Thinking Fast, Judging Wrong: A Mini-Review of Dual-Process Theory in Criminal and Legal Decision-Making

This mini-review examines how dual-process theory, which distinguishes fast, intuitive (System 1) and slow, reflective (System 2) processes, shapes decision-making in criminal and legal contexts. Specifically, offender behavior often relies on rapid, heuristic-driven responses, particularly under stress, time pressure, or emotionally charged situations. Moreover, individual traits such as self-control further influence the balance between intuition and deliberation. Similarly, judges and jurors are affected by cognitive strain, narrative-driven reasoning, and emotional cues, leading them to rely on intuition despite analytical experience. Consequently, these patterns contribute to systematic cognitive biases, including anchoring, confirmation, and availability effects, across investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative stages. By synthesizing evidence from offender studies, judicial and jury research, and analyses of wrongful convictions, this review demonstrates that intuitive dominance can override reflective reasoning, leading to real-world errors. Finally, the review highlights interventions such as structured evidence evaluation, cognitive bias training, and reflective decision-making strategies, which aim to mitigate errors and improve outcomes in the criminal justice system. Keywords: dual-process theory, system 1, system 2, cognitive bias, criminal decision-making, legal decision-making