, including limited access to subsidized inputs, financing, fair markets, and technical knowledge, resulting in significantly lower productivity and incomes compared to their corporate counterparts (Brandi et al., 2015; Euler et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). Plantation workers, especially women, experience appalling working conditions with low wages and inadequate social protection, while traditional communities continue to lose their residential territories (Li, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis bias stems from an extractive policy paradigm that prioritizes macroeconomic growth and large-scale investment, coupled with asymmetrical power relations where corporations maintain privileged access to political and bureaucratic spheres oligarchy (Li, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; McCarthy, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010a\u003c/span\u003e; Winters, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Weak agrarian governance characterized by overlapping regulations, corrupt licensing practices, and inequitable law enforcement further deepened existing injustices (Bachriadi \u0026amp; Wiradi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e; Hall et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Fundamental transformation toward justice requires genuine agrarian reform, robust corporate law enforcement, empowerment of farmers and workers, paradigmatic policy shifts, and meaningful participation of local communities (Li, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePlantations have played a pivotal role in Indonesia's economy since the Dutch colonial period in the 17th century. As in many developing countries, commercial plantations play an important role by providing economic and social benefits (Carle \u0026amp; Holmgren, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Likewise, smallholder plantations are a strategic aspect in achieving sustainable development (Mulyasari et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). However, the plantation sector has a significant impact on social structures, land use patterns, and the environment. The industry presents a dual challenge: fostering economic growth while also managing the environmental and sustainability issues associated with such expansion.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePlantations have transformed vast areas into a 'green mine\u0026rsquo;, capable of providing a source of economy and becoming a foreign exchange mainstay (Sembiring, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e). Plantations in Indonesia have been successful over time, from the colonial period to the present. Compared to other commodities, palm plantations have been significantly more successful economically (Iddris et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Nugroho \u0026amp; Dayanti, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). In Indonesia, palm oil already covers 11\u0026nbsp;million hectares, and 10 to 20\u0026nbsp;million more hectares are planned, most of it in plantation style (Xu et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). The land dimensions of renewed plantation expansion were thrust into public debate in 2008-9 when there was a spike in transnational land acquisitions widely described as a \u0026ldquo;global land grab\u0026rdquo;. The polemical term \"grab\" usefully drew attention to what was being taken away: customary land rights, diverse farming systems, and ecological balance (Gyapong, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile the economic benefits of plantations in Indonesia are significant, the environmental consequences of their expansion are often overlooked. In Indonesia, the net present value (an aggregate measure of the returns from a plantation over its productive life) runs at US\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e10,000 per hectare (Cramb \u0026amp; McCarthy, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e). However, these economic gains are often overshadowed by the long-term environmental costs, such as deforestation, soil degradation, and loss of biodiversity. Southeast Asia has experienced some of the highest annual deforestation rates in the world between 1990 and 1997 (Achard et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e; Mayaux et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e; Sodhi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e)), with deforestation continuing at an accelerated pace since 2000 (Miettinen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe environmental consequences of plantation activities are far-reaching. The consequences of such rapid deforestation include the destruction of vital ecosystems and a significant contribution to global climate change, as tropical rainforests act as carbon sinks (Wilcove et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). As in developing countries, the significant growth economy economic growth shows another face: centers of poverty. Driven by population growth, economic development, and global demand for natural resources such as timber, rubber, and palm oil (Laurance, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Sodhi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Wilcove et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). Despite the wealth generated by plantations, many plantation workers live in poverty, and local communities often face land dispossession, exclusion from decision-making processes, and inadequate compensation (Sodhi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMany plantation conflicts in Indonesia stem from the socio-economic gap between plantation companies and surrounding communities (Muadi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). Although the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning (ATR/BPN) has issued Regulation No. 21 of 2020 to address land disputes, agrarian reform in Indonesia continues to face major challenges. Bureaucratic inefficiencies and political resistance have slowed the resolution of plantation-related land conflicts. Through its programs, ATR/BPN plays a key role in providing land legality via redistribution, certification of Agrarian Reform Objects (TORA) from released forest areas, and management of transmigration lands (Raturandang \u0026amp; Tjempaka, 2025; Salim et al., 2021). These efforts are further mandated by Presidential Regulation No. 86 of 2018, which calls for accelerated land redistribution. However, implementation has been hampered by structural obstacles, including overlapping claims, vague land boundaries, unresolved disputes, and resistance from vested interests (Amaliyah et al., 2021). As a result, the gap between policy goals and on-the-ground realities has generated persistent dissatisfaction among affected communities. Agrarian reform, therefore, must be seen not just as a legal process, but as a continuous realignment of land control, ownership, and access\u0026mdash;aimed at fostering legal certainty, equity, and sustainable development for all Indonesians (Lu et al., 2015).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis research addresses the critical issue of the complex relationship between plantation expansion, land conflicts, and agrarian reform. This study aims to critically examine the effectiveness of agrarian reform policies, particularly the role of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA), in resolving structural land conflicts in Indonesia's plantation sector. By focusing on conflict cases in West Java and Bengkulu, the research investigates how historical injustices, unequal land tenure systems, and weak institutional responses contribute to the persistence of disputes between local communities and plantation companies. The study offers a comprehensive analysis that integrates both community and corporate perspectives to assess the practical implementation of land reform on the ground. Through this multidimensional approach, the research seeks to propose a holistic agrarian reform framework that addresses not only legal ownership but also issues of access, justice, and sustainable rural transformation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eLITERATURE REVIEW\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAgrarian Key Concept Social Welfare\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAgrarian reform serves as a fundamental conceptual framework that advocates systemic transformation in land distribution and control patterns to realize social equality and mitigate disparities in agricultural-based communities (Jacobs, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). The essence of this theoretical perspective lies in the equitable reallocation of land from power holders or agrarian elites to small-scale farmers and historically marginalized segments of society. Through agrarian architectural reform, conflicts rooted in imbalances in land tenure can be significantly reduced.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition to the redistribution dimension, the conceptualization of agrarian reform also identifies structural obstacles originating from political dominance and vested economic interests that have the potential to hinder the optimal implementation of reform. Consequently, this paradigm emphasizes the urgency of just and transparent governance and the consolidation of grassroots institutions as integral components of the reform agenda. This framework is strengthened by studies that explore the link between agrarian redistribution and sustainable development, and social justice (Sachs, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). For sustainable agrarian reform, a holistic approach is necessary, combining asset and access reforms. This includes providing capital, technical skills, infrastructure, and market access to the poor (Kartodihardjo \u0026amp; Cahyono, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Widodo, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). Strengthening governance through corruption prevention programs, public information disclosure, and reducing clientelism is crucial for effective agrarian reform (Kartodihardjo \u0026amp; Cahyono, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Involving local communities and social movements in the reform process can help ensure that policies are more inclusive and address the needs of marginalized groups(Lee, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTheories of agrarian conflict: Structural and Plantation\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAgrarian conflict arises from contradictions in claims over agrarian resources, which can involve social groups, corporations, or the state (Antoro, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e), The components of the subject matter of conflicting claims over the control of agrarian resources are summarized as internal and external conflicts (Rilus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Rilus defines internal conflict as a conflict of power nature arises in society. Fisher \u0026amp; Kartikasari (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) mention that conflict generally involves a relationship between two or more parties who have or feel they have source power, where the parties have goals that are not in line with each other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePlantation conflict arises because of the system of capitalism that drives the system of production. The system most original production is a close relationship among public farmers (or workers) with the means of production, land. Initially, agricultural production systems are centered around subsistence farming, but the entry of capitalism disrupts this, separating farmers from the land. Capitalism accelerates by separating farmers from their means of production: the land. Before the market system, agriculture had a strong connection between farmers and the land. So, it is very accurate if (Fine, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) shows that the easiest way to create a system of capitalism is to deprive master farmers or public farmers of the land. Rachman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) explains that structural agrarian conflict involves several interconnected components: causes, effects, and conditions that preserve the conflict. These components help explain how agrarian conflicts persist across generations, especially when land ownership and control are concentrated within a small elite, while local communities continue to face exclusion. Structural agrarian conflicts, particularly in plantation areas, are often chronic, systemic, and widespread, impacting not just the immediate parties involved but also shaping broader socio-economic conditions. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e illustrates the systemic roots of plantation land conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eAccess and Exclusion to Agrarian Sources\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTheories of access to land have been developed by scholars such as Ribot \u0026amp; Peluso (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e) and Schlager \u0026amp; Ostrom (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1992\u003c/span\u003e). Schlager \u0026amp; Ostrom's property rights regimes theory views land rights as a \"bundle of rights\" that determine how resources are accessed and used. In contrast, Ribot \u0026amp; Peluso define access as the \"ability to benefit from something,\" which emphasizes control over land access rather than just legal ownership (Hall et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). This framework recognizes that real power lies in the ability to derive benefits from the land, which is particularly relevant in plantation conflicts where local communities may lack formal ownership but have de facto access, making them vulnerable to displacement.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"METHODS","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe research will use a descriptive-qualitative methodology to explain the chain of structural agrarian conflicts in plantation areas. The \"Structural Agrarian Conflicts Explanation Chain\" framework, developed by Rachman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e), is used to define the root problems of these conflicts in order to find appropriate solutions. A study of conflict plantation is a type of descriptive-qualitative study. A qualitative study was used to look for influencing factors of a conflict plantation. The qualitative method allows for a comprehensive examination of the underlying causes and dynamics of these conflicts, as well as the socio-cultural context in which they occur.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe research locations were selected based on two main criteria: 1) they are designated as Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform (LPRA) currently being addressed by the government through the Acceleration Team Solution Conflict Agrarian and Strengthening Policy Agrarian 2021; 2) they have chronic plantation conflicts that have resulted in significant socio-agrarian and ecological crises. The chosen locations are in four districts across two provinces: West Java and Bengkulu.