In Similarity We Trust: Not the Type of Moral Judgment but Like-Mindedness Drives Inferences of Trustworthiness
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Abstract
Recent research has looked at the primacy of moral character assessment in social interactions, focusing on how individuals infer trustworthiness based on others’ moral decisions, particularly in sacrificial moral dilemmas. These dilemmas typically juxtapose utilitarian principles (harm for the greater good) against deontological ethics (inherent rightness or wrongness of actions). We extend previous research, which relied on single-shot sacrificial dilemmas, by studying how individuals infer trustworthiness in the context of iterative dilemmas that involve multiple moral decisions. This approach addresses some of the limitations associated with prior work by considering the interdependency of moral judgments. In a series of five studies (N = 1234), we uncover robust evidence for a similarity effect in trust inference: people trust those whose moral preferences align with their own. The similarity effect not only applies to consistent deontological or utilitarian choices, but even extends to switching patterns across dilemma iterations. These findings challenge previous research that suggested that trust inference is primarily driven by a general preference for deontological others.
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- last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00