Mnemicity vs. Temporality: Distinguishing between components of episodic representations

Human beings regularly 'mentally travel' to past and future times in memory and imagination. In theory, whether an event is remembered or imagined (its ‘mnemicity’) underspecifies whether it is oriented towards the past or the future (its ‘temporality’). However, it remains unclear to what extent the temporal orientation of such episodic simulations is cognitively represented separately from their status as memories or imagination. To address this question, we investigated to what extent episodic simulations are distinguishable in memory by virtue of both temporal orientation and mnemicity. In three experiments (N = 360), participants were asked to generate and later recall events differing along the lines of temporal orientation (past/future) and mnemicity (remembered/imagined). Across all of our experiments, we found that mnemicity and temporality each contributed to participants’ ability to discriminate different types of event simulations in recall. However, participants were also consistently more likely to confuse in recall event simulations that shared the same temporal orientation rather than the same mnemicity. These results show that the temporal orientation of episodic simulations can be cognitively represented separately from their mnemicity and have implications for debates about the structure of episodic representations as well as the role of temporality in this structure.