An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Innovation Cost Control in Power Batteries: Synergy between Technology-Driven Cost Reduction and Institutional Consolidation of Innovation Gains

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Innovation Cost Control in Power Batteries: Synergy between Technology-Driven Cost Reduction and Institutional Consolidation of Innovation Gains | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Innovation Cost Control in Power Batteries: Synergy between Technology-Driven Cost Reduction and Institutional Consolidation of Innovation Gains jian sun, hua zou, Siruo Zhang This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-9189662/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The high cost of power batteries has become a critical bottleneck hindering the large-scale diffusion of new energy vehicles. From a synergistic perspective, this study develops a modularity-based theoretical framework for innovation cost control in power batteries and proposes a collaborative mechanism linking technology-driven cost reduction with the institutional consolidation of innovation gains. This mechanism is designed to unlock the internal potential of both the technological innovation module and the institutional innovation module. An evolutionary game approach is further employed to examine the coopetitive relationships among multiple actors. The results show that: (1) the synergy between technology-driven cost reduction and institutional consolidation facilitates innovation cost control in power batteries, and the In-Power battery case demonstrates that this mechanism can help battery firms achieve a cost advantage over industry competitors; (2) the government-industry-academia-research coopetition ecosystem serves as an important platform for innovation cost control, and a strategic combination of strong institutional support by government, high innovation investment by firms, and active participation in commercialization by universities and research institutes forms a stable equilibrium; and (3) the intensity of collaborative willingness is generally positively associated with cost-control returns. As collaborative willingness increases, the capacity for information sharing, resource integration, and risk sharing among innovation actors is strengthened. However, when the complexity of collaboration becomes excessively high, marginal returns decline because coordination costs rise, indicating that collaborative development has an efficiency boundary. By highlighting the dual driving forces of technology and institutions, this study extends the research perspective on innovation cost control in power batteries and provides a theoretical reference for subsequent studies in related fields. Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences Physical sciences/Mathematics and computing technology-driven cost reduction institutional consolidation of innovation gains power batteries cost control game theory Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-9189662","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":618241950,"identity":"262f5f12-e73e-4f5a-acd6-8f4139d6978c","order_by":0,"name":"jian sun","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Shenyang University of Technology","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"jian","middleName":"","lastName":"sun","suffix":""},{"id":618241951,"identity":"4747c7ef-d808-4cb9-a65d-45b44a44ca9a","order_by":1,"name":"hua zou","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Shenyang University of Technology","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"hua","middleName":"","lastName":"zou","suffix":""},{"id":618241952,"identity":"2e500068-ca20-49f9-9898-556ada8cd536","order_by":2,"name":"Siruo Zhang","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Shenyang University of Technology","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Siruo","middleName":"","lastName":"Zhang","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-03-22 07:38:32","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9189662/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9189662/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":106770229,"identity":"32e87927-2326-465c-b740-75ab500fb8fb","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-04-13 09:59:45","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1076829,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"3.26powerbatterymanuscriptrefsjournalstyle.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9189662/v1_covered_5e639e1f-e7ab-40be-ba3e-a97144e968db.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Innovation Cost Control in Power Batteries: Synergy between Technology-Driven Cost Reduction and Institutional Consolidation of Innovation Gains","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"technology-driven cost reduction, institutional consolidation of innovation gains, power batteries, cost control, game theory","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9189662/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9189662/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"The high cost of power batteries has become a critical bottleneck hindering the large-scale diffusion of new energy vehicles. 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However, when the complexity of collaboration becomes excessively high, marginal returns decline because coordination costs rise, indicating that collaborative development has an efficiency boundary. 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