What Does the Literature Tell Us About Ukraine’s Maritime Operations? A PRISMA-Guided Scoping Review

What Does the Literature Tell Us About Ukraine’s Maritime Operations? 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A PRISMA-Guided Scoping Review Jostein Mattingsdal, Anders Løvik, Kari Jensen This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8620810/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is essential for national survival and global stability during wartime. In the Black Sea’s semi‑enclosed and highly contested environment, maintaining operational access under persistent conflict poses significant challenges. This PRISMA‑guided scoping review, preregistered on the Open Science Framework (OSF), examines how Ukrainian maritime operations from 2022 to 2025 sought to protect these critical routes. A systematic search across ProQuest and EBSCO databases, supplemented by AI‑assisted discovery, targeted peer‑reviewed and gray literature published between February 2022 and October 2025. Screening followed the Rayyan protocol, identifying 224 studies, with 11 included in the final analysis. Findings indicate a shift from traditional sea control to asymmetric sea denial enabled by uncrewed systems, long‑range strike capabilities, and commercial off‑the‑shelf technologies. Coalition support, particularly NATO’s intelligence sharing and legal‑diplomatic measures, was central to sustaining limited maritime access and grain exports. Ukraine’s approach rests on three pillars: technological adaptation, coalition integration, and environmental leverage. Remaining gaps include deterrence strategies, defense–private sector coordination, economic costs, and practitioner insights constrained by operational security. Securing SLOCs in contested environments requires multidimensional strategies that integrate kinetic denial, lawfare, coalition frameworks, and societal resilience. International Relations Black Sea Ukraine Sea lines of communication maritime security sea power scoping review PRISMA Figures Figure 1 Introduction Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are the lifelines of global trade, energy security, and strategic power projection. In wartime, their security becomes a decisive factor for national survival and operational success. Control of maritime routes enables the flow of essential goods, military supplies, and economic resources, while denying access can cripple an adversary’s strategic options (Dismukes, 2020 ). For this review, SLOC security refers to the continuous effort to keep maritime routes open and safe through a combination of naval actions and international political-legal cooperation to protect the system from both criminal threats and state-level military conflict (Khurana, 2007 ). The Black Sea, as a semi-enclosed and geopolitically contested region, illustrates the difficulty of securing SLOCs in wartime. During periods of sustained conflict, its environment imposes unique challenges: restricted geography, dynamic weather, and persistent threats from precision strikes and hybrid warfare (Sanders, 2017 ). In this context, both military and civilian maritime platforms must assume multiple roles beyond their primary functions, ranging from surveillance and raids to cargo transport and logistical support. Meeting these demands requires adaptable, multi-capable assets and integrated systems across defense and commercial sectors (Trelawny, 2013 ). Guided by PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) standards (Veroniki et al., 2025 ) and grounded in Sea power theory (Andrew et al., 2016 ; Armstrong, 2023 ; Till, 2018 ; Vego, 2023 ), this review adopts Tangredi’s (Tangredi, 2020 ) expansive definition of sea power as its conceptual foundation. Tangredi emphasizes that sea power extends far beyond naval warfare, encompassing the control of maritime trade, access to ocean resources, and the diplomatic and economic uses of maritime capabilities. This perspective highlights the inherently dual military–civilian nature of securing SLOCs in wartime. In the Black Sea context, sea power is inseparable from commercial shipping, port operations, and broader geo-economic dynamics. This provides a critical conceptual lens for understanding how maritime assets contribute simultaneously to economic resilience and military effectiveness. Against this backdrop, the scoping review addresses the research question: RQ1: What evidence exists in peer-reviewed and gray literature (2022–2025) detailing how Ukrainian maritime operations secured SLOCs in the Black Sea? To answer this question, the review pursues three objectives: Map tactics, technologies, and coalition integration. Evaluate strategic outcomes for regional stability. Identify key operational enablers and constraints. By framing Ukraine’s experience within modern naval warfare paradigms, this review applies a Logic Model (Mattingsdal, 2025) to structure its analytical approach. The model operationalizes the framework through four interrelated dimensions: precursor conditions shaped by geostrategic pressures such as the Russian blockade; military operations that included defensive strategies like the “grain corridor”; capability adaptation through the integration of NATO intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and allied support; and tactical execution involving phased actions that produced strategic outcomes. This structured approach bridges academic discourse and NATO doctrinal development (NATO, 2025 ), offering actionable insights for securing SLOCs under wartime conditions in contested narrow seas. Methods To ensure transparent and comprehensive reporting, this review followed PRISMA framework throughout the search and selection process. It structures the workflow into four key stages: (1) Identification of records across databases, (2) Screening of titles and abstracts, (3) Eligibility assessment of full-text studies against predefined criteria, and (4) Inclusion of studies that meet all requirements for final synthesis (Veroniki et al., 2025 ). Study Design This scoping review was designed following Ringnes et al.’s ( 2024 ) framework and conducted according to a preregistered protocol on the Open Science Framework (Mattingsdal et al., 2025 ) to ensure reproducibility and minimize bias. Search Strategy The corresponding author conducted the literature search using predefined criteria. The search primarily targeted ProQuest and EBSCO databases to ensure the relevance of the articles retrieved. Searches were limited to studies published between February 22, 2022, and October 14, 2025, and included the following sources: Peer-reviewed literature : Searches were conducted in ProQuest across 15 databases: ASFA: Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts; Coronavirus Research Database; Early Modern Collection; eBook Central; Education Collection; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Library & Information Science Collection; Linguistics Collection; Literature Online; Luthers Werke; Patrologia Latina; Periodicals Archive Online; Politics Collection; ProQuest One Academic; and Sociology Collection. The Boolean query applied was: ((("Ukrainian" OR "Ukraine") AND ("naval" OR "maritime" OR "fleet" OR "navy") AND ("operation*" OR "mission" OR "campaign" OR "tactic" OR "strateg*") AND ("Sea Lines of Communication" OR "SLOC" OR "shipping lane*" OR "maritime corridor*") AND stype.exact("Conference Papers & Proceedings" OR "Government & Official Publications" OR "Books" OR "Scholarly Journals") AND la.exact("English")) NOT (subt.exact("climate change"))). Gray literature : Searches were conducted in EBSCO across two databases: Military & Government Collection; and eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), using the following Boolean query: (("Ukrainian naval operations") AND ("Ukraine maritime security") AND ("Black Sea" OR "grain corridor") AND ("after-action report" OR "policy brief" OR "analysis" OR "case study" OR "OSINT")). AI-assisted discovery In addition to database searches, Keenious ( 2025 ) an AI-powered research assistant, was employed to enhance literature discovery. Keenious identifies relevant academic articles, books, and other scholarly sources based on user-defined prompts and allows refinement through filters such as publication year and document type. For this review, the primary research question (RQ1) was used as the prompt in Keenious to ensure alignment with the study objectives. This approach complemented traditional database searches by broadening coverage and improving relevance. Search validation involved maritime security experts assessing recall/precision (κ = 0.82). Screening Protocol The screening process was independently conducted by three authors between November 1 and December 15, 2025, following a Rayyan protocol designed to minimize selection bias. The process began with title screening, followed by abstract screening. Titles containing relevant keywords without contradictions were flagged, and their corresponding abstracts were reviewed to confirm compliance with the inclusion criteria and the presence of keyword variations. Initially, the Rayyan auto-resolve function was applied, with subsequent verification by the screener. Each author categorized articles as Include, Maybe, or Exclude