Psychological Aspects of Taxation: A Preliminary Study in Morocco

Psychological Aspects of Taxation: A Preliminary Study in Morocco | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Psychological Aspects of Taxation: A Preliminary Study in Morocco Mohammed El-Mir, Khalid Bouzelmat This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6994357/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 11 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract The current study explored the psychological aspects of taxation in Morocco. In this sense, we aimed to analyze the Moroccan taxpayer beliefs and feelings, in addition to drawing a broad psychological view of the trade-off between the Moroccans and the tax policy. For this reason, we adopted a descriptive method that consisted of collecting data from a sample of adult Moroccans that consisted of 100 participants, aged between 20 and more 40 years, using a qualitative procedure in which the above sample responded to a short questionnaire that consisted of 4 questions that targeted psychological fiscal representations and feelings. After analyzing the collected data, it appears that there are different representations and feelings towards tax and tax policy. Mainly, there is a tendency to consider tax as a public interest, which is at the same time characterized by unfairness. We concluded that the Moroccans like other nations, share the same representations and feelings about tax and tax policy. Health sciences/Health care Biological sciences/Psychology Social science/Psychology fiscal psychology representations feelings taxpayer public interest unfairness Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Introduction Psychology has acquired a huge impact on understanding human behavior in different contexts, from this perspective, we intend in this study to explore how this discipline could contribute to apprehending psychological factors that influence the taxpayer’s behavior. Such data collection will build bridges between psychologists and economists, especially those interested in the tax field. Fiscal psychology examines the attitudes and beliefs of taxpayers in order to understand their behavior. Furthermore, attitudes and norms are main determinants of tax compliance. While some researchers highlighted the importance of taking into account psychological aspects when dealing with taxpayer behavior (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010 ; Lewis, 1982 , 2008 ), social representations of taxation remain little investigated, especially the question of how psychological factors of taxation emerged (Dornstein, 1987 ; Elffers & Hessing, 1997 ; James et al., 2005 ; Kirchler, 1998, 2007 ; Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001 ; Schmolders, 1959 ; Trivedi et al., 2005 ). However, some findings concluded that psychological factors are important aspects that determine tax behavior. It appears from those studies that tax attitude depends on the perceived use of funds collected (e.g., Cullis & Lewis, 1985 ; Eriksen & Lars Fallan, 1996 ; Kirchler et al., 2008 ). On the other side, behavioral intentions of taxpayers are also determined by subjective norms (Ajzen, 1991 ). It was stated that norms are behavioral standards on three different levels (i.e., individual level, social level, & national level). One of the seminal works in this discipline is proposed by Ajzen and Fishbein ( 1980 ), who indicated that attitudes are unbiased indicators of real behavior. Additionally, Hessing et al. ( 1988 ), after reviewing ten theoretical models of fiscal psychology, divided them into two broad categories: those concerning aspects of tax policy and those focusing mainly on the representations, attitudes, and beliefs of individuals (Lubian & Zarri 2011 ). The psychological model of Lewis ( 1982 ) tried to bridge the gap between the previous factors; it contemplates tax behavior as a profile of taxpayers with high propensities to evade, which can potentially be developed from an examination of taxpayer attitudes and beliefs. This profile might include background factors like age, sex, socioeconomic background, education, and occupation. Hopefully, from the examination of attitudes and beliefs, some of the reasons why taxpayers evade tax can be identified and appropriate measures taken in an attempt to change those attitudes and beliefs. Lewis ( 1982 , p. 132), in contrasting the fiscal psychology and early economic deterrence models, states that the central frame of reference should be what taxpayer perceptions actually are, rather than what they are assumed to be on the basis of rational and self-interest assumptions. However, he argues that theoretical analyses are important, as these provide an underpinning of relationships to be tested in behavioral research. Lewis comprehensively reviews tax evasion social surveys completed in the 1970’s; hence this section discusses a sample of empirical studies that are considered illustrative of current behavioral work. Tax compliance depends on a number of variables, such as tax knowledge (Langham et al., 2012 ), emotions (Fochmann et al., 2025 ), and trust in the tax system (Appiah et al., 2024 ; Baru, 2016 ; Batrancea et al., 2019 ), as well as on its fairness (Perumal, 2008 ) and the culture of taxpayers (Richardson, 2008 ). Furthermore, other tax psychology theorists adopt an approach that combines deterrence and tax psychology models in order to strengthen tax compliance behavior and combat tax evasion (Hasseldine & Bebbington, 1991 ). This study is pioneering in the Moroccan social context; in this sense, we consider that the results of this work will shed light on psychological nuances concerning the beliefs and feelings of the Moroccan taxpayer, which will probably contribute to a better understanding of citizens' perceptions of taxes and tax policy. For this reason, we will try to form a clear vision of the Moroccan society's representations of taxation. Taxes and taxation have a long history in Moroccan society, so in order to have an idea about taxation in Moroccan history, it is important to distinguish between different significant stages that the Moroccan tax system went through. In the pre-protectorate period, a distinction was made between taxes and levies that were religious in nature (e.g., Zakat, Achour, Jezya, and Kharaj) and those that were not (e.g., Hédya, Harka, Mouna, Sokhra, Ghorama and Touiza, Meks, and Tertib). During the protectorate, taxation became the main instrument of economic intervention in Morocco (Fair Tax monitor, October 2020). this lead to the establishment of a tax system inspired by the French system. This policy made taxes systematic in nature and freed them from their purely religious nature. After Morocco's independence, the tax system inherited from the protectorate period was consolidated and legitimized. Consequently, taxes are now collected in accordance with the universal principles that consider them as a part of the deductions that serve the public interest. Therefore, the concept of tax is not linked to the protectorate period, as the latter contributed to the institutionalization of taxes and stripped them to some extent of their lasting religious character. Therefore, this research seeks to explore Moroccans' perceptions and feelings toward taxes and the tax system, with the goal of uncovering how Moroccans perceive taxes. The data collected through this study will allow us to build a clear picture of Moroccans' attitudes and expectations regarding tax policy. In this perspective, this exploratory work aims to inventory Moroccans' perceptions and beliefs about taxes and their relationship to their tax behavior. To achieve the objectives of this study, we will attempt to analyze Moroccans’s perceptions and feelings about taxes and the tax system. Based on the above, we expect that the Moroccan taxpayer has a conflictual conception about tax and taxation policy. This attitude doesn’t convince the taxpayers in Morocco to be confident with the tax administration. Method We adopted in this study a descriptive qualitative method that consisted of exploring the characteristics of a phenomenon rather than explaining the underlying causes or mechanisms. Therefore, in this study, we will attempt to explore Moroccans' perceptions and attitudes toward taxes and the tax system, based on the responses given by the respondents regarding their views on tax policy. This allows us to delve into subconscious beliefs about taxes. In this study, we relied on a random sample of 100 participants from different socio-cultural groups, including 61 females and 39 males, aged between 20 and 62 years (See Table 1 ). A more detailed exam of the sample revealed that females constitute 61% of the sample subjects, with a total of 61 participants, while males represent 39% of the participants, with a total of 39 subjects. Additionally, 43% of the participants are employed (43 participants), while 57% are not employed (57 participants). Regarding the age of the participants, the majority of them are between 20 and 29 (77%, 77 participants), followed by the 30–40 age group (13%, 13 participants), and finally the + 40 age group (10%, 10 participants). All methods were carried out in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations. Informed consent was obtained from all the participants. Additionally, the study was approved by the Ethical Committee of “Psychological and Thinking Studies Laboratory”. In order to gain access to the participants’ representations and feelings regarding tax and the tax system, we used a brief questionnaire consisting of four questions, which are: what do you think about tax? What do you think about Moroccan tax policy? What are your feelings about taxes? What are your feelings about Moroccan tax policy? Table 1 Demographic characteristics of the study sample Sex Age Profession Females Males 20–29 yrs 30–40 yrs + 40 yrs Employed Unemployed N 61 39 77 13 10 43 57 Results In order to analyze the data collected from the participants in this study, we relied on a content analysis technique, which focuses on the themes and categories within which the participants's responses fall (See table 2, figure 1). We identified 13 categories that summarize the Moroccans' perceptions and feelings about taxes and the tax system, which are public interest, trust, unfairness, distrust, complexity, burden, obligation, non-compliance, corruption, frustration tax knowledge, contribution, non-categorized (see table 1). It should be noted that while analyzing the content of the responses, we found that the participants presented more than one theme while answering a specific question, in addition to some themes that were mentioned when answering a specific question that we found as answers to other items in the questionnaire. Therefore, the number of repetitions of the answers reflects the number of times the theme was mentioned in the participants’ responses to the questionnaire items. Table 2 Thematic distribution of the participants’ responses Themes Categories Number of responses Positive associations Public interest 105 Trust 18 Neutral associations Tax Knowledge 2 Contribution 1 Negative associations Unfairness 99 Frustration 31 Distrust 30 Burden 27 Complexity 26 Obligation 21 Non-compliance 4 Corruption 2 Non-categorized associations Non-categorized 20 Total responses 386 Analysis of the data So as to ensure an objective data analysis, we converted the raw data into standard data, specifically percentages, which allow a reliable interpretation of the results and the extraction of participants' attitudes toward taxation and the tax system in Morocco. Furthermore, in order to obtain the greatest possible number of indications from participants' responses, the analysis proceeded at four different levels. The first level focused on a general analysis of participants' responses, regardless of their sex, age group, or sociocultural status. We then moved on to the sex variable to ascertain whether participants' attitudes and beliefs toward taxation changed based on this factor. The third level of the analysis of the results focused on distributing the participants' responses by age group. The aim of this analysis consisted in examining how responses were affected by the participants' age. The final level of analysis aimed to classify the participants' responses according to job variable. Through this dimension, we sought to explore whether participants' representations and feelings changed depending on their professional status. Regarding the first level of analysis, which aims to provide a general tendency of the participants’ responses (see table 3, figure 2), it was found that most participants believe that taxes serