Phenomenological control as cold control

We first review recent work from our lab which construes hypnotisability as an example of a more general trait of capacity for phenomenological control, which people can use to create subjective experiences in many non-hypnotic contexts where having those experiences fulfils people’s goals; and second we review recent work which construes phenomenological control as a specifically metacognitive process, where intentional cognitive and motor action occurs without awareness of specific intentions (cold control theory). In terms of the reach of phenomenological control, we argue that various laboratory phenomena, namely vicarious pain, mirror-touch synesthesia and the rubber hand illusion are to an unknown degree a construction of phenomenological control. The argument can of course be extended in principle to other findings. In terms of the reach of cold control, we present a new theory of intentional binding and show how it can measure the absence of conscious intentions in the hypnotic context; we obtain no evidence that cold control gives one abilities beyond the changes in the metacogntiive monitoring it postulates; and we explore the negative correlation between mindfulness and cold control (seen as a lack of mindfulness of intentions).