The Role of the Audit Committee on ESG Performance of Non-Financial Firms Listed on the French CAC 40

The Role of the Audit Committee on ESG Performance of Non-Financial Firms Listed on the French CAC 40 | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The Role of the Audit Committee on ESG Performance of Non-Financial Firms Listed on the French CAC 40 Sana Masmoudi, Ahnaf Ali Alsmady This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7446080/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 08 Dec, 2025 Read the published version in Discover Sustainability → Version 1 posted 15 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Purpose This article explores the effect of audit committee characteristics on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance of French-listed non-financial firms on the CAC 40 index from 2018 to 2022—a period capturing the COVID-19 pandemic. While investors and regulators are paying more attention to ESG performance, there has been little attention paid to the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly audit committees, in shaping ESG performance in continental European environments. Design/methodology/approach Drawing from agency theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory, the study examines the influence of four widely researched audit committee attributes—namely, independence, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity on ESG performance. The research utilizes ESG scores provided by Refinitiv and employs Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression to account for panel-level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Firm-level controls include profitability, leverage, size, and board structure. Findings The results indicate that audit committee independence and women's involvement are strong and positive predictors of ESG performance, while financial sophistication and tenure are non-significant. The study highlights the strategic importance of independent and diverse corporate governance in fostering sustainability performance, especially in a crisis context. This article contributes to the existing literature on ESG governance by focusing on the under-researched French context and providing empirical evidence of the audit substructures' role in crisis resilience. Originality/value: This study offers novel empirical evidence on the impact of audit committee independence and gender diversity on ESG performance in the under-explored French CAC 40 context, reflecting its distinct governance and regulatory environment. It also contributes by examining these relationships across pre- and post-pandemic periods, providing fresh insights into the role of internal governance in sustaining corporate resilience during crises. ESG performance audit committee corporate governance CAC 40 France COVID-19 1. Introduction In today's sustainability-focused business world, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance is now a central tenet of corporate responsibility and long-term value creation. In this regard, the ESG considerations are increasingly being considered not as an option, but as a part of risk management, ethical practice, and stakeholder engagement (Khan & Newar, 2024 ). Regulators, institutional investors, and civil society are demanding greater transparency about how firms address climate-related risks, respect human rights, and offer board-level oversight (Kotsantonis et al., 2016; Eccles & Klimenko, 2019 ). In this new model of governance, the audit committee, traditionally charged with assuring adequate financial reporting and risk management, has assumed an expanded role. Modern models of corporate governance locate audit committees centrally to review sustainability reports, monitor ESG-related risks, and ensure ethical alignment of financial performance with social impact (Zaman et al., 2011). While interest in ESG monitoring has grown, there has been very little empirical research addressing the distinctive factors of audit committees that are affecting non-financial performance outcomes, particularly in continental European contexts (Pozzoli et al. 2022 ). Much of the extant literature focuses on board-level attributes or macro-level governance variables (e.g., institutional ownership, Buchetti et al. ( 2025 ), often neglecting micro-level governance mechanisms such as audit committees (Pozzoli et al. 2022 ). Moreover, prior research is predominantly concentrated in Anglo-Saxon countries, overlooking regions like France, where the governance framework differs significantly (Ooghe & De Langhe, 2002 ; La Porta et al., 1998). Academic literature frequently compares the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European corporate governance models, emphasizing their differences. The Anglo-Saxon model, which is common in nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, is distinguished by a shareholder-centric strategy, dispersed ownership, and a heavy reliance on capital markets (La Porta et al., 1998). In contrast, the Continental European model, which includes France, is more stakeholder-oriented, with concentrated ownership and a two-tier board structure that includes representatives from diverse stakeholders, including employees. According to La Porta et al. (1998), these discrepancies stem from diverse corporate situations, cultural norms, and legal frameworks, such as France has a unique governing landscape, which the current study spotlights. It gives enterprises the option of using a typical single-tier board (monistic structure), akin to the Anglo-Saxon model, or a dualistic system with distinct management and supervisory boards. This flexibility differs from the more homogeneous approach preferred in Anglo-Saxon institutions. Furthermore, the French system frequently institutionalizes supervision and competence via a proliferation of specialized board committees, including those focused on ESG problems (AFEP-MEDEF Code, 2022 ). This more interventionist and stakeholder-focused approach sets it apart from the market-driven and shareholder-centric Anglo-Saxon model. The historical dominance of study on Anglo-American systems has resulted in a comparative disregard of these other frameworks. Moreover, the French corporate context with its codified legal system, stakeholder-oriented governance model, and dual-board structures offers a distinctive institutional setting in which audit committees may influence ESG outcomes in unique ways (Nekhili et al., 2016). Moreover, the current study covers an important pandemic period, COVID-19. This pandemic further reinforces the necessity of effective ESG governance. The crisis was a test of corporate sustainability pledges, increasing the expectations of stakeholders for socially responsible and environmentally friendly conduct. Multiple studies proved that companies with robust ESG portfolios exhibited higher operational resilience and investor trust during the crisis (Broadstock et al., 2021 ; Albitar et al., 2021 ). There is, nonetheless, scant proof that audit committee qualities contributed towards ESG resilience under system stress, most notably in leading European indices like CAC 40, which opens the light for more research to be conducted. Therefore, this study bridges such gaps by studying the effects of audit committee attributes on ESG performance in French CAC 40 firms in the 2018–2022 period. This time frame comprises three differentiated periods: pre-pandemic normal (2018–2019), the height of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021), and the early stage of post-pandemic recovery (2022). The timing is also significant due to concurrent regulatory developments in France, like the Loi PACTE (2019), and rising standardization of ESG reporting practices, as reflected in Refinitiv's ESG metrics. The study employs three theoretical models: agency theory , stakeholder theory , and legitimacy theory to analyze the effect of audit committee independence, financial experience, tenure, and gender diversity on ESG performance. It thereby contributes to the extant literature on ESG governance and offers managerial implications for regulators, boards, and policymakers seeking to enhance ESG supervision employing internal governance mechanisms. The results of this study reveal that independence of the audit committee and gender diversity have strong positive effects on ESG performance. Also, independent monitoring and multiple perspectives enhance sustainability performance, but financial knowledge and tenure have no significant effects, with a negative but nonsignificant relationship. Among the control variables, board size and firm size is positively related to ESG performance, sales and profitability do not have an impact, and leverage negatively impacts. The results as a whole highlight the important function of certain governance mechanisms, particularly diversity and independence, in facilitating ESG performance. The rest of the paper follows this structure. Section 2 explains the literature and theoretical background. Section 3 presents the hypotheses of the study. Section 4 introduces the data, sample, and approach. Section 5 examines the empirical findings and discussion. Section 6 concludes with implications and recommendations for further research. 2. Study Background 2.1 Audit Committee, ESG Performance, and The French Context 2.1.1 Audit Committee Characteristics and ESG The background of the audit committee can have a big impact on how ESG concerns are handled and reported. Independent audit committees, for instance, may promote more objective sustainability reporting and are less vulnerable to management prejudice (Zgarni et al., 2016). The committee's capacity to evaluate ESG risks incorporated into financial performance and guarantee precise integration of sustainability metrics is enhanced by financial competence (Kent & Stewart, 2008). Due to complacency and over-familiarity with management, tenure or length of service can either increase supervision through accumulated institutional expertise or decrease it (Sharma & Iselin, 2012). Diverse viewpoints are brought about by gender diversity, which has also been connected to enhanced ethical supervision, monitoring, and awareness of social and environmental issues (Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ; Bernardi & Threadgill, 2010 ). The literature is still fragmented and context-dependent despite new evidence. Because ownership structures, board cultures, and governance codes vary greatly in France, studies conducted in Anglo-American contexts might not be immediately applicable there (Nekhili et al., 2016). Furthermore, not many researchers have looked at these correlations during times of systemic disruption, such the COVID-19 crisis, which put ESG governance to the test (Broadstock et al., 2021 ; Albitar et al., 2021 ). 2.1.2 ESG Performance and Corporate Governance ESG (environmental, social, and governance) performance has become a key component of contemporary company evaluation, changing the way the public, regulators, and investors see businesses. Carbon emissions, labor practices, board accountability, and stakeholder involvement are just a few of the non-financial aspects of company behavior that are captured by ESG measurements. ESG has been increasingly linked to business value, cost of capital, and shock resistance in recent years (Friede et al., 2015 ; Fatemi et al., 2018 ). ESG strategy implementation and oversight now depend heavily on corporate governance processes, especially board-level organizations like audit committees. Researchers contend that the completeness, transparency, and credibility of ESG disclosures are impacted by the quality of governance (Dhaliwal et al., 2011 ; García-Sánchez et al., 2019 ). But up until now, most of the research has concentrated on board composition in general, paying little attention to the audit committee, which directly reviews both financial and non-financial disclosures. 2.1.3 The French Context for ESG Governance Research France is a good choice for studying the connection between audit committee attributes and ESG performance because of its distinct institutional and regulatory framework. France follows a stakeholder-oriented model with roots in civil law traditions, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon nations, where corporate governance is largely shareholder-centric. The governance of ESG concerns is significantly shaped by this institutional architecture, which places a high priority on employee representation, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and state engagement (Nekhili et al., 2016). Furthermore, France has led Europe in enacting laws requiring ESG disclosure, which makes it an ideal place to conduct an empirical evaluation of ESG results. Law in the globe first required non-financial disclosures in 2001 with the French Nouvelles Régulations Économiques (NRE) Law. The Loi Pacte (2019) and Grenelle II Act (2010) came next, further integrating ESG into corporate reporting systems (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008 ). Large French companies' ESG disclosures are now much more transparent and standardized thanks to these regulations, providing a solid foundation for research. Moreover, the French corporate board's structure, which frequently adopts a unitary board with audit and risk committees, enables a targeted evaluation of the ways in which ESG is influenced by micro-level board characteristics like independence, tenure, expertise, and gender diversity. In contrast, previous research, particularly in Anglo-American contexts, has disproportionately concentrated on macro-level determinants or board composition in general (Zaman et al., 2011). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic, which served as a systemic shock and a litmus test for businesses' ESG resilience, occurred throughout the study period (2018–2022). During the crisis, investors, civic society, and authorities closely examined French companies' governance, environmental stewardship, and social responsibility, especially those listed on the CAC 40. Because of these factors, France is ideally suited to assess whether internal governance practices—like audit committees—had a significant impact on preserving or improving ESG performance in times of crisis (Albitar et al., 2021 ; Broadstock et al., 2021 ). Therefore, in addition to offering a governance environment that is legally and culturally unique, the French context also offers a policy-rich and crisis-affected environment for evaluating how well audit committees support ESG goals. 3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development The link between audit committee characteristics and ESG performance can be investigated through the complementary lenses of Agency Theory , Stakeholder Theory , and Legitimacy Theory . Taken together, these theories explain the importance of internal governance mechanisms for management and external social pressures shape the effectiveness of ESG oversight. Thus, this section describes the theory and its relationship with the study's developed model. In this regard, Jensen & Meckling (1976) posit that the separation of ownership and control creates principal–agent conflicts, whereby managers may act in their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. The ESG reporting is particularly vulnerable to such opportunism because sustainability disclosures often involve subjective measures and qualitative narratives, which can be manipulated to project an overly positive image—a practice known as “greenwashing” (Boiral, 2013; García-Sánchez et al., 2021). Moreover, audit committees function as a crucial internal governance mechanism to mitigate these conflicts. When they are independent, financially literate, and proactive, they reduce information asymmetry, monitor managerial behavior, and enhance the credibility of both financial and non-financial disclosures (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). Empirical research has shown that well-structured audit committees significantly improve the reliability of ESG reports (Haji, 2015; Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2018 ). However, agency theory’s narrow focus on shareholder value means it must be supplemented by other perspectives to capture the broader societal implications of ESG performance (Letza et al., 2004). Also, Freeman ( 1984 ) extends corporate responsibility beyond shareholders to all parties affected by the firm’s activities, including employees, customers, regulators, and communities. ESG reporting is thus viewed not only as compliance, but as a strategic tool for sustaining positive stakeholder relationships (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Harrison et al., 2019). Thus, audit committees that are diverse in expertise (Aman-Ullah et al., 2022 ) and composition are better equipped to integrate multiple stakeholder concerns into the firm’s ESG strategy (Michelon et al., 2015). Studies demonstrate that stakeholder-oriented boards are associated with higher environmental innovation, social responsibility, and ethical governance practices (Jo & Harjoto, 2012; Velte & Stawinoga, 2020). Nevertheless, stakeholder theory is sometimes criticized for lacking guidance on how to resolve conflicting stakeholder interests (Key, 1999), reinforcing the need for skilled governance bodies to balance these competing priorities. Moreover, Legitimacy theory asserts that organizations must align with societal norms, values, and expectations to maintain their "social license to operate" (Suchman, 1995). The ESG disclosures are a key mechanism for signaling such alignment, especially in industries under public and regulatory scrutiny (Deegan, 2002; Cho et al., 2015). In this regard, the audit committees enhance legitimacy by ensuring ESG disclosures are credible, comprehensive, and responsive to external demands. The presence of independent, financially expert, and gender-diverse members is associated with better governance ratings and higher inclusion in sustainability indices (Kolk, 2008; Buallay, 2019). However, legitimacy theory also warns of the risk of symbolic compliance—producing ESG reports for reputational purposes without substantive improvements (Boiral, 2013; Michelon et al., 2015)—highlighting the importance of robust audit committee oversight. Drawing on these theoretical foundations, the study examines four audit committee characteristics that may affect ESG performance, such as independence, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity, as follows. 3.1 Hypotheses Development 3.1.1 Audit Committee Independence According to the agency theory argument, the independent audit committees are more likely to exercise objective oversight, free from managerial influence, thereby improving the transparency and reliability of ESG disclosures (Bronson et al., 2009 ). From a legitimacy theory perspective, independence signals impartial governance to external stakeholders, reducing skepticism about ESG claims. In this regard, Al-Shaer and Zaman ( 2018 ) found a positive link between independence and sustainability reporting quality in UK firms. While Raimo et al. (2021) observed similar patterns in European contexts. Moreover, during the COVID‐19 pandemic, independent committees were pivotal in maintaining ESG standards despite financial pressures (Broadstock et al., 2021 ). Empirical findings from developed and emerging economies repeatedly affirm the core importance of audit committee independence in stimulating ESG performance, though contextual differences shape the size and mechanism of this relationship. In the one hand, in developed economies, Al-Shaer and Zaman ( 2018 ) demonstrate that independent audit committees significantly increase the credibility of UK-listed company sustainability reports, suggesting that independence diminishes managerial bias and enhances stakeholder confidence. Similarly, Raimo et al. (2021), examining 13 EU nations between 2018 and 2020, finds a positive association between the independence of audit committees and ESG scores, whose effect amplifies during the COVID-19 pandemic—highlighting independence as a key governance resilience driver in periods of crisis. On the other hand, in emerging markets, the evidence also indicates positive correlation, though typically mediated by regulatory environments and governance maturity. Ahmed Haji and Mohd Ghazali ( 2013 ) attest to the fact that audit committee independence significantly improves CSR disclosure quality for Malaysian firms (Aman-Ullah et al., 2023 ), implying its role in advancing transparency levels in less developed ESG report settings. Moreover, Albitar et al. ( 2021 ) report that in the GCC context i.e., Bahrain and Kuwait a greater degree of audit committee independence is associated with higher levels of environmental and community disclosure in line with stakeholder and legitimacy theory predictions. In other countries such as Jordan, Al-Sa'eed (2018) formulates a meaningful link between audit committee independence and the quality of CSR disclosure for Amman Stock Exchange-listed companies. But in the Indonesian state-owned enterprises, evidence is brought forth by Setiany et al. (2017) that independence improves reporting on ESG-related issues. Collectively, these studies suggest that even though the favorable impact of audit committee independence on ESG performance is well-documented in diverse institutional contexts, its success in developed countries is precipitated by established regulatory frameworks and market monitoring, whereas in developing countries, it plays a more foundational role in institutionalizing ESG practices and compensating for inferior enforcement mechanisms. Based on this discussion, the proposed hypothesis is as follows: H 1 Audit committee independence is positively and significantly associated with ESG performance. 3.1.2 Audit Committee Financial Expertise Agency theory suggests that financially skilled audit committee members can better detect misreporting, assess ESG-related risks, and integrate sustainability into the firm’s reporting framework (Kent et al., 2010). Stakeholder theory reinforces this, as financially literate members can interpret complex ESG metrics and address the diverse informational needs of stakeholders. In this regard, Velte (2018) found that German firms with financially expert committees produced more accurate ESG disclosures. In addition, Shaukat et al. (2016) reported that financial expertise was linked to the integration of sustainability into corporate strategy. Microsoft’s audit committee, for example, uses financial ESG expertise to align climate targets with capital allocation. The Audit committee accounting knowledge (ACFE) has emerged to be increasingly defined as a central catalyst of effective monitoring of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Theoretically, ACFE enhances monitoring by upgraded information processing, bolstering obedience with complex disclosure rules, and enhancing internal control systems over non-financial disclosures (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). In developed economies, evidence is consistently documenting that financially literate committees with larger sizes are associated with improved ESG reporting quality. For instance, a cross-sectional study grounded on U.S. and European companies illustrates that financial/accounting expert within audit committees notably improve ESG disclosure scores simply by closer alignment of sustainability reporting with internal audit activities and more rigorous external assurance coordination (Dao et al., 2022; Jizi, 2017). Similarly, within the European setting, financial literacy has been observed to reduce sustainability reporting lags and improve the credibility of ESG disclosures within mandatory regimes (Velte, 2021). In developing countries, where institutional systems of ESG compliance remain relatively underdeveloped, ACFE appears to serve to supplement a deficient governance framework. Experience in Indonesia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries indicates specialist expertise within audit committees enhances ESG disclosure breadth and depth significantly, with particular emphasis laid on the role of the chairperson of the committee in determining ESG oversight agendas (Al-Ajmi et al., 2024; KNE Social Sciences, 2023). These findings highlight that the effectiveness of ACFE is not universal but conditional upon context variables such as regulatory enforcement, assurance market maturity, and cultural expectations regarding corporate disclosure. Critically, however, ACFE is not necessarily guaranteed to lead to stronger ESG outcomes universally. Some research cautions that expertise, without independence and adequate frequency of meetings, leads to symbolic compliance rather than substantial monitoring (Arslan et al., 2024). In addition, in extensively standardized ESG settings for jurisdictions (e.g., CSRD in the EU), the marginal utility of ACFE may be watered down with more significant roles from sustainability committees or chief sustainability officers. Collectively, the literature suggests that financial acumen is a necessary but not adequate condition for effective ESG governance whose performance is contingent upon broader institutional complementarities. According to the above discussion, the study proposed the following hypothesis: H 2 Audit committee financial expertise is positively and significantly associated with ESG performance. 