Income Distribution of Forest Rights Transfer Cooperation Based on Game Theory: A Case of China

Abstract Forest resources primarily characterize the terrestrial ecosystem and forest ecosystem is an important part of the global carbon cycle. Multiple participants to complete the large-scale production of forestland can effectively achieve carbon neutrality and realize the economic benefits of the forest industry, requiring far-reaching changes in the way forestland is managed. It is imminent to promote forest rights transfer between forest farmers and social capital. Based on the evolutionary game theory, we find that income distribution is a significant factor affecting the stable cooperation between business enterprises and forest farmers. To distribute income effectively within this cooperative framework, whereby farmers transfer their forest rights in different ways, we use a trapezoidal fuzzy number weighting method. This method improves the traditional Shapley value based on the investment and risk level of each participant in the cooperative alliance. Using a case study of forest rights transfer in Xin’tai city of China, we show that the improved Shapley value method can optimize the income distribution of forest rights transfer and ensure that all parties obtain long-term and stable benefits.