Business Media Politics in Indonesia: Transformation, Regulation, and Democratic Challenges

Business Media Politics in Indonesia: Transformation, Regulation, and Democratic Challenges | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Business Media Politics in Indonesia: Transformation, Regulation, and Democratic Challenges Erman Anom This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8714884/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesian media has transitioned from tightly controlled state instruments to liberalized markets. Initially celebrated as democratic watchdogs, media outlets expanded rapidly but soon came under the dominance of conglomerates and oligarchic ownership. In the digital era, commercialization, ownership concentration, and weak regulatory enforcement have transformed Indonesian media into hybrid institutions that function simultaneously as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments. This study examines how regulatory frameworks, ownership structures, and commercialization drive the transformation of Indonesian media. It introduces the concept of business media politics to extend political economy of communication theory by integrating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis, offering a context-sensitive framework for emerging democracies in the Global South. Employing a qualitative political economy approach, the research combines historical analysis, document review of regulatory texts and ownership records, and critical discourse analysis (CDA) of media coverage during the 2019–2024 electoral cycles. Semi-structured interviews with journalists, academics, and policy analysts were conducted, with data coded in NVivo to ensure thematic consistency and triangulation. Findings reveal that weak regulation facilitates ownership concentration and oligarchic influence, reinforcing commercialization and political capture. Media conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia and Media Group illustrate how editorial agendas align with proprietors’ political and economic interests. Comparative insights from the Philippines, India, and Brazil underscore similar patterns of regulatory fragility and media capture across the Global South. Indonesian media thus operates as hybrid entities under fragile regulatory regimes, embodying the convergence of business imperatives and political power. The proposed concept of business media politics offers a novel framework for analyzing media transformation in emerging democracies. Limitations include the qualitative scope and the focus on the 2019–2024 period; future research should employ quantitative big data analysis and cross-national comparisons to advance understanding of media regulation and democratic resilience. JEL L82•K23• P16•O53•D72 Media regulation Platform governance Digital democracy Ownership concentration Business media politics Indonesia Political economy Global South Figures Figure 1 1. Introduction The Indonesian media landscape has undergone a profound transformation, shifting from its role as a democratic pillar to functioning increasingly as a business-driven political actor (Firman & Rahmawati, 2023 ). Unlike Western capitalist contexts, where economic imperatives dominate, Indonesian media embodies a dual character: simultaneously shaping public opinion and operating as commercial enterprises. Post-Reformasi liberalization expanded media markets, yet it also entrenched ownership concentration and facilitated political capture (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ). This study situates the transformation of Indonesian media within comparative media systems perspectives, emphasizing the tensions between democratic ideals and market-driven logics (Humprecht et al., 2022b ; Voltmer, 2008 ). By examining the interplay of regulation, ownership, and commercialization, it highlights how Indonesia’s media institutions navigate the competing demands of democratic accountability and economic imperatives, offering insights into broader patterns of media evolution in emerging democracies (Amallah et al., 2025 ). The transformation of Indonesian media must be understood within broader debates on media policy and political economy. Recent scholarship argues that media institutions function not only as cultural and political actors but also as economic enterprises subject to market imperatives. In Indonesia, this duality has become increasingly pronounced since the fall of the New Order regime, when liberalization expanded the media landscape but simultaneously enabled the consolidation of conglomerates and oligarchic ownership (Humprecht et al., 2022a ). Empirical studies demonstrate that ownership concentration contributes to content homogenization and undermines media pluralism. Recent scholarship shows that conglomeration enhances efficiency but diminishes diversity, privileging economic and political interests over public service obligations (Haikal et al., 2024 ). The convergence of editorial agendas with proprietors’ interests—commonly referred to as ownership alignment—has emerged as a defining characteristic of Indonesian media politics. From a global perspective, the Indonesian case reflects broader theories of media system transformation and mediatization. Hallin & Mancini, ( 2010 ) advance comparative models of media systems, while Strömbäck, ( 2008 ) underscores how political actors adapt to media logics shaped by commercial imperatives. These frameworks are especially pertinent to Indonesia, where weak regulation and fragmented governance have enabled media institutions to operate simultaneously as commercial enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments (Hassan et al., 2019 ). Thus, the Indonesian media landscape illustrates the convergence of business imperatives and political power within fragile regulatory regimes. The originality of this study lies in its introduction of the concept of business media politics, which extends the political economy of communication by explicitly incorporating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis. In contrast to prior research that has focused primarily on ownership concentration or commercialization, this study underscores how weak regulation institutionalizes the hybrid role of media as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments. By situating Indonesia within comparative debates on media systems and digital governance in the Global South, it advances a context-sensitive framework that enriches both theoretical and empirical understandings of media transformation in emerging democracies. 2. Literature Review 2.1 Regulation and Media Politics In practice, however, media regulation often reflects the interests of dominant political and economic elites rather than safeguarding pluralism and diversity (Allen et al., 2017 ). In Indonesia, regulatory frameworks have historically oscillated between control and liberalization. During the New Order, licensing systems such as SIUPP curtailed press freedom and concentrated ownership among political allies, reinforcing state dominance over the media (Sumiati, 2020 ). Post-Reformasi reforms, including Law No. 40/1999 on the Press, formally guaranteed rights of criticism and correction, yet enforcement remained weak and fragmented. Rather than protecting the public interest, regulation frequently reinforced elite hegemony and facilitated commercialization (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ). Recent scholarship underscores the digital dimension of media regulation. Lim, ( 2017 ) examines social media governance in Indonesia, demonstrating how states deploy regulatory frameworks to control platforms such as TikTok and YouTube while leveraging algorithmic power for political purposes. Masduki & D’Haenens, ( 2022 ) highlight Indonesia’s MR5/2020 as an instance of digital populism and state capture, where regulation legitimizes surveillance and censorship rather than safeguarding pluralism. These perspectives extend earlier debates by situating Indonesian regulation within broader struggles over digital governance in the Global South. 2.2 Economic Perspectives Regulation plays a pivotal role in shaping organizational behavior and market dynamics. Moss et al., ( 2009 ) contends that regulation functions as a set of constraints guiding organizational decision-making, ensuring that institutions align with broader social and economic objectives rather than pursuing purely profit-driven motives. Within the media sector, regulation is designed to balance commercial imperatives with democratic responsibilities. Yet concentrated ownership frequently undermines this balance. Garz & Ots, ( 2025 ) demonstrate that media consolidation reduces diversity, limits competition, and erodes content quality. In Europe, Tomaz, ( 2024 ) shows similar patterns, while in Indonesia, ownership concentration has been closely linked to ownership alignment, whereby editorial policies reflect the political and economic interests of media proprietors rather than serving the public (Masduki et al., 2023 ). The rise of digital platforms introduces new economic challenges. Kapczynski, ( 2019 ), in her review of contemporary scholarship, underscores that the commodification and exploitation of personal data reflect deeper structures of informational capitalism and highlight the urgent need for stronger governance frameworks. In Southeast Asia, Arugay et al., ( 2024 ) demonstrate how digital democracy in the Philippines is undermined by disinformation networks and algorithmic manipulation, while Tiwari & Pandey, ( 2024 ) show that platform regulation in India struggles to safeguard electoral integrity. These comparative insights indicate that Indonesia’s weak enforcement of MR5/2020 ((Nidhal et al., 2025 ) reflects a broader regional pattern of governance gaps within the digital economy. 2.3 Political Economy of Communication The political economy of communication offers a critical framework for examining the structural interplay between media, capital, and politics. Prodnik, ( 2014 ) identifies three key dimensions of commodification—content, audiences, and labor—showing how media organizations transform information into marketable goods, audiences into quantifiable consumer segments, and labor into standardized production processes. This perspective underscores how media institutions operate not merely as cultural intermediaries but as economic enterprises embedded within broader systems of capital accumulation and political influence (Flew & Wilding, 2021 ). In Indonesia, these dynamics are most evident in the convergence of capital, politics, and regulation. Media conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia, Media Group, and MNC Group exemplify how ownership structures intertwine with political affiliations, shaping editorial agendas and influencing electoral competition (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ; Masduki et al., 2023 ). Comparative perspectives further reinforce this analysis. González de Bustamante and Relly (2020) highlight how media capture and concentrated ownership in Latin America weaken democratic resilience, revealing clear parallels with Indonesia’s experience of oligarchic capture. These cases illustrate that fragile regulatory frameworks institutionalize commodification, transforming media into hybrid entities that simultaneously operate as commercial enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments (Guerrero & Márquez-Ramírez, 2014 ). 