Political Nepotism in Frictional Labour Market

Political Nepotism in Frictional Labour Market | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Political Nepotism in Frictional Labour Market Debojyoti Mazumder, Rajit Biswas This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6544401/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract We build a model where labour market friction incentivizes political leaders to promote nepotism in the job market under the threat of political regime change. In the equilibrium, at least one of the leaders would choose nepotism, while both the leaders choose nepotism in an economy where labour market friction is high and/or productivity is low. Social surplus generated from nepotism can be higher compared to a no-nepotism situation. If workers are heterogeneous, then the low ability workers face higher probability of getting a job and a higher wage in nepotism situation, if they are ideologically closer to the incumbent. JEL classification: J71, J64, D72. Search and matching Labour market friction Nepotism Political regime change Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6544401","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":449815981,"identity":"e54ff380-bda4-44e7-aa48-0284683b470f","order_by":0,"name":"Debojyoti Mazumder","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Reserve Bank of India","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Debojyoti","middleName":"","lastName":"Mazumder","suffix":""},{"id":449815984,"identity":"46970883-e827-4e28-a32a-6b86e52e286d","order_by":1,"name":"Rajit Biswas","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Centre For Development Studies","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Rajit","middleName":"","lastName":"Biswas","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-04-28 06:23:17","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6544401/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6544401/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":86863349,"identity":"97c22463-9447-4865-9d47-735b590b8a13","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-16 12:46:54","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":558881,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"EGBM2025.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6544401/v1_covered_8d9bdbb4-6114-45f8-8c36-5c271d3bc800.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Political Nepotism in Frictional Labour Market","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Search and matching, Labour market friction, Nepotism, Political regime change","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6544401/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6544401/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eWe build a model where labour market friction incentivizes political leaders to promote nepotism in the job market under the threat of political regime change. In the equilibrium, at least one of the leaders would choose nepotism, while both the leaders choose nepotism in an economy where labour market friction is high and/or productivity is low. Social surplus generated from nepotism can be higher compared to a no-nepotism situation. If workers are heterogeneous, then the low ability workers face higher probability of getting a job and a higher wage in nepotism situation, if they are ideologically closer to the incumbent.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eJEL classification: J71, J64, D72.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Political Nepotism in Frictional Labour Market","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-04-30 16:56:54","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6544401/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"fb024ba3-fc8a-41f2-890b-0145cac475cd","owner":[],"postedDate":"April 30th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-07-16T12:38:47+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-04-30 16:56:54","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6544401","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6544401","identity":"rs-6544401","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}