Lower Rounds Lattice-based Anonymous AKA under the seCK model for the IoT

Abstract The authenticated key agreement (AKA) method used in the Internet of Things (IoT) provides identity authentication and agreed symmetric keys to encrypt large amounts of communication messages for devices and servers. With the development of the quantum computing techniques and corresponding algroithms, classical authenticated key agreement methods based on public key, such as RSA and ECC become vulnerable. Many scholars have proposed lattice-based authenticated key agreement schemes to achieve post-quantum security and address this issue. However, these scheme's security models (such as BR, CK, and ROR) only can capture limited types of adversary attacks and require many communication rounds. To this end, we propose a lower communication rounds lattice-based anonymous authenticated key agreement (LA-AKA) protocol under the seCK model, which can capture a wider range of adversary attacks. The LA-AKA scheme utilizes an identity-based public key system for key agreement, and this system avoids complex resource consumption caused by certificate verification. During the identity authentication and key agreement phase, the communication entities do not need to transmit static public keys; they only need to engage in two communication rounds to generate the session key. Furthermore, the LA-AKA scheme can resist signal leakage attacks caused by key reuse in the ring learning with errors (RLWE) security assumption. The LA-AKA scheme provides higher security, as security analysis proves. The performance evaluation shows that as the number of devices and servers in the system increases, the computational advantage of the LA-AKA scheme in the broadcast channel becomes more significant.