during this step. After individual screening was completed, the lists were compared to identify conflicts, which were resolved by either exclusion or inclusion in a consolidated list through arbitration. Articles appearing on all three lists were automatically advanced to the full-text screening stage. An intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) analysis in SPSS (version 27) of the screeners’ ratings showed good individual reliability (ICC = 0.74), while the average of all three ratings demonstrated excellent reliability (ICC = 0.90). Inclusion Criteria Time Frame: Published between 2022 and 2025 Geographic Focus: Must pertain to Ukrainian activities in the Black Sea Topic Relevance: Must address SLOC security, naval tactics, coastal areas, or strategic control of shipping lanes. Literature Type: Peer-reviewed articles or gray literature (e.g., conference proceedings, policy briefs, reports) Language: English, or other languages if a reliable translation is available Abstract Availability: Must include an abstract or summary for screening. Exclusion Criteria Outside Time Frame: Published before 2022 Irrelevant Geography: Focuses on naval operations outside the Black Sea or not involving Ukraine. Irrelevant Topic: Does not discuss SLOCs, maritime operations, coastal areas, or strategic military actions. Non-Applicable Literature: Fiction, opinion pieces without factual basis, or promotional content Missing Abstract: Articles without an abstract or summary Data Extraction Framework During full-text screening, studies were organized into structured categories and subcategories to enable quantitative analysis. Operational factors included Security Mechanisms, Maritime Mechanisms, Naval Tactics, and Strategies Employed. Contextual factors encompassed Technologies, Strategic Outcomes, Coalition Support, Environmental, as well as Political Dynamics. The authors independently coded studies in Rayyan, resolving discrepancies through consensus. This ensured accuracy and transparency in the final dataset. Results The initial search yielded 9591 records from academic databases, gray literature, and an AI-assisted discovery platform, without any limitations on the timeframe. Following a systematic screening process, 224 studies were identified that met the inclusion criteria for final analysis (see Fig. 1 ). Peer-reviewed studies were most common in our findings at 63.6%, followed by grey literature with 36.4%. Data extraction prioritized operational dimensions (tactics, technologies) and contextual moderators (coalition support, constraints) across included studies. Rayyan-generated syntheses categorized findings with multidimensional studies coded across all applicable domains. The categories, subcategories and distribution of the dimensions are presented in Tables 1 – 2 . Table 1 Summary of operational dimensions Category Subcategory Number of studies Percentage of total Total mentions Security Mechanisms Domestic Resilience 2 18.2 7 Military Operations 4 36.4 6 Legal Frameworks 6 54.5 14 Deterrence 1 9.1 5 Resistance Activities 1 9.1 6 Maritime Mechanisms Sea Denial and Sea Control 4 36.4 9 Blockade 5 45.5 5 Shipping Enablement 5 45.5 18 Intelligence and Reconnaissance 1 9.1 1 Law Enforcement 3 27.3 4 Naval Tactics Uncrewed Systems 11 100 18 Strike Operations 7 63.6 9 Amphibious Operations 5 45.5 8 Special Operations 1 9.1 3 Strategies Employed SLOC Protection 1 9.1 1 Ground and Air Integration 1 9.1 1 Strategic Campaigning 3 27.3 5 Table 2 Summary of contextual dimensions Category Subcategory Number of studies Percentage of total Total mentions Technologies Long-Range Strike and Anti-Ship Weapons 7 63.6 20 Air and Missile Defense Systems 4 36.4 11 Uncrewed Systems 9 81.8 17 Targeting and Fires 6 54.5 9 Operational Enablers 7 63.6 11 Maritime Safety 3 27.3 4 Strategic Outcomes Continuity in Commercial Shipping 7 63.6 18 Constraint on Maritime Freedom of Action 2 18.2 2 Operational Effects Enabling Maritime Access 3 27.3 6 International Support and Domestic Resilience 2 18.2 4 Global Market and Legal Effects 3 27.3 5 Coalition Support Legal and Diplomatic Actions 7 63.6 14 Maritime Security 1 9.1 1 Military Assistance 3 27.3 7 Coalition Frameworks 2 18.2 3 Defense–Private Sector Synergy 1 9.1 2 Environmental Physical Geography 2 18.2 4 Maritime Hazards and Chokepoints 4 36.4 8 Electromagnetic/Cyber 1 9.1 1 Battlespace Geometry 3 27.3 3 Littoral Constraints 3 27.3 4 Political Dynamics Military Actions and Infrastructure Impact 7 63.6 13 Disruptions in Maritime Access 2 18.2 2 Lawfare and the Legal Diplomatic Contest 1 9.1 1 Sanctions, Energy and Economic Resilience 2 18.2 3 Maritime Security Dynamics 1 9.1 1 Discussion This PRISMA-guided scoping review synthesizes data from peer-reviewed and rigorously screened gray literature sources examining Ukraine’s strategies for securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) during 2022–2025. Framed through contemporary sea power theory, our analysis reveals Ukraine’s redefinition of littoral warfare through asymmetric innovation, where sea denial – rather than traditional sea control – emerges as the strategic cornerstone. The literature converges on several interdependent themes shaping operational and strategic outcomes. Quantitative statements below refer to the analytic subset (n = 11) unless otherwise noted. The literature converges on several interdependent themes shaping operational and strategic outcomes. Structural Patterns in Literature Three salient observations emerged. First, naval tactics – particularly the use of uncrewed systems – were present in 100% of the studies within the dataset, underscoring their centrality in interpretations of Ukraine’s maritime adaptation. Second, balanced emphasis was evident across core operational domains: technological applications (81.8%) and coalition support (63.6%) featured prominently, indicating recognition of their interdependence rather than isolation of any single factor. Third, peer-reviewed scholarship dominated both levels of analysis: 7 of 11 studies (63.6%) in the analytic subset and 191 of 220 studies (86.8%) across the full dataset, with the remaining 29 classified as gray literature. Most gray literature identified during initial screening was excluded due to insufficient methodological rigor, while the peer-reviewed articles were rejected for failing to meet inclusion criteria (e.g., lack of relevance to SLOC security). While systematic syntheses exist for maritime security broadly, we did not identify dedicated systematic reviews or meta-analyses specific to the Russia–Ukraine conflict, a gap that limits generalizable insights for doctrine development. Uncrewed Systems as Strategic Enablers. Studies highlight the transformative role of USVs – often including platforms such as Sea Baby and Magura V5 – evolving from tactical harassment to strategic tools enabling precision strikes and contributing to littoral defense (Bojor et al., 2024 ; Kormych et al., 2024 ; Packard et al., 2025 ). This evolution aligns with modern sea power theory, were persistent, low-cost denial substitutes for traditional fleet engagements. Crucially, these capabilities are underpinned by commercial off-the-shelf technologies, especially SATCOM solutions, which provide indispensable command, control, real-time ISR, and Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace (IPB) in contested environments. References to specific systems such as Starlink appear in three sources (Bojor et al., 2024 ; Kofman, 2024 ; Mankoff & J, 2024), but we frame this more broadly as commercial SATCOM integration enabling effective maritime warfare despite resource constraints. For instance, Neag and Solescu ( 2024 ) note that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) benefited from ‘access to Western military intelligence.’ Naval Warfare and Maritime Lawfare. Outcome-focused analyses (Chumak & A, 2024; Fink, 2022 ; Kollakowski, 2023 ; Kormych et al., 2024 ; Wolkov et al., 2023 ) consistently document Ukraine's success in maintaining functional shipping corridors – aligning with how Vego ( 2000 ) describes maritime operations in contested waters. This continuity was enabled by a synergistic combination of long-range anti-ship capabilities and sophisticated maritime lawfare measures (Kofman, 2024 ; Packard et al., 2025 ). identifies the RK-360MC Neptune (indigenous) and Harpoon (Western-supplied) as pivotal systems used to sink the cruiser Moskva and disrupt Russian supply lines to Snake Island (Kormych et al., 2024 ), while Kollakowski ( 2023 ) describes how the technical ranges of these systems created a sea denial zone that forced the Russian Navy to operate from a much greater distance. Kormych et al. ( 2024 ) explicitly frames the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) as a form of lawfare, explaining how Russia exploited legal ambiguity and procedural loopholes to create artificial delays in inspections, slowing Ukrainian exports and gaining strategic leverage with impunity. Legal and diplomatic instruments were employed to legitimize maritime access (e.g., challenging the de facto Russian blockade under UNCLOS and the law of naval warfare), constrain adversary freedom of action, establish humanitarian corridor regimes, and sustain critical grain exports. Studies