Primitive and advanced Theory-of-Mind: Defending and reformulating their difference 14/06/2023

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Abstract

Can we nowadays keep a qualitative difference between the primitive and advanced Theory-of-Mind? This article tries to defend and reformulate such difference. Thus, after underlining the contrast between two kinds of mental states – (full) contents and (empty) expectations –, I apply it to the detection of foreign (that is, not one's own) mental states as well. Then, three points are proposed: First, ‘vicarious expectations’ sustain the primitive ToM; second, a subject can have no expectation of inner states which are intrinsically impossible for him; third, the state of interacting with ourselves as with a different person – e.g., the thinking what others think of us – cannot be a vicarious expectation of ours, but it requires the estimation of foreign contents. From this hypothesis, I deduce that vicarious expectations are unable to sustain self-conscious emotions or the really effective reception of pointing gestures. These two abilities, which are necessary in ‘the new, human, lifestyle’, could appear only when ‘the estimation of foreign contents’ – i.e., the origin of the advanced ToM – arose.

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europepmc
last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00