American Mission in Afghanistan: Geopolitical Interests, Strategies and Reasons of Failure

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Abstract

Afghanistan was considered a bridge to American geopolitical interests in Central Asia.In the late 1990s, the Taliban moved away from the American orbit of influence, the US policies based on democracy and human rights toward Central Asia failed and many diffused threats emerged as primary geopolitical challenges. As a consequence, the US interests and role in Central Asia received serious blows. The US looked for an overriding global threat around which it could organize its geopolitical interests. The al Qaeda’s attack on twin towers in the US in September 11, 2001 transformed terrorism into a threat with such global significance and the US’s militaristic approach culminated in the War on Terror. However, American post-9/11 mission in Afghanistan was hobbled by a series of challenges which became more complicated due to the overriding geopolitical thrust underpinning it. The geopolitical thrust of the mission not only hindered the US ability to grasp the unfolding security environment within Afghanistan, it raised obstacles for the great power in finding out proper strategies to fix the challenges. At last, the US had to end the mission that had goneawry and withdrew from Afghanistan leaving the country to the very groups those were previously considered and treated as insurgents.

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last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00