Action Field Theory: The Roles of Memory and Action in Automaticity of Cognitive Control

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Abstract

Task-irrelevant features are processed even when people are fully aware of their undesired effects on task performance. This fact is exemplified by several types of interference effects in choice-reaction tasks, such as Stroop interference and the Simon effect. The observations are typically attributed to inextricable consequences of automatic cognitive processes involved in performing these tasks. However, evidence has accumulated suggesting that processes underlying these effects depend on one’s intention to perform particular tasks, rather than being strictly automatic. Thus, there exists a paradox: the interference from task-irrelevant features presumes processes that are under intentional control. The present review attempts to resolve this paradox. I propose an integrated view of attentional control, Action Field Theory, which formulates principles that account for a range of phenomena concerning automatic control of human behavior.

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last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00