emphasize the operational consequences of precise legal framing versus ambiguity, demonstrating measurable gains in tactical survivability and operational resilience when lawfare complemented kinetic actions. For example, Fink ( 2022 ) analyzes how parties leveraged interpretations of blockade law to align with state narratives, a central component of lawfare during active hostilities. This exemplifies a practical reinterpretation of control of communications: achieved not through decisive battle but through persistent denial and legal legitimization. Logistics and Economic Resilience in Maritime Operations : Underpinning the lawfare approaches is a critical logistical dimension. Illustrative examples – such as capacity issues at the Ukrainian Danube ports (Reni, Izmail, Ust-Dunaisk) and liability insurance for vessels carrying goods through the grain corridor, are mentioned in literature as pivotal in reducing immediate risk and enabling temporary corridors (Chumak & A, 2024; Wolkov et al., 2023 ). Concurrently, studies emphasize Ukraine's logistical adaptation through partial, albeit costly, diversification of export routes via the Danube River, rail, and road networks. This logistical resilience operates within a context dominated by profound economic stakes: agricultural exports constitute a vital component of Ukraine's GDP and foreign exchange earnings, while soaring insurance premiums and extensive infrastructure damage represent significant friction costs constraining maritime access efficiency. The global implications of disrupted SLOCs further underscore the strategic weight of maintaining even limited maritime access, elevating it beyond national interest to a matter of international concern (Kormych et al., 2024 ). Interdependent Operational Enablers and Resilience : The foundation of Ukrainian maritime resilience rests upon three interdependent pillars identified across the literature: 1) Technological Edge (near-universal prevalence), creating risk-perimeter defenses through asymmetric systems and COTS integration (Bojor et al., 2024 ; Packard et al., 2025 ); 2) Coalition Support, encompassing NATO ISR/EW integration, intelligence sharing, and vital diplomatic/legal actions amplifying tactical reach and sustaining commerce (Kormych & Malyarenko, 2023 ; Mankoff & J, 2024); and 3) Environmental Leverage, where littoral constraints functioned as natural force multipliers (Kormych et al., 2024 ). Resilience emerges as a cross-cutting theme manifesting in multiple forms: the adaptability of Ukraine's maritime industry (Chumak & A, 2024) and civil-military coordination (Kormych et al., 2024 ); the rapid integration and scaling of COTS tech, like DJI Mavic drones, and the recalibration of deterrence strategies (Mankoff & J, 2024); and the evolution of Ukrainian SOF towards NATO-aligned standards (Neag & Solescu, 2024 ). This triad of enablers, operating within a framework of national resilience, underscores the necessity of integrating kinetic, non-kinetic, geostrategic, and societal factors for effective SLOC defense in war. Critical Gaps and Research Imperatives The review exposes significant limitations within the current evidence base. The overwhelming focus on uncrewed systems and kinetic effects overshadows crucial areas: Deterrence, Special Operations (despite their noted evolution), Intelligence and Reconnaissance methodologies, dedicated SLOC Protection tactics, and Defense–Private Sector Synergy (each appearing in only one study or less). Evaluations of these niche areas, along with detailed analysis of economic friction costs (insurance, infrastructure damage) and the operational mechanics of SOF evolution, lack methodological consistency, comparative analysis, and empirical depth. More fundamentally, a profound gap exists in primary, practitioner-driven research. Operational perspectives, particularly from naval operators, are conspicuously absent due to classification restrictions, OPSEC concerns, and the inherent sensitivity of tactical data. This absence constrains the depth of operational insight available in open-source literature and hinders the translation of academic analysis into actionable doctrine. Future research must prioritize methodologies to ethically capture practitioner accounts and integrate classified data insights where possible. Specific priorities include examining real-time decision-making during maritime engagements, analyzing civil-military coordination synergies (especially lawfare-kinetic integration and private sector collaboration), and rigorously linking technological enablers with coalition frameworks to model resilience under economic and logistical pressures. Limitations of the Data Base This scoping review adhered to PRISMA guidelines for transparency. However, limitations include reliance on open-source data, potential publication bias, and sparse coding in underrepresented domains. The analytic subset (n = 11) was selected for quantitative synthesis based on relevance and methodological rigor. Policy and Practical Implications Ukraine's maritime actions – emphasizing asymmetry, cost-imposition, and resilience through adaptation (COTS integration, civil-military coordination, diversified logistics) – offer a potentially viable model for SLOC defense in contested narrow seas, particularly for navies facing superior adversaries. The centrality of economic survival (GDP reliance on exports) and global stability (food security implications) as drivers for this strategy cannot be overstated. However, the very limited data on defense–private sector synergy (9.1%) should be interpreted as a research gap rather than a doctrinal deficiency. Although naval guidance for shipping and risk‑sharing mechanisms exist within NATO and related maritime doctrines (Usluer, 2022 ), the literature reviewed provides little empirical assessment of how these frameworks function in wartime SLOC protection or how industry-government interactions unfold under sustained maritime coercion. This absence suggests a need for further research rather than new doctrine, particularly studies examining how existing civil-military mechanisms are operationalized, adapted, or stressed in contested maritime environments. The documented effectiveness of integrated lawfare-kinetic operations further underscores the need for maritime doctrines that explicitly incorporate legal instruments, diplomatic channels, and resilience planning (encompassing logistics diversification and economic cost mitigation) as core force multipliers. Addressing the identified research gaps, particularly concerning practitioner insights, economic friction, and underrepresented operational domains like SOF and private sector integration, is essential for developing robust, evidence-based maritime security strategies applicable to future conflicts where economic endurance is as critical as tactical success. Reflections on theory. This review highlights contemporary understandings of sea power in the context of littoral warfare. First, it demonstrates that persistent sea denial can fulfill key maritime objectives without the need for traditional sea control. Ukraine's deployment of uncrewed systems, long-range strikes, and lawfare to maintain access to SLOCs reflects Corbett's (2009) logic of controlling communications through selective denial. It also aligns with Vego’s ( 2023 ) discussion of coastal defenses and his broader argument that, in the littorals, a weaker side can construct multilayered defensive systems capable of contesting an adversary’s freedom of action and imposing significant operational constraints. Moreover, the review highlights that contemporary sea power is inherently multi‑domain. Vego ( 2023 ) notes that effective naval operations increasingly rely on the integration of kinetic capabilities with informational, operational, and organizational functions, including ISR, command and control, and the wider political‑legal context that shapes the use of maritime force. The screened literature on Ukraine’s maritime operations reflects this shift: by integrating long‑range precision strikes, uncrewed systems, and legal‑diplomatic measures to challenge Russia’s maritime claims, Ukraine demonstrates how contemporary sea power emerges from the convergence of technological, informational, and legal instruments employed to impose sea denial and secure access to the SLOC. Conclusion This PRISMA-guided scoping review synthesizes evidence on Ukraine’s maritime operations to secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Black Sea from 2022 to 2025. The findings reveal a decisive shift from traditional sea control toward an asymmetric strategy centered on sea denial. This transformation was enabled by uncrewed systems, long-range strike capabilities, and commercially available technologies, which together allowed Ukraine to impose costs on a superior adversary. These innovations, combined with NATO’s intelligence sharing and legal-diplomatic support, sustained limited maritime access and ensured continuity of grain exports despite persistent Russian interdiction. Three interdependent pillars underpin this resilience: technological edge, coalition integration, and environmental leverage. Ukraine’s technological edge-particularly uncrewed systems and precision strike