3.1.3 Audit Committee Tenure The effect of tenure is theoretically ambiguous. Resource dependence and agency theory suggest that longer tenure improves oversight due to greater institutional knowledge (Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007), but prolonged tenure may also compromise independence and objectivity (Sharma & Iselin, 2012). Empirical results are mixed: Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado ( 2019 ) found a positive relationship between tenure and ESG disclosure in Spanish firms. On the other hand, Cucari et al. ( 2018 ) reported neutral or negative effects depending on governance conditions. Some global corporations, such as HSBC, balance experience and independence by rotating committee members to maintain fresh perspectives. The duration of audit committee members' tenures is another feature that has gained growing scholarly interest in the scope of ESG oversight. Longer tenures have been conceived by proponents as giving committee members longer-term knowledge specific to the firm, more solid relational capital with management, and more ability to monitor complex streams of sustainability information (Vafeas, 2003). Empirical evidence from mature markets documents a positive correlation between audit committee tenure and ESG performance, particularly when paired with financial expertise and independence (Dao et al., 2022). Such studies argue that pooled monitoring experience allows committees to identify inconsistencies in information, ensure uniformity in ESG programs, and facilitate the integration of sustainability issues within audit procedures. Yet, the connection between tenure and ESG is not linear. Highly regulated environments have condemned excessive tenure for creating complacency, reducing scrutiny, and strengthening management control over ESG narratives (Velte, 2021). In emerging markets, conversely, shorter tenure has been discovered to hinder ESG monitoring due to the steep learning curve in managing poor reporting frameworks and underdeveloped markets of assurance. Empirical evidence among Indonesian listed companies shows that more tenured audit committees are positively associated with the quality of sustainability disclosure because they provide stability to governance structures amid institutional voids (KNE Social Sciences, 2023). In GCC markets also, moderate tenure improves monitoring of ESG-related risks, particularly in state-owned enterprises where there is no external monitoring (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2019). The downside is that tenure has a two-bladed impact on ESG monitoring: consistency develops monitoring skill, but excessive longevity undermines objectivity. Tenure is thus best served by a staggered refreshment model, which balances institutional memory with the infusion of new thinking. The literature thus suggests an "inverted U-shaped" between audit committee tenure and ESG efficiency, emphasizing the importance of contextualizing optimal tenure in each regulatory and cultural context. According to the above discussion, the study proposed the following hypothesis: H 3 Audit committee tenure is significantly associated with ESG performance. 3.1.4 Gender Diversity in the Audit Committee Stakeholder theory argues that gender-diverse committees better reflect societal diversity and address a wider range of stakeholder concerns. Legitimacy theory suggests that visible diversity enhances external perceptions of fairness and inclusivity (Terjesen et al., 2009). Adams and Ferreira ( 2009 ) found that gender diversity improves monitoring intensity, while Bernardi and Threadgill ( 2010 ) linked it to stronger ethical oversight. Firms such as L’Oréal have credited diverse audit committees with strengthening their ESG credentials and earning recognition on global sustainability indices. On the other hand, the gender diversity on audit committees has been widely debated as a governance mechanism impacting ESG performance. The theoretical foundation is based on stakeholder and resource dependence theories, which recommend that women bring diverse viewpoints, enhanced risk aversion, and more stakeholder orientation, which cumulatively trigger improved ESG oversight (Hillman et al., 2007). Empirical evidence from developed countries provides strong support: firms with greater female representation on audit committees have improved ESG disclosure quality, more extensive environmental risk oversight, and a higher likelihood of engaging external assurance providers (Omenihu et al., 2025; Velte, 2021). Moreover, the Quasi-experiments of board gender quota legislation in Europe further confirm a causal enhancement of sustainability reporting credibility with females being appointed to oversight committees (Zhang et al., 2023). In developing settings, the role of women audit committee members appears even more critical. In addition, the empirical evidence from Indonesia and GCC countries highlights that the presence of women is positively associated with ESG disclosure quality, particularly when combined with financial experience or longer tenure (Al-Ajmi et al., 2024; KNE Social Sciences, 2023). These observations suggest that gender diversity has interaction effects with other committee attributes in influencing significant ESG impacts, rather than affecting them solo. Symbolic female presence without granting them leadership roles, however, limits their influence. Also, there is some evidence that where women are audit committee chairs or have oversight responsibility for sustainability reporting, the positive effect on ESG outcomes is stronger (Arslan et al., 2024). Above all, gender diversity is no panacea. Other research warns against tokenism, where the presence of a single female member has no notable effect on ESG disclosure credibility (Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ). The "critical mass" theory contends that meaningful impact is achieved only when women comprise at least 30–40% of the committee, as the tipping point where influence reaches beyond symbolic representation. Overall, while empirical results are more consistent with one another than for tenure, the literature points out that the effectiveness of audit committee gender diversity depends on both the presence of women and the substantive roles they play in the committee structure. According to the above discussion, the study proposed the following hypothesis: H 4 Audit committee gender diversity is positively and significantly associated with ESG performance. 4. Research Methodology This research aims to examine the attributes of audit committees in terms of French-listed firms' ESG performance. For this, the research has four hypotheses under the research ( H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , and H 4 ). The independent variables of the study model include independence of audit committees, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity. The dependent variable includes ESG performance. Following this, the data context, the model, and the definitions and measurements of the variables are established in the next section. Then, a test of the regression model will be carried out using a regression diagnostics test. 4.1 Sample and Data Collection The study sample consists of 36 non-financial firms listed on the CAC 40 index over a five-year period from 2018 to 2022. Financial firms were excluded due to their different governance and regulatory frameworks, which may affect the outcomes and the model setting under the study. The total panel comprises 180 firm-year observations. In addition, the ESG performance scores were gathered from the Refinitiv ESG database, a recognized and standardized source of ESG metrics. Audit committee characteristics and control variable information were collected manually from annual reports, corporate governance disclosures, and financial databases such as Bloomberg and Datastream . Care was taken to provide data consistency across the five years and fill in any missing values. The table below shows the sample description: Table 1 Sample Collection Procedure and Distribution Industry Two-digit SIC codes Frequency (%) Observations General building 15 2 5.55 10 Special trade 17 1 2.77 5 Food products 20 3 8.33 15 Textile mill products 22 1 2.77 5 Chemicals 28 6 16.66 30 Petroleum and coal 29 1 2.77 5 Rubber and plastics 30 1 2.77 5 Non metal products 32 3 8.33 15 Machinery and equipment 35 2 5.55 10 Electronic equipment 36 2 5.55 10 Instruments products 38 1 2.77 5 Truck transport 42 1 2.77 5 Telecommunications 48 4 11.11 20 Public utilities services 49 1 2.77 5 Wholesale trade-durables 50 1 2.77 5 Hotels and other lodging places 70 1 2.77 5 Business services 73 2 5.55 10 Social services 83 3 8.33 15 Total 36 100 180 4.2 Empirical models and variable measurement To validate the study objectives and examine the hypothesis under the study, the regression model is used in the equation Eq. [ 1 ]. The H 1 examines the association of audit committee independence and ESG performance. Also, the H 2 examines the association of audit committee financial expertise and ESG performance. In addition, the H 3 examines audit committee tenure and ESG performance. Finally, H 4 examines the association of audit committee gender diversity and ESG performance. The following model presented is the study framework and hypotheses under the study. Also, Table 2 explains the variables' measurement and symbols of each variable used in the study model. $$\:{ESG}_{i,t}={\beta\:}_{0}+{\beta\:}_{1}{ACI}_{i,t}+{{{\beta\:}_{2}FE}_{,it}+{\beta\:}_{3}\:{TAC}_{,it}+\:\beta\:}_{4}{GD}_{i,t}+{\beta\:}_{5}{BS}_{i,t}\:+{\beta\:}_{6}{FP}_{i,t}+{\beta\:}_{7}{Le}_{i,t}+{\beta\:}_{8}{Fs}_{i,t}+{\beta\:}_{9}{Sa}_{i,t}+{ϵ}_{i,t}..\varvec{E}\varvec{q}.\left[1\right]$$ Table 2 Variables and measurements Variable Symbol Measurement References Panel A: Dependent Variable ESG Performance ESG Composite ESG performance score obtained from Refinitiv. Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0–100. Masmoudi, 2024 ; Pozzoli et al., 2022 Panel B: Independent and Moderator Variables Audit Committee Independence ACI Percentage of independent members in the audit committee. Raimo et al. 2021 ; Broadstock et al. 2021 Financial Expertise FE Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience. Velte, 2018 ; Shaukat et al. 2016 Tenure Audit Committee TAC Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members. Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado, 2019 ; Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007 Gender Diversity GD Percentage of female members on the audit committee. Velte, 2018; Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ; Terjesen et al., 2009; Jo and Harjoto, 2012 Control Variables : Board Size BS Total number of board members. Tajuddin et al., 2024 ; Alsmady, 2023, 2018 Firm Profitability FP Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders’ Equity). Masmoudi & Barhoumi, 2023 Leverage Le Debt-to-Asset ratio. Li et al., 2023; Masmoudi, 2024 . Firm Size Fs Natural logarithm of total assets. Masmoudi & Barhoumi, 2023 ; Abbas et al, 2022 ; Abeysekera et al, 2020 ; Breuer et al., 2018 ; Madden et al., 2020 ; Ortas et al., 2018 Sales Sa Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue. Amaral et al. 1997 4.2.1 Dependent variable [ESG Performance] Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) encompasses a set of factors that shape a firm's capacity to implement its strategic objectives and sustain long-term value creation. Although frequently categorized as non-financial or extra-financial, the management of ESG dimensions exerts a demonstrable and quantifiable influence on financial performance. The discourse surrounding sustainability has progressively shifted from abstract and aspirational terminology, such as “sustainable,” towards more operationally grounded and strategically actionable concepts, such as “ESG.” Within this context, ESG reporting should be viewed not solely as an ethical imperative, but also as a financially motivated endeavor aimed at identifying best practices and achieving sustainable long-term outcomes that inform managerial decision-making (NASDAQ, ESG Reporting Guide 2.0, 2019: 4). This study examines the influence of audit committee characteristics on ESG performance, utilizing multiple explanatory variables. In this regard, following other previous researchers, the ESG performance is operationalized as a composite index derived from Refinitiv’s ESG metrics, which aggregate environmental, social, and governance scores to provide an integrated assessment of a firm’s sustainability practices (Pozzoli et al., 2022 ). Elevated ESG ratings are indicative of effective management of ESG-related risks and opportunities elements increasingly recognized as fundamental to the preservation and enhancement of long-term corporate value (Friede et al., 2015 ). 4.2.2 Independent variables of audit committee characteristics 4.2.2.1 Audit Committee Independence Moreover, the first independent variable used in the above model is Audit Committee Independence (ACI). The ACI is defined as the percentage of independent members on the audit committee. According to Al-Shaer & Zaman ( 2018 ), independence is essential for guaranteeing objective monitoring and eliminating conflicts of interest, especially in the context of ESG disclosures, where management may be tempted to offer an unduly positive perspective of performance. Therefore, independent committees are thought to improve the legitimacy of sustainability reporting by offering fair evaluations, hence increasing stakeholder trust (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2018 ). 4.2.1.2 Financial Expertise In the current study, the Financial Expertise (FE) refers to the percentage of audit committee members who have professional qualifications or appropriate financial expertise. Kent et al., (2010) stated that this variable is important because financially literate members are better prepared to traverse complicated ESG indicators, analyze associated risks, and assure the accuracy of sustainability reporting (Kent et al., 2010; Velte, 2018). Thus, the presence of financial expertise on the committee is associated with higher reporting quality and better alignment of financial and ESG initiatives (Shaukat et al. 2016). 4.2.1.3 Tenure Audit Committee Also, the current study has the Tenure Audit Committee (TAC) variable, which measures the average length of service of committee members. Tenure has a mixed impact on oversight efficacy; while longer tenure might contribute to increased institutional expertise and continuity in governance (Rutherford & Buchholtz, 2007). In addition, it can lead to complacency and impaired objectivity over time (Sharma and Iselin, 2012). Therefore, this paradox implies that tenure must be carefully managed to balance experience with new perspectives. 4.2.1.4 Gender Diversity Finally, this study model has the Gender diversity (GD), which is measured as the proportion of female audit committee members. In this regard, the diverse committees are thought to reflect a greater range of opinions, potentially improving ethical monitoring and responsiveness to social and environmental challenges (Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ; Terjesen et al., 2009; Velte, 2018). According to the previous research, gender-diverse boards are more likely to implement complete ESG initiatives because they excel at incorporating varied stakeholder interests into corporate governance (Jo & Harjoto, 2012). 4.2.3 Control variables The current study adds several control variables, such as Board Size (BS) (Alsmady, 2023, 2018), which represents the total number of board members. The previous studies have two different views on this point (Coles et al. 2008a, 2008b) regarding the board size, some argued that larger boards can provide a different experience and improve decision-making, but they can also face coordination and efficiency issues (Yermack, 1996). In addition, Firm Profitability (FP), measured as Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders' Equity), is included to account for the financial resources available for ESG activities, as profitable businesses are more likely to invest in sustainability (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Moreover, the Leverage (Le), also known as the Debt-to-Asset ratio, reflects a company's financial structure and risk profile; higher leverage might limit a company's ability to invest in ESG activities due to increasing financial responsibilities (Li et al., 2023). Then, the Firm Size (Fs) is represented by the natural logarithm of total assets, serving as a proxy for the scale of operations and resource availability for implementing ESG practices (Abeysekera et al., 2020). Lastly, Sales (Sa), calculated as the natural logarithm of annual sales revenue, reveals a company's market position and strategic priorities, which can impact its commitment to ESG performance (Pozzoli et al., 2022 ). 5. Results and Discussions 5.1 Diagnostics test This diagnostic test is used to verify whether the chosen statistical method in the current study is the most appropriate and to ensure the model meets the core assumptions for valid inference. This involves testing for multicollinearity , heteroskedasticity , autocorrelation , model specification , normality , cross-sectional dependence , and potential endogeneity . Table 3 Diagnostics test Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) (Multicollinearity) Variable VIF 1/VIF ACI 1.79 0.559 FE 1.25 0.798 TAC 1.13 0.888 GD 1.37 0.728 BS 1.78 0.561 FP 1.23 0.816 Le 1.78 0.560 Fs 1.33 0.749 Sa 1.79 0.560 Mean VIF 1.5 The Breusch–Pagan and White tests (Heteroskedasticity) Test χ² Stat p-value Breusch–Pagan 15.47 0.017 ** White 28.92 0.008 ** Wooldridge Test f (Autocorrelation) Test F Stat p-value Wooldridge AR(1) 1.87 0.196 Model Specification (Ramsey RESET Test) Test F Stat p-value RESET 1.12 0.342 Jarque–Bera test (Normality Test) Test JB Stat p-value Jarque–Bera 3.21 0.2 Pesaran CD (Cross-Sectional Dependence Test) Test CD Stat p-value Pesaran CD 0.94 0.347 Durbin–Wu–Hausman (Endogeneity) Test χ² Stat p-value Durbin–Wu–Hausman 1.63 0.202 Note : ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable = Composite ESG performance score obtained from Refinitiv . Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0–100; ACI is Audit Committee Independence = Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise = Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee = Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity = Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size = Total number of board members; FP is Firm Profitability = Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders’ Equity); Le is Leverage = Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size = Natural logarithm of total assets and Sa is Sales = Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue. * , ** , *** Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Multicollinearity test, Variance Inflation Factors ( VIF ), was calculated for all independent variables. The VIF for all explanatory variables was well below the threshold of 5, with a mean VIF of 1.50. This indicates that the independent variables are not excessively correlated, ensuring that coefficient estimates are stable and not inflated by multicollinearity. The low VIF values also imply that the model’s estimates are unlikely to suffer from variance distortions due to redundant predictors. In addition, the Heteroskedasticity Both the Breusch–Pagan and White tests rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (p < 0.05), confirming the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error terms. This violation of the constant variance assumption justifies the adoption of Generalized Least Squares ( GLS ) estimation, which corrects for heteroskedasticity and produces more efficient and unbiased standard errors compared to conventional OLS. Next, the Serial Correlation assumption of regression analysis. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data failed to reject the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation (p > 0.05). This suggests that the residuals are not serially dependent across time within each cross-sectional unit, supporting the validity of the GLS estimates and avoiding efficiency losses that would arise from autocorrelated errors. In addition, the Model Specification test. The Ramsey RESET test indicated no evidence of model misspecification (p > 0.05). This implies that the model’s functional form is correctly specified and that there is no strong indication of omitted variables or inappropriate transformations of the existing predictors. In addition, the Normality of residuals test of the Jarque–Bera test results (p > 0.05) suggests that the residuals are approximately normally distributed. This supports the validity of the model’s inference procedures, particularly for hypothesis testing, and reduces concerns about non-normality affecting the reliability of t- and z-statistics. Finally, the Cross-Sectional Dependence Pesaran CD test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (p > 0.05). This means that shocks or unobserved factors affecting one cross-sectional unit (e.g., a firm) are not systematically related to those affecting other units, strengthening the case for the independence of the residual structure. Moreover, several previous researchers highlighted the governance variables Endogeneity, thus the current study conducted the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test revealed no significant evidence of endogeneity (p > 0.05) among the governance variables, such as audit committee characteristics, under the current study. This indicates that the explanatory variables are not systematically correlated with the error term, reducing the risk of biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. As such, the model’s results can be interpreted as having a causal direction consistent with the theoretical framework. Overall, the diagnostic tests confirm that while heteroskedasticity is present—necessitating GLS estimation—the other core assumptions of regression analysis hold. There is no evidence of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, model misspecification, cross-sectional dependence, or endogeneity. The model is therefore well-specified, and the GLS estimates are both efficient and reliable. 