2.4 Commercialization and Ownership Alignment Commercialization has become a defining characteristic of the Indonesian media landscape, intensifying reliance on advertising revenues and political sponsorship. This economic dependence shapes editorial agendas, frequently privileging the interests of owners and sponsors over commitments to public service. Empirical studies confirm that ownership alignment undermines pluralism. Amallah et al., ( 2025 ) find that Indonesian media conglomeration enhances efficiency but homogenizes content, thereby limiting audience choice. Similarly, Masduki & D’Haenens, ( 2022 ) show that post–New Order liberalization spurred rapid growth, yet competition was driven more by economic and political interests than by public service obligations. Gap Analysis Focus of Previous Studies Limitations Contribution of This Article Classical regulation (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ) Did not address the digital era or platform governance Incorporates digital regulation, including MR5/2020 and platform cases such as TikTok, YouTube, and Meta Ownership alignment (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ) Focused primarily on ownership, lacking integration of digital regulation and comparative perspectives Introduces the concept of business media politics, integrating regulation, economics, and politics Regional studies (Banaji, 2025 ) Partial analyses, not directly connected to Indonesia Fills the gap through Global South comparisons, including the Philippines, India, and Brazil 3. Theoretical Framework This study is guided by three interrelated theoretical frameworks that together explain how Indonesian media evolves into business media politics under conditions of weak regulation. Political Economy of Communication (Mosco, 2008 ). The political economy of communication emphasizes the structural relationship between media, capital, and politics. Mosco, ( 2008 ) identifies three key processes: commodification, spatialization, and structuration. Commodification refers to the transformation of content, audiences, and labor into marketable goods; spatialization highlights the expansion of media power across geographic and institutional boundaries; and structuration examines how social relations are reproduced through media systems. In Indonesia, these processes are evident in the ways media conglomerates commodify audiences through advertising, extend influence across platforms, and reproduce elite political interests through ownership alignment. Media System Transformation Theory (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Hallin and Mancini (2004) propose three comparative models of media systems—liberal, democratic corporatist, and polarized pluralist—each reflecting distinct relationships between media, politics, and society. Indonesia’s post-Reformasi trajectory illustrates a hybrid transformation: while liberalization expanded the number of media outlets, weak regulation and oligarchic ownership fostered a polarized pluralist system dominated by political-economic elites. This framework situates Indonesia within global comparative media studies, demonstrating how emerging democracies diverge from Western liberal models by combining market-driven logics with entrenched political patronage. Mediatization of Politics (Strömbäck, 2008 ). Strömbäck, ( 2008 ) identifies four phases of mediatization, illustrating how political actors progressively adapt their strategies to media logic. In Indonesia, electoral competition during the 2019–2024 cycles demonstrates how political elites deploy media conglomerates as strategic assets, shaping narratives and influencing voter perceptions. Mediatization theory thus explains how media institutions evolve from neutral intermediaries into active political players, reinforcing ownership alignment and oligarchic influence. Together, these frameworks provide a systemic lens for analyzing the transformation of Indonesian media. The convergence of commodification, system transformation, and mediatization demonstrates how weak regulation enables media institutions to operate simultaneously as commercial enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments. This hybrid role—conceptualized as business media politics —extends existing theories by explicitly incorporating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis. In doing so, it offers a context-sensitive framework for understanding media transformation in emerging democracies across the Global South. 4. Methodology This study employs a qualitative research design that integrates document analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine the transformation of Indonesian media into business-oriented political institutions. The methodological approach is grounded in the political economy of communication, emphasizing the interplay between regulation, ownership, and political influence. Document analysis was conducted on regulatory texts, ownership records, and policy documents to trace institutional frameworks and patterns of media governance. Critical discourse analysis was applied to media coverage during the 2019–2024 electoral cycles, focusing on how narratives reflected ownership interests and political alignments. Semi-structured interviews with journalists, academics, and policy analysts provided additional insights into regulatory enforcement, editorial decision-making, and the broader political economy of Indonesian media. Data were coded and analyzed using NVivo to ensure thematic consistency and triangulation across sources. This multi-method approach strengthens validity by combining structural analysis of regulation and ownership with interpretive analysis of discourse and practice, thereby capturing the hybrid role of media as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments. 4.1 Research Design This study adopts a qualitative research design that combines document analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) to investigate the transformation of Indonesian media institutions. Document analysis was employed to trace the historical and regulatory evolution of the media sector. Following Glenn, ( 2009 ), document analysis provides systematic insights into how policies, ownership structures, and regulatory frameworks shape media practices and institutional behavior. Critical discourse analysis was applied to media texts and narratives to examine how ownership alignment and political affiliations are reproduced through discourse, particularly during electoral cycles. CDA enables the identification of underlying power relations and ideological orientations embedded in media content, thereby revealing how editorial agendas are shaped by economic and political interests. 4.2 Data Sources To ensure triangulation and strengthen validity, this study draws upon multiple sources: Regulatory texts: Law No. 40/1999 on the Press, Law No. 32/2002 on Broadcasting, and Government Regulation No. 20/1994 on Foreign Investment in Media, which provide the legal framework for media governance. Ownership records: Data from major conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia, Media Group, and MNC Group, illustrating patterns of concentration and political affiliation. Political coverage: Media reporting during the 2019 and 2024 electoral cycles, analyzed to identify ownership influence and editorial alignment. Secondary literature: Foundational and contemporary scholarship on Indonesian media politics and regulation (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ), which contextualizes empirical findings within broader theoretical debates. 4.3 In-depth Interviews Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 informants, comprising: Five senior journalists from national and regional outlets, Five academics specializing in media studies and political communication, Five regulators and policy analysts engaged in media governance. Informants were selected through purposive sampling to ensure direct relevance to the research questions. This was complemented by snowball sampling, which facilitated the identification of additional experts with insider perspectives and specialized knowledge. The combination of purposive and snowball strategies enhanced the diversity of viewpoints while maintaining analytical focus, thereby strengthening the validity of the findings. 4.4 Analytical Approach Data were analyzed using NVivo 12 software to facilitate systematic coding, thematic categorization, and triangulation across documents, interviews, and media texts. Historical contextualization was employed to situate Indonesian media within broader socio-political developments, enabling the identification of continuities and ruptures in regulatory and ownership patterns. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was applied to examine how media texts reproduce ownership interests and political ideologies, with particular attention to electoral cycles and policy debates. This dual approach—combining historical contextualization with CDA—provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how regulation, commercialization, and ownership alignment converge to shape the dynamics of Indonesian media politics. By integrating structural and discursive dimensions, the analysis captures both institutional trajectories and the ideological functions of media in emerging democracies. 4.5 Ethical Considerations All interview participants provided informed consent and were assured of anonymity and confidentiality. Sensitive data were anonymized during transcription and analysis to protect participant identities. The study received ethical clearance from the Research Ethics Committee of Universitas Esa Unggul, thereby ensuring compliance with international standards of research integrity and ethical practice in qualitative inquiry. 5 Results and Discussion 5.1 Transformation into Business Entities The transformation of Indonesian media from democratic watchdogs into business enterprises reflects a broader structural shift in the political economy of communication. During the New Order era, media licensing was tightly controlled through the Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers (SIUPP), which restricted press freedom and concentrated ownership among regime cronies (Hill, 1994). This regulatory environment ensured that media institutions functioned primarily as instruments of state control rather than as independent platforms for public discourse. Following the Reformasi period, liberalization dismantled many of these restrictions, enabling rapid expansion of media outlets. However, this expansion was accompanied by intensified commercialization and oligarchic consolidation. Media conglomerates increasingly operated as profit-driven enterprises, relying heavily on advertising revenues and political sponsorship. As a result, editorial agendas became closely aligned with the interests of owners and their political patrons, undermining the normative role of the press as a democratic watchdog. This transformation illustrates how weak regulatory enforcement allowed media institutions to evolve into hybrid entities that simultaneously serve commercial, political, and ideological functions. Rather than safeguarding pluralism, deregulation facilitated the commodification of audiences and the instrumentalization of media for electoral competition. The Indonesian case thus exemplifies how media liberalization, in the absence of strong governance, can reproduce patterns of elite dominance and erode democratic resilience. Following the Reformasi period, liberalization dismantled many restrictions and opened the media market to new entrants. Yet rather than fostering pluralism, liberalization facilitated the rise of powerful media conglomerates that consolidated ownership across print, broadcast, and digital platforms. This consolidation enabled efficiency and expansion but simultaneously reinforced homogenization of content and reduced diversity. The resulting media landscape reflects a paradox: while liberalization expanded the number of outlets, ownership concentration limited the range of perspectives available to audiences. In practice, conglomeration entrenched the influence of political-economic elites, transforming media institutions into strategic assets that serve commercial and political interests more than democratic deliberation. The shift toward commercialization transformed Indonesian media into industries increasingly driven by advertising revenues and political sponsorship. Media organizations began to prioritize profitability and market share, often at the expense of their democratic functions. Ownership concentration further entrenched political affiliations within media institutions, with conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia and Media Group operating simultaneously as commercial businesses and strategic political assets (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ; Masduki et al., 2023 ). This trajectory underscores the paradox of liberalization: while the post-Reformasi era expanded the media landscape, weak regulatory enforcement and oligarchic ownership redirected media functions away from serving the public interest. Instead, media institutions became instruments for advancing commercial imperatives and political agendas, thereby eroding pluralism and weakening the press’s normative role as a democratic watchdog. 