platforms-reshaped the operational dynamics of the Black Sea, creating risk-perimeter defenses and enabling persistent harassment of Russian naval forces. Coalition integration amplified these effects through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and diplomatic initiatives that legitimized humanitarian corridors and constrained adversary freedom of action. Environmental leverage, rooted in the Black Sea’s geography and littoral constraints, further enhanced operational flexibility and force multiplication. Despite these advances, critical gaps persist in literature. Deterrence strategies, defense–private sector collaboration, and economic friction costs remain underexplored. The absence of practitioner-driven insights limits doctrinal development and hinders translation of academic findings into actionable guidance. Addressing these gaps through empirical research and ethical integration of operational perspectives is essential for future doctrine and policy. Policy implications are clear. Maritime security strategies for modern conflicts must integrate both direct engagement with the enemy and non-kinetic actions that focus on influencing, disrupting, or shaping the operational environment, effectively bridging the gap between military and civilian maritime operations. Formal risk-sharing frameworks with commercial actors are vital to enhance resilience and mitigate economic vulnerabilities. Additionally, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that legal instruments and diplomatic engagement can complement kinetic actions, to shape threats and sustain maritime access under contested conditions. In sum, securing SLOCs in contested environments will depend not only on tactical success but on the ability to adapt, innovate, and integrate across domains. Ukraine’s experience underscores the imperative for agile, multidimensional strategies that combine technological ingenuity, legal frameworks, and coalition solidarity to safeguard maritime lifelines in an era of hybrid warfare. Declarations Data Availability: All data supporting the findings of this study are available from the authors upon reasonable request. Competing Interests : The authors declare that they have no financial, non‑financial, personal, or professional competing interests relevant to this work. Ethics and Consent : This scoping review does not involve original research with human subjects. 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Inst Study War Dec, 16 Additional Declarations The authors declare no competing interests. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. 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Mattingsdal","email":"","orcid":"https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5148-2893","institution":"Norwegian Defense University College","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Jostein","middleName":"","lastName":"Mattingsdal","suffix":""},{"id":575742444,"identity":"d80181c0-810f-4b33-959b-67d75495d284","order_by":1,"name":"Anders Løvik","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"University of 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09:56:01","extension":"html","order_by":6,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":96556,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"earlyproof.html","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8620810/v1/a3dbaa939f429585e5ea8be5.html"},{"id":100595630,"identity":"9c2a00ed-4ece-4aad-b175-86062d808913","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-19 13:48:58","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":99467,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ePRISMA flowchart showing identification, screening, eligibility, and included articles.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"SRFigure1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8620810/v1/c42903a9aad13b0c6ba062a4.png"},{"id":100597433,"identity":"092fde7f-8529-4c66-8c18-57670e549f58","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-01-19 14:17:29","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":766752,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8620810/v1/6db27bf1-8c81-4082-a189-357403a4a270.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"The authors declare no competing interests.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003eWhat Does the Literature Tell Us About Ukraine’s Maritime Operations? A PRISMA-Guided Scoping Review\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eSea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are the lifelines of global trade, energy security, and strategic power projection. In wartime, their security becomes a decisive factor for national survival and operational success. Control of maritime routes enables the flow of essential goods, military supplies, and economic resources, while denying access can cripple an adversary’s strategic options (Dismukes, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). For this review, SLOC security refers to the continuous effort to keep maritime routes open and safe through a combination of naval actions and international political-legal cooperation to protect the system from both criminal threats and state-level military conflict (Khurana, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Black Sea, as a semi-enclosed and geopolitically contested region, illustrates the difficulty of securing SLOCs in wartime. During periods of sustained conflict, its environment imposes unique challenges: restricted geography, dynamic weather, and persistent threats from precision strikes and hybrid warfare (Sanders, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). In this context, both military and civilian maritime platforms must assume multiple roles beyond their primary functions, ranging from surveillance and raids to cargo transport and logistical support. Meeting these demands requires adaptable, multi-capable assets and integrated systems across defense and commercial sectors (Trelawny, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGuided by PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) standards (Veroniki et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) and grounded in Sea power theory (Andrew et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Armstrong, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Till, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Vego, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e), this review adopts Tangredi’s (Tangredi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) expansive definition of sea power as its conceptual foundation. Tangredi emphasizes that sea power extends far beyond naval warfare, encompassing the control of maritime trade, access to ocean resources, and the diplomatic and economic uses of maritime capabilities. This perspective highlights the inherently dual military–civilian nature of securing SLOCs in wartime. In the Black Sea context, sea power is inseparable from commercial shipping, port operations, and broader geo-economic dynamics. This provides a critical conceptual lens for understanding how maritime assets contribute simultaneously to economic resilience and military effectiveness. Against this backdrop, the scoping review addresses the research question:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eRQ1: What evidence exists in peer-reviewed and gray literature (2022–2025) detailing how Ukrainian maritime operations secured SLOCs in the Black Sea?\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo answer this question, the review pursues three objectives:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eMap tactics, technologies, and coalition integration.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eEvaluate strategic outcomes for regional stability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIdentify key operational enablers and constraints.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBy framing Ukraine’s experience within modern naval warfare paradigms, this review applies a Logic Model (Mattingsdal, 2025) to structure its analytical approach. The model operationalizes the framework through four interrelated dimensions: precursor conditions shaped by geostrategic pressures such as the Russian blockade; military operations that included defensive strategies like the “grain corridor”; capability adaptation through the integration of NATO intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and allied support; and tactical execution involving phased actions that produced strategic outcomes. This structured approach bridges academic discourse and NATO doctrinal development (NATO, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), offering actionable insights for securing SLOCs under wartime conditions in contested narrow seas.\u003c/p\u003e "},{"header":"Methods","content":"\u003cp\u003eTo ensure transparent and comprehensive reporting, this review followed PRISMA framework throughout the search and selection process. It structures the workflow into four key stages: (1) Identification of records across databases, (2) Screening of titles and abstracts, (3) Eligibility assessment of full-text studies against predefined criteria, and (4) Inclusion of studies that meet all requirements for final synthesis (Veroniki et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eStudy Design\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis scoping review was designed following Ringnes et al.