5.2 Descriptive Statistics Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The mean ESG score across the sample is 77.62 (out of 100), with a standard deviation of 9.32, indicating generally high ESG performance among CAC 40 firms, though some variation exists (min = 49.68, max = 94.31). Such results align with findings by Eccles et al. ( 2014 ), which also report high ESG scores in firms with robust governance structures. Additionally, the average audit committee independence is 78.32%, suggesting a strong adherence to governance guidelines; consistent with research by Al-Shaer and Zaman ( 2018 ), who emphasize that independent committees enhance sustainability reporting quality. Moreover, the average gender diversity of 44% on audit committees reflecting moderate female representation, which in line with findings from Terjesen et al. (2009), who argue that higher gender diversity, correlates with improved governance and enhanced ESG outcomes. This comparative analysis underscores the importance of strong governance mechanisms in promoting sustainability practices and highlights the ongoing need for increased diversity within corporate governance structures to further enhance ESG performance. The findings indicate that the average financial expertise ratio among audit committee members is 82.7%, coupled with an average tenure of 5.04 years, showing a range of 1 to 12 years. This high level of financial expertise is consistent with research by Velte (2018), who argues that greater financial literacy within audit committees leads to improved oversight and better decision-making, particularly in relation to ESG performance. The average tenure of 5.04 years suggests a reasonable level of stability within the committees, which aligns with studies by Sharma and Iselin (2012), who contend that moderate tenure can foster effective governance by balancing continuity and fresh perspectives. However, the variability in tenure (ranging from 1 to 12 years) raises questions about the potential for complacency, as noted in the literature. Longer tenures may lead to entrenched views, potentially hindering innovative approaches to sustainability (Klein et al., 2018). This comparison highlights the importance of both financial expertise and appropriate tenure lengths in shaping effective audit committee dynamics, ultimately influencing the firm's ESG performance outcomes. Control variables show that board size, firm profitability, and firm size vary considerably. Notably, the average board size is near 14 members, with a standard deviation of 2.56. This indicates that firms tend to have relatively large boards, which may facilitate diverse perspectives but could also pose challenges related to coordination and decision-making. Also, return on equity (mean = 10.95%) spans from large negative values (–63%) to high profitability (142.15%), suggesting financial volatility across firms. The average firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, is 17.49. This consistent measurement provides a standardized way to assess the scale of operations across firms. In addition, for Leverage (Le), the average debt-to-asset ratio is 0.616, with a standard deviation of 0.172. This indicates a moderate level of leverage among firms, suggesting that firms are likely to have a balanced approach to debt and equity financing. Finally, Sales (Sa) indicates that the average sales revenue, also measured as the natural logarithm, is 2.90. This indicates a general level of market activity, with variability suggesting differences in market position among the firms. Overall, the descriptive statistics provide valuable insights into the characteristics of the sample firms, highlighting trends in governance, financial performance, and ESG practices that are relevant for understanding the study's findings. Table 4 Descriptive Statistics Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max ESG Score 77.623 9.323 49.68 94.31 ACI 0.783 0.201 0.142 1 FE 0.827 0.378 0 1 TAC 5.044 2.509 1 12 GD 0.440 0.082 0.181 0.642 BS 13.511 2.564 6 19 FP 10.947 17.306 -63 142.15 Le 0.616 0.172 0.215 1.201 Fs 17.494 0.988 16 19 Sa 2.900 2.550 1.330 1.980 Note : ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable = Composite ESG performance score obtained from Refinitiv. Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0–100; ACI is Audit Committee Independence = Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise = Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience ; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee = Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity = Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size = Total number of board members. FP is Firm Profitability = Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders’ Equity); Le is Levearage = Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size = Natural logarithm of total assets ; Sa is Sales = Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue. 5.3 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics Table 5 summarizes the correlation matrix results. It shows that there is no critical multicollinearity issues with the data supplied. According to prior research (Asteriou and Hall, 2007; Mason & Perreault, 1991), values less than 90% do not present problems in regression analysis. Table 5 reveals a positive and significant correlation between ESG performance and audit committee independence (r = 0.377, p < 0.01), and between ESG and financial expertise (r = 0.165, p < 0.05). These align with findings by Al-Shaer and Zaman ( 2018 ) and Velte (2018), who also found a positive impact of independence on sustainability reporting quality, and suggest stronger links between financial literacy and improved ESG outcomes, respectively. In addition, the relationship between ESG and tenure is weaker and discloses a positive and significant correlation (r = 0.079, p < 0.10). Nevertheless, the relationship between ESG and gender diversity is negative and statistically insignificant, suggesting limited direct influence. These results suggest that prolonged tenure may lead to complacency (Sharma and Iselin, 2012), while the impact of gender diversity may depend on the critical mass theory (Adams and Ferreira, 2009 ). Significant positive correlations also exist between ESG performance and board size (r = 0.587, p < 0.001) and firm size (r = 0.235, p < 0.001), consistent with the notion that larger boards and firms have greater resources and pressures to implement ESG strategies. This is consistent with Zaman et al. (2011) who argue that diverse boards enhance governance effectiveness. Firm Profitability and Leverage is negatively associated with ESG, hinting that financially constrained firms may underinvest in sustainability. These findings align with Eccles et al. ( 2014 ) who propose a non-linear relationship, where profitability may not directly lead to enhanced ESG performance but rather depends on other governance factors. In addition, Li et al. (2023) argue that financially constrained firms often focus on short-term solvency, which can hinder their commitment to ESG initiatives. Similarly, El Ghoul et al. ( 2011 ) found that high leverage negatively impacts ESG performance, reinforcing the notion that debt levels can limit investment in sustainability. Lastly, Sales is positively associated with ESG (r = 0.185, p < 0.05) suggesting that firms with higher revenue may also perform better in ESG metrics, as financial resources can facilitate increased investment in sustainability initiatives. This aligns with findings from Amaral et al. ( 1997 ), who indicate that while sales can reflect a firm’s market position, they do not necessarily correlate with ESG performance. Overall, the correlation matrix highlights significant relationships, particularly the strong positive correlation between ESG performance and audit committee independence (ACI) and board size (BS). These findings suggest that governance structures play a crucial role in influencing firms' ESG strategies and outcomes, while also indicating areas where further research could explore the nuances of these relationships. Table 5 Correlation Matrix ESG ACI FE TAC GD BS FP Le Fs Sa ESG 1 ACI 0.377 *** 1 FE 0.165 ** 0.105 1 TAC 0.079 * 0.089 * 0.196 *** 1 GD -0.108 -0.238 *** -0.285 *** -0.084 1 BS 0.587 *** 0.605 *** 0.280 *** 0.037 -0.285 *** 1 FP -0.025 -0.012 0.171 ** -0.008 0.080 -0.098 1 Le -0.041 -0.134 ** 0.202 *** -0.082 -0.199 *** 0.085 -0.375 *** 1 Fs 0.235 *** 0.433 *** 0.010 -0.008 0.044 -0.463 *** -0.026 0.057 1 Sa 0.185 ** -0.131 ** 0.131 ** 0.048 -0.331 *** -0.028 0.087 0.153 ** 0.199 *** 1 Note : ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable = Composite ESG performance score obtained from Refinitiv . Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0–100; ACI is Audit Committee Independence = Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise = Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee = Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity = Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size = Total number of board members. FP is Firm Profitability = Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders’ Equity); Le is Leverage = Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size = Natural logarithm of total assets; Sa is Sales = Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue. * , ** , *** Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 5.3 Regression Results The regression results are presented in Table 6 , which presents the results of the audit committee characteristics on ESG performance. The regression analysis indicates that 45.33% of the variability in ESG performance can be explained by the audit committee characteristics and control variables included in the model. This suggests a level of explanatory power, highlighting the relevance of these independent variables in influencing ESG outcomes. However, the Adjusted R-squared ( R 2 ) value reflects that 41.05% of the variance in ESG performance is explained when considering the potential overfitting that can occur with additional variables. These coefficients imply that the model maintains a good fit without being overly complex, reinforcing the robustness of the identified relationships between audit committee characteristics, such as independence and gender diversity, and ESG performance. The coefficient for audit committee independence is 0.043 (p = 0.081), indicating a positive and significant relationship with ESG performance at 10% level which confirms the first hypothesis under the study ( H 1 ). This supports agency theory, which posits that independent audit committees enhance oversight and reduce managerial bias in reporting (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This finding aligns with Al-Shaer and Zaman ( 2018 ), who also found that independence, improves the quality of sustainability disclosures. In testing hypothesis ( H 2 ), the coefficient for financial expertise is 1.048 (p = 0.429), showing no significant relationship with ESG performance. This contrasts with literature suggesting that financial expertise enhances ESG reporting quality (Kent et al., 2010; Velte, 2018). The lack of significance in these findings may indicate that financial knowledge alone does not suffice for effective ESG governance, highlighting the need for contextual factors, such as regulatory frameworks and stakeholder engagement. Also, the Tenure Audit Committee (TAC) has a negative coefficient (-0.177, p = 0.139), indicating that longer tenure may be associated with lower ESG performance, but the relationship is not statistically significant, suggesting that experience alone does not guarantee effective oversight. The significant and negative relationship between AC tenure and ESG performance confirms that a long board tenure leads to increased familiarity, which undermines the effectiveness of control activities, according to previous audit quality literature (Sharma and Iselin, 2012; Setiany et al., 2017). As a result, prolonged AC tenure diminishes attention to ESG initiatives. The findings are consistent with prior research on audit quality, indicating that a long tenure has a negative impact on the auditor's independence (Carey and Simnett, 2006; Chi et al., 2009). Following this line of reasoning, these findings did not support H 3 . As a result, the analysis of AC tenure contributes to the AC literature by investigating the relationship between AC tenure and ESG performance. Moreover, the hypotheses number ( H 4 ) examine the Gender Diversity (GD) effect on ESG performance, the results indicate a strong positive relationship (coefficient = 0.163, p = 0.000), which shows that greater gender diversity on the audit committee is significantly associated with improved ESG performance, reinforcing the idea that diverse perspectives enhance governance related to sustainability. This finding supports stakeholder theory, which advocates diverse perspectives in governance (Freeman, 1984 ). It is consistent with Adams and Ferreira ( 2009 ), who found that gender diversity improves ethical oversight. The results reinforce calls for increased representation of women in corporate governance roles. Therefore, the findings accept hypothesis H 4 . Concerning control variables, Board Size (BS) has a significant and positive relationship with ESG performance (coefficient = 0.242, p = 0.000), suggests that larger boards are positively associated with better ESG performance, likely due to the diverse expertise available for implementing ESG strategies. These findings support the notion that larger boards and firms possess greater resources and diverse expertise, facilitating effective ESG governance (Zaman et al., 2011). For Firm Profitability (FP), it indicates no significant impact of profitability on ESG performance (coefficient = -0.012, p = 0.416), suggesting that profitability alone does not drive sustainability efforts. This aligns with studies that propose a non-linear relationship between profitability and sustainability (Eccles et al., 2014 ). In addition, leverage (Le) has a significant negative relationship (coefficient = -6.819, p = 0.031) and indicates that higher leverage is associated with lower ESG performance, implying that firms with more debt may prioritize financial obligations over sustainability initiatives. This supports the outcomes of Li et al. (2023). Moreover, Firm Size (Fs) reveals a strong positive relationship (coefficient = 2.093, p = 0.000), which indicates that larger firms tend to perform better in ESG metrics, likely due to more resources being available for sustainability initiatives. Lastly, Sales (Sa) suggests a positive but statistically insignificant relationship (coefficient = 2.250, p = 0.133), indicating that sales revenue may not have a direct impact on ESG performance. Overall, the regression results reveal that audit committee independence and gender diversity are significant predictors of ESG performance, while financial expertise and tenure do not show strong associations. Additionally, board size and firm size positively correlates with ESG outcomes, whereas leverage negatively impacts performance. These findings underscore the importance of effective governance structures in enhancing sustainability practices within firms. Table 6 Generalized least squares regression (GLSR) ESG Coefficient Std. err. P>|z| ACI 0.043 0.024 0.081 * FE 1.048 1.324 0.429 TAC -0.177 0.119 0.139 GD 0.163 0.039 0.000 ** BS 0.242 0.030 0.000 ** FP -0.012 0.015 0.416 Le -6.819 3.165 0.031 * Fs 2.093 0.576 0.000 ** Sa 2.250 1.500 0.133 _cons 20.862 10.890 0.055 * Obs. R-squared = Adj R-squared = Prob > F = 180 0.4533 0.4105 0.0000*** Note : ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable = Composite ESG performance score obtained from Refinitiv . Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0–100 ; ACI is Audit Committee Independence = Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise = Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee = Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity = Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size = Total number of board members. FP is Firm Profitability = Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders’ Equity); Le is Levearage = Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size = Natural logarithm of total assets; Sa is Sales = Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue. * , ** , *** Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 5.4 Interpretation and Comparison with Literature The regression results highlight significant relationships between specific audit committee characteristics and ESG performance, aligning with existing literature while also contributing new insights into the governance of sustainability. First , agency theory emphasizes that ACI is essential for impartial monitoring and minimizing information asymmetry between stakeholders and management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since independent members are less susceptible to managerial influence, ESG-related disclosures and practices may be subject to strict supervision (Khan et al., 2013). Moreover, the positive coefficient for ACI in this study (0.043) suggests that a higher proportion of independent members on audit committees enhances ESG performance, albeit marginally significant (p = 0.081). This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that independence fosters objective oversight and reduces the influence of management biases in sustainability reporting (Al-Shaer & Zaman, 2018 ; Raimo et al., 2021). Such independence is vital in ensuring that ESG disclosures are credible and reliable, particularly in contexts where management may be tempted to engage in "greenwashing" (Boiral, 2013). Second , Audit Committee Financial Expertise (FE) reflects the committee’s capacity to understand complex financial and non-financial information. According to earlier studies, members with financial expertise improve reporting quality and guarantee the integrity of sustainability reporting, which promotes ESG transparency (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). In this study, the lack of a significant relationship between financial expertise and ESG performance contrasts with studies that emphasize the importance of financial literacy in enhancing the quality of sustainability disclosures (Kent et al., 2010; Velte, 2018). While some literature suggests that financially skilled committee members are better positioned to oversee complex ESG metrics, this study also indicates that more presence does not guarantee effective governance in ESG matters. This discrepancy may arise from the unique corporate governance context in France, where other factors may play a more critical role in shaping ESG outcomes. Third , Audit Committee Tenure (TAC) captures the effect of experience and continuity in oversight functions. Longer tenure can increase institutional expertise and efficiency (Vafeas, 2003), but too long service can weaken independence and breed complacency, which can have both positive and negative effects on ESG supervision. In this study, the tenure of the audit committee presents a negative coefficient, suggesting that longer tenure may be detrimental to ESG performance, although not statistically significant. This finding resonates with literature indicating that prolonged tenure can lead to complacency and reduced oversight (Sharma & Iselin, 2012). In contrast, some studies argue that experience enhances institutional knowledge and governance effectiveness (Vafeas, 2003). The mixed findings highlight the need for firms to balance continuity with fresh perspectives in governance structures. Fourth , more discussion that is thorough and ethical awareness have been associated with gender diversity (GD) on the audit committee (Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ). Having more women on the board could encourage wider stakeholder considerations and bring business practices into line with ESG guidelines. In this study, the strong positive relationship between gender diversity and ESG performance supports existing literature that associates diverse boards with improved ethical oversight and responsiveness to stakeholder concerns (Adams & Ferreira, 2009 ; Terjesen et al., 2009). This finding underscores the value of incorporating varied perspectives in decision-making processes related to sustainability, reinforcing calls for increased diversity in corporate governance. These findings support the hypotheses (H 1 and H 4 ). Control variables—Board Size (BS), Firm Profitability (FP), Leverage (Le), Firm Size (Fs), and Sales (Sa)—are incorporated to mitigate omitted variable bias. However, Board Size (BS) shows a significant positive effect on ESG performance (coefficient = 0.242, p = 0.000). These outcomes align with research suggesting that larger boards can provide a broader array of expertise and resources necessary for effective ESG oversight (Zaman et al., 2011). However, it also raises questions about potential coordination challenges that may arise with larger boards, as noted by Yermack (1996). For Leverage (Le), the results present a negative association between leverage and ESG performance (coefficient = − 6.819, p = 0.031) which is consistent with literature suggesting that financially constrained firms may prioritize debt obligations over sustainability initiatives (Li et al., 2023). This finding highlights the importance of financial stability in enabling firms to invest in ESG practices. Moreover, the strong positive relationship between firm size and ESG performance (coefficient = 2.093, p = 0.000) corroborates findings that larger firms often have more resources to allocate to sustainability efforts (Abeysekera et al., 2020). This result emphasizes the correlation between corporate scale and the capacity for effective ESG implementation. A thorough analysis of how audit committee attributes impact ESG performance while taking firm-level heterogeneity into account is made possible by the model's integration of these variables, which is consistent with both agency theory and resource dependence theory. In summary, while the findings affirm several established relationships in the literature, they also highlight the complexities of governance in the French corporate context. The unique institutional and regulatory environment in France may shape the dynamics between audit committee characteristics and ESG performance differently than in Anglo-American contexts, warranting further investigation into the specific drivers of sustainability governance. 6. Conclusion and Implications This study explored how audit committee attributes affected the ESG performance of non-financial companies included on the CAC 40 index in France between 2018 and 2022. The study concentrated on four important audit committee characteristics: independence, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity. These were placed within the larger framework of agency theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Suchman, 1995). To guarantee thorough assessment, firm-level controls were also included, including size of board, profitability, leverage, size of firm, and sales. This study offers fresh empirical insights into ESG governance mechanisms in the little-studied French environment by using panel data and a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression approach (Nekhili et al., 2016; Michelon et al., 2015). The empirical results reveal that audit committee independence and gender diversity exert the most substantial and statistically significant positive effects on ESG performance. This supports earlier findings that ESG monitoring methods that are inclusive and structurally anchored increase sustainable results (Post & Byron, 2015; Eccles et al., 2014 ). In line with research highlighting the importance of female involvement in corporate governance, gender diversity in particular shows up as a strong predictor of non-financial performance (Galbreath, 2018 ; Terjesen et al., 2009). In addition to meeting legal and ethical requirements, a gender-diverse board improves stakeholder responsiveness and committee oversight. In line with studies by Al-Shaer and Zaman ( 2018 ) and Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), which indicate that structural autonomy enhances the quality of non-financial disclosure, the audit committee's independence also has a beneficial effect, albeit one that is significant. On the other hand, tenure and financial expertise did not show any discernible effects, suggesting that typical governance abilities alone might not be enough to promote ESG changes. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Velte (2018) and Shamil et al. (2014), who pointed out that for financial literacy to be effective, it needs to be supplemented with ESG-specific training or frameworks. According to Cucari et al. ( 2018 ) and Sharma and Iselin (2012), tenure may have a limited influence because of entrenchment effects over time, which could weaken objectivity and decrease the effectiveness of supervision. In accordance with the findings, board size, firm size, and leverage emerge as key determinants influencing ESG performance. Due to institutional scrutiny, reputation management incentives, and easier access to resources, larger companies typically perform better on ESG dimensions (Chih et al., 2010 ; Jo & Harjoto, 2011). High levels of leverage, on the other hand, have a detrimental impact on ESG performance, indicating that financially strapped companies can put short-term solvency ahead of long-term sustainability (El Ghoul et al., 2011 ; Li & Zhao, 2019). These findings demonstrate that both financial influence company ESG trajectories and governance issues, particularly when external pressures like the COVID-19 pandemic are present (Albitar et al., 2021 ; Broadstock et al., 2021 ). From a theoretical perspective, this study demonstrates that ESG performance may be explained by a combination of legitimacy-seeking behavior (Suchman, 1995), stakeholder responsiveness (Husted & de Sousa-Filho, 2017), and internal governance structures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In nations like France, where stakeholder rights and ESG compliance are legally ingrained, the triangulation of these frameworks offers a comprehensive understanding of how audit committee structures function within larger institutional and social expectations (Nekhili et al., 2016; Comyns & Figge, 2015 ). 