5.2 Commercialization Commercialization has become a central driver of media transformation in Indonesia. Heavy reliance on advertising revenues and political sponsorships has reinforced ownership alignment, whereby editorial agendas increasingly reflect the preferences of proprietors and sponsors rather than the public interest (Masduki & D’Haenens, 2022 ). This dynamic illustrates how market imperatives reshape journalistic priorities, privileging profitability and political patronage over democratic accountability. Empirical studies confirm that commercialization not only narrows editorial independence but also fosters homogenization of content, as media outlets compete for advertising share by reproducing similar narratives and entertainment-driven formats. In practice, this has weakened the press’s watchdog function, reducing its capacity to hold elites accountable. Instead, media institutions increasingly operate as hybrid entities—balancing commercial imperatives with political affiliations—thereby blurring the line between journalism and political advocacy. This dependence weakens pluralism, fosters homogenization of content, and intensifies political capture. Media Group, owned by Surya Paloh, exemplifies how media enterprises function simultaneously as profit-driven businesses and political instruments, shaping narratives to align with ownership interests (Sulistijanto et al., 2025 ). As both a commercial conglomerate and a political vehicle, Media Group demonstrates the dual role of Indonesian media institutions: generating revenue through advertising while strategically advancing partisan agendas. This case highlights how ownership alignment transforms media from democratic watchdogs into hybrid entities that blur the boundaries between journalism, commerce, and political advocacy. From a global perspective, commercialization reflects broader structural trends in contemporary media systems. Barnett, ( 2009 ) argues that commercialization undermines the democratic role of journalism by subordinating editorial independence to market logics, privileging profitability over public accountability. In Indonesia, this dynamic is further exacerbated by weak regulatory enforcement, which enables oligarchic ownership structures to dominate the media landscape. As a result, Indonesian media exemplifies how commercialization, when unchecked by effective governance, transforms journalism into a vehicle for elite interests, eroding pluralism and weakening the press’s normative role as a democratic institution. 5.3 Regulatory Weakness Regulatory weakness remains one of the most critical challenges in the Indonesian media landscape. Although post-Reformasi reforms introduced legal guarantees for press freedom, enforcement mechanisms have often been fragmented, inconsistent, and vulnerable to political capture. Regulatory bodies frequently lack the institutional capacity and independence necessary to oversee ownership concentration or enforce compliance with broadcasting and press laws. This weakness has allowed oligarchic actors to exploit loopholes and regulatory ambiguities, consolidating control over media institutions while evading accountability. For example, foreign investment restrictions and cross-ownership rules are inconsistently applied, enabling conglomerates to expand across platforms with minimal oversight. Moreover, regulatory agencies are often subject to political influence, which undermines their ability to act as neutral arbiters of media governance. As a result, regulation in Indonesia functions more as a symbolic safeguard than as an effective mechanism for protecting pluralism and independence. Weak enforcement not only facilitates commercialization and ownership alignment but also intensifies the mediatization of politics, as media institutions operate with limited checks on their dual role as business enterprises and political instruments. A prominent example of regulatory weakness is Ministerial Regulation No. 5/2020 (MR5), which requires private electronic system providers to register with the government, grant access to user data, and remove content deemed disruptive to public order. Critics contend that MR5 grants excessive discretionary power to the state, enabling censorship and surveillance without adequate safeguards (Suleiman, 2021 ). The regulation illustrates how legal instruments, while framed as mechanisms for maintaining public order, can be deployed to curtail press freedom and digital rights. In practice, MR5 reflects the broader tension between state authority and democratic accountability, highlighting how regulatory frameworks in Indonesia often serve political interests rather than protecting media independence. Moreover, overlapping jurisdictions and limited enforcement capacity further undermine regulatory institutions. Although the Press Law (No. 40/1999) and the Broadcasting Law (No. 32/2002) affirm freedom of expression, they provide inadequate safeguards against commercialization and political capture. Consequently, regulation often legitimizes ownership concentration and oligarchic influence rather than restraining them. Within this framework, regulatory weakness functions as a structural condition that facilitates the convergence of business and political interests in media institutions, transforming them into hybrid entities that advance both economic and political power. 5.4 Comparative Perspectives: Global South Cases To enhance international relevance, the Indonesian case can be situated within broader patterns observed across emerging democracies in the Global South: Philippines: Media capture remains entrenched through family-owned conglomerates closely linked to political dynasties. Curato, ( 2017 ) highlights how disinformation and populist narratives reinforce elite dominance, reflecting dynamics similar to Indonesia’s oligarchic ownership structures. India: Digital disinformation and weak platform regulation continue to undermine electoral integrity. Banaji & Bhat, ( 2021 ) analyze how WhatsApp’s circulation of right-wing propaganda interacts with state regulation, paralleling Indonesia’s MR5/2020 framework. Brazil: Matos, ( 2011 ) illustrates how media oligarchies erode democratic resilience, with conglomerates shaping narratives to safeguard elite interests. This trajectory resonates with Indonesia’s hybrid media institutions operating under fragile regulatory conditions. Taken together, these comparative insights underscore that Indonesia’s challenges are not unique but emblematic of a wider Global South pattern, where weak regulation, commercialization, and ownership concentration converge to compromise democratic accountability. 6. Conclusion This study has analyzed the transformation of Indonesian media into hybrid institutions that operate simultaneously as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments within fragile regulatory regimes. By introducing the concept of business media politics, the research extends the political economy of communication by integrating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis. The findings reveal that weak regulatory enforcement enables ownership concentration and oligarchic influence, thereby reinforcing commercialization and political capture. Media conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia and Media Group illustrate how editorial agendas align with proprietors’ political and economic interests, undermining pluralism and diminishing the press’s democratic role. Comparative insights from the Philippines, India, and Brazil further demonstrate that Indonesia’s experience reflects broader patterns of regulatory fragility and media capture across the Global South. The theoretical contribution of this study lies in its articulation of business media politics as a context-sensitive framework for examining media transformation in emerging democracies. Empirically, the research highlights the convergence of commercialization, ownership alignment, and regulatory weakness as defining characteristics of Indonesia’s media landscape. This study is limited by its qualitative scope and its focus on the 2019–2024 electoral cycles. Future research should incorporate quantitative big data analysis, longitudinal designs, and cross-national comparisons to deepen understanding of media regulation and democratic resilience. Such approaches will be essential for advancing comparative media systems theory and informing policy debates on how to safeguard pluralism in the digital era. Contribution and Novelty This study advances the field of media policy and political communication in several important ways: Conceptual Innovation: It introduces business media politics as a novel analytical framework for understanding hybrid media roles. The concept captures the dual function of media institutions in Indonesia as both commercial enterprises and political actors. Theoretical Extension: It extends the political economy of communication by explicitly incorporating regulatory dynamics into analyses of media transformation, thereby bridging structural ownership studies with regulatory scholarship. Comparative Relevance: By situating the Indonesian case within broader Global South trajectories, the study highlights how commercialization, ownership concentration, and regulatory fragility converge to undermine democratic accountability across emerging democracies. Demonstrates how regulatory fragility institutionalizes commercialization and ownership alignment. Empirical evidence indicates that fragmented enforcement facilitates oligarchic influence, with MR5 serving as a clear example of regulatory overreach that consolidates both state and market dominance. Provides empirical insights from a non-Western democracy, extending comparative media systems theory to the Global South. The Indonesian case exemplifies a hybrid media system in which market logics, political patronage, and regulatory fragility