The Allure of Simplicity: Framing Effects and Theoretical Virtues

Are simpler explanations better, all else equal? Many people seem to think so. And many capitalize on this by claiming that their explanations are simple — perhaps the simplest! But some scholars have argued that parsimony’s scope is rather limited and its justificatory basis quite thin. And some psychological studies cast doubt on the net benefits of parsimony: considering the simplicity of an explanation can derail probabilistic reasoning. Alas, once acquired, status as a theoretical virtue is rarely lost. To advance the debate, we conduct experiments that test another way so-called theoretical virtues may impair reasoning (N = 1312). Results show that merely labeling explanations “simplest” can bias decisions beyond what base rates or the conjunction rules of probability merit (Experiment 1). Alternative labels like “most complex” or “most unifying” did not have such reliable or consistent effects (Experiment 2). These findings complement recent arguments and evidence about the risk of considering simplicity and raises broader questions about how theoretical “virtues” can mislead people. The good news is that people were more resilient to fallacious appeals to simplicity when evaluating more familiar and less mathematical explanations (Experiment 3). This suggests a potentially novel content effect: simplicity’s fallacious allure may be more potent in more alien, abstract, or arithmetic contexts in which other cues are less salient. Together, these data add objections to simplicity’s virtuous status, especially when describing potentially complex quantitative explanations to the uninitiated.