6.1 Policy and Practical Implications The findings of this study carry significant policy and practical implications for regulators, corporate boards, and stakeholders involved in sustainability governance. First, the positive impact of audit committee independence and gender diversity on ESG performance underscores the need for regulatory frameworks that promote these characteristics within corporate governance structures. Policymakers could consider legislating a minimum number of independent members and promoting gender diversity on audit committees, as has been done in other countries (European Commission, 2012; Securities and Exchange Commission, 2020). Furthermore, organizations should prioritize audit committee members' training and development to improve their grasp of ESG concerns, given that financial competence did not significantly improve ESG outcomes in this study (Kent et al., 2010). This emphasizes the need for specific governance procedures that address the unique difficulties and demands of sustainability in today's business environment. Furthermore, the negative relationship between leverage and ESG performance suggests that policymakers should encourage financial stability among firms, possibly through tax breaks or grants for sustainable investments, to foster a stronger commitment to ESG initiatives (Li et al., 2023). Overall, these consequences argue for a comprehensive approach to corporate governance that incorporates sustainability into audit committees' basic tasks, establishing a culture of accountability and openness that is critical for long-term value generation. 6.2 Limitations and Future Research The current study suffers from several significant limitations even though it offers insightful information on the connection between audit committee attributes and ESG performance. First, the sample is restricted to non-financial firms listed on the French CAC 40 index, which may limit the generalizability of the findings to other sectors and markets. Second, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits causal inferences. Longitudinal studies could provide deeper insights into how changes in audit committee characteristics over time influence ESG performance, particularly during periods of crisis or regulatory change (Broadstock et al., 2021 ). Moreover, while this study focuses on specific audit committee characteristics, other factors such as organizational culture, stakeholder engagement strategies, and external pressures from investors or regulators may also play significant roles in shaping ESG outcomes. Future research could adopt a multi-dimensional approach, incorporating these variables into the analysis to provide a more holistic view of ESG governance. Future research could examine a number of important topics to improve knowledge of the connection between audit committee attributes and ESG performance. First, broadening the geographic focus to encompass a variety of areas and industries would offer insightful information about how cultural and legal variations affect the efficacy of governance in sustainable initiatives. Furthermore, by tracking changes in audit committee dynamics over time, longitudinal research could demonstrate how these structures adjust to changing regulatory constraints and market conditions. Last, incorporating qualitative techniques—like interviewing audit committee members—would improve knowledge of decision-making procedures and relationships and provide insight into how these elements affect ESG performance and supervision. Eventually, while this study lays the groundwork for understanding the role of audit committees in ESG performance, addressing these limitations and pursuing the suggested avenues for future research will deepen insights into effective governance in sustainability. Declarations Author Contribution A.B wrote the manuscript Acknowledgement We are deeply grateful to the reviewers for their valuable feedback and thoughtful recommendations, which helped us strengthen and refine this paper Data Availability The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. No conflict of interest statement. No funding received. Clinical trial number: Not applicable. Ethics, Consent to Participate, and Consent to Publish declarations: not applicable. The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request. References Abbas YA, Mehmood W, Lazim YY, Aman-Ullah A. Sustainability reporting and corporate reputation of Malaysian IPO companies. Environ Sci Pollut Res. 2022;29(52):78726–38. Adams RB, Ferreira D. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. J Financ Econ. 2009;94(2):291–309. AFEP-MEDEF Code. 2022, « Code de gouvernement d’entreprise des sociétés cotées », afep, Mouvement des Entreprises de France, 45 pages. Ahmed Haji A, Mohd Ghazali NA. A longitudinal examination of intellectual capital disclosures and corporate governance attributes in Malaysia. Asian Rev Acc. 2013;21(1):27–52. Albitar K, Hussainey K, Kolade N, Gerged AM. ESG disclosure and COVID-19: A comparative study of US and European firms. Technol Forecast Soc Chang. 2021;166:120455. Al-Shaer H, Zaman M. Credibility of sustainability reports: The contribution of audit committees. Bus Strategy Environ. 2018;27(7):973–86. Aman-Ullah A, Mehmood W, Amin S, Abbas YA. Human capital and organizational performance: A moderation study through innovative leadership. J Innov Knowl. 2022;7(4):100261. Aman-Ullah A, Ali A, Mehmood W, Fareed M, Aman-Ullah A. Corporate social responsibility and patient’s intention to revisit: a serial mediation study witnessing the healthcare sector. Environ Sci Pollut Res. 2023;30(8):22078–88. Amaral LAN, Buldyrev SV, Havlin S, Leschhorn H, Maass P, Salinger MA, Stanley MH. Scaling behavior in economics: I. Empirical results for company growth. J Phys I. 1997;7(4):621–33. Arellano M, Bover O. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. J Econ. 1995;68(1):29–51. Bernardi RA, Threadgill VH. Women directors and corporate social responsibility. J Bus Ethics. 2010;92(1):111–26. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0145-9 . Blundell R, Bond S. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. J Econ. 1998;87(1):115–43. Brammer S, Pavelin S. Factors influencing the quality of corporate environmental disclosure. Bus Strategy Environ. 2008;17(2):120–36. Bravo F, Reguera-Alvarado N. Do independent directors behave differently to enhance corporate social responsibility? Corp Soc Responsib Environ Manag. 2019;26(1):57–70. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1659 . Broadstock DC, Chan K, Cheng LTW, Wang X. The role of ESG performance during times of financial crisis: Evidence from COVID-19 in China. Finance Res Lett. 2021;38:101716. Bronson SN, Carcello JV, Hollingsworth CW, Neal TL. Are fully independent audit committees really necessary? J Account Public Policy. 2009;28(4):265–80. Buchetti B, Arduino FR, Perdichizzi S. A literature review on corporate governance and ESG research: Emerging trends and future directions. Int Rev Financial Anal. 2025;97:103759. Chih HL, Shen CH, Kang FC. Corporate social responsibility, investor protection, and earnings management: Some international evidence. J Bus Ethics. 2010;96(2):155–69. Comyns B, Figge F. Greenhouse gas reporting quality in the oil and gas industry: A longitudinal study using the typology of 'search', 'experience' and 'credence' information. Acc Auditing Account J. 2015;28(3):403–33. Cucari N, De Falco E, S., Orlando B. Diversity of board of directors and environmental social governance: Evidence from Italian listed companies. Corp Soc Responsib Environ Manag. 2018;25(3):250–66. Dhaliwal DS, Li OZ, Tsang A, Yang YG. Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and the cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting. Acc Rev. 2011;86(1):59–100. Eccles RG, Klimenko S. The investor revolution. Harvard Business Rev. 2019;97(3):106–16. Eccles RG, Ioannou I, Serafeim G. The impact of corporate sustainability on organizational processes and performance. Manage Sci. 2014;60(11):2835–57. El Ghoul S, Guedhami O, Kwok CCY, Mishra DR. Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital? J Banking Finance. 2011;35(9):2388–406. Fatemi A, Glaum M, Kaiser S. ESG performance and firm value: The moderating role of disclosure. Glob Financ J. 2018;38:45–64. Freeman RB. Longitudinal analyses of the effects of trade unions. J Labor Econ. 1984;2(1):1–26. Friede G, Busch T, Bassen A. ESG and financial performance: Aggregated evidence from more than 2000 empirical studies. J Sustainable Finance Invest. 2015;5(4):210–33. Galbreath J. Is board gender diversity linked to financial performance? The mediating mechanism of CSR. Bus Soc. 2018;57(5):863–89. García-Sánchez IM, Martínez-Ferrero J, García-Benau MA. Integrated reporting: The mediating role of the board of directors’ gender diversity on corporate social responsibility performance. Bus Strategy Environ. 2019;28(7):1618–31. Khan MA, Newar K. (2024). Sustainable Financial Strategies: Analyzing the Role of ESG in Corporate Financial Performance and Risk Management. J Acad Sci, 1(6). LaPorta RL, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny RW. Law and finance. J Polit Econ. 1998;106(6):1113–55. Masmoudi S. Evaluating the effects of ESG reporting on earnings management in an emerging economy. J Acc Manage Inform Syst. 2024;23(3):507–30. Masmoudi S, Barhoumi J. The impact of corporate social responsibility disclosure on firm value: The moderating role of board gender diversity in French companies. J Commer Acc Res. 2023;12(1):39. Ooghe H, De Langhe T. The Anglo-American versus the Continental European corporate governance model: empirical evidence of board composition in Belgium. Eur Bus Rev. 2002;14(6):437–49. Pozzoli M, Pagani A, Paolone F. The impact of audit committee characteristics on ESG performance in the European Union member states: Empirical evidence before and during the COVID-19 pandemic. J Clean Prod. 2022;371:133411. Tajuddin AH, Akter S, Mohd-Rashid R, Mehmood W. The influence of board size and board independence on triple bottom line reporting. Arab Gulf J Sci Res. 2024;42(3):1026–43. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. 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Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn today's sustainability-focused business world, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance is now a central tenet of corporate responsibility and long-term value creation. In this regard, the ESG considerations are increasingly being considered not as an option, but as a part of risk management, ethical practice, and stakeholder engagement (Khan \u0026amp; Newar, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Regulators, institutional investors, and civil society are demanding greater transparency about how firms address climate-related risks, respect human rights, and offer board-level oversight (Kotsantonis et al., 2016; Eccles \u0026amp; Klimenko, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this new model of governance, the audit committee, traditionally charged with assuring adequate financial reporting and risk management, has assumed an expanded role. Modern models of corporate governance locate audit committees centrally to review sustainability reports, monitor ESG-related risks, and ensure ethical alignment of financial performance with social impact (Zaman et al., 2011). While interest in ESG monitoring has grown, there has been very little empirical research addressing the distinctive factors of audit committees that are affecting non-financial performance outcomes, particularly in continental European contexts (Pozzoli et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMuch of the extant literature focuses on board-level attributes or macro-level governance variables (e.g., institutional ownership, Buchetti et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), often neglecting micro-level governance mechanisms such as audit committees (Pozzoli et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, prior research is predominantly concentrated in Anglo-Saxon countries, overlooking regions like France, where the governance framework differs significantly (Ooghe \u0026amp; De Langhe, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2002\u003c/span\u003e; La Porta et al., 1998). Academic literature frequently compares the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European corporate governance models, emphasizing their differences. The Anglo-Saxon model, which is common in nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, is distinguished by a shareholder-centric strategy, dispersed ownership, and a heavy reliance on capital markets (La Porta et al., 1998). In contrast, the Continental European model, which includes France, is more stakeholder-oriented, with concentrated ownership and a two-tier board structure that includes representatives from diverse stakeholders, including employees.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAccording to La Porta et al. (1998), these discrepancies stem from diverse corporate situations, cultural norms, and legal frameworks, such as France has a unique governing landscape, which the current study spotlights. It gives enterprises the option of using a typical single-tier board (monistic structure), akin to the Anglo-Saxon model, or a dualistic system with distinct management and supervisory boards. This flexibility differs from the more homogeneous approach preferred in Anglo-Saxon institutions. Furthermore, the French system frequently institutionalizes supervision and competence via a proliferation of specialized board committees, including those focused on ESG problems (AFEP-MEDEF Code, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). This more interventionist and stakeholder-focused approach sets it apart from the market-driven and shareholder-centric Anglo-Saxon model. The historical dominance of study on Anglo-American systems has resulted in a comparative disregard of these other frameworks. Moreover, the French corporate context with its codified legal system, stakeholder-oriented governance model, and dual-board structures offers a distinctive institutional setting in which audit committees may influence ESG outcomes in unique ways (Nekhili et al., 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the current study covers an important pandemic period, COVID-19. This pandemic further reinforces the necessity of effective ESG governance. The crisis was a test of corporate sustainability pledges, increasing the expectations of stakeholders for socially responsible and environmentally friendly conduct. Multiple studies proved that companies with robust ESG portfolios exhibited higher operational resilience and investor trust during the crisis (Broadstock et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Albitar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). There is, nonetheless, scant proof that audit committee qualities contributed towards ESG resilience under system stress, most notably in leading European indices like CAC 40, which opens the light for more research to be conducted.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTherefore, this study bridges such gaps by studying the effects of audit committee attributes on ESG performance in French CAC 40 firms in the 2018\u0026ndash;2022 period. This time frame comprises three differentiated periods: pre-pandemic normal (2018\u0026ndash;2019), the height of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020\u0026ndash;2021), and the early stage of post-pandemic recovery (2022). The timing is also significant due to concurrent regulatory developments in France, like the Loi PACTE (2019), and rising standardization of ESG reporting practices, as reflected in Refinitiv's ESG metrics. The study employs three theoretical models: \u003cem\u003eagency theory\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003estakeholder theory\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003elegitimacy theory\u003c/em\u003e to analyze the effect of audit committee independence, financial experience, tenure, and gender diversity on ESG performance. It thereby contributes to the extant literature on ESG governance and offers managerial implications for regulators, boards, and policymakers seeking to enhance ESG supervision employing internal governance mechanisms.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe results of this study reveal that independence of the audit committee and gender diversity have strong positive effects on ESG performance. Also, independent monitoring and multiple perspectives enhance sustainability performance, but financial knowledge and tenure have no significant effects, with a negative but nonsignificant relationship. Among the control variables, board size and firm size is positively related to ESG performance, sales and profitability do not have an impact, and leverage negatively impacts. The results as a whole highlight the important function of certain governance mechanisms, particularly diversity and independence, in facilitating ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe rest of the paper follows this structure. Section 2 explains the literature and theoretical background. Section 3 presents the hypotheses of the study. Section 4 introduces the data, sample, and approach. Section 5 examines the empirical findings and discussion. Section 6 concludes with implications and recommendations for further research.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Study Background","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.1 Audit Committee, ESG Performance, and The French Context\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.1.1 Audit Committee Characteristics and ESG\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe background of the audit committee can have a big impact on how ESG concerns are handled and reported. Independent audit committees, for instance, may promote more objective sustainability reporting and are less vulnerable to management prejudice (Zgarni et al., 2016). The committee's capacity to evaluate ESG risks incorporated into financial performance and guarantee precise integration of sustainability metrics is enhanced by financial competence (Kent \u0026amp; Stewart, 2008). Due to complacency and over-familiarity with management, tenure or length of service can either increase supervision through accumulated institutional expertise or decrease it (Sharma \u0026amp; Iselin, 2012). Diverse viewpoints are brought about by gender diversity, which has also been connected to enhanced ethical supervision, monitoring, and awareness of social and environmental issues (Adams \u0026amp; Ferreira, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Bernardi \u0026amp; Threadgill, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe literature is still fragmented and context-dependent despite new evidence. Because ownership structures, board cultures, and governance codes vary greatly in France, studies conducted in Anglo-American contexts might not be immediately applicable there (Nekhili et al., 2016). Furthermore, not many researchers have looked at these correlations during times of systemic disruption, such the COVID-19 crisis, which put ESG governance to the test (Broadstock et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Albitar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.1.2 ESG Performance and Corporate Governance\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eESG (environmental, social, and governance) performance has become a key component of contemporary company evaluation, changing the way the public, regulators, and investors see businesses. Carbon emissions, labor practices, board accountability, and stakeholder involvement are just a few of the non-financial aspects of company behavior that are captured by ESG measurements. ESG has been increasingly linked to business value, cost of capital, and shock resistance in recent years (Friede et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e; Fatemi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eESG strategy implementation and oversight now depend heavily on corporate governance processes, especially board-level organizations like audit committees. Researchers contend that the completeness, transparency, and credibility of ESG disclosures are impacted by the quality of governance (Dhaliwal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e; Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). But up until now, most of the research has concentrated on board composition in general, paying little attention to the audit committee, which directly reviews both financial and non-financial disclosures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e2.1.3 The French Context for ESG Governance Research\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrance is a good choice for studying the connection between audit committee attributes and ESG performance because of its distinct institutional and regulatory framework. France follows a stakeholder-oriented model with roots in civil law traditions, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon nations, where corporate governance is largely shareholder-centric. The governance of ESG concerns is significantly shaped by this institutional architecture, which places a high priority on employee representation, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and state engagement (Nekhili et al., 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, France has led Europe in enacting laws requiring ESG disclosure, which makes it an ideal place to conduct an empirical evaluation of ESG results. Law in the globe first required non-financial disclosures in 2001 with the French Nouvelles R\u0026eacute;gulations \u0026Eacute;conomiques (NRE) Law. The Loi Pacte (2019) and Grenelle II Act (2010) came next, further integrating ESG into corporate reporting systems (Brammer \u0026amp; Pavelin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e). Large French companies' ESG disclosures are now much more transparent and standardized thanks to these regulations, providing a solid foundation for research.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the French corporate board's structure, which frequently adopts a unitary board with audit and risk committees, enables a targeted evaluation of the ways in which ESG is influenced by micro-level board characteristics like independence, tenure, expertise, and gender diversity. In contrast, previous research, particularly in Anglo-American contexts, has disproportionately concentrated on macro-level determinants or board composition in general (Zaman et al., 2011).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, the COVID-19 pandemic, which served as a systemic shock and a litmus test for businesses' ESG resilience, occurred throughout the study period (2018\u0026ndash;2022). During the crisis, investors, civic society, and authorities closely examined French companies' governance, environmental stewardship, and social responsibility, especially those listed on the CAC 40. Because of these factors, France is ideally suited to assess whether internal governance practices\u0026mdash;like audit committees\u0026mdash;had a significant impact on preserving or improving ESG performance in times of crisis (Albitar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Broadstock et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTherefore, in addition to offering a governance environment that is legally and culturally unique, the French context also offers a policy-rich and crisis-affected environment for evaluating how well audit committees support ESG goals.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe link between audit committee characteristics and ESG performance can be investigated through the complementary lenses of \u003cem\u003eAgency Theory\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eStakeholder Theory\u003c/em\u003e, and \u003cem\u003eLegitimacy Theory\u003c/em\u003e. Taken together, these theories explain the importance of internal governance mechanisms for management and external social pressures shape the effectiveness of ESG oversight. Thus, this section describes the theory and its relationship with the study's developed model.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this regard, Jensen \u0026amp; Meckling (1976) posit that the separation of ownership and control creates principal\u0026ndash;agent conflicts, whereby managers may act in their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. The ESG reporting is particularly vulnerable to such opportunism because sustainability disclosures often involve subjective measures and qualitative narratives, which can be manipulated to project an overly positive image\u0026mdash;a practice known as \u0026ldquo;greenwashing\u0026rdquo; (Boiral, 2013; Garc\u0026iacute;a-S\u0026aacute;nchez et al., 2021). Moreover, audit committees function as a crucial internal governance mechanism to mitigate these conflicts. When they are independent, financially literate, and proactive, they reduce information asymmetry, monitor managerial behavior, and enhance the credibility of both financial and non-financial disclosures (Fama \u0026amp; Jensen, 1983; Krishnan \u0026amp; Visvanathan, 2008). Empirical research has shown that well-structured audit committees significantly improve the reliability of ESG reports (Haji, 2015; Al-Shaer \u0026amp; Zaman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). However, agency theory\u0026rsquo;s narrow focus on shareholder value means it must be supplemented by other perspectives to capture the broader societal implications of ESG performance (Letza et al., 2004).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlso, Freeman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1984\u003c/span\u003e) extends corporate responsibility beyond shareholders to all parties affected by the firm\u0026rsquo;s activities, including employees, customers, regulators, and communities. ESG reporting is thus viewed not only as compliance, but as a strategic tool for sustaining positive stakeholder relationships (Donaldson \u0026amp; Preston, 1995; Harrison et al., 2019). Thus, audit committees that are diverse in expertise (Aman-Ullah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) and composition are better equipped to integrate multiple stakeholder concerns into the firm\u0026rsquo;s ESG strategy (Michelon et al., 2015). Studies demonstrate that stakeholder-oriented boards are associated with higher environmental innovation, social responsibility, and ethical governance practices (Jo \u0026amp; Harjoto, 2012; Velte \u0026amp; Stawinoga, 2020). Nevertheless, stakeholder theory is sometimes criticized for lacking guidance on how to resolve conflicting stakeholder interests (Key, 1999), reinforcing the need for skilled governance bodies to balance these competing priorities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, \u003cem\u003eLegitimacy theory\u003c/em\u003e asserts that organizations must align with societal norms, values, and expectations to maintain their \"social license to operate\" (Suchman, 1995). The ESG disclosures are a key mechanism for signaling such alignment, especially in industries under public and regulatory scrutiny (Deegan, 2002; Cho et al., 2015). In this regard, the audit committees enhance legitimacy by ensuring ESG disclosures are credible, comprehensive, and responsive to external demands. The presence of independent, financially expert, and gender-diverse members is associated with better governance ratings and higher inclusion in sustainability indices (Kolk, 2008; Buallay, 2019). However, legitimacy theory also warns of the risk of symbolic compliance\u0026mdash;producing ESG reports for reputational purposes without substantive improvements (Boiral, 2013; Michelon et al., 2015)\u0026mdash;highlighting the importance of robust audit committee oversight.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDrawing on these theoretical foundations, the study examines four audit committee characteristics that may affect ESG performance, such as independence, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity, as follows.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.1 Hypotheses Development\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e\u003cb\u003e3.1.1\u003c/b\u003e Audit Committee Independence\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAccording to the agency theory argument, the independent audit committees are more likely to exercise objective oversight, free from managerial influence, thereby improving the transparency and reliability of ESG disclosures (Bronson et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). From a legitimacy theory perspective, independence signals impartial governance to external stakeholders, reducing skepticism about ESG claims. In this regard, Al-Shaer and Zaman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) found a positive link between independence and sustainability reporting quality in UK firms. While Raimo et al. (2021) observed similar patterns in European contexts. Moreover, during the COVID‐19 pandemic, independent committees were pivotal in maintaining ESG standards despite financial pressures (Broadstock et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Empirical findings from developed and emerging economies repeatedly affirm the core importance of audit committee independence in stimulating ESG performance, though contextual differences shape the size and mechanism of this relationship.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the one hand, in developed economies, Al-Shaer and Zaman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrate that independent audit committees significantly increase the credibility of UK-listed company sustainability reports, suggesting that independence diminishes managerial bias and enhances stakeholder confidence. Similarly, Raimo et al. (2021), examining 13 EU nations between 2018 and 2020, finds a positive association between the independence of audit committees and ESG scores, whose effect amplifies during the COVID-19 pandemic\u0026mdash;highlighting independence as a key governance resilience driver in periods of crisis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, in emerging markets, the evidence also indicates positive correlation, though typically mediated by regulatory environments and governance maturity. Ahmed Haji and Mohd Ghazali (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e) attest to the fact that audit committee independence significantly improves CSR disclosure quality for Malaysian firms (Aman-Ullah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e), implying its role in advancing transparency levels in less developed ESG report settings. Moreover, Albitar et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) report that in the GCC context i.e., Bahrain and Kuwait a greater degree of audit committee independence is associated with higher levels of environmental and community disclosure in line with stakeholder and legitimacy theory predictions. In other countries such as Jordan, Al-Sa'eed (2018) formulates a meaningful link between audit committee independence and the quality of CSR disclosure for Amman Stock Exchange-listed companies. But in the Indonesian state-owned enterprises, evidence is brought forth by Setiany et al. (2017) that independence improves reporting on ESG-related issues.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eCollectively, these studies suggest that even though the favorable impact of audit committee independence on ESG performance is well-documented in diverse institutional contexts, its success in developed countries is precipitated by established regulatory frameworks and market monitoring, whereas in developing countries, it plays a more foundational role in institutionalizing ESG practices and compensating for inferior enforcement mechanisms. Based on this discussion, the proposed hypothesis is as follows:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eH\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eAudit committee independence is positively and significantly associated with ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e\u003cb\u003e3.1.2\u003c/b\u003e Audit Committee Financial Expertise\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAgency theory suggests that financially skilled audit committee members can better detect misreporting, assess ESG-related risks, and integrate sustainability into the firm\u0026rsquo;s reporting framework (Kent et al., 2010). Stakeholder theory reinforces this, as financially literate members can interpret complex ESG metrics and address the diverse informational needs of stakeholders.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this regard, Velte (2018) found that German firms with financially expert committees produced more accurate ESG disclosures. In addition, Shaukat et al. (2016) reported that financial expertise was linked to the integration of sustainability into corporate strategy. Microsoft\u0026rsquo;s audit committee, for example, uses financial ESG expertise to align climate targets with capital allocation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe Audit committee accounting knowledge (ACFE) has emerged to be increasingly defined as a central catalyst of effective monitoring of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure. Theoretically, ACFE enhances monitoring by upgraded information processing, bolstering obedience with complex disclosure rules, and enhancing internal control systems over non-financial disclosures (DeFond \u0026amp; Zhang, 2014). In developed economies, evidence is consistently documenting that financially literate committees with larger sizes are associated with improved ESG reporting quality. For instance, a cross-sectional study grounded on U.S. and European companies illustrates that financial/accounting expert within audit committees notably improve ESG disclosure scores simply by closer alignment of sustainability reporting with internal audit activities and more rigorous external assurance coordination (Dao et al., 2022; Jizi, 2017). Similarly, within the European setting, financial literacy has been observed to reduce sustainability reporting lags and improve the credibility of ESG disclosures within mandatory regimes (Velte, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn developing countries, where institutional systems of ESG compliance remain relatively underdeveloped, ACFE appears to serve to supplement a deficient governance framework. Experience in Indonesia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries indicates specialist expertise within audit committees enhances ESG disclosure breadth and depth significantly, with particular emphasis laid on the role of the chairperson of the committee in determining ESG oversight agendas (Al-Ajmi et al., 2024; KNE Social Sciences, 2023). These findings highlight that the effectiveness of ACFE is not universal but conditional upon context variables such as regulatory enforcement, assurance market maturity, and cultural expectations regarding corporate disclosure.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eCritically, however, ACFE is not necessarily guaranteed to lead to stronger ESG outcomes universally. Some research cautions that expertise, without independence and adequate frequency of meetings, leads to symbolic compliance rather than substantial monitoring (Arslan et al., 2024). In addition, in extensively standardized ESG settings for jurisdictions (e.g., CSRD in the EU), the marginal utility of ACFE may be watered down with more significant roles from sustainability committees or chief sustainability officers. Collectively, the literature suggests that financial acumen is a necessary but not adequate condition for effective ESG governance whose performance is contingent upon broader institutional complementarities. According to the above discussion, the study proposed the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eH\u003csub\u003e2\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eAudit committee financial expertise is positively and significantly associated with ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e\u003cb\u003e3.1.3\u003c/b\u003e Audit Committee Tenure\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe effect of tenure is theoretically ambiguous. \u003cem\u003eResource dependence\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eagency theory\u003c/em\u003e suggest that longer tenure improves oversight due to greater institutional knowledge (Rutherford \u0026amp; Buchholtz, 2007), but prolonged tenure may also compromise independence and objectivity (Sharma \u0026amp; Iselin, 2012). Empirical results are mixed: Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e) found a positive relationship between tenure and ESG disclosure in Spanish firms. On the other hand, Cucari et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) reported neutral or negative effects depending on governance conditions. Some global corporations, such as HSBC, balance experience and independence by rotating committee members to maintain fresh perspectives.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe duration of audit committee members' tenures is another feature that has gained growing scholarly interest in the scope of ESG oversight. Longer tenures have been conceived by proponents as giving committee members longer-term knowledge specific to the firm, more solid relational capital with management, and more ability to monitor complex streams of sustainability information (Vafeas, 2003). Empirical evidence from mature markets documents a positive correlation between audit committee tenure and ESG performance, particularly when paired with financial expertise and independence (Dao et al., 2022). Such studies argue that pooled monitoring experience allows committees to identify inconsistencies in information, ensure uniformity in ESG programs, and facilitate the integration of sustainability issues within audit procedures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eYet, the connection between tenure and ESG is not linear. Highly regulated environments have condemned excessive tenure for creating complacency, reducing scrutiny, and strengthening management control over ESG narratives (Velte, 2021). In emerging markets, conversely, shorter tenure has been discovered to hinder ESG monitoring due to the steep learning curve in managing poor reporting frameworks and underdeveloped markets of assurance. Empirical evidence among Indonesian listed companies shows that more tenured audit committees are positively associated with the quality of sustainability disclosure because they provide stability to governance structures amid institutional voids (KNE Social Sciences, 2023). In GCC markets also, moderate tenure improves monitoring of ESG-related risks, particularly in state-owned enterprises where there is no external monitoring (Al-Shaer \u0026amp; Zaman, 2019).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe downside is that tenure has a two-bladed impact on ESG monitoring: consistency develops monitoring skill, but excessive longevity undermines objectivity. Tenure is thus best served by a staggered refreshment model, which balances institutional memory with the infusion of new thinking. The literature thus suggests an \"inverted U-shaped\" between audit committee tenure and ESG efficiency, emphasizing the importance of contextualizing optimal tenure in each regulatory and cultural context. According to the above discussion, the study proposed the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eH\u003csub\u003e3\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eAudit committee tenure is significantly associated with ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e\u003cb\u003e3.1.4\u003c/b\u003e Gender Diversity in the Audit Committee\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eStakeholder theory argues that gender-diverse committees better reflect societal diversity and address a wider range of stakeholder concerns. Legitimacy theory suggests that visible diversity enhances external perceptions of fairness and inclusivity (Terjesen et al., 2009). Adams and Ferreira (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e) found that gender diversity improves monitoring intensity, while Bernardi and Threadgill (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e) linked it to stronger ethical oversight. Firms such as L\u0026rsquo;Or\u0026eacute;al have credited diverse audit committees with strengthening their ESG credentials and earning recognition on global sustainability indices.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, the gender diversity on audit committees has been widely debated as a governance mechanism impacting ESG performance. The theoretical foundation is based on stakeholder and resource dependence theories, which recommend that women bring diverse viewpoints, enhanced risk aversion, and more stakeholder orientation, which cumulatively trigger improved ESG oversight (Hillman et al., 2007). Empirical evidence from developed countries provides strong support: firms with greater female representation on audit committees have improved ESG disclosure quality, more extensive environmental risk oversight, and a higher likelihood of engaging external assurance providers (Omenihu et al., 2025; Velte, 2021). Moreover, the Quasi-experiments of board gender quota legislation in Europe further confirm a causal enhancement of sustainability reporting credibility with females being appointed to oversight committees (Zhang et al., 2023). In developing settings, the role of women audit committee members appears even more critical.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, the empirical evidence from Indonesia and GCC countries highlights that the presence of women is positively associated with ESG disclosure quality, particularly when combined with financial experience or longer tenure (Al-Ajmi et al., 2024; KNE Social Sciences, 2023). These observations suggest that gender diversity has interaction effects with other committee attributes in influencing significant ESG impacts, rather than affecting them solo. Symbolic female presence without granting them leadership roles, however, limits their influence. Also, there is some evidence that where women are audit committee chairs or have oversight responsibility for sustainability reporting, the positive effect on ESG outcomes is stronger (Arslan et al., 2024). Above all, gender diversity is no panacea.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOther research warns against tokenism, where the presence of a single female member has no notable effect on ESG disclosure credibility (Adams \u0026amp; Ferreira, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). The \"critical mass\" theory contends that meaningful impact is achieved only when women comprise at least 30\u0026ndash;40% of the committee, as the tipping point where influence reaches beyond symbolic representation. Overall, while empirical results are more consistent with one another than for tenure, the literature points out that the effectiveness of audit committee gender diversity depends on both the presence of women and the substantive roles they play in the committee structure. According to the above discussion, the study proposed the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eH\u003csub\u003e4\u003c/sub\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eAudit committee gender diversity is positively and significantly associated with ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Research Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis research aims to examine the attributes of audit committees in terms of French-listed firms' ESG performance. For this, the research has four hypotheses under the research (\u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e1\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e, \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e2\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e, \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e3\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e, and \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e4\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e). The independent variables of the study model include independence of audit committees, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity. The dependent variable includes ESG performance. Following this, the data context, the model, and the definitions and measurements of the variables are established in the next section. Then, a test of the regression model will be carried out using a regression diagnostics test.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.1 Sample and Data Collection\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe study sample consists of 36 non-financial firms listed on the CAC 40 index over a five-year period from 2018 to 2022. Financial firms were excluded due to their different governance and regulatory frameworks, which may affect the outcomes and the model setting under the study. The total panel comprises 180 firm-year observations. In addition, the ESG performance scores were gathered from the \u003cem\u003eRefinitiv\u003c/em\u003e ESG database, a recognized and standardized source of ESG metrics. Audit committee characteristics and control variable information were collected manually from annual reports, corporate governance disclosures, and financial databases such as \u003cem\u003eBloomberg\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eDatastream\u003c/em\u003e. Care was taken to provide data consistency across the five years and fill in any missing values. The table below shows the sample description:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSample Collection Procedure and Distribution\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIndustry\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTwo-digit SIC codes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrequency\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(%)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGeneral building\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.55\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSpecial trade\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFood products\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.33\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTextile mill products\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eChemicals\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e28\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e16.66\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePetroleum and coal\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e29\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRubber and plastics\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e30\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNon metal products\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e32\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.33\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMachinery and equipment\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e35\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.55\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eElectronic equipment\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e36\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.55\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eInstruments products\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e38\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTruck transport\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e42\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTelecommunications\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e48\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e11.11\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePublic utilities services\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e49\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWholesale trade-durables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e50\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eHotels and other lodging places\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e70\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBusiness services\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e73\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.55\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSocial services\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e83\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.33\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTotal\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e36\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e100\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e180\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2 Empirical models and variable measurement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo validate the study objectives and examine the hypothesis under the study, the regression model is used in the equation \u003cem\u003eEq.\u003c/em\u003e\u0026nbsp;[\u003cb\u003e1\u003c/b\u003e]. The \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e1\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e examines the association of audit committee independence and ESG performance. Also, the \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e2\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e examines the association of audit committee financial expertise and ESG performance. In addition, the \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e3\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e examines audit committee tenure and ESG performance. Finally, \u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e4\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e examines the association of audit committee gender diversity and ESG performance. The following model presented is the study framework and hypotheses under the study. Also, Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e explains the variables' measurement and symbols of each variable used in the study model.