converge. This context-sensitive framework offers analytical leverage for understanding media transformation in other post-authoritarian democracies. The novelty of this study lies in conceptualizing business media politics as an analytical lens for examining how economic imperatives, political power, and regulatory fragility converge to shape democratic media systems. By foregrounding this intersection, the framework advances existing scholarship on media policy and political communication, offering a context-sensitive approach to understanding hybrid media roles in emerging democracies. Limitations This study is limited by its reliance on qualitative data, with interviews conducted with only 15 informants and a primary focus on the 2019–2024 electoral cycles. The scope does not include quantitative big data analysis or longitudinal comparisons across multiple electoral periods, which may constrain the generalizability of the findings. Future Research Directions To advance understanding of media transformation in emerging democracies, future research should: Integrate quantitative approaches : Employ big data from digital platforms to systematically measure disinformation flows and ownership influence. Examine algorithmic governance : Conduct in-depth analyses of platform regulation (e.g., TikTok, Meta, YouTube) to assess how digital governance interacts with state power and shapes media ecosystems. Pursue cross-national comparisons : Undertake comparative studies across Global South contexts (e.g., the Philippines, India, Brazil) to identify both convergent patterns and divergent trajectories in media regulation and democratic resilience. Author Contributions (CRediT Taxonomy) Conceptualization : Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani Methodology : Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi Investigation (Fieldwork, Interviews, Document Review) : Erman Anom, Asnawi, Lely Arrianie Data Curation (Transcription, Coding, Organization) : Asnawi, Lely Arrianie Formal Analysis (Critical Discourse Analysis, Thematic Coding) : Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi Validation (Triangulation, Peer Review of Coding) : Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie Project Administration : Erman Anom, Lely Arrianie Resources (Regulatory Texts, Ownership Records, Interview Networks) : Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani Writing – Original Draft : Erman Anom, Asnawi Writing – Review & Editing : Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie Supervision : Mus Chairil Samani Declarations Author Contributions (CRediT Taxonomy) Conceptualization: Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani Methodology: Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi Investigation (Fieldwork, Interviews, Document Review): Erman Anom, Asnawi, Lely Arrianie Data Curation (Transcription, Coding, Organization): Asnawi, Lely Arrianie Formal Analysis (Critical Discourse Analysis, Thematic Coding): Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi Validation (Triangulation, Peer Review of Coding): Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie Project Administration: Erman Anom, Lely Arrianie Resources (Regulatory Texts, Ownership Records, Interview Networks): Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani Writing – Original Draft: Erman Anom, Asnawi Writing – Review & Editing: Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie Supervision: Mus Chairil Samani Acknowledgments The authors extend their sincere gratitude to the journalists, academics, and policy analysts who generously shared their insights during interviews and contributed valuable perspectives to this study. Special thanks are also due to the Faculty of Communication Studies, Universitas Esa Unggul, for providing institutional support and facilitating ethical clearance. The authors further acknowledge the assistance of colleagues and research assistants who contributed to transcription, coding, and data organization, thereby ensuring the rigor and consistency of the qualitative analysis. Funding This research received no external funding. Conflict of Interest Declaration The authors declare no conflict of interest. References Allen H, Connolly S, Hargreaves Heap SP (2017) Media pluralism: What matters for governance and regulation? J Media Econ 30(2):47–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/08997764.2017.1364257 Amallah NS, Heryanto GG, Praptiningsih NA, Adeni A, Setiawan B (2025) Media independence and share ownership structure in Indonesian media with a focus on Tempo. 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J Communication 72(3):449. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqac010 Humprecht E, Herrero LC, Blassnig S, Brüggemann M, Engesser S (2022b) Media Systems in the Digital Age: An Empirical Comparison of 30 Countries. J Communication 72(2):145–164. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqab054 Kapczynski A (2019) The law of informational capitalism. Yale Law J 129:1460–1515. https://yalelawjournal.org/pdf/KapczynskiBookReview_b2hvici9.pdf Lim M (2017) Freedom to hate: social media, algorithmic enclaves, and the rise of tribal nationalism in Indonesia. Crit Asian Stud 49(3):411–427. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1341188 Masduki, D’Haenens L (2022) Concentration of Media Ownership in Indonesia: A Setback for Viewpoint Diversity. Int J Communication 16:2239–2259 Masduki M, Utomo WP, Rahayu R, Wendratama E, Kurnia N, Rianto P, Aprilia MP, Zuhri S, Edvra PA, Tristi MA, Paramastri MA, Adiputra WM (2023) & Putri Laksmi Nurul Suci. Media Ownership and Political Affiliation in Indonesia (E. Wendratama (ed.); Vol. 1). PR2Media Matos C (2011) Media and democracy in Brazil. Westminster papers in communication and culture. Westminst Papers Communication Cult 8(1):178–196. https://doi.org/10.5325/j.ctv1gk4r2c.13 Mosco V (2008) Current Trends in the Political Economy of Communication. Global Media J -- Can Ed 1(1):45–63 Moss D, Cisternino J, Stiglitz J, Barr MS, Mullainathan S, Shafir E, Benkler Y, Baker T, Greenstone M, Balleisen EJ, Eisner M, Abdelal R, Ruggie J (2009) New Perspectives on Regulation. Tobin Project Website. The Tobin Project Nidhal M, Athalla R, Alfarisi A (2025) Shadows of Censorship: Indonesia’s Content Moderation Policy Development. In Center for Indonesian Policy Studies (CIPS) (Issue 31). https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/324483/1/1933611669.pdf Prodnik JA (2014) A seeping commodification: The long revolution in the proliferation of communication commodities. TripleC 12(1):142–168. https://doi.org/10.31269/vol12iss1pp142-168 Strömbäck J (2008) Four phases of mediatization: An analysis of the mediatization of politics. Int J Press/Politics 13(3):228–246. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161208319097 Suleiman A (2021) A study on the access of ministry, government agencies, and law enforcement authority to electronic system organizers’ data and systems (Policy Paper No. 39) (Issue 39). https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/249419/1/CIPS-PP39.pdf Sulistijanto AB, Abdurrahman MS, Putra DKS (2025) Broadcasting in the shadow of power: regulatory challenges and political violations during Indonesia’s 2024 election. Front Communication 10(October):1–13. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2025.1682232 Sumiati W (2020) the Non-Cooperative Journalists’ Struggle Against Self-Censorship During the New Order Indonesia (1967–1998). Metahumaniora 10(1):52. https://doi.org/10.24198/mh.v10i1.26409 Tiwari P, Pandey P (2024) Social Media and Its Impact on the Electoral Process in India: A Critical Study. Dehradun Law Rev 16(1):119–130 Tomaz T (2024) Media ownership and control in Europe: A multidimensional approach. Eur J Communication 39(5):498–511. https://doi.org/10.1177/02673231241270994 Voltmer K (2008) Comparing media systems in new democracies: East meets South meets West. Central European Journal of Communication , 1 (1994), 23–40. http://ptks.pl/cejc/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CEJC_Vol_1_No1_Voltmer.pdf Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8714884","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":581434237,"identity":"0f77248c-7c1f-4583-b39b-c0cc69d58bcb","order_by":0,"name":"Erman Anom","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Universitas Esa Unggul","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Erman","middleName":"","lastName":"Anom","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-01-28 00:23:14","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8714884/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8714884/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":101749952,"identity":"633b6ba4-52ef-4fe1-8ac6-b47efeb2c6f5","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-03 10:02:25","extension":"jpg","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":54109,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eConceptual diagram for the Business Media Politics model\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8714884/v1/cb57588e3e395f90a1861ae0.jpg"},{"id":104403888,"identity":"136b4ff8-4d58-461d-b3a1-1c1b9879c8c2","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-11 12:19:18","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1111226,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8714884/v1/568430b4-7b71-48f5-8ad1-88a75eb1bac2.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Business Media Politics in Indonesia: Transformation, Regulation, and Democratic Challenges","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe Indonesian media landscape has undergone a profound transformation, shifting from its role as a democratic pillar to functioning increasingly as a business-driven political actor (Firman \u0026amp; Rahmawati, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Unlike Western capitalist contexts, where economic imperatives dominate, Indonesian media embodies a dual character: simultaneously shaping public opinion and operating as commercial enterprises. Post-Reformasi liberalization expanded media markets, yet it also entrenched ownership concentration and facilitated political capture (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study situates the transformation of Indonesian media within comparative media systems perspectives, emphasizing the tensions between democratic ideals and market-driven logics (Humprecht et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022b\u003c/span\u003e; Voltmer, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e). By examining the interplay of regulation, ownership, and commercialization, it highlights how Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s media institutions navigate the competing demands of democratic accountability and economic imperatives, offering insights into broader patterns of media evolution in emerging democracies (Amallah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe transformation of Indonesian media must be understood within broader debates on media policy and political economy. Recent scholarship argues that media institutions function not only as cultural and political actors but also as economic enterprises subject to market imperatives. In Indonesia, this duality has become increasingly pronounced since the fall of the New Order regime, when liberalization expanded the media landscape but simultaneously enabled the consolidation of conglomerates and oligarchic ownership (Humprecht et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022a\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical studies demonstrate that ownership concentration contributes to content homogenization and undermines media pluralism. Recent scholarship shows that conglomeration enhances efficiency but diminishes diversity, privileging economic and political interests over public service obligations (Haikal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). The convergence of editorial agendas with proprietors\u0026rsquo; interests\u0026mdash;commonly referred to as ownership alignment\u0026mdash;has emerged as a defining characteristic of Indonesian media politics.