Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections

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Abstract We examine whether politicians avoid tax increases in election years. Using a pre-analysis plan and new data that distinguish between when taxes are legislated and when they come into force, we find that in an election year implemented gasoline and corporate income tax changes are smaller and enacted tax increases are less likely. We do not find evidence that these election effects depend on other political, demographic, or macroeconomic conditions, or on changes in overall legislative output in election years. These effects are stronger for gasoline taxes, consistent with a legislative response to the high political salience of gasoline taxes. JEL Codes: D72; D78; H24; H71; K34; P16
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Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections Andrew C. Chang, Linda R. Cohen, Amihai Glazer, Urbashee Paul This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-4048396/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 29 Jan, 2021 Read the published version in Finance and Economics Discussion Series → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract We examine whether politicians avoid tax increases in election years. Using a pre-analysis plan and new data that distinguish between when taxes are legislated and when they come into force, we find that in an election year implemented gasoline and corporate income tax changes are smaller and enacted tax increases are less likely. We do not find evidence that these election effects depend on other political, demographic, or macroeconomic conditions, or on changes in overall legislative output in election years. These effects are stronger for gasoline taxes, consistent with a legislative response to the high political salience of gasoline taxes. JEL Codes: D72; D78; H24; H71; K34; P16 Corporate Income Taxes Electoral Cycle Gasoline Tax Pre-analysis Plan Political Budget Cycle Tax Salience Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Published Journal Publication published 29 Jan, 2021 Read the published version in Finance and Economics Discussion Series → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-4048396","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":278808021,"identity":"e34e8f5b-ddec-4b08-a0ae-25b3dfd87fe1","order_by":0,"name":"Andrew C. 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