\u003cdiv id=\"Equa\" class=\"Equation\"\u003e\u003cdiv format=\"TEX\" class=\"mathdisplay\" id=\"FileID_Equa\" name=\"EquationSource\"\u003e\n$$\\:{ESG}_{i,t}={\\beta\\:}_{0}+{\\beta\\:}_{1}{ACI}_{i,t}+{{{\\beta\\:}_{2}FE}_{,it}+{\\beta\\:}_{3}\\:{TAC}_{,it}+\\:\\beta\\:}_{4}{GD}_{i,t}+{\\beta\\:}_{5}{BS}_{i,t}\\:+{\\beta\\:}_{6}{FP}_{i,t}+{\\beta\\:}_{7}{Le}_{i,t}+{\\beta\\:}_{8}{Fs}_{i,t}+{\\beta\\:}_{9}{Sa}_{i,t}+{ϵ}_{i,t}..\\varvec{E}\\varvec{q}.\\left[1\\right]$$\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eVariables and measurements\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSymbol\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMeasurement\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eReferences\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePanel A: Dependent Variable\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eESG Performance\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eESG\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eComposite ESG performance score obtained from Refinitiv. Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0\u0026ndash;100.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMasmoudi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Pozzoli et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePanel B: Independent and Moderator Variables\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAudit Committee Independence\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eACI\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePercentage of independent members in the audit committee.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRaimo et al. 2021\u0026nbsp;; Broadstock et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinancial Expertise\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePercentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVelte, 2018 ; Shaukat et al. 2016\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTenure Audit Committee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTAC\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAverage tenure (in years) of audit committee members.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBravo and Reguera-Alvarado, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e; Rutherford and Buchholtz, 2007\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGender Diversity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGD\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePercentage of female members on the audit committee.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVelte, 2018; Adams \u0026amp; Ferreira, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Terjesen et al., 2009; Jo and Harjoto, 2012\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eControl Variables\u003c/b\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBoard Size\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBS\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTotal number of board members.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTajuddin et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Alsmady, 2023, 2018\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirm Profitability\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFP\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eReturn on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders\u0026rsquo; Equity).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMasmoudi \u0026amp; Barhoumi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLeverage\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLe\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDebt-to-Asset ratio.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLi et al., 2023; Masmoudi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirm Size\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFs\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNatural logarithm of total assets.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMasmoudi \u0026amp; Barhoumi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;; Abbas et al, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;; Abeysekera et al, 2020 ; Breuer et al., 2018 ; Madden et al., 2020 ; Ortas et al., 2018\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSales\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSa\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eNatural logarithm of total annual sales revenue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAmaral et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2.1 Dependent variable [ESG Performance]\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eEnvironmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) encompasses a set of factors that shape a firm's capacity to implement its strategic objectives and sustain long-term value creation. Although frequently categorized as non-financial or extra-financial, the management of ESG dimensions exerts a demonstrable and quantifiable influence on financial performance. The discourse surrounding sustainability has progressively shifted from abstract and aspirational terminology, such as \u0026ldquo;sustainable,\u0026rdquo; towards more operationally grounded and strategically actionable concepts, such as \u0026ldquo;ESG.\u0026rdquo; Within this context, ESG reporting should be viewed not solely as an ethical imperative, but also as a financially motivated endeavor aimed at identifying best practices and achieving sustainable long-term outcomes that inform managerial decision-making (NASDAQ, ESG Reporting Guide 2.0, 2019: 4).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study examines the influence of audit committee characteristics on ESG performance, utilizing multiple explanatory variables. In this regard, following other previous researchers, the ESG performance is operationalized as a composite index derived from \u003cb\u003eRefinitiv\u0026rsquo;s\u003c/b\u003e ESG metrics, which aggregate environmental, social, and governance scores to provide an integrated assessment of a firm\u0026rsquo;s sustainability practices (Pozzoli et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Elevated ESG ratings are indicative of effective management of ESG-related risks and opportunities elements increasingly recognized as fundamental to the preservation and enhancement of long-term corporate value (Friede et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2.2 Independent variables of audit committee characteristics\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section4\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2.2.1 Audit Committee Independence\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the first independent variable used in the above model is Audit Committee Independence (ACI). The ACI is defined as the percentage of independent members on the audit committee. According to Al-Shaer \u0026amp; Zaman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), independence is essential for guaranteeing objective monitoring and eliminating conflicts of interest, especially in the context of ESG disclosures, where management may be tempted to offer an unduly positive perspective of performance. Therefore, independent committees are thought to improve the legitimacy of sustainability reporting by offering fair evaluations, hence increasing stakeholder trust (Al-Shaer \u0026amp; Zaman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section4\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2.1.2 Financial Expertise\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the current study, the Financial Expertise (FE) refers to the percentage of audit committee members who have professional qualifications or appropriate financial expertise. Kent et al., (2010) stated that this variable is important because financially literate members are better prepared to traverse complicated ESG indicators, analyze associated risks, and assure the accuracy of sustainability reporting (Kent et al., 2010; Velte, 2018). Thus, the presence of financial expertise on the committee is associated with higher reporting quality and better alignment of financial and ESG initiatives (Shaukat et al. 2016).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section4\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2.1.3 Tenure Audit Committee\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlso, the current study has the Tenure Audit Committee (TAC) variable, which measures the average length of service of committee members. Tenure has a mixed impact on oversight efficacy; while longer tenure might contribute to increased institutional expertise and continuity in governance (Rutherford \u0026amp; Buchholtz, 2007). In addition, it can lead to complacency and impaired objectivity over time (Sharma and Iselin, 2012). Therefore, this paradox implies that tenure must be carefully managed to balance experience with new perspectives.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec21\" class=\"Section4\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2.1.4 Gender Diversity\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, this study model has the Gender diversity (GD), which is measured as the proportion of female audit committee members. In this regard, the diverse committees are thought to reflect a greater range of opinions, potentially improving ethical monitoring and responsiveness to social and environmental challenges (Adams \u0026amp; Ferreira, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Terjesen et al., 2009; Velte, 2018). According to the previous research, gender-diverse boards are more likely to implement complete ESG initiatives because they excel at incorporating varied stakeholder interests into corporate governance (Jo \u0026amp; Harjoto, 2012).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2.3 Control variables\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe current study adds several control variables, such as Board Size (BS) (Alsmady, 2023, 2018), which represents the total number of board members. The previous studies have two different views on this point (Coles et al. 2008a, 2008b) regarding the board size, some argued that larger boards can provide a different experience and improve decision-making, but they can also face coordination and efficiency issues (Yermack, 1996). In addition, Firm Profitability (FP), measured as Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders' Equity), is included to account for the financial resources available for ESG activities, as profitable businesses are more likely to invest in sustainability (Waddock \u0026amp; Graves, 1997). Moreover, the Leverage (Le), also known as the Debt-to-Asset ratio, reflects a company's financial structure and risk profile; higher leverage might limit a company's ability to invest in ESG activities due to increasing financial responsibilities (Li et al., 2023). Then, the Firm Size (Fs) is represented by the natural logarithm of total assets, serving as a proxy for the scale of operations and resource availability for implementing ESG practices (Abeysekera et al., 2020). Lastly, Sales (Sa), calculated as the natural logarithm of annual sales revenue, reveals a company's market position and strategic priorities, which can impact its commitment to ESG performance (Pozzoli et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Results and Discussions","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.1 Diagnostics test\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis diagnostic test is used to verify whether the chosen statistical method in the current study is the most appropriate and to ensure the model meets the core assumptions for valid inference. This involves testing for \u003cb\u003emulticollinearity\u003c/b\u003e, \u003cb\u003eheteroskedasticity\u003c/b\u003e, \u003cb\u003eautocorrelation\u003c/b\u003e, \u003cb\u003emodel specification\u003c/b\u003e, \u003cb\u003enormality\u003c/b\u003e, \u003cb\u003ecross-sectional dependence\u003c/b\u003e, and potential \u003cb\u003eendogeneity\u003c/b\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDiagnostics test\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eVariance Inflation Factors (VIF) (Multicollinearity)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVariable\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eVIF\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e1/VIF\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eACI\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.79\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.559\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFE\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.25\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.798\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTAC\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.13\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.888\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGD\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.37\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.728\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBS\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.78\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.561\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFP\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.23\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.816\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLe\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.78\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.560\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFs\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.33\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.749\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSa\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.79\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.560\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMean VIF\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.5\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe Breusch\u0026ndash;Pagan and White tests (Heteroskedasticity)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTest\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eχ\u0026sup2; Stat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eBreusch\u0026ndash;Pagan\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.47\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.017 \u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhite\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e28.92\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.008 \u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eWooldridge Test f (Autocorrelation)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTest\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eF Stat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eWooldridge AR(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.87\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.196\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eModel Specification (Ramsey RESET Test)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eTest\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eF Stat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eRESET\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.12\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.342\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eJarque\u0026ndash;Bera test (Normality Test)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTest\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eJB Stat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eJarque\u0026ndash;Bera\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.21\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003ePesaran CD (Cross-Sectional Dependence Test)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTest\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCD Stat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePesaran CD\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.94\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.347\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDurbin\u0026ndash;Wu\u0026ndash;Hausman (Endogeneity)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTest\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eχ\u0026sup2; Stat\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ep-value\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDurbin\u0026ndash;Wu\u0026ndash;Hausman\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.63\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.202\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNote\u003c/b\u003e: ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Composite ESG performance score obtained from \u003cem\u003eRefinitiv\u003c/em\u003e. Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0\u0026ndash;100; ACI is Audit Committee Independence\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Total number of board members; FP is Firm Profitability\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders\u0026rsquo; Equity); Le is Leverage\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total assets and Sa is Sales\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e*\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e, \u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e**\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e, \u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e***\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e \u003cem\u003eSignificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cb\u003eMulticollinearity\u003c/b\u003e test, Variance Inflation Factors (\u003cb\u003eVIF\u003c/b\u003e), was calculated for all independent variables. The VIF for all explanatory variables was well below the threshold of 5, with a mean VIF of 1.50. This indicates that the independent variables are not excessively correlated, ensuring that coefficient estimates are stable and not inflated by multicollinearity. The low VIF values also imply that the model\u0026rsquo;s estimates are unlikely to suffer from variance distortions due to redundant predictors. In addition, the \u003cb\u003eHeteroskedasticity\u003c/b\u003e Both the \u003cb\u003eBreusch\u0026ndash;Pagan and White\u003c/b\u003e tests rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05), confirming the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error terms. This violation of the constant variance assumption justifies the adoption of Generalized Least Squares (\u003cb\u003eGLS\u003c/b\u003e) estimation, which corrects for heteroskedasticity and produces more efficient and unbiased standard errors compared to conventional OLS.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNext, the \u003cb\u003eSerial Correlation\u003c/b\u003e assumption of regression analysis. The \u003cb\u003eWooldridge\u003c/b\u003e test for \u003cb\u003eautocorrelation\u003c/b\u003e in panel data failed to reject the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). This suggests that the residuals are not serially dependent across time within each cross-sectional unit, supporting the validity of the GLS estimates and avoiding efficiency losses that would arise from autocorrelated errors. In addition, the \u003cb\u003eModel Specification\u003c/b\u003e test. The \u003cb\u003eRamsey RESET\u003c/b\u003e test indicated no evidence of model misspecification (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). This implies that the model\u0026rsquo;s functional form is correctly specified and that there is no strong indication of omitted variables or inappropriate transformations of the existing predictors. In addition, the \u003cb\u003eNormality\u003c/b\u003e of residuals test of the \u003cb\u003eJarque\u0026ndash;Bera test\u003c/b\u003e results (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05) suggests that the residuals are approximately normally distributed. This supports the validity of the model\u0026rsquo;s inference procedures, particularly for hypothesis testing, and reduces concerns about non-normality affecting the reliability of t- and z-statistics.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, the \u003cb\u003eCross-Sectional Dependence Pesaran CD test\u003c/b\u003e failed to reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). This means that shocks or unobserved factors affecting one cross-sectional unit (e.g., a firm) are not systematically related to those affecting other units, strengthening the case for the independence of the residual structure. Moreover, several previous researchers highlighted the governance variables Endogeneity, thus the current study conducted the \u003cb\u003eDurbin\u0026ndash;Wu\u0026ndash;Hausman\u003c/b\u003e test revealed no significant evidence of endogeneity (p\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;0.05) among the governance variables, such as audit committee characteristics, under the current study. This indicates that the explanatory variables are not systematically correlated with the error term, reducing the risk of biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates. As such, the model\u0026rsquo;s results can be interpreted as having a causal direction consistent with the theoretical framework.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the diagnostic tests confirm that while heteroskedasticity is present\u0026mdash;necessitating GLS estimation\u0026mdash;the other core assumptions of regression analysis hold. There is no evidence of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, model misspecification, cross-sectional dependence, or endogeneity. The model is therefore well-specified, and the GLS estimates are both efficient and reliable.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.2 Descriptive Statistics\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The mean ESG score across the sample is 77.62 (out of 100), with a standard deviation of 9.32, indicating generally high ESG performance among CAC 40 firms, though some variation exists (min\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;49.68, max\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;94.31). Such results align with findings by Eccles et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e), which also report high ESG scores in firms with robust governance structures. Additionally, the average audit committee independence is 78.32%, suggesting a strong adherence to governance guidelines; consistent with research by Al-Shaer and Zaman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), who emphasize that independent committees enhance sustainability reporting quality.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the average gender diversity of 44% on audit committees reflecting moderate female representation, which in line with findings from Terjesen et al. (2009), who argue that higher gender diversity, correlates with improved governance and enhanced ESG outcomes. This comparative analysis underscores the importance of strong governance mechanisms in promoting sustainability practices and highlights the ongoing need for increased diversity within corporate governance structures to further enhance ESG performance. The findings indicate that the average financial expertise ratio among audit committee members is 82.7%, coupled with an average tenure of 5.04 years, showing a range of 1 to 12 years. This high level of financial expertise is consistent with research by Velte (2018), who argues that greater financial literacy within audit committees leads to improved oversight and better decision-making, particularly in relation to ESG performance. The average tenure of 5.04 years suggests a reasonable level of stability within the committees, which aligns with studies by Sharma and Iselin (2012), who contend that moderate tenure can foster effective governance by balancing continuity and fresh perspectives. However, the variability in tenure (ranging from 1 to 12 years) raises questions about the potential for complacency, as noted in the literature. Longer tenures may lead to entrenched views, potentially hindering innovative approaches to sustainability (Klein et al., 2018). This comparison highlights the importance of both financial expertise and appropriate tenure lengths in shaping effective audit committee dynamics, ultimately influencing the firm's ESG performance outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl variables show that board size, firm profitability, and firm size vary considerably. Notably, the average board size is near 14 members, with a standard deviation of 2.56. This indicates that firms tend to have relatively large boards, which may facilitate diverse perspectives but could also pose challenges related to coordination and decision-making. Also, return on equity (mean\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;10.95%) spans from large negative values (\u0026ndash;63%) to high profitability (142.15%), suggesting financial volatility across firms. The average firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, is 17.49. This consistent measurement provides a standardized way to assess the scale of operations across firms. In addition, for Leverage (Le), the average debt-to-asset ratio is 0.616, with a standard deviation of 0.172. This indicates a moderate level of leverage among firms, suggesting that firms are likely to have a balanced approach to debt and equity financing. Finally, Sales (Sa) indicates that the average sales revenue, also measured as the natural logarithm, is 2.90. This indicates a general level of market activity, with variability suggesting differences in market position among the firms.