\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) framework and conducted according to a preregistered protocol on the Open Science Framework (Mattingsdal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) to ensure reproducibility and minimize bias.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eSearch Strategy\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe corresponding author conducted the literature search using predefined criteria. The search primarily targeted ProQuest and EBSCO databases to ensure the relevance of the articles retrieved. Searches were limited to studies published between February 22, 2022, and October 14, 2025, and included the following sources:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003ePeer-reviewed literature\u003c/em\u003e: Searches were conducted in ProQuest across 15 databases: ASFA: Aquatic Sciences and Fisheries Abstracts; Coronavirus Research Database; Early Modern Collection; eBook Central; Education Collection; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); Library \u0026amp; Information Science Collection; Linguistics Collection; Literature Online; Luthers Werke; Patrologia Latina; Periodicals Archive Online; Politics Collection; ProQuest One Academic; and Sociology Collection. The Boolean query applied was: \u003cspan fontcategory=\"NonProportional\" class=\"\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003e(((\"Ukrainian\" OR \"Ukraine\") AND (\"naval\" OR \"maritime\" OR \"fleet\" OR \"navy\") AND (\"operation*\" OR \"mission\" OR \"campaign\" OR \"tactic\" OR \"strateg*\") AND (\"Sea Lines of Communication\" OR \"SLOC\" OR \"shipping lane*\" OR \"maritime corridor*\") AND stype.exact(\"Conference Papers \u0026amp; Proceedings\" OR \"Government \u0026amp; Official Publications\" OR \"Books\" OR \"Scholarly Journals\") AND la.exact(\"English\")) NOT (subt.exact(\"climate change\"))).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eGray literature\u003c/em\u003e: Searches were conducted in EBSCO across two databases: Military \u0026amp; Government Collection; and eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), using the following Boolean query: \u003cem\u003e((\"Ukrainian naval operations\") AND (\"Ukraine maritime security\") AND (\"Black Sea\" OR \"grain corridor\") AND (\"after-action report\" OR \"policy brief\" OR \"analysis\" OR \"case study\" OR \"OSINT\")).\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eAI-assisted discovery\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn addition to database searches, Keenious (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) an AI-powered research assistant, was employed to enhance literature discovery. Keenious identifies relevant academic articles, books, and other scholarly sources based on user-defined prompts and allows refinement through filters such as publication year and document type. For this review, the primary research question (RQ1) was used as the prompt in Keenious to ensure alignment with the study objectives. This approach complemented traditional database searches by broadening coverage and improving relevance. Search validation involved maritime security experts assessing recall/precision (κ\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.82).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eScreening Protocol\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe screening process was independently conducted by three authors between November 1 and December 15, 2025, following a Rayyan protocol designed to minimize selection bias. The process began with title screening, followed by abstract screening. Titles containing relevant keywords without contradictions were flagged, and their corresponding abstracts were reviewed to confirm compliance with the inclusion criteria and the presence of keyword variations. Initially, the Rayyan auto-resolve function was applied, with subsequent verification by the screener. Each author categorized articles as Include, Maybe, or Exclude during this step. After individual screening was completed, the lists were compared to identify conflicts, which were resolved by either exclusion or inclusion in a consolidated list through arbitration. Articles appearing on all three lists were automatically advanced to the full-text screening stage. An intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) analysis in SPSS (version 27) of the screeners\u0026rsquo; ratings showed good individual reliability (ICC\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.74), while the average of all three ratings demonstrated excellent reliability (ICC\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.90).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eInclusion Criteria\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTime Frame: Published between 2022 and 2025\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eGeographic Focus: Must pertain to Ukrainian activities in the Black Sea\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTopic Relevance: Must address SLOC security, naval tactics, coastal areas, or strategic control of shipping lanes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eLiterature Type: Peer-reviewed articles or gray literature (e.g., conference proceedings, policy briefs, reports)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eLanguage: English, or other languages if a reliable translation is available\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAbstract Availability: Must include an abstract or summary for screening.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eExclusion Criteria\u003c/em\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eOutside Time Frame: Published before 2022\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIrrelevant Geography: Focuses on naval operations outside the Black Sea or not involving Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIrrelevant Topic: Does not discuss SLOCs, maritime operations, coastal areas, or strategic military actions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eNon-Applicable Literature: Fiction, opinion pieces without factual basis, or promotional content\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eMissing Abstract: Articles without an abstract or summary\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eData Extraction Framework\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDuring full-text screening, studies were organized into structured categories and subcategories to enable quantitative analysis. \u003cem\u003eOperational factors\u003c/em\u003e included Security Mechanisms, Maritime Mechanisms, Naval Tactics, and Strategies Employed. \u003cem\u003eContextual factors\u003c/em\u003e encompassed Technologies, Strategic Outcomes, Coalition Support, Environmental, as well as Political Dynamics.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe authors independently coded studies in Rayyan, resolving discrepancies through consensus. This ensured accuracy and transparency in the final dataset.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe initial search yielded 9591 records from academic databases, gray literature, and an AI-assisted discovery platform, without any limitations on the timeframe. Following a systematic screening process, 224 studies were identified that met the inclusion criteria for final analysis (see Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). Peer-reviewed studies were most common in our findings at 63.6%, followed by grey literature with 36.4%.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eData extraction prioritized operational dimensions (tactics, technologies) and contextual moderators (coalition support, constraints) across included studies. Rayyan-generated syntheses categorized findings with multidimensional studies coded across all applicable domains. The categories, subcategories and distribution of the dimensions are presented in Tables\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e\u0026ndash;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary of operational dimensions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"7\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCategory\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubcategory\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNumber of studies\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePercentage of total\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTotal mentions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecurity Mechanisms\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDomestic Resilience\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMilitary Operations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e36.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegal Frameworks\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e54.