Direct and indirect self-enhancement in free will beliefs

Self-enhancement is generally accepted as a constituent principle of social cognition. In the present paper, we demonstrate the footprint of this phenomenon in the context of free will beliefs. In a small initial study (N = 61), we find a small average effect of direct self-enhancement, such that some people tend to attribute more free will to themselves than to others. Very few believe the opposite, and most see no self-other difference at all. In a second study (N = 173), we find robust evidence for an indirect form of self-enhancement, such that most respondents rate others who share their belief in free will and indeterminism as more competent and moral. In a third study (N = 220), we find evidence for both direct and indirect self-enhancement, the latter emerging as a greater willingness to cooperate with others who share the respondent's belief in free will. Interestingly, we also find that indirect self-enhancement is strongest among respondents who avoid direct self-enhancement, suggesting that there may be a hydraulic relationship between the two.