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the descriptive statistics provide valuable insights into the characteristics of the sample firms, highlighting trends in governance, financial performance, and ESG practices that are relevant for understanding the study's findings.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDescriptive Statistics\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eVariable\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMean\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eStd. Dev.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMin\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMax\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eESG Score\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e77.623\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e9.323\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e49.68\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e94.31\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eACI\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.783\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.201\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.142\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.827\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.378\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTAC\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.044\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.509\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e12\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.440\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.082\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.181\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.642\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eBS\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13.511\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.564\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFP\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10.947\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.306\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-63\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e142.15\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLe\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.616\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.172\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.215\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.201\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFs\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.494\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.988\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSa\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.900\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.550\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.330\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.980\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"5\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eNote\u003c/em\u003e : ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Composite ESG performance score obtained from Refinitiv. Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0\u0026ndash;100; ACI is Audit Committee Independence\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience ; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Total number of board members. FP is Firm Profitability\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders\u0026rsquo; Equity); Le is Levearage\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total assets ; Sa is Sales\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec26\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.3 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Diagnostics\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e summarizes the correlation matrix results. It shows that there is no critical multicollinearity issues with the data supplied. According to prior research (Asteriou and Hall, 2007; Mason \u0026amp; Perreault, 1991), values less than 90% do not present problems in regression analysis. Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e reveals a positive and significant correlation between ESG performance and audit committee independence (r\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.377, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01), and between ESG and financial expertise (r\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.165, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05). These align with findings by Al-Shaer and Zaman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) and Velte (2018), who also found a positive impact of independence on sustainability reporting quality, and suggest stronger links between financial literacy and improved ESG outcomes, respectively.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, the relationship between ESG and tenure is weaker and discloses a positive and significant correlation (r\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.079, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.10). Nevertheless, the relationship between ESG and gender diversity is negative and statistically insignificant, suggesting limited direct influence. These results suggest that prolonged tenure may lead to complacency (Sharma and Iselin, 2012), while the impact of gender diversity may depend on the critical mass theory (Adams and Ferreira, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Significant positive correlations also exist between ESG performance and board size (r\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.587, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.001) and firm size (r\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.235, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.001), consistent with the notion that larger boards and firms have greater resources and pressures to implement ESG strategies. This is consistent with Zaman et al. (2011) who argue that diverse boards enhance governance effectiveness. Firm Profitability and Leverage is negatively associated with ESG, hinting that financially constrained firms may underinvest in sustainability. These findings align with Eccles et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e) who propose a non-linear relationship, where profitability may not directly lead to enhanced ESG performance but rather depends on other governance factors. In addition, Li et al. (2023) argue that financially constrained firms often focus on short-term solvency, which can hinder their commitment to ESG initiatives. Similarly, El Ghoul et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e) found that high leverage negatively impacts ESG performance, reinforcing the notion that debt levels can limit investment in sustainability. Lastly, Sales is positively associated with ESG (r\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.185, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05) suggesting that firms with higher revenue may also perform better in ESG metrics, as financial resources can facilitate increased investment in sustainability initiatives. This aligns with findings from Amaral et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e), who indicate that while sales can reflect a firm\u0026rsquo;s market position, they do not necessarily correlate with ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the correlation matrix highlights significant relationships, particularly the strong positive correlation between ESG performance and audit committee independence (ACI) and board size (BS). These findings suggest that governance structures play a crucial role in influencing firms' ESG strategies and outcomes, while also indicating areas where further research could explore the nuances of these relationships.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 5\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCorrelation Matrix\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"12\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c9\" colnum=\"9\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c10\" colnum=\"10\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c11\" colnum=\"11\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c12\" colnum=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eESG\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eACI\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFE\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTAC\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGD\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eBS\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFP\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eLe\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFs\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSa\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eESG\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eACI\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.377\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFE\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.165\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.105\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTAC\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.079\u003csup\u003e*\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.089\u003csup\u003e*\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.196\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGD\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.108\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.238\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.285\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.084\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBS\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.587\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.605\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.280\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.037\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.285\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFP\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.025\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.012\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.171\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.008\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.080\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.098\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLe\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.041\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.134\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.202\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.082\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.199\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.085\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.375\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFs\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.235\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.433\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.010\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.008\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.044\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.463\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.026\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.057\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSa\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.185\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.131\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.131\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.048\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.331\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.028\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.087\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.153\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.199\u003csup\u003e***\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"1\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"12\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNote\u003c/b\u003e: ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Composite ESG performance score obtained from \u003cem\u003eRefinitiv\u003c/em\u003e. Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0\u0026ndash;100; ACI is Audit Committee Independence\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Total number of board members. FP is Firm Profitability\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders\u0026rsquo; Equity); Le is Leverage\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total assets; Sa is Sales\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e*\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e, \u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e**\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e, \u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e***\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e \u003cem\u003eSignificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec27\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.3 Regression Results\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe regression results are presented in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e, which presents the results of the audit committee characteristics on ESG performance. The regression analysis indicates that 45.33% of the variability in ESG performance can be explained by the audit committee characteristics and control variables included in the model. This suggests a level of explanatory power, highlighting the relevance of these independent variables in influencing ESG outcomes. However, the Adjusted R-squared (\u003cem\u003eR\u003c/em\u003e\u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e2\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e) value reflects that 41.05% of the variance in ESG performance is explained when considering the potential overfitting that can occur with additional variables. These coefficients imply that the model maintains a good fit without being overly complex, reinforcing the robustness of the identified relationships between audit committee characteristics, such as independence and gender diversity, and ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe coefficient for audit committee independence is 0.043 (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.081), indicating a positive and significant relationship with ESG performance at 10% level which confirms the first hypothesis under the study (\u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e1\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e). This supports agency theory, which posits that independent audit committees enhance oversight and reduce managerial bias in reporting (Jensen \u0026amp; Meckling, 1976). This finding aligns with Al-Shaer and Zaman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), who also found that independence, improves the quality of sustainability disclosures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn testing hypothesis (\u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e2\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e), the coefficient for financial expertise is 1.048 (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.429), showing no significant relationship with ESG performance. This contrasts with literature suggesting that financial expertise enhances ESG reporting quality (Kent et al., 2010; Velte, 2018). The lack of significance in these findings may indicate that financial knowledge alone does not suffice for effective ESG governance, highlighting the need for contextual factors, such as regulatory frameworks and stakeholder engagement.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlso, the Tenure Audit Committee (TAC) has a negative coefficient (-0.177, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.139), indicating that longer tenure may be associated with lower ESG performance, but the relationship is not statistically significant, suggesting that experience alone does not guarantee effective oversight. The significant and negative relationship between AC tenure and ESG performance confirms that a long board tenure leads to increased familiarity, which undermines the effectiveness of control activities, according to previous audit quality literature (Sharma and Iselin, 2012; Setiany et al., 2017). As a result, prolonged AC tenure diminishes attention to ESG initiatives. The findings are consistent with prior research on audit quality, indicating that a long tenure has a negative impact on the auditor's independence (Carey and Simnett, 2006; Chi et al., 2009). Following this line of reasoning, these findings did not support H\u003csub\u003e3\u003c/sub\u003e. As a result, the analysis of AC tenure contributes to the AC literature by investigating the relationship between AC tenure and ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the hypotheses number (\u003cb\u003eH\u003c/b\u003e\u003csub\u003e\u003cb\u003e4\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/sub\u003e) examine the Gender Diversity (GD) effect on ESG performance, the results indicate a strong positive relationship (coefficient\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.163, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.000), which shows that greater gender diversity on the audit committee is significantly associated with improved ESG performance, reinforcing the idea that diverse perspectives enhance governance related to sustainability. This finding supports stakeholder theory, which advocates diverse perspectives in governance (Freeman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1984\u003c/span\u003e). It is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e), who found that gender diversity improves ethical oversight. The results reinforce calls for increased representation of women in corporate governance roles. Therefore, the findings accept hypothesis H\u003csub\u003e4\u003c/sub\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eConcerning control variables, Board Size (BS) has a significant and positive relationship with ESG performance (coefficient\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.242, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.000), suggests that larger boards are positively associated with better ESG performance, likely due to the diverse expertise available for implementing ESG strategies. These findings support the notion that larger boards and firms possess greater resources and diverse expertise, facilitating effective ESG governance (Zaman et al., 2011). For Firm Profitability (FP), it indicates no significant impact of profitability on ESG performance (coefficient = -0.012, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.416), suggesting that profitability alone does not drive sustainability efforts. This aligns with studies that propose a non-linear relationship between profitability and sustainability (Eccles et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). In addition, leverage (Le) has a significant negative relationship (coefficient = -6.819, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.031) and indicates that higher leverage is associated with lower ESG performance, implying that firms with more debt may prioritize financial obligations over sustainability initiatives. This supports the outcomes of Li et al. (2023). Moreover, Firm Size (Fs) reveals a strong positive relationship (coefficient\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.093, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.000), which indicates that larger firms tend to perform better in ESG metrics, likely due to more resources being available for sustainability initiatives. Lastly, Sales (Sa) suggests a positive but statistically insignificant relationship (coefficient\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.250, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.133), indicating that sales revenue may not have a direct impact on ESG performance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the regression results reveal that audit committee independence and gender diversity are significant predictors of ESG performance, while financial expertise and tenure do not show strong associations. Additionally, board size and firm size positively correlates with ESG outcomes, whereas leverage negatively impacts performance. These findings underscore the importance of effective governance structures in enhancing sustainability practices within firms.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab6\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 6\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGeneralized least squares regression (GLSR)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eESG\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eCoefficient\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStd. err.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eP\u0026gt;|z|\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eACI\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.043\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.024\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.081\u003csup\u003e*\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFE\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.048\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.324\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.429\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eTAC\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.177\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.119\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.139\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eGD\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.163\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.039\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eBS\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.242\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.030\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFP\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.012\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.015\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.416\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eLe\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-6.819\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.165\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.031\u003csup\u003e*\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFs\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.093\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.576\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003csup\u003e**\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eSa\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.250\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.500\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.133\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e_cons\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20.862\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10.890\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.055\u003csup\u003e*\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eR-squared =\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAdj R-squared =\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eProb\u0026thinsp;\u0026gt;\u0026thinsp;F =\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e180\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.4533\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.4105\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0000***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eNote\u003c/b\u003e: ESG Performance is the Dependent Variable\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Composite ESG performance score obtained from \u003cem\u003eRefinitiv\u003c/em\u003e. Aggregated across environmental, social, and governance pillars, scaled 0\u0026ndash;100 ; ACI is Audit Committee Independence\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of independent members in the audit committee, FE is Financial Expertise\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of members with professional financial qualifications or experience; TAC is Tenure Audit Committee\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Average tenure (in years) of audit committee members; GD is Gender Diversity\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Percentage of female members on the audit committee; BS is Board Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Total number of board members. FP is Firm Profitability\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Return on Equity (Net Income / Shareholders\u0026rsquo; Equity); Le is Levearage\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Debt-to-Asset ratio; Fs is Firm Size\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total assets; Sa is Sales\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Natural logarithm of total annual sales revenue.