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eData collection was carried out using three primary methods: 1) in-depth interviews, 2) online mass media analysis, and 3) document analysis and associated observation. Interviews were conducted with a diverse range of subjects, including farmer groups, private and state-owned companies, central and local government officials, and national and local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Online mass media analysis was performed on leading outlets such as Tempo and Kompas, as well as various local media, to understand the public narrative and discourse surrounding the conflicts.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEthical considerations are a crucial part of this research, prioritizing participant welfare and data integrity. All participants were informed of the study's purpose and their voluntary involvement. Informed consent was obtained, and participants were made aware of their rights, including confidentiality and the ability to withdraw at any time. Data was anonymized to protect privacy and stored securely. Extra care was taken to prevent harm, retaliation, or misrepresentation, especially for those discussing sensitive issues. Finally, the objectivity of the analysis was maintained by using the most up-to-date and reliable scientific literature to ensure the findings accurately reflect the facts on the ground.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"RESULTS","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTypology of Plantation Land Conflict\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study identifies plantation land conflicts based on the subject of the conflict: between communities and holders of Cultivation Rights (HGU), which include both private companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like state-owned plantations (PTPN/ PT. Perkebunan Nusantara) as shown in Table 1. This grouping aims to find innovative solutions for each typology. A key difference is the land status when an HGU expires; unproductive land can become state land and potentially be redistributed to the public. However, resolving conflicts on PTPN land is complex because the HGU land is a state asset, requiring approval from the Minister of SOEs and the Minister of Finance.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 1\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTypology of Conflict Subjects Business Entities Holding HGU Plantations\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eState-owned enterprises\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePrivate Owned Enterprise\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eA. West Java Province\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; PTPN VIII Kertamanah Garden in Margamukti Village, Canning District, Bandung\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.\u0026nbsp;PT. Havea Indonesia (Havindo)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eB. Bengkulu Province\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. PTPN VIII in North Bengkulu Regency\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 300px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.PT Ika Hasfarm in Central Bengkulu Regency\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Processed data, 2021\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis dynamic aligns with what Ribot \u0026amp; Peluso (2003) describe as \u0026quot;access\u0026quot;, the actual ability to benefit from resources, which often conflicts with formal ownership regimes Schlager \u0026amp; Ostrom (1992). The communities\u0026apos; historical ties to the land, based on centuries of cultivation and occupation, underscore a deeper socio-economic reality: the current legal framework does not always account for local populations\u0026apos; lived experiences and rights. Therefore, the conflict is not merely about land ownership but involves broader issues of social justice, resource access, and historical reparation.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003ePlantation Land Conflicts in West Java Province\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1) \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Land Conflict between the community and the Indonesian Veterans Legion (LVRI) and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTable 2 summarizes the key aspects of the land conflict between the community, LVRI, and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah. The conflict stems from the LVRI\u0026apos;s claim to land in the PTPN VIII HGU area, based on historical permissions. However, the Ministry of ATR/BPN clarifies that no such land grant was ever made to LVRI. This issue was brought to light when three farmers were arrested for working on the plantation\u0026apos;s land, accused of damaging crops and occupying the area. The farmers subsequently issued statements denying involvement with the HGU land. This case illustrates how historical land claims, complicated by outdated legal frameworks and government policies, continue to affect local communities. The long-standing nature of these disputes highlights the need for clearer land rights recognition and resolution mechanisms.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eLVRI Vs. PTPN VIII Plantation Land Conflict Profile Summary\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"604\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eROOT OF THE PROBLEM\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 208px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIMPACT AND\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCONFLICT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; Dutch colonial heritage plantation.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; PTPN VIII does not recognize partnerships or plasma.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; Inequality of land tenure and people\u0026apos;s need for arable land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 208px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; To work on PTPN VIII HGU land with horticultural commodities, especially potatoes, carrots, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; Revoke the main plant of PTPN VIII, cloves.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; The demonstration conveyed the demand for the release of 3 farmers from prison.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; LVRI demands that ATR/BPN recognize their rights to land in the PTPN VIII HGU area.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp;Farmers with horticultural commodities cultivate many HGU areas.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp;Landslide-prone area.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp;The uncertainty of PTPN\u0026apos;s business and the protection (legality) of farmers\u0026apos; land is not guaranteed.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp;Damage the crops of land cultivators.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5. \u0026nbsp;The police were deployed, and three farmers were arrested.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis case illustrates a classic conflict of overlapping claims: formal legal ownership versus moral-historical access. While PTPN VIII holds legal HGU status, farmers and the Indonesian Veterans Legion (LVRI) assert historical and patriotic legitimacy over the land. The state\u0026apos;s refusal to recognize LVRI\u0026apos;s claim and the criminalization of farmers exemplify Ribot and Peluso\u0026rsquo;s (2003) concept of access being denied despite long-term usage. The power asymmetry is reinforced through state instruments (e.g., police), validating Rachman\u0026rsquo;s (2013) description of structural agrarian conflict: enduring, systemic, and politically protected.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e2) \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Plantation land conflicts between communities in Margamukti Village, Pengalengan District, Bandung, and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis conflict is motivated by the inequality of land tenure felt by farmers (see Table 3). Farmers have started working on the land since 1998, which is more massive in the post-reform era. The farmers consider that the PTPN VIII HGU area is the right of the farmers.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 3\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSummary of Land Conflict Profile of Margamukti Village Farmers Vs. PTPN VIII\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"581\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eROOT OF THE PROBLEM\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 176px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIMPACT AND\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCONFLICT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp;Most of the village area is HGU land and sub holding PTPN/Perhutani area (pine/protected company class)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp;Dutch colonial heritage plantation.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp;PTPN VIII does not recognize partnerships or plasma.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp;Inequality of land tenure and the people\u0026apos;s need for arable land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; To work on PTPN VIII HGU land with horti commodities, especially potatoes, carrots, etc.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; Revoke the main plant of PTPN VIII, cloves.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; Demonstrations convey demands.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; Propose as the object of agrarian reform.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 176px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; Farmers with horticultural commodities cultivate many HGU areas.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; Landslide-prone area.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; The uncertainty of PTPN\u0026apos;s business and the protection (legality) of farmers\u0026apos; land is not guaranteed.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; Mobilize employees to occupy farmers\u0026apos; land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5. \u0026nbsp; Deploy the police; three farmers were arrested.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe argument is due to the government\u0026apos;s current agrarian reform program. Farmers consider that they have worked on PTPN VIII\u0026apos;s land for an extended period and are allowed to propose it as a land object of agrarian reform (TORA). Existing land is cultivated by farmers in the form of horticultural commodity crops such as carrots, tomatoes, potatoes, and others.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e3) \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Conflicts over plantation land between communities in three villages in the District of Nanggung, Bogor Regency, and PT. Havea Indonesia (Havindo)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis conflict began with the issuance of a plantation concession right (HGU) for PT Cengkeh Zanzibar (PT CZ) in 1988 (see Table 4). In the previous few years, ownership rights had been issued for the community, namely Prona, in 1981, and the redistribution program, as many as 282 fields in 1983. This conflict is a prime example of how state intervention and policies have created historical entanglements. In many instances, government programs such as Prona and land redistribution have not fully compensated or recognized local communities\u0026apos; long-standing occupancy and land rights. As a result, the land intended for the community\u0026rsquo;s benefit is instead controlled by plantation companies, leaving farmers to assert their rights through protest and occupation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 4\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSummary Profile of Plantation Land Conflict, AMANAT Vs. PT Havindo\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"587\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eROOT OF THE PROBLEM\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 182px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIMPACT AND\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCONFLICT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp;The arable lands and settlements in the three villages of the Nanggung sub-district were unilaterally included in the HGU area. The HGU was published in 1988.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp;In 1983/4, a citizen\u0026apos;s certificate was issued in the redistribution program.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp;Inequality of land tenure and the need for arable land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp;Since the 1990s, the company has abandoned its HGU land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; Continue to work on the land that is included in the HGU.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; The community works on the abandoned land of the company.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; Most of the HGU land, 95 percent, is controlled by the community.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; 2013 Demonstration against the extension of the HGU.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5. \u0026nbsp; Regent Cancels the recommendation letter for HGU extension.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6. \u0026nbsp; Propose as the object of agrarian reform.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 182px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; Farmers cultivate many HGU areas with seasonal agriculture or fast-growing timber.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; Landslide-prone area.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; Business uncertainty for the company (the company only controls land with an area of 15 hectares) and the protection (legality) of the farmers\u0026apos; land is not guaranteed.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; Paying thugs or champions to destroy and burn community gardens or crops.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis case demonstrates how abandoned corporate land (HGU) becomes a de facto communal resource. The state\u0026rsquo;s failure to monitor and redistribute abandoned land aligns with Rachman\u0026rsquo;s idea of chronic conflict: unresolved for decades despite clear community claims and historical redistribution programs (Prona 1983). The fact that 95% of the land is worked by communities yet still claimed by the corporation underscores the failure of formal agrarian governance and validates the need for access-based legal recognition.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003ePlantation Land Conflict in Bengkulu Province\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eConflicts in Bengkulu were often triggered by the \u0026quot;October Package\u0026quot; (PAKTO) policy of the 1980s, which eased HGU issuance without proper consultation or compensation for local communities. This policy has implications for accelerating the issuance of permits and HGUs. As a result, the term \u0026apos;Conditional HGU\u0026apos; appears, namely HGU, which has been granted but must be followed by proof of settlement of sale and purchase or compensation for community land in the area. The PAKTO policy has created land use conflicts, particularly by prioritizing the issuance of HGU to plantation companies without proper consultation or compensation for the local communities that have lived and worked the land for generations.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e1) \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;Conflict over plantation land between communities in Central Bengkulu Regency and PT Ika Hasfarm.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn 1993, PT Ika Hasfarm (PT IH) obtained Land Use Rights (HGU) from the Head of BPN Number 20/HGU/BPN/92 for a land area of 1,400 hectares. The HGU is a plantation area for cocoa commodities. During 1993-1998, the HGU land was not used by PT IH. During this period, there was no cacao planting or cultivation activity. The company also does not show activities, such as an office building or foreman employees operating (see Table 5).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 5\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSummary Profile of Plantation Land Conflict\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCentral Bengkulu Rural Farmers with PT Ika Farm\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"604\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eROOT OF THE PROBLEM\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIMPACT AND\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCONFLICT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; Most of the compensation has not been carried out by the company after the issuance of the HGU in 1993. The company suffered losses and was entangled in bank loans.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; Until 1998 there was no company activity, either cultivation or management.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; The land is included in the abandoned database. Moreover, the community considers the company to have abandoned the land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; There is little inequality in land tenure and availability for the community. As a result, people work on plantation land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; The community continues to work on PT Ika Hisfarm\u0026apos;s HGU land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; The farmers planted 577 hectares of rubber, 420 hectares of oil palm, and 45 hectares of upland rice.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; 500 families are working on the land\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4. \u0026nbsp; It was proposed as TOL (Land Reform Object) in 2008 and TORA during the government of President Joko Widodo.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; Farmers cultivate many HGU areas.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; The uncertainty of PTPN\u0026apos;s business and the protection (legality) of farmers\u0026apos; land is not guaranteed.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn 2008, the Secretary General of the Bengkulu Farmers Union (STaB) requested the revocation of PT IH\u0026apos;s HGU and made the HGU land a Land Reform Object (TOL). According to factual information, PT IH, in the early 2000s, had applied for the release of HGU land. The application failed because the HGU land became abandoned land. After all, the company was entangled in bank credit. The land is indicated as abandoned and included in the abandoned land database. To apply for the release of HGU must be removed from the database and can become the object of land redistribution.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e2) \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp; Plantation land conflicts between communities and PTPN VII\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe plantation land conflict in Air Sekamanak Village, Pinang Raya District, North Bengkulu Regency, was triggered by the community\u0026apos;s plan to participate in a plantation replanting program (Table 6). When the community participates in the program, there is one prerequisite to issuing a Certificate that the community land area of the Sumber Rezeki Air Sekamanak Farmer Group is free from the PTPN VII Business Use Rights (HGU) area (Prerequisites for Replanting Gardens).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 6\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSummary Profile of Plantation Land Conflict\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWater Sekamanak Village Farmers Vs.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePTPN VII\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"604\"\u003e\n \u003cthead\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eROOT OF THE PROBLEM\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHOW THE COMMUNITY DEMANDS\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eIMPACT AND\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCONFLICT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/thead\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 207px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp;PTPN VII does not want to issue a certificate that the plantation/farmer\u0026apos;s land is not included in the PTPN VII HGU area.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp;The certificate is a prerequisite for participating in the garden replanting program.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; Through the Village Head, the community sent a letter to the PTPN VII Ketahun unit manager.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2. \u0026nbsp; The community, through the village, asked the Head of the North Bengkulu Regency Land Office to mediate in this case.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3. \u0026nbsp; The research results and verification of the Land Office that the community lands totaling 79 plots (in total) are outside the HGU. However, eight plots are directly adjacent to the HGU land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 198px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1. \u0026nbsp; PTPN VII is unwilling to state that the community land is not or is free from HGU land.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe results of the study conducted by the Land Office of North Bengkulu Regency are lands that members of the farmer group have cultivated are not or outside the PTPN VII HGU land, namely HGU Nos. 63 and No. 08\u0026apos;s. PTPN VII. Based on these findings, farmer groups can continue to apply for a plantation replanting program.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;In this case, the conflict revolves around administrative obstruction, where farmers\u0026apos; eligibility for a replanting program is hindered by PTPN\u0026rsquo;s refusal to issue a non-HGU certificate. Although the land lies outside the HGU boundaries, the company\u0026rsquo;s reluctance to formally acknowledge this keeps farmers in legal limbo. This reflects how power operates through bureaucratic ambiguity, sustaining conflict. Ultimately, these plantation land conflicts reveal how land is not only a physical resource but also a site of power, identity, and struggle. The tension between formal land rights held by corporations and the historical presence of farming communities reflects a broader contestation over who truly has the right to benefit from land. As seen across the cases, from West Java to Bengkulu, the persistence of conflict is less about legal ambiguity and more about systemic exclusion, where bureaucratic procedures and institutional interests maintain the status quo. In this context, land becomes a battleground where communities assert not only their economic needs but also their dignity and historical claims, challenging a system that continues to privilege legality over legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEFFORTS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF PLANTATION LAND CONFLICT BY VARIOUS PARTIES\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSettlement of Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;This research has identified the root causes and conditions that perpetuate plantation land conflicts in two districts, namely Bandung Regency and Bogor Regency. The Data and Information Centre stated that the area of Cultivation Rights (HGU) in Bandung Regency reached 35,015.55 hectares, with the HGU unit reaching 287 HGU. The number of Cultivation Rights in Bogor Regency has reached 395 HGU (covering an area of 17,487.25 hectares). This research was conducted in HGU plantation areas in Bandung Regency (Kecamatan Pengalengan) and the Regency of Bogor (District of Nanggung).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eLocal populations who have historically lived on, worked, and cultivated these HGU lands are frequently marginalized. They are excluded from legal land ownership and deprived of access to land. These tensions are further exacerbated by ongoing economic inequality and the unmet demand for agricultural land among rural communities.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe parties involved in resolving land conflicts between rural community groups and PTPN VIII Kebun Kertamanah are land cultivators, the head of Kertamanah Village, the Bandung Regency Land Office, and PTPN VIII. In 2019, the land cultivators proposed their land as the object of agrarian reform. This proposal was not accepted by the Head of the West Java Province ATR/BPN Regional Office because the object is PTPN VIII HGU land.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis rejection highlights the tension between formal legal ownership (through HGU) and the traditional or customary claims by farmers who have worked the land for decades. The consequence of this denial is that farmers continue to face legal exclusion, while the company gains control of land that local communities have long depended upon. This fuels social unrest and increased demands for land reform as local communities seek to regain access to the land they consider integral to their livelihood and culture.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSeeing the struggle of the farmers, the company made an offer. PTPN VIII took a humanist approach; farmers were allowed to work on the company\u0026apos;s land by implementing a partnership program or cooperation. The company innovates by implementing the \u0026quot;Land Asset Utilization Program for Village Community Empowerment Around Gardens, \u0026quot; called PMDK. 17 farmer groups and 400 farmers attended the program. The land area in this program reaches 360 hectares. This initiative by PTPN VIII is a positive example of corporate social responsibility aimed at addressing some of the root causes of conflict, mainly the lack of opportunities for local communities. The consequence, however, is that this solution is not permanent; it still requires careful monitoring to ensure that the rights and benefits of farmers are protected and that the partnerships are truly equitable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a difference in the settlement efforts carried out by farmer groups from three villages in Nanggung District, Bogor Regency. Farmer groups build networks of struggle by cooperating with agrarian and environmental activists, academic activists, and officials at the district to central levels. The network that has been made has paid off with the Regent\u0026apos;s commitment to cancel the technical recommendation letter for the extension of PT Havea Indonesia\u0026apos;s HGU.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe network to the central government seems to have been successfully carried out by farmer groups. It was proven by a visit from the Presidential Staff Office (KSP) to review the conflict locations and the object of the community\u0026apos;s proposed TORA. The Regent formed a committee in the Bogor Regency Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) team. GTRA involves various Regional Work Units (SKPD) to accelerate land redistribution. In addition, GTRA is also fully supported by the Bogor Regency Land Office. Civil organizations\u0026apos; participation aims to maintain the farmer groups\u0026apos; spirit in fighting for their rights. Currently, the Bogor Regency GTRA team is prioritizing the redistribution plan on the ex-HGU land of PT Havea, Indonesia. In the past, the Land Office has conducted research to obtain a social map for the community of potential recipients of land redistribution. Looking at the two cases above, the case in Bandung Regency can be solved by empowering rural communities, while in the case of Bogor Regency, GTRA initiation is needed.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSettlement of Plantation Land Conflicts in Bengkulu\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe total HGU in Bengkulu Province is 361,379.68 hectares, and 247 HGU. North Bengkulu Regency has an area of Cultivation Right (HGU) reaching 58,106.72 hectares, with several HGU getting 48 HGU. Meanwhile, Central Bengkulu Regency has an area of 15,299.37 hectares of HGU land, totaling 16 HGU. Conflicts in the two districts occurred between communities and private plantation HGU holders.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUntil 2021, several potential objects will become Land Objects for Agrarian Reform (TORA). From transmigration and 5,039.17 hectares of HGU and the release of forest areas, there are 4,900.3 hectares. TORA potential from the abandoned land of PT. Purwanira Dharma Efforts in North Bengkulu covering an area of 2,188.95 hectares, from PT. Bumi Rafflesia Indah in Bengkulu Tengah is 564.96 hectares from PT. Asririmba Wira Bhakti Mukomuko has an area of 1,046.31, and PT Bukit Daun Mas Mukomuko has 24.35 hectares. As for the former HGU lands that were successfully granted certificates to the community through TORA in 2021, there were 1,621 plots (765,5737 ha) for 1,315 families.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"DISCUSSION","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eThe Role of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) in Plantation Conflict Resolution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrom the four research districts, the role of the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA) has not been running well. The local government has not utilized this institution in resolving plantation land conflicts or in proposing the objectives of agrarian reform. The utilization is quite good, although not optimal, namely Bogor Regency. GTRA Bogor Regency has been running to handle several cases of plantation land conflicts and has proposed it as TORA.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThere are two main reasons why GTRA at the district and provincial levels is not working well. \u003cem\u003eFirst\u003c/em\u003e, the local government assumes that agrarian reform is the domain of the Ministry of ATR/BPN. As a result, local governments are not very active in driving GTRA as a motor for land redistribution for the community. \u003cem\u003eSecond\u003c/em\u003e, the regional government does not yet have a special budget for GTRA activities. Such an assumption shows that local governments do not yet have complete information, nor do they share experiences from other local governments in implementing GTRA at the regional level.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese findings resonate with the principal-agent theory in governance. The Ministry of ATR/BPN (the principal) may have delegated the responsibility for agrarian reform to local governments (the agents), but the agents are not fully executing this responsibility, either due to lack of resources, knowledge, or political will. According to Ostrom\u0026rsquo;s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, local governments may lack the necessary institutional arrangements to facilitate the smooth implementation of land reforms. Without effective vertical integration of governance, wherein local, regional, and central authorities work collaboratively, the implementation of GTRA will continue to face significant challenges.