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDeterrence\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eResistance Activities\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaritime Mechanisms\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSea Denial and Sea Control\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e36.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBlockade\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e45.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eShipping Enablement\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e45.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntelligence and Reconnaissance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLaw Enforcement\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNaval Tactics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUncrewed Systems\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e100\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrike Operations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e63.6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAmphibious Operations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e45.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSpecial Operations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategies Employed\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSLOC Protection\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGround and Air Integration\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic Campaigning\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSummary of contextual dimensions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCategory\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubcategory\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNumber of studies\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePercentage of total\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTotal mentions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTechnologies\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLong-Range Strike and Anti-Ship Weapons\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e63.6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e20\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAir and Missile Defense Systems\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e36.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUncrewed Systems\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e81.8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e17\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTargeting and Fires\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e54.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOperational Enablers\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e63.6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e11\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaritime Safety\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eStrategic Outcomes\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eContinuity in Commercial Shipping\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e63.6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstraint on Maritime Freedom of Action\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOperational Effects Enabling Maritime Access\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInternational Support and Domestic Resilience\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGlobal Market and Legal Effects\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCoalition Support\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLegal and Diplomatic Actions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e63.6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e14\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaritime Security\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMilitary Assistance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCoalition Frameworks\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDefense\u0026ndash;Private Sector Synergy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnvironmental\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhysical Geography\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaritime Hazards and Chokepoints\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e36.4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eElectromagnetic/Cyber\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBattlespace Geometry\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLittoral Constraints\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolitical Dynamics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMilitary Actions and Infrastructure Impact\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e63.6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e13\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDisruptions in Maritime Access\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLawfare and the Legal Diplomatic Contest\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSanctions, Energy and Economic Resilience\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMaritime Security Dynamics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e9.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis PRISMA-guided scoping review synthesizes data from peer-reviewed and rigorously screened gray literature sources examining Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s strategies for securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) during 2022\u0026ndash;2025. Framed through contemporary sea power theory, our analysis reveals Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s redefinition of littoral warfare through asymmetric innovation, where sea denial \u0026ndash; rather than traditional sea control \u0026ndash; emerges as the strategic cornerstone. The literature converges on several interdependent themes shaping operational and strategic outcomes. Quantitative statements below refer to the analytic subset (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;11) unless otherwise noted. The literature converges on several interdependent themes shaping operational and strategic outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eStructural Patterns in Literature\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThree salient observations emerged. First, naval tactics \u0026ndash; particularly the use of uncrewed systems \u0026ndash; were present in 100% of the studies within the dataset, underscoring their centrality in interpretations of Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s maritime adaptation. Second, balanced emphasis was evident across core operational domains: technological applications (81.8%) and coalition support (63.6%) featured prominently, indicating recognition of their interdependence rather than isolation of any single factor. Third, peer-reviewed scholarship dominated both levels of analysis: 7 of 11 studies (63.6%) in the analytic subset and 191 of 220 studies (86.8%) across the full dataset, with the remaining 29 classified as gray literature. Most gray literature identified during initial screening was excluded due to insufficient methodological rigor, while the peer-reviewed articles were rejected for failing to meet inclusion criteria (e.g., lack of relevance to SLOC security). While systematic syntheses exist for maritime security broadly, we did not identify dedicated systematic reviews or meta-analyses specific to the Russia\u0026ndash;Ukraine conflict, a gap that limits generalizable insights for doctrine development.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eUncrewed Systems as Strategic Enablers.\u003c/em\u003e Studies highlight the transformative role of USVs \u0026ndash; often including platforms such as Sea Baby and Magura V5 \u0026ndash; evolving from tactical harassment to strategic tools enabling precision strikes and contributing to littoral defense (Bojor et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Kormych et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Packard et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). This evolution aligns with modern sea power theory, were persistent, low-cost denial substitutes for traditional fleet engagements. Crucially, these capabilities are underpinned by commercial off-the-shelf technologies, especially SATCOM solutions, which provide indispensable command, control, real-time ISR, and Intelligence Preparation of Battlespace (IPB) in contested environments. References to specific systems such as Starlink appear in three sources (Bojor et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Kofman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Mankoff \u0026amp; J, 2024), but we frame this more broadly as commercial SATCOM integration enabling effective maritime warfare despite resource constraints. For instance, Neag and Solescu (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) note that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) benefited from \u0026lsquo;access to Western military intelligence.\u0026rsquo;\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eNaval Warfare and Maritime Lawfare.\u003c/em\u003e Outcome-focused analyses (Chumak \u0026amp; A, 2024; Fink, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Kollakowski, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Kormych et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Wolkov et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) consistently document Ukraine's success in maintaining functional shipping corridors \u0026ndash; aligning with how Vego (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2000\u003c/span\u003e) describes maritime operations in contested waters. This continuity was enabled by a synergistic combination of long-range anti-ship capabilities and sophisticated maritime lawfare measures (Kofman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Packard et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). identifies the RK-360MC Neptune (indigenous) and Harpoon (Western-supplied) as pivotal systems used to sink the cruiser Moskva and disrupt Russian supply lines to Snake Island (Kormych et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), while Kollakowski (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) describes how the technical ranges of these systems created a sea denial zone that forced the Russian Navy to operate from a much greater distance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eKormych et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) explicitly frames the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) as a form of lawfare, explaining how Russia exploited legal ambiguity and procedural loopholes to create artificial delays in inspections, slowing Ukrainian exports and gaining strategic leverage with impunity. Legal and diplomatic instruments were employed to legitimize maritime access (e.g., challenging the de facto Russian blockade under UNCLOS and the law of naval warfare), constrain adversary freedom of action, establish humanitarian corridor regimes, and sustain critical grain exports. Studies emphasize the operational consequences of precise legal framing versus ambiguity, demonstrating measurable gains in tactical survivability and operational resilience when lawfare complemented kinetic actions. For example, Fink (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) analyzes how parties leveraged interpretations of blockade law to align with state narratives, a central component of lawfare during active hostilities. This exemplifies a practical reinterpretation of control of communications: achieved not through decisive battle but through persistent denial and legal legitimization.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eLogistics and Economic Resilience in Maritime Operations\u003c/em\u003e: Underpinning the lawfare approaches is a critical logistical dimension. Illustrative examples \u0026ndash; such as capacity issues at the Ukrainian Danube ports (Reni, Izmail, Ust-Dunaisk) and liability insurance for vessels carrying goods through the grain corridor, are mentioned in literature as pivotal in reducing immediate risk and enabling temporary corridors (Chumak \u0026amp; A, 2024; Wolkov et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Concurrently, studies emphasize Ukraine's logistical adaptation through partial, albeit costly, diversification of export routes via the Danube River, rail, and road networks. This logistical resilience operates within a context dominated by profound economic stakes: agricultural exports constitute a vital component of Ukraine's GDP and foreign exchange earnings, while soaring insurance premiums and extensive infrastructure damage represent significant friction costs constraining maritime access efficiency. The global implications of disrupted SLOCs further underscore the strategic weight of maintaining even limited maritime access, elevating it beyond national interest to a matter of international concern (Kormych et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eInterdependent Operational Enablers and Resilience\u003c/em\u003e: The foundation of Ukrainian maritime resilience rests upon three interdependent pillars identified across the literature: 1) Technological Edge (near-universal prevalence), creating risk-perimeter defenses through asymmetric systems and COTS integration (Bojor et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Packard et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e); 2) Coalition Support, encompassing NATO ISR/EW integration, intelligence sharing, and vital diplomatic/legal actions amplifying tactical reach and sustaining commerce (Kormych \u0026amp; Malyarenko, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Mankoff \u0026amp; J, 2024); and 3) Environmental Leverage, where littoral constraints functioned as natural force multipliers (Kormych et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResilience emerges as a cross-cutting theme manifesting in multiple forms: the adaptability of Ukraine's maritime industry (Chumak \u0026amp; A, 2024) and civil-military coordination (Kormych et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e); the rapid integration and scaling of COTS tech, like DJI Mavic drones, and the recalibration of deterrence strategies (Mankoff \u0026amp; J, 2024); and the evolution of Ukrainian SOF towards NATO-aligned standards (Neag \u0026amp; Solescu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). This triad of enablers, operating within a framework of national resilience, underscores the necessity of integrating kinetic, non-kinetic, geostrategic, and societal factors for effective SLOC defense in war.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eCritical Gaps and Research Imperatives\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe review exposes significant limitations within the current evidence base. The overwhelming focus on uncrewed systems and kinetic effects overshadows crucial areas: Deterrence, Special Operations (despite their noted evolution), Intelligence and Reconnaissance methodologies, dedicated SLOC Protection tactics, and Defense\u0026ndash;Private Sector Synergy (each appearing in only one study or less). Evaluations of these niche areas, along with detailed analysis of economic friction costs (insurance, infrastructure damage) and the operational mechanics of SOF evolution, lack methodological consistency, comparative analysis, and empirical depth. More fundamentally, a profound gap exists in primary, practitioner-driven research. Operational perspectives, particularly from naval operators, are conspicuously absent due to classification restrictions, OPSEC concerns, and the inherent sensitivity of tactical data. This absence constrains the depth of operational insight available in open-source literature and hinders the translation of academic analysis into actionable doctrine. Future research must prioritize methodologies to ethically capture practitioner accounts and integrate classified data insights where possible. Specific priorities include examining real-time decision-making during maritime engagements, analyzing civil-military coordination synergies (especially lawfare-kinetic integration and private sector collaboration), and rigorously linking technological enablers with coalition frameworks to model resilience under economic and logistical pressures.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eLimitations of the Data Base\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis scoping review adhered to PRISMA guidelines for transparency. However, limitations include reliance on open-source data, potential publication bias, and sparse coding in underrepresented domains. The analytic subset (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;11) was selected for quantitative synthesis based on relevance and methodological rigor.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003ePolicy and Practical Implications\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eUkraine's maritime actions \u0026ndash; emphasizing asymmetry, cost-imposition, and resilience through adaptation (COTS integration, civil-military coordination, diversified logistics) \u0026ndash; offer a potentially viable model for SLOC defense in contested narrow seas, particularly for navies facing superior adversaries. The centrality of economic survival (GDP reliance on exports) and global stability (food security implications) as drivers for this strategy cannot be overstated. However, the very limited data on defense\u0026ndash;private sector synergy (9.1%) should be interpreted as a research gap rather than a doctrinal deficiency. Although naval guidance for shipping and risk‑sharing mechanisms exist within NATO and related maritime doctrines (Usluer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), the literature reviewed provides little empirical assessment of how these frameworks function in wartime SLOC protection or how industry-government interactions unfold under sustained maritime coercion. This absence suggests a need for further research rather than new doctrine, particularly studies examining how existing civil-military mechanisms are operationalized, adapted, or stressed in contested maritime environments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe documented effectiveness of integrated lawfare-kinetic operations further underscores the need for maritime doctrines that explicitly incorporate legal instruments, diplomatic channels, and resilience planning (encompassing logistics diversification and economic cost mitigation) as core force multipliers. Addressing the identified research gaps, particularly concerning practitioner insights, economic friction, and underrepresented operational domains like SOF and private sector integration, is essential for developing robust, evidence-based maritime security strategies applicable to future conflicts where economic endurance is as critical as tactical success.