Criminal Governance and Optimal Enforcement in Crime Chains | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Criminal Governance and Optimal Enforcement in Crime Chains Jinglei Huang, Danxia Xie, Min Su, Shangrong Chen This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7679811/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This study extends the traditional individual decision-making model by examining not only isolated criminal acts but also interrelated and joint offenses. It analyzes governance strategies and optimal enforcement intensity within criminal networks. By incorporating cross-externalities among crimes, the paper identifies a "synergistic effect" in related crimes and a "crowding-out effect" in related but non-overlapping offenses. The findings demonstrate that only a coordinated governance approach throughout the entire criminal chain can achieve optimal social outcomes. Additionally, the study reveals a substitution relationship among property, liberty, and capital punishments, and argues that penalties should be optimized based on a comprehensive evaluation of social costs and benefits. JEL Classification: F13, O24, O41 criminal governance optimal enforcement crime chains crowding-out effect synergistic effect Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. 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