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a global perspective, the Indonesian case reflects broader theories of media system transformation and mediatization. Hallin \u0026amp; Mancini, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e) advance comparative models of media systems, while Str\u0026ouml;mb\u0026auml;ck, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) underscores how political actors adapt to media logics shaped by commercial imperatives. These frameworks are especially pertinent to Indonesia, where weak regulation and fragmented governance have enabled media institutions to operate simultaneously as commercial enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments (Hassan et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThus, the Indonesian media landscape illustrates the convergence of business imperatives and political power within fragile regulatory regimes. The originality of this study lies in its introduction of the concept of business media politics, which extends the political economy of communication by explicitly incorporating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis. In contrast to prior research that has focused primarily on ownership concentration or commercialization, this study underscores how weak regulation institutionalizes the hybrid role of media as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments. By situating Indonesia within comparative debates on media systems and digital governance in the Global South, it advances a context-sensitive framework that enriches both theoretical and empirical understandings of media transformation in emerging democracies.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Literature Review","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Regulation and Media Politics\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn practice, however, media regulation often reflects the interests of dominant political and economic elites rather than safeguarding pluralism and diversity (Allen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). In Indonesia, regulatory frameworks have historically oscillated between control and liberalization. During the New Order, licensing systems such as SIUPP curtailed press freedom and concentrated ownership among political allies, reinforcing state dominance over the media (Sumiati, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Post-Reformasi reforms, including Law No. 40/1999 on the Press, formally guaranteed rights of criticism and correction, yet enforcement remained weak and fragmented. Rather than protecting the public interest, regulation frequently reinforced elite hegemony and facilitated commercialization (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRecent scholarship underscores the digital dimension of media regulation. Lim, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) examines social media governance in Indonesia, demonstrating how states deploy regulatory frameworks to control platforms such as TikTok and YouTube while leveraging algorithmic power for political purposes. Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) highlight Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s MR5/2020 as an instance of digital populism and state capture, where regulation legitimizes surveillance and censorship rather than safeguarding pluralism. These perspectives extend earlier debates by situating Indonesian regulation within broader struggles over digital governance in the Global South.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Economic Perspectives\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulation plays a pivotal role in shaping organizational behavior and market dynamics. Moss et al., (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e) contends that regulation functions as a set of constraints guiding organizational decision-making, ensuring that institutions align with broader social and economic objectives rather than pursuing purely profit-driven motives. Within the media sector, regulation is designed to balance commercial imperatives with democratic responsibilities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eYet concentrated ownership frequently undermines this balance. Garz \u0026amp; Ots, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrate that media consolidation reduces diversity, limits competition, and erodes content quality. In Europe, Tomaz, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) shows similar patterns, while in Indonesia, ownership concentration has been closely linked to ownership alignment, whereby editorial policies reflect the political and economic interests of media proprietors rather than serving the public (Masduki et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe rise of digital platforms introduces new economic challenges. Kapczynski, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), in her review of contemporary scholarship, underscores that the commodification and exploitation of personal data reflect deeper structures of informational capitalism and highlight the urgent need for stronger governance frameworks. In Southeast Asia, Arugay et al., (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrate how digital democracy in the Philippines is undermined by disinformation networks and algorithmic manipulation, while Tiwari \u0026amp; Pandey, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) show that platform regulation in India struggles to safeguard electoral integrity. These comparative insights indicate that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s weak enforcement of MR5/2020 ((Nidhal et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) reflects a broader regional pattern of governance gaps within the digital economy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3 Political Economy of Communication\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe political economy of communication offers a critical framework for examining the structural interplay between media, capital, and politics. Prodnik, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e) identifies three key dimensions of commodification\u0026mdash;content, audiences, and labor\u0026mdash;showing how media organizations transform information into marketable goods, audiences into quantifiable consumer segments, and labor into standardized production processes. This perspective underscores how media institutions operate not merely as cultural intermediaries but as economic enterprises embedded within broader systems of capital accumulation and political influence (Flew \u0026amp; Wilding, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn Indonesia, these dynamics are most evident in the convergence of capital, politics, and regulation. Media conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia, Media Group, and MNC Group exemplify how ownership structures intertwine with political affiliations, shaping editorial agendas and influencing electoral competition (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Masduki et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Comparative perspectives further reinforce this analysis. Gonz\u0026aacute;lez de Bustamante and Relly (2020) highlight how media capture and concentrated ownership in Latin America weaken democratic resilience, revealing clear parallels with Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s experience of oligarchic capture. These cases illustrate that fragile regulatory frameworks institutionalize commodification, transforming media into hybrid entities that simultaneously operate as commercial enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments (Guerrero \u0026amp; M\u0026aacute;rquez-Ram\u0026iacute;rez, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.4 Commercialization and Ownership Alignment\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eCommercialization has become a defining characteristic of the Indonesian media landscape, intensifying reliance on advertising revenues and political sponsorship. This economic dependence shapes editorial agendas, frequently privileging the interests of owners and sponsors over commitments to public service. Empirical studies confirm that ownership alignment undermines pluralism. Amallah et al., (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) find that Indonesian media conglomeration enhances efficiency but homogenizes content, thereby limiting audience choice. Similarly, Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) show that post\u0026ndash;New Order liberalization spurred rapid growth, yet competition was driven more by economic and political interests than by public service obligations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eGap Analysis\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"No\" id=\"Taba\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFocus of Previous Studies\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLimitations\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eContribution of This Article\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eClassical regulation\u003c/b\u003e (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDid not address the digital era or platform governance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncorporates digital regulation, including MR5/2020 and platform cases such as TikTok, YouTube, and Meta\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eOwnership alignment\u003c/b\u003e (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFocused primarily on ownership, lacking integration of digital regulation and comparative perspectives\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntroduces the concept of business media politics, integrating regulation, economics, and politics\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRegional studies\u003c/b\u003e (Banaji, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePartial analyses, not directly connected to Indonesia\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFills the gap through Global South comparisons, including the Philippines, India, and Brazil\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Theoretical Framework","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study is guided by three interrelated theoretical frameworks that together explain how Indonesian media evolves into \u003cem\u003ebusiness media politics\u003c/em\u003e under conditions of weak regulation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolitical Economy of Communication (Mosco, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e). The political economy of communication emphasizes the structural relationship between media, capital, and politics. Mosco, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) identifies three key processes: commodification, spatialization, and structuration. Commodification refers to the transformation of content, audiences, and labor into marketable goods; spatialization highlights the expansion of media power across geographic and institutional boundaries; and structuration examines how social relations are reproduced through media systems. In Indonesia, these processes are evident in the ways media conglomerates commodify audiences through advertising, extend influence across platforms, and reproduce elite political interests through ownership alignment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eMedia System Transformation Theory (Hallin \u0026amp; Mancini, 2004). Hallin and Mancini (2004) propose three comparative models of media systems\u0026mdash;liberal, democratic corporatist, and polarized pluralist\u0026mdash;each reflecting distinct relationships between media, politics, and society. Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s post-Reformasi trajectory illustrates a hybrid transformation: while liberalization expanded the number of media outlets, weak regulation and oligarchic ownership fostered a polarized pluralist system dominated by political-economic elites. This framework situates Indonesia within global comparative media studies, demonstrating how emerging democracies diverge from Western liberal models by combining market-driven logics with entrenched political patronage.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eMediatization of Politics (Str\u0026ouml;mb\u0026auml;ck, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e). Str\u0026ouml;mb\u0026auml;ck, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) identifies four phases of mediatization, illustrating how political actors progressively adapt their strategies to media logic. In Indonesia, electoral competition during the 2019\u0026ndash;2024 cycles demonstrates how political elites deploy media conglomerates as strategic assets, shaping narratives and influencing voter perceptions. Mediatization theory thus explains how media institutions evolve from neutral intermediaries into active political players, reinforcing ownership alignment and oligarchic influence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTogether, these frameworks provide a systemic lens for analyzing the transformation of Indonesian media. The convergence of commodification, system transformation, and mediatization demonstrates how weak regulation enables media institutions to operate simultaneously as commercial enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments. This hybrid role\u0026mdash;conceptualized as \u003cem\u003ebusiness media politics\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;extends existing theories by explicitly incorporating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis. In doing so, it offers a context-sensitive framework for understanding media transformation in emerging democracies across the Global South.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"4. Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study employs a qualitative research design that integrates document analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine the transformation of Indonesian media into business-oriented political institutions. The methodological approach is grounded in the political economy of communication, emphasizing the interplay between regulation, ownership, and political influence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDocument analysis was conducted on regulatory texts, ownership records, and policy documents to trace institutional frameworks and patterns of media governance. Critical discourse analysis was applied to media coverage during the 2019\u0026ndash;2024 electoral cycles, focusing on how narratives reflected ownership interests and political alignments. Semi-structured interviews with journalists, academics, and policy analysts provided additional insights into regulatory enforcement, editorial decision-making, and the broader political economy of Indonesian media.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eData were coded and analyzed using NVivo to ensure thematic consistency and triangulation across sources. This multi-method approach strengthens validity by combining structural analysis of regulation and ownership with interpretive analysis of discourse and practice, thereby capturing the hybrid role of media as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1 Research Design\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study adopts a qualitative research design that combines document analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) to investigate the transformation of Indonesian media institutions. Document analysis was employed to trace the historical and regulatory evolution of the media sector. Following Glenn, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e), document analysis provides systematic insights into how policies, ownership structures, and regulatory frameworks shape media practices and institutional behavior.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCritical discourse analysis was applied to media texts and narratives to examine how ownership alignment and political affiliations are reproduced through discourse, particularly during electoral cycles. CDA enables the identification of underlying power relations and ideological orientations embedded in media content, thereby revealing how editorial agendas are shaped by economic and political interests.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2 Data Sources\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo ensure triangulation and strengthen validity, this study draws upon multiple sources:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulatory texts: Law No. 40/1999 on the Press, Law No. 32/2002 on Broadcasting, and Government Regulation No. 20/1994 on Foreign Investment in Media, which provide the legal framework for media governance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eOwnership records: Data from major conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia, Media Group, and MNC Group, illustrating patterns of concentration and political affiliation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolitical coverage: Media reporting during the 2019 and 2024 electoral cycles, analyzed to identify ownership influence and editorial alignment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecondary literature: Foundational and contemporary scholarship on Indonesian media politics and regulation (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), which contextualizes empirical findings within broader theoretical debates.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.3 In-depth Interviews\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSemi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 informants, comprising:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eFive senior journalists from national and regional outlets,\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eFive academics specializing in media studies and political communication,\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eFive regulators and policy analysts engaged in media governance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInformants were selected through purposive sampling to ensure direct relevance to the research questions. This was complemented by snowball sampling, which facilitated the identification of additional experts with insider perspectives and specialized knowledge. The combination of purposive and snowball strategies enhanced the diversity of viewpoints while maintaining analytical focus, thereby strengthening the validity of the findings.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.4 Analytical Approach\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eData were analyzed using NVivo 12 software to facilitate systematic coding, thematic categorization, and triangulation across documents, interviews, and media texts. Historical contextualization was employed to situate Indonesian media within broader socio-political developments, enabling the identification of continuities and ruptures in regulatory and ownership patterns. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was applied to examine how media texts reproduce ownership interests and political ideologies, with particular attention to electoral cycles and policy debates.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis dual approach\u0026mdash;combining historical contextualization with CDA\u0026mdash;provides a comprehensive framework for understanding how regulation, commercialization, and ownership alignment converge to shape the dynamics of Indonesian media politics. By integrating structural and discursive dimensions, the analysis captures both institutional trajectories and the ideological functions of media in emerging democracies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.5 Ethical Considerations\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAll interview participants provided informed consent and were assured of anonymity and confidentiality. Sensitive data were anonymized during transcription and analysis to protect participant identities. The study received ethical clearance from the Research Ethics Committee of Universitas Esa Unggul, thereby ensuring compliance with international standards of research integrity and ethical practice in qualitative inquiry.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5 Results and Discussion","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.1 Transformation into Business Entities\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe transformation of Indonesian media from democratic watchdogs into business enterprises reflects a broader structural shift in the political economy of communication. During the New Order era, media licensing was tightly controlled through the \u003cem\u003eSurat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers\u003c/em\u003e (SIUPP), which restricted press freedom and concentrated ownership among regime cronies (Hill, 1994). This regulatory environment ensured that media institutions functioned primarily as instruments of state control rather than as independent platforms for public discourse.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFollowing the Reformasi period, liberalization dismantled many of these restrictions, enabling rapid expansion of media outlets. However, this expansion was accompanied by intensified commercialization and oligarchic consolidation. Media conglomerates increasingly operated as profit-driven enterprises, relying heavily on advertising revenues and political sponsorship. As a result, editorial agendas became closely aligned with the interests of owners and their political patrons, undermining the normative role of the press as a democratic watchdog.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis transformation illustrates how weak regulatory enforcement allowed media institutions to evolve into hybrid entities that simultaneously serve commercial, political, and ideological functions. Rather than safeguarding pluralism, deregulation facilitated the commodification of audiences and the instrumentalization of media for electoral competition. The Indonesian case thus exemplifies how media liberalization, in the absence of strong governance, can reproduce patterns of elite dominance and erode democratic resilience.