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e*\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e, \u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e**\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e, \u003csup\u003e\u003cem\u003e***\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/sup\u003e \u003cem\u003eSignificance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec28\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.4 Interpretation and Comparison with Literature\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe regression results highlight significant relationships between specific audit committee characteristics and ESG performance, aligning with existing literature while also contributing new insights into the governance of sustainability.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFirst\u003c/em\u003e, agency theory emphasizes that ACI is essential for impartial monitoring and minimizing information asymmetry between stakeholders and management (Jensen \u0026amp; Meckling, 1976). Since independent members are less susceptible to managerial influence, ESG-related disclosures and practices may be subject to strict supervision (Khan et al., 2013). Moreover, the positive coefficient for ACI in this study (0.043) suggests that a higher proportion of independent members on audit committees enhances ESG performance, albeit marginally significant (p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.081). This finding is consistent with previous research indicating that independence fosters objective oversight and reduces the influence of management biases in sustainability reporting (Al-Shaer \u0026amp; Zaman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Raimo et al., 2021). Such independence is vital in ensuring that ESG disclosures are credible and reliable, particularly in contexts where management may be tempted to engage in \"greenwashing\" (Boiral, 2013).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eSecond\u003c/em\u003e, Audit Committee Financial Expertise (FE) reflects the committee\u0026rsquo;s capacity to understand complex financial and non-financial information. According to earlier studies, members with financial expertise improve reporting quality and guarantee the integrity of sustainability reporting, which promotes ESG transparency (Krishnan \u0026amp; Visvanathan, 2008). In this study, the lack of a significant relationship between financial expertise and ESG performance contrasts with studies that emphasize the importance of financial literacy in enhancing the quality of sustainability disclosures (Kent et al., 2010; Velte, 2018). While some literature suggests that financially skilled committee members are better positioned to oversee complex ESG metrics, this study also indicates that more presence does not guarantee effective governance in ESG matters. This discrepancy may arise from the unique corporate governance context in France, where other factors may play a more critical role in shaping ESG outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThird\u003c/em\u003e, Audit Committee Tenure (TAC) captures the effect of experience and continuity in oversight functions. Longer tenure can increase institutional expertise and efficiency (Vafeas, 2003), but too long service can weaken independence and breed complacency, which can have both positive and negative effects on ESG supervision. In this study, the tenure of the audit committee presents a negative coefficient, suggesting that longer tenure may be detrimental to ESG performance, although not statistically significant. This finding resonates with literature indicating that prolonged tenure can lead to complacency and reduced oversight (Sharma \u0026amp; Iselin, 2012). In contrast, some studies argue that experience enhances institutional knowledge and governance effectiveness (Vafeas, 2003). The mixed findings highlight the need for firms to balance continuity with fresh perspectives in governance structures.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eFourth\u003c/em\u003e, more discussion that is thorough and ethical awareness have been associated with gender diversity (GD) on the audit committee (Adams \u0026amp; Ferreira, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). Having more women on the board could encourage wider stakeholder considerations and bring business practices into line with ESG guidelines. In this study, the strong positive relationship between gender diversity and ESG performance supports existing literature that associates diverse boards with improved ethical oversight and responsiveness to stakeholder concerns (Adams \u0026amp; Ferreira, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e; Terjesen et al., 2009). This finding underscores the value of incorporating varied perspectives in decision-making processes related to sustainability, reinforcing calls for increased diversity in corporate governance. These findings support the hypotheses (H\u003csub\u003e1\u003c/sub\u003e and H\u003csub\u003e4\u003c/sub\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl variables\u0026mdash;Board Size (BS), Firm Profitability (FP), Leverage (Le), Firm Size (Fs), and Sales (Sa)\u0026mdash;are incorporated to mitigate omitted variable bias. However, Board Size (BS) shows a significant positive effect on ESG performance (coefficient\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.242, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.000). These outcomes align with research suggesting that larger boards can provide a broader array of expertise and resources necessary for effective ESG oversight (Zaman et al., 2011). However, it also raises questions about potential coordination challenges that may arise with larger boards, as noted by Yermack (1996). For Leverage (Le), the results present a negative association between leverage and ESG performance (coefficient = \u0026minus;\u0026thinsp;6.819, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.031) which is consistent with literature suggesting that financially constrained firms may prioritize debt obligations over sustainability initiatives (Li et al., 2023). This finding highlights the importance of financial stability in enabling firms to invest in ESG practices. Moreover, the strong positive relationship between firm size and ESG performance (coefficient\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;2.093, p\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.000) corroborates findings that larger firms often have more resources to allocate to sustainability efforts (Abeysekera et al., 2020). This result emphasizes the correlation between corporate scale and the capacity for effective ESG implementation. A thorough analysis of how audit committee attributes impact ESG performance while taking firm-level heterogeneity into account is made possible by the model's integration of these variables, which is consistent with both agency theory and resource dependence theory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn summary, while the findings affirm several established relationships in the literature, they also highlight the complexities of governance in the French corporate context. The unique institutional and regulatory environment in France may shape the dynamics between audit committee characteristics and ESG performance differently than in Anglo-American contexts, warranting further investigation into the specific drivers of sustainability governance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6. Conclusion and Implications","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study explored how audit committee attributes affected the ESG performance of non-financial companies included on the CAC 40 index in France between 2018 and 2022. The study concentrated on four important audit committee characteristics: independence, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity. These were placed within the larger framework of agency theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory (Jensen \u0026amp; Meckling, 1976; Suchman, 1995). To guarantee thorough assessment, firm-level controls were also included, including size of board, profitability, leverage, size of firm, and sales. This study offers fresh empirical insights into ESG governance mechanisms in the little-studied French environment by using panel data and a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression approach (Nekhili et al., 2016; Michelon et al., 2015).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe empirical results reveal that audit committee independence and gender diversity exert the most substantial and statistically significant positive effects on ESG performance. This supports earlier findings that ESG monitoring methods that are inclusive and structurally anchored increase sustainable results (Post \u0026amp; Byron, 2015; Eccles et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). In line with research highlighting the importance of female involvement in corporate governance, gender diversity in particular shows up as a strong predictor of non-financial performance (Galbreath, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Terjesen et al., 2009). In addition to meeting legal and ethical requirements, a gender-diverse board improves stakeholder responsiveness and committee oversight. In line with studies by Al-Shaer and Zaman (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) and Michelon and Parbonetti (2012), which indicate that structural autonomy enhances the quality of non-financial disclosure, the audit committee's independence also has a beneficial effect, albeit one that is significant.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, tenure and financial expertise did not show any discernible effects, suggesting that typical governance abilities alone might not be enough to promote ESG changes. This outcome is consistent with the findings of Velte (2018) and Shamil et al. (2014), who pointed out that for financial literacy to be effective, it needs to be supplemented with ESG-specific training or frameworks. According to Cucari et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) and Sharma and Iselin (2012), tenure may have a limited influence because of entrenchment effects over time, which could weaken objectivity and decrease the effectiveness of supervision.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn accordance with the findings, board size, firm size, and leverage emerge as key determinants influencing ESG performance. Due to institutional scrutiny, reputation management incentives, and easier access to resources, larger companies typically perform better on ESG dimensions (Chih et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Jo \u0026amp; Harjoto, 2011). High levels of leverage, on the other hand, have a detrimental impact on ESG performance, indicating that financially strapped companies can put short-term solvency ahead of long-term sustainability (El Ghoul et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e; Li \u0026amp; Zhao, 2019). These findings demonstrate that both financial influence company ESG trajectories and governance issues, particularly when external pressures like the COVID-19 pandemic are present (Albitar et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Broadstock et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFrom a theoretical perspective, this study demonstrates that ESG performance may be explained by a combination of legitimacy-seeking behavior (Suchman, 1995), stakeholder responsiveness (Husted \u0026amp; de Sousa-Filho, 2017), and internal governance structures (Jensen \u0026amp; Meckling, 1976). In nations like France, where stakeholder rights and ESG compliance are legally ingrained, the triangulation of these frameworks offers a comprehensive understanding of how audit committee structures function within larger institutional and social expectations (Nekhili et al., 2016; Comyns \u0026amp; Figge, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec30\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e6.1 Policy and Practical Implications\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe findings of this study carry significant policy and practical implications for regulators, corporate boards, and stakeholders involved in sustainability governance. First, the positive impact of audit committee independence and gender diversity on ESG performance underscores the need for regulatory frameworks that promote these characteristics within corporate governance structures. Policymakers could consider legislating a minimum number of independent members and promoting gender diversity on audit committees, as has been done in other countries (European Commission, 2012; Securities and Exchange Commission, 2020). Furthermore, organizations should prioritize audit committee members' training and development to improve their grasp of ESG concerns, given that financial competence did not significantly improve ESG outcomes in this study (Kent et al., 2010). This emphasizes the need for specific governance procedures that address the unique difficulties and demands of sustainability in today's business environment. Furthermore, the negative relationship between leverage and ESG performance suggests that policymakers should encourage financial stability among firms, possibly through tax breaks or grants for sustainable investments, to foster a stronger commitment to ESG initiatives (Li et al., 2023). Overall, these consequences argue for a comprehensive approach to corporate governance that incorporates sustainability into audit committees' basic tasks, establishing a culture of accountability and openness that is critical for long-term value generation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec31\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e6.2 \u003cem\u003eLimitations and Future Research\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe current study suffers from several significant limitations even though it offers insightful information on the connection between audit committee attributes and ESG performance. First, the sample is restricted to non-financial firms listed on the French CAC 40 index, which may limit the generalizability of the findings to other sectors and markets. Second, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits causal inferences. Longitudinal studies could provide deeper insights into how changes in audit committee characteristics over time influence ESG performance, particularly during periods of crisis or regulatory change (Broadstock et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Moreover, while this study focuses on specific audit committee characteristics, other factors such as organizational culture, stakeholder engagement strategies, and external pressures from investors or regulators may also play significant roles in shaping ESG outcomes. Future research could adopt a multi-dimensional approach, incorporating these variables into the analysis to provide a more holistic view of ESG governance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFuture research could examine a number of important topics to improve knowledge of the connection between audit committee attributes and ESG performance. First, broadening the geographic focus to encompass a variety of areas and industries would offer insightful information about how cultural and legal variations affect the efficacy of governance in sustainable initiatives. Furthermore, by tracking changes in audit committee dynamics over time, longitudinal research could demonstrate how these structures adjust to changing regulatory constraints and market conditions. Last, incorporating qualitative techniques\u0026mdash;like interviewing audit committee members\u0026mdash;would improve knowledge of decision-making procedures and relationships and provide insight into how these elements affect ESG performance and supervision.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEventually, while this study lays the groundwork for understanding the role of audit committees in ESG performance, addressing these limitations and pursuing the suggested avenues for future research will deepen insights into effective governance in sustainability.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eA.B wrote the manuscript\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe are deeply grateful to the reviewers for their valuable feedback and thoughtful recommendations, which helped us strengthen and refine this paper\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNo conflict of interest statement.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eNo funding received.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eClinical trial number: Not applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEthics, Consent to Participate, and Consent to Publish declarations: not applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAbbas YA, Mehmood W, Lazim YY, Aman-Ullah A. 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Arab Gulf J Sci Res. 2024;42(3):1026\u0026ndash;43.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-sustainability","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"disu","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Sustainability](https://www.springer.com/43621)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Discover Sustainability","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"ESG performance, audit committee, corporate governance, CAC 40, France, COVID-19","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7446080/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7446080/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePurpose\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis article explores the effect of audit committee characteristics on Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) performance of French-listed non-financial firms on the CAC 40 index from 2018 to 2022—a period capturing the COVID-19 pandemic. While investors and regulators are paying more attention to ESG performance, there has been little attention paid to the role of internal governance mechanisms, particularly audit committees, in shaping ESG performance in continental European environments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDesign/methodology/approach\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDrawing from agency theory, stakeholder theory, and legitimacy theory, the study examines the influence of four widely researched audit committee attributes—namely, independence, financial expertise, tenure, and gender diversity on ESG performance. The research utilizes ESG scores provided by Refinitiv and employs Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression to account for panel-level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Firm-level controls include profitability, leverage, size, and board structure.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFindings\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe results indicate that audit committee independence and women's involvement are strong and positive predictors of ESG performance, while financial sophistication and tenure are non-significant. The study highlights the strategic importance of independent and diverse corporate governance in fostering sustainability performance, especially in a crisis context. This article contributes to the existing literature on ESG governance by focusing on the under-researched French context and providing empirical evidence of the audit substructures' role in crisis resilience.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOriginality/value:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study offers novel empirical evidence on the impact of audit committee independence and gender diversity on ESG performance in the under-explored French CAC 40 context, reflecting its distinct governance and regulatory environment. It also contributes by examining these relationships across pre- and post-pandemic periods, providing fresh insights into the role of internal governance in sustaining corporate resilience during crises.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"The Role of the Audit Committee on ESG Performance of Non-Financial Firms Listed on the French CAC 40","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-09-16 16:55:38","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7446080/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-09-22T13:06:08+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"229463456956956420775667129337981918749","date":"2025-09-14T13:01:09+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-09-14T09:38:56+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"163068428813206776271602854381111401257","date":"2025-09-14T09:22:28+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-09-14T06:00:06+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"333349811508107577766421069020040747061","date":"2025-09-12T09:26:04+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"325233693737662336204036936094973269532","date":"2025-09-12T07:22:55+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"6840815193697594767328572915062749567","date":"2025-09-09T16:03:24+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-09-09T03:41:37+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"159339290831552783112763495337758393027","date":"2025-09-08T15:17:58+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-09-08T11:42:27+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-09-08T11:40:47+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-09-01T13:14:41+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-08-31T17:51:22+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Discover Sustainability","date":"2025-08-31T17:47:46+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-sustainability","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"disu","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Sustainability](https://www.springer.com/43621)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Discover Sustainability","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"0eb51e69-e6f8-4a47-8dce-348aa0c0ba43","owner":[],"postedDate":"September 16th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"published-in-journal","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-12-15T16:03:05+00:00","versionOfRecord":{"articleIdentity":"rs-7446080","link":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-025-02358-4","journal":{"identity":"discover-sustainability","isVorOnly":false,"title":"Discover Sustainability"},"publishedOn":"2025-12-08 15:58:12","publishedOnDateReadable":"December 8th, 2025"},"versionCreatedAt":"2025-09-16 16:55:38","video":"","vorDoi":"10.1007/s43621-025-02358-4","vorDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s43621-025-02358-4","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7446080","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7446080","identity":"rs-7446080","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}