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLuthfi (2018) highlights Sigi Regency as a model for effective GTRA implementation, supported by academics, civil society, and local stakeholders. The Regent issued a policy allowing the use of village funds for resolving land conflicts, exemplifying discretionary innovation. Similarly, in Bogor Regency, the Regent mobilized various regional agencies (SKPDs) to support post-redistribution access, such as in agriculture, infrastructure, and MSME development, each allocating budgets for GTRA. These cases illustrate the importance of collaborative governance involving multi-stakeholder participation in managing land reform.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study\u0026rsquo;s findings on plantation land conflicts in West Java and Bengkulu align with structural agrarian conflict theory. As Rachman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) notes, such conflicts persist due to unrecognized access rights, even where communities have long cultivated the land. This supports Ribot and Peluso\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e) concept that access is central for communities dependent on land. Although HGU holders possess legal rights, local moral and historical claims are often overlooked, fueling prolonged disputes. The colonial roots of these conflicts further affirm the views of Fine (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e) and Marx, who argue that land dispossession under capitalism drives structural inequality. This dynamic, where corporate land concentration excludes local communities, reflects a persistent and systemic conflict.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eComprehensive Solutions to Mitigate Future Plantation Conflicts: A Holistic Agrarian Reform Framework\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003ePlantation conflicts stem from long-standing structural inequalities rooted in the colonial era (Karim et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Today\u0026rsquo;s plantation sector is marked by concentrated land ownership, dispossession of smallholders and indigenous groups through exploitative practices (Permadi \u0026amp; Azizi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), weak legal protections, and neglected productive lands\u0026mdash;all of which fuel persistent conflict and marginalization. These tensions are exacerbated by differing conflict resolution approaches: while some private companies engage in community partnerships, most state-owned enterprises lack clear mechanisms, with PTPN VIII in Bandung being a rare example of effective intervention (Kartodihardjo \u0026amp; Cahyono, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe proposed solution framework (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e) is grounded in the principle of holistic agrarian reform that transcends conventional land redistribution models. This approach integrates two fundamental dimensions: asset reform (redistributing ownership of productive assets) and access reform (expanding access to complementary resources essential for agricultural productivity). The framework recognizes that sustainable conflict resolution requires addressing not only the immediate issue of land ownership but also the broader ecosystem of resources, institutions, and market mechanisms that determine the viability of agricultural livelihoods.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe holistic agrarian reform framework rests on four interconnected pillars that support sustainable rural transformation (Kartodihardjo \u0026amp; Cahyono, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). First, accessible and diversified financial capital, from microfinance to government-backed funds, to support productive land use. Second, human resource development through technical training aligned with agricultural innovation and market needs. Third, physical infrastructure such as irrigation, transport, and processing facilities that enable market connectivity. Fourth, fair market access mechanisms, including cooperatives, value chain integration, and pricing systems that ensure income stability for farmers and food security for consumers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe success of this holistic framework depends on three key strategies (Herdiansyah \u0026amp; Majesty, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). First, optimizing institutions by activating and strengthening GTRA at all levels with interagency coordination supported by adequate resources and enforcement mandates (Borras, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Second, preventing land re-concentration through socialization, promotion of communal ownership, and strict post-redistribution monitoring, as illustrated by the Bogor case, where redistributed land was reabsorbed into plantation concessions. The third strategic component promotes restorative justice, particularly in resolving conflicts with indigenous communities, by restoring violated rights through dialogue, reconciliation, and recognition of customary tenure, laying the groundwork for sustainable coexistence (McCarthy, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010b\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe implementation of this comprehensive framework aims to transform Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s agrarian system from one marked by conflict and inequality into one grounded in social justice, economic growth, and environmental sustainability (Habibi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). It seeks to promote equitable land distribution, boost rural productivity and incomes, reduce land-related violence, and build resilient agricultural systems. By tackling the root causes of plantation conflicts, the framework positions agrarian reform as a driver of poverty reduction, food security, and sustainable rural development, offering long-term benefits for all stakeholders.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUltimately, this integrated framework underscores that resolving plantation land conflicts requires more than technical fixes, it demands a structural transformation rooted in justice, inclusivity, and sustainability. By linking the root causes of conflict with targeted interventions and long-term development goals, the framework moves beyond short-term dispute resolution toward a proactive vision of agrarian reform. It calls for a reimagining of land governance in Indonesia, where land is not monopolized by a few, but equitably accessed, productively utilized, and collectively managed for the benefit of communities, ecosystems, and future generations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"CONCLUSION","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe study highlighted several core issues in plantation land conflicts: Plantation companies, a legacy of the colonial era, continue to claim community lands as HGU areas, resulting in land grabbing, inequality in land tenure, and abandonment of HGU lands. Communities oppose the granting or extension of HGU rights, while repressive measures are being taken to maintain control over plantation lands. A proposed solution for resolving these conflicts is through a partnership mechanism, where part of the HGU land is redistributed to the community. This approach can work well in private plantations, but state-owned plantation companies (PTPN) currently lack a clear conflict resolution mechanism, except for the efforts seen in PTPN VIII in Bandung.