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFollowing the Reformasi period, liberalization dismantled many restrictions and opened the media market to new entrants. Yet rather than fostering pluralism, liberalization facilitated the rise of powerful media conglomerates that consolidated ownership across print, broadcast, and digital platforms. This consolidation enabled efficiency and expansion but simultaneously reinforced homogenization of content and reduced diversity. The resulting media landscape reflects a paradox: while liberalization expanded the number of outlets, ownership concentration limited the range of perspectives available to audiences. In practice, conglomeration entrenched the influence of political-economic elites, transforming media institutions into strategic assets that serve commercial and political interests more than democratic deliberation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe shift toward commercialization transformed Indonesian media into industries increasingly driven by advertising revenues and political sponsorship. Media organizations began to prioritize profitability and market share, often at the expense of their democratic functions. Ownership concentration further entrenched political affiliations within media institutions, with conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia and Media Group operating simultaneously as commercial businesses and strategic political assets (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e; Masduki et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis trajectory underscores the paradox of liberalization: while the post-Reformasi era expanded the media landscape, weak regulatory enforcement and oligarchic ownership redirected media functions away from serving the public interest. Instead, media institutions became instruments for advancing commercial imperatives and political agendas, thereby eroding pluralism and weakening the press\u0026rsquo;s normative role as a democratic watchdog.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec16\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.2 Commercialization\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eCommercialization has become a central driver of media transformation in Indonesia. Heavy reliance on advertising revenues and political sponsorships has reinforced ownership alignment, whereby editorial agendas increasingly reflect the preferences of proprietors and sponsors rather than the public interest (Masduki \u0026amp; D\u0026rsquo;Haenens, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). This dynamic illustrates how market imperatives reshape journalistic priorities, privileging profitability and political patronage over democratic accountability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmpirical studies confirm that commercialization not only narrows editorial independence but also fosters homogenization of content, as media outlets compete for advertising share by reproducing similar narratives and entertainment-driven formats. In practice, this has weakened the press\u0026rsquo;s watchdog function, reducing its capacity to hold elites accountable. Instead, media institutions increasingly operate as hybrid entities\u0026mdash;balancing commercial imperatives with political affiliations\u0026mdash;thereby blurring the line between journalism and political advocacy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis dependence weakens pluralism, fosters homogenization of content, and intensifies political capture. Media Group, owned by Surya Paloh, exemplifies how media enterprises function simultaneously as profit-driven businesses and political instruments, shaping narratives to align with ownership interests (Sulistijanto et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). As both a commercial conglomerate and a political vehicle, Media Group demonstrates the dual role of Indonesian media institutions: generating revenue through advertising while strategically advancing partisan agendas. This case highlights how ownership alignment transforms media from democratic watchdogs into hybrid entities that blur the boundaries between journalism, commerce, and political advocacy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom a global perspective, commercialization reflects broader structural trends in contemporary media systems. Barnett, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e) argues that commercialization undermines the democratic role of journalism by subordinating editorial independence to market logics, privileging profitability over public accountability. In Indonesia, this dynamic is further exacerbated by weak regulatory enforcement, which enables oligarchic ownership structures to dominate the media landscape. As a result, Indonesian media exemplifies how commercialization, when unchecked by effective governance, transforms journalism into a vehicle for elite interests, eroding pluralism and weakening the press\u0026rsquo;s normative role as a democratic institution.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.3 Regulatory Weakness\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegulatory weakness remains one of the most critical challenges in the Indonesian media landscape. Although post-Reformasi reforms introduced legal guarantees for press freedom, enforcement mechanisms have often been fragmented, inconsistent, and vulnerable to political capture. Regulatory bodies frequently lack the institutional capacity and independence necessary to oversee ownership concentration or enforce compliance with broadcasting and press laws.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis weakness has allowed oligarchic actors to exploit loopholes and regulatory ambiguities, consolidating control over media institutions while evading accountability. For example, foreign investment restrictions and cross-ownership rules are inconsistently applied, enabling conglomerates to expand across platforms with minimal oversight. Moreover, regulatory agencies are often subject to political influence, which undermines their ability to act as neutral arbiters of media governance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs a result, regulation in Indonesia functions more as a symbolic safeguard than as an effective mechanism for protecting pluralism and independence. Weak enforcement not only facilitates commercialization and ownership alignment but also intensifies the mediatization of politics, as media institutions operate with limited checks on their dual role as business enterprises and political instruments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eA prominent example of regulatory weakness is Ministerial Regulation No. 5/2020 (MR5), which requires private electronic system providers to register with the government, grant access to user data, and remove content deemed disruptive to public order. Critics contend that MR5 grants excessive discretionary power to the state, enabling censorship and surveillance without adequate safeguards (Suleiman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). The regulation illustrates how legal instruments, while framed as mechanisms for maintaining public order, can be deployed to curtail press freedom and digital rights. In practice, MR5 reflects the broader tension between state authority and democratic accountability, highlighting how regulatory frameworks in Indonesia often serve political interests rather than protecting media independence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eMoreover, overlapping jurisdictions and limited enforcement capacity further undermine regulatory institutions. Although the Press Law (No. 40/1999) and the Broadcasting Law (No. 32/2002) affirm freedom of expression, they provide inadequate safeguards against commercialization and political capture. Consequently, regulation often legitimizes ownership concentration and oligarchic influence rather than restraining them. Within this framework, regulatory weakness functions as a structural condition that facilitates the convergence of business and political interests in media institutions, transforming them into hybrid entities that advance both economic and political power.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.4 Comparative Perspectives: Global South Cases\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo enhance international relevance, the Indonesian case can be situated within broader patterns observed across emerging democracies in the Global South:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePhilippines: Media capture remains entrenched through family-owned conglomerates closely linked to political dynasties. Curato, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) highlights how disinformation and populist narratives reinforce elite dominance, reflecting dynamics similar to Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s oligarchic ownership structures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndia: Digital disinformation and weak platform regulation continue to undermine electoral integrity. Banaji \u0026amp; Bhat, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) analyze how WhatsApp\u0026rsquo;s circulation of right-wing propaganda interacts with state regulation, paralleling Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s MR5/2020 framework.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eBrazil: Matos, (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e) illustrates how media oligarchies erode democratic resilience, with conglomerates shaping narratives to safeguard elite interests. This trajectory resonates with Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s hybrid media institutions operating under fragile regulatory conditions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTaken together, these comparative insights underscore that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s challenges are not unique but emblematic of a wider Global South pattern, where weak regulation, commercialization, and ownership concentration converge to compromise democratic accountability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6. Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study has analyzed the transformation of Indonesian media into hybrid institutions that operate simultaneously as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments within fragile regulatory regimes. By introducing the concept of business media politics, the research extends the political economy of communication by integrating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe findings reveal that weak regulatory enforcement enables ownership concentration and oligarchic influence, thereby reinforcing commercialization and political capture. Media conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia and Media Group illustrate how editorial agendas align with proprietors\u0026rsquo; political and economic interests, undermining pluralism and diminishing the press\u0026rsquo;s democratic role. Comparative insights from the Philippines, India, and Brazil further demonstrate that Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s experience reflects broader patterns of regulatory fragility and media capture across the Global South.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe theoretical contribution of this study lies in its articulation of business media politics as a context-sensitive framework for examining media transformation in emerging democracies. Empirically, the research highlights the convergence of commercialization, ownership alignment, and regulatory weakness as defining characteristics of Indonesia\u0026rsquo;s media landscape.