Retroactive merger review of Duke and Progress Energy in North and South Carolina

Retroactive merger review of Duke and Progress Energy in North and South Carolina | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Retroactive merger review of Duke and Progress Energy in North and South Carolina Sarthak Vij This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-4676204/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract In July 2012, Duke Energy Corporation completed its acquisition of Progress Energy, Inc., forming the largest electric utility company in the United States. This merger occurred within the unique regulatory environments of North and South Carolina, which operate regulated electricity markets outside the governance of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). This study investigates the impact of the Duke-Progress Energy merger on electricity prices for residential, industrial, and commercial consumers in these states using a synthetic control method. Our analysis reveals that post-merger, North Carolina experienced significant reductions in electricity prices across all sectors, indicating that merger efficiencies were effectively transferred to end-users. Conversely, South Carolina saw a relative increase in electricity prices despite a more competitive market structure. These contrasting outcomes highlight the complex interplay between market dynamics, regulatory oversight, and operational efficiencies in the electricity sector. The findings underscore the importance of considering local market conditions and regulatory environments when evaluating the effects of utility mergers. Energy mergers vertical mergers utility mergers and regulations mergers in non-RTO states Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files Controlandtreatmentgrouppricetracking.xlsx ConsolidatedDataFile.xlsx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-4676204","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":323395069,"identity":"10059e57-1ea9-45de-8b9e-8fc8e52e0daf","order_by":0,"name":"Sarthak Vij","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Johns Hopkins University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Sarthak","middleName":"","lastName":"Vij","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2024-07-02 19:36:18","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4676204/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4676204/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":60984832,"identity":"d1ff287d-8ce1-4119-babe-0506b440c788","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-07-24 09:50:45","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":597712,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"v5Journal.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4676204/v1_covered_55e705a6-d679-4d2c-bd27-53151551a380.pdf"},{"id":60982808,"identity":"12a6ebaa-3825-4572-8970-862771ce5017","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-07-24 09:26:34","extension":"xlsx","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":25375,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Controlandtreatmentgrouppricetracking.xlsx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4676204/v1/adb8695c9a4bcb3f1cf62575.xlsx"},{"id":60982809,"identity":"50a1ac36-fa8a-4603-bc1b-f182fd42e194","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-07-24 09:26:34","extension":"xlsx","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"supplement","size":8259083,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"ConsolidatedDataFile.xlsx","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4676204/v1/2dbbfd16abd6894310fda065.xlsx"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Retroactive merger review of Duke and Progress Energy in North and South Carolina","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Energy mergers, vertical mergers, utility mergers and regulations, mergers in non-RTO states","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4676204/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4676204/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eIn July 2012, Duke Energy Corporation completed its acquisition of Progress Energy, Inc., forming the largest electric utility company in the United States. 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