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eReflections on theory.\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis review highlights contemporary understandings of sea power in the context of littoral warfare. First, it demonstrates that persistent sea denial can fulfill key maritime objectives without the need for traditional sea control. Ukraine's deployment of uncrewed systems, long-range strikes, and lawfare to maintain access to SLOCs reflects Corbett's (2009) logic of controlling communications through selective denial. It also aligns with Vego\u0026rsquo;s (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) discussion of coastal defenses and his broader argument that, in the littorals, a weaker side can construct multilayered defensive systems capable of contesting an adversary\u0026rsquo;s freedom of action and imposing significant operational constraints.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, the review highlights that contemporary sea power is inherently multi‑domain. Vego (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) notes that effective naval operations increasingly rely on the integration of kinetic capabilities with informational, operational, and organizational functions, including ISR, command and control, and the wider political‑legal context that shapes the use of maritime force. The screened literature on Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s maritime operations reflects this shift: by integrating long‑range precision strikes, uncrewed systems, and legal‑diplomatic measures to challenge Russia\u0026rsquo;s maritime claims, Ukraine demonstrates how contemporary sea power emerges from the convergence of technological, informational, and legal instruments employed to impose sea denial and secure access to the SLOC.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis PRISMA-guided scoping review synthesizes evidence on Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s maritime operations to secure Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in the Black Sea from 2022 to 2025. The findings reveal a decisive shift from traditional sea control toward an asymmetric strategy centered on sea denial. This transformation was enabled by uncrewed systems, long-range strike capabilities, and commercially available technologies, which together allowed Ukraine to impose costs on a superior adversary. These innovations, combined with NATO\u0026rsquo;s intelligence sharing and legal-diplomatic support, sustained limited maritime access and ensured continuity of grain exports despite persistent Russian interdiction.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThree interdependent pillars underpin this resilience: technological edge, coalition integration, and environmental leverage. Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s technological edge-particularly uncrewed systems and precision strike platforms-reshaped the operational dynamics of the Black Sea, creating risk-perimeter defenses and enabling persistent harassment of Russian naval forces. Coalition integration amplified these effects through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support and diplomatic initiatives that legitimized humanitarian corridors and constrained adversary freedom of action. Environmental leverage, rooted in the Black Sea\u0026rsquo;s geography and littoral constraints, further enhanced operational flexibility and force multiplication.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite these advances, critical gaps persist in literature. Deterrence strategies, defense\u0026ndash;private sector collaboration, and economic friction costs remain underexplored. The absence of practitioner-driven insights limits doctrinal development and hinders translation of academic findings into actionable guidance. Addressing these gaps through empirical research and ethical integration of operational perspectives is essential for future doctrine and policy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolicy implications are clear. Maritime security strategies for modern conflicts must integrate both direct engagement with the enemy and non-kinetic actions that focus on influencing, disrupting, or shaping the operational environment, effectively bridging the gap between military and civilian maritime operations. Formal risk-sharing frameworks with commercial actors are vital to enhance resilience and mitigate economic vulnerabilities. Additionally, Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s experience demonstrates that legal instruments and diplomatic engagement can complement kinetic actions, to shape threats and sustain maritime access under contested conditions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn sum, securing SLOCs in contested environments will depend not only on tactical success but on the ability to adapt, innovate, and integrate across domains. Ukraine\u0026rsquo;s experience underscores the imperative for agile, multidimensional strategies that combine technological ingenuity, legal frameworks, and coalition solidarity to safeguard maritime lifelines in an era of hybrid warfare.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eData Availability:\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll data supporting the findings of this study are available from the authors upon reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eCompeting Interests\u003c/em\u003e: The authors declare that they have no financial, non‑financial, personal, or professional competing interests relevant to this work.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eEthics and Consent\u003c/em\u003e: This scoping review does not involve original research with human subjects. 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Inst Study War Dec, \u003cem\u003e16\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[{"identity":"0fb4f8ca-f97a-4eee-b2df-b02db84926ba","identifier":"10.13039/100015842","name":"Forsvaret","awardNumber":"N/A","order_by":0}],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"Norwegian Defence University College","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Black Sea, Ukraine, Sea lines of communication, maritime security, sea power, scoping review, PRISMA","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8620810/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8620810/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eSecuring Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is essential for national survival and global stability during wartime. In the Black Sea’s semi‑enclosed and highly contested environment, maintaining operational access under persistent conflict poses significant challenges. This PRISMA‑guided scoping review, preregistered on the Open Science Framework (OSF), examines how Ukrainian maritime operations from 2022 to 2025 sought to protect these critical routes. A systematic search across ProQuest and EBSCO databases, supplemented by AI‑assisted discovery, targeted peer‑reviewed and gray literature published between February 2022 and October 2025. Screening followed the Rayyan protocol, identifying 224 studies, with 11 included in the final analysis. Findings indicate a shift from traditional sea control to asymmetric sea denial enabled by uncrewed systems, long‑range strike capabilities, and commercial off‑the‑shelf technologies. Coalition support, particularly NATO’s intelligence sharing and legal‑diplomatic measures, was central to sustaining limited maritime access and grain exports. Ukraine’s approach rests on three pillars: technological adaptation, coalition integration, and environmental leverage. Remaining gaps include deterrence strategies, defense–private sector coordination, economic costs, and practitioner insights constrained by operational security. Securing SLOCs in contested environments requires multidimensional strategies that integrate kinetic denial, lawfare, coalition frameworks, and societal resilience.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"What Does the Literature Tell Us About Ukraine’s Maritime Operations? A PRISMA-Guided Scoping Review","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-01-19 09:55:56","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8620810/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"d92682da-19b6-495a-b0b7-b60353893663","owner":[],"postedDate":"January 19th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":61263637,"name":"International Relations"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-01-19T09:55:56+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-01-19 09:55:56","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8620810","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8620810","identity":"rs-8620810","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}