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study is limited by its qualitative scope and its focus on the 2019\u0026ndash;2024 electoral cycles. Future research should incorporate quantitative big data analysis, longitudinal designs, and cross-national comparisons to deepen understanding of media regulation and democratic resilience. Such approaches will be essential for advancing comparative media systems theory and informing policy debates on how to safeguard pluralism in the digital era.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eContribution and Novelty\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study advances the field of media policy and political communication in several important ways:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eConceptual Innovation: It introduces \u003cem\u003ebusiness media politics\u003c/em\u003e as a novel analytical framework for understanding hybrid media roles. The concept captures the dual function of media institutions in Indonesia as both commercial enterprises and political actors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTheoretical Extension: It extends the political economy of communication by explicitly incorporating regulatory dynamics into analyses of media transformation, thereby bridging structural ownership studies with regulatory scholarship.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparative Relevance: By situating the Indonesian case within broader Global South trajectories, the study highlights how commercialization, ownership concentration, and regulatory fragility converge to undermine democratic accountability across emerging democracies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eDemonstrates how regulatory fragility institutionalizes commercialization and ownership alignment. Empirical evidence indicates that fragmented enforcement facilitates oligarchic influence, with MR5 serving as a clear example of regulatory overreach that consolidates both state and market dominance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eProvides empirical insights from a non-Western democracy, extending comparative media systems theory to the Global South. The Indonesian case exemplifies a hybrid media system in which market logics, political patronage, and regulatory fragility converge. This context-sensitive framework offers analytical leverage for understanding media transformation in other post-authoritarian democracies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe novelty of this study lies in conceptualizing business media politics as an analytical lens for examining how economic imperatives, political power, and regulatory fragility converge to shape democratic media systems. By foregrounding this intersection, the framework advances existing scholarship on media policy and political communication, offering a context-sensitive approach to understanding hybrid media roles in emerging democracies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eLimitations\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study is limited by its reliance on qualitative data, with interviews conducted with only 15 informants and a primary focus on the 2019\u0026ndash;2024 electoral cycles. The scope does not include quantitative big data analysis or longitudinal comparisons across multiple electoral periods, which may constrain the generalizability of the findings.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eFuture Research Directions\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo advance understanding of media transformation in emerging democracies, future research should:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eIntegrate quantitative approaches\u003c/b\u003e: Employ big data from digital platforms to systematically measure disinformation flows and ownership influence.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eExamine algorithmic governance\u003c/b\u003e: Conduct in-depth analyses of platform regulation (e.g., TikTok, Meta, YouTube) to assess how digital governance interacts with state power and shapes media ecosystems.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePursue cross-national comparisons\u003c/b\u003e: Undertake comparative studies across Global South contexts (e.g., the Philippines, India, Brazil) to identify both convergent patterns and divergent trajectories in media regulation and democratic resilience.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eAuthor Contributions (CRediT Taxonomy)\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eConceptualization\u003c/b\u003e: Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eMethodology\u003c/b\u003e: Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInvestigation (Fieldwork, Interviews, Document Review)\u003c/b\u003e: Erman Anom, Asnawi, Lely Arrianie\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eData Curation (Transcription, Coding, Organization)\u003c/b\u003e: Asnawi, Lely Arrianie\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eFormal Analysis (Critical Discourse Analysis, Thematic Coding)\u003c/b\u003e: Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eValidation (Triangulation, Peer Review of Coding)\u003c/b\u003e: Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eProject Administration\u003c/b\u003e: Erman Anom, Lely Arrianie\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eResources (Regulatory Texts, Ownership Records, Interview Networks)\u003c/b\u003e: Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eWriting \u0026ndash; Original Draft\u003c/b\u003e: Erman Anom, Asnawi\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eWriting \u0026ndash; Review \u0026amp; Editing\u003c/b\u003e: Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eSupervision\u003c/b\u003e: Mus Chairil Samani\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contributions (CRediT Taxonomy)\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cul\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConceptualization:\u003c/strong\u003e Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMethodology:\u003c/strong\u003e Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInvestigation (Fieldwork, Interviews, Document Review):\u003c/strong\u003e Erman Anom, Asnawi, Lely Arrianie\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Curation (Transcription, Coding, Organization):\u003c/strong\u003e Asnawi, Lely Arrianie\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFormal Analysis (Critical Discourse Analysis, Thematic Coding):\u003c/strong\u003e Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani, Asnawi\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eValidation (Triangulation, Peer Review of Coding):\u003c/strong\u003e Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProject Administration:\u003c/strong\u003e Erman Anom, Lely Arrianie\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eResources (Regulatory Texts, Ownership Records, Interview Networks):\u003c/strong\u003e Erman Anom, Mus Chairil Samani\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWriting – Original Draft:\u003c/strong\u003e Erman Anom, Asnawi\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eWriting – Review \u0026amp; Editing:\u003c/strong\u003e Mus Chairil Samani, Lely Arrianie\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSupervision:\u003c/strong\u003e Mus Chairil Samani\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgments\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors extend their sincere gratitude to the journalists, academics, and policy analysts who generously shared their insights during interviews and contributed valuable perspectives to this study. Special thanks are also due to the Faculty of Communication Studies, Universitas Esa Unggul, for providing institutional support and facilitating ethical clearance. The authors further acknowledge the assistance of colleagues and research assistants who contributed to transcription, coding, and data organization, thereby ensuring the rigor and consistency of the qualitative analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eFunding\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis research received no external funding.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch2\u003eConflict of Interest Declaration\u003c/h2\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no conflict of interest.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAllen H, Connolly S, Hargreaves Heap SP (2017) Media pluralism: What matters for governance and regulation? 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Initially celebrated as democratic watchdogs, media outlets expanded rapidly but soon came under the dominance of conglomerates and oligarchic ownership. In the digital era, commercialization, ownership concentration, and weak regulatory enforcement have transformed Indonesian media into hybrid institutions that function simultaneously as economic enterprises, political actors, and ideological instruments. This study examines how regulatory frameworks, ownership structures, and commercialization drive the transformation of Indonesian media. It introduces the concept of business media politics to extend political economy of communication theory by integrating regulatory dynamics into political communication analysis, offering a context-sensitive framework for emerging democracies in the Global South. Employing a qualitative political economy approach, the research combines historical analysis, document review of regulatory texts and ownership records, and critical discourse analysis (CDA) of media coverage during the 2019–2024 electoral cycles. Semi-structured interviews with journalists, academics, and policy analysts were conducted, with data coded in NVivo to ensure thematic consistency and triangulation. Findings reveal that weak regulation facilitates ownership concentration and oligarchic influence, reinforcing commercialization and political capture. Media conglomerates such as Kompas Gramedia and Media Group illustrate how editorial agendas align with proprietors’ political and economic interests. Comparative insights from the Philippines, India, and Brazil underscore similar patterns of regulatory fragility and media capture across the Global South. Indonesian media thus operates as hybrid entities under fragile regulatory regimes, embodying the convergence of business imperatives and political power. The proposed concept of business media politics offers a novel framework for analyzing media transformation in emerging democracies. Limitations include the qualitative scope and the focus on the 2019–2024 period; future research should employ quantitative big data analysis and cross-national comparisons to advance understanding of media regulation and democratic resilience.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eJEL \u003c/strong\u003eL82•K23• P16•O53•D72\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Business Media Politics in Indonesia: Transformation, Regulation, and Democratic Challenges","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-02-03 10:02:20","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8714884/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"deb5f9d5-d6a1-4544-bbe7-c47d426f4eb4","owner":[],"postedDate":"February 3rd, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-03-08T13:54:39+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-02-03 10:02:20","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8714884","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8714884","identity":"rs-8714884","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}