Structure-Trait-Identity Relation (STIR): An Integrative Framework for Understanding Redistribution Decisions in Economic Games

As a social species, making redistribution decisions about how to allocate or reallocate resources across different individuals or groups is crucial for human’s survival and well-being at both micro (e.g., disaster relief distribution, charity donation, household income budget) and macro levels (e.g., national budget allocation, public support to wealth redistribution policies) of human society. Dictator games, among other economic games, have been used intensively to study such decisions regarding resource (re)allocation. In a typical dictator game, there are two players: a dictator and a recipient. The dictator decides how to redistribute an endowment, which the recipient cannot reject. Various factors, including dictator personality traits, recipient identity, and endowment transfer actions, have been found to influence dictators' decisions. Several models have been proposed to explain why dictators make certain redistribution decisions in dictator games. While insightful, existing models often oversimplify complex factors, such as task economic structure (e.g., source of endowment, price of transferring endowment between dictators and recipients) and partner identity (e.g, group membership, social closeness), hindering a holistic understanding of redistribution decisions. In this narrative review, we present an integrative framework categorizing factors into four main categories: task structure, dictator trait (trait), recipient identity (identity), and framing. We discuss potential interactions between task economic structure, dictator trait, and recipient identity. We also discuss how framing may influence redistribution decisions through multiple domains. This Structure-Trait-Identity Relation (STIR) framework provides a systematic approach to analyzing decision dynamics and resolving empirical inconsistencies. Future directions are also discussed.