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study provides several key recommendations: First, the government should optimize the use of GTRA institutions at various levels to ensure bottom-up participation. Central GTRA should encourage local governments to exercise discretion and improve the effectiveness of GTRA. Collaboration with the Ministry of Villages, PDT, and Transmigration to integrate village funds for agrarian reform is also necessary. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises should be more actively involved in these efforts. Reflecting on research in Bogor Regency, which showed land reconcentration after redistribution into HGU plantations, the study recommends broader socialization of land redistribution, especially in the form of communal ownership. Finally, applying restorative justice principles is crucial for resolving conflicts with indigenous peoples and restoring their lost rights.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe proposed holistic agrarian reform framework represents a paradigm shift from reactive conflict management to proactive system transformation. By integrating asset redistribution with access reform, institutional strengthening with community empowerment, and economic development with social justice, this approach offers a comprehensive solution to the persistent problem of plantation conflicts. The successful implementation of this framework requires sustained political commitment, adequate resource allocation, and collaborative efforts among government agencies, civil society organizations, and private sector stakeholders. Ultimately, the goal is to establish an agrarian system that is not only conflict-free but also economically viable, socially inclusive, and environmentally sustainable.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eImplications for the future, this study demands systemic transformation through Cultivation Rights Policy Revision that mandates conflict resolution \u003cem\u003eprior to\u003c/em\u003e rights extension via partial land redistribution for partnerships and implementation of \u003cem\u003erestorative justice\u003c/em\u003e for indigenous communities, with specific operational mechanisms for state-owned plantation enterprises (PTPN). Institutional strengthening of the National Land Agency (GTRA) serves as the coordination hub among ministries (Agrarian and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency, State-Owned Enterprises, Finance, Village Affairs) to integrate cross-actor collaboration through village fund schemes in participatory mapping, designing fiscal incentives (corporate income tax reductions) for redistributor companies, and preventing land reconcentration through communal certificates with non-transferability clauses. Differentiated partnership models based on equity \u003cem\u003eprofit-sharing\u003c/em\u003e (private sector) and \u003cem\u003eoutgrower schemes\u003c/em\u003e (state-owned enterprises) that guarantee permanent off-taker arrangements, alongside a multidimensional monitoring framework utilizing measurable economic-social-ecological indicators supported by GTRA's digital platform, regional task forces in acute conflict areas, and endowment funds from plantation taxation. This implementation shifts the paradigm from reactive to proactive collaboration to ensure sustainable agrarian justice.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCREDIT AUTHORSHIP CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConceptualization:\u003c/strong\u003e Trie Sakti, Eliana Sidipurwanty; \u003cstrong\u003eMethodology\u003c/strong\u003e: Nurul Hilmiati, Eliana Sidipurwanty; \u003cstrong\u003eFormal analysis and investigation\u003c/strong\u003e: Arditya Wicaksono, Septina Marryanti Prihatin; \u003cstrong\u003eWriting\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;original draft preparation\u003c/strong\u003e: Trie Sakti, Samuel Fery Purba, Intan Hapsari Surya Putri; \u003cstrong\u003eWriting\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;review and editing\u003c/strong\u003e: Eliana Sidipurwanty, Arditya Wicaksono, Husmiati Yusuf, Herlina Tarigan, Herma Juniarti; \u003cstrong\u003eSupervision:\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003eTrie Sakti.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDECLARATION OF INTEREST STATEMENT\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCONSENT TO PUBLISH\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNo identifying information or images of individual participants are included in this article; therefore, separate consent to publish was not required.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDATA AVAILABILITY\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFUNDING DECLARATION\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that this study did not receive any funding.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAchard, F., Eva, H. 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Annual oil palm plantation maps in Malaysia and Indonesia from 2001 to 2016. \u003cem\u003eEarth System Science Data\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e12\u003c/em\u003e(2), 847\u0026ndash;867. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.5194/essd-12-847-2020\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.5194/essd-12-847-2020\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"agrarian reform, plantation, land conflict, sustainable land governance, land rights","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7414626/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7414626/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003ePlantations have been a cornerstone of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s economy since the colonial era, driving economic growth while simultaneously triggering social and environmental challenges. This study examines the structural agrarian conflicts arising from plantation expansion, focusing on land disputes between communities and plantation companies in West Java and Bengkulu. Using a qualitative approach, the research employs in-depth interviews, media analysis, and document reviews to analyze the root causes and persistence of these conflicts. Findings reveal that historical land dispossession, unequal resource distribution, and weak legal recognition of customary land rights perpetuate tensions. While private plantations have adopted partnership models to mitigate conflicts, state-owned plantations (PTPN) face bureaucratic hurdles in land redistribution. The study highlights the ineffectiveness of current agrarian reform policies, particularly the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA), due to limited local government engagement and funding. Recommendations include strengthening GTRA\u0026rsquo;s role, integrating village funds for agrarian reform, and adopting restorative approaches to resolve historical injustices. This research contributes to the discourse on sustainable land governance by emphasizing the intersection of policy, corporate accountability, and community rights in Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s plantation sector.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Assessing Agrarian Reform as a Structural Solution to Plantation Land Conflicts in West Java and Bengkulu, Indonesia","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-08-26 06:40:39","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7414626/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"75d1176a-05ed-4b94-94d9-375fed39c720","owner":[],"postedDate":"August 26th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-09-07T16:23:20+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-08-26 06:40:39","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7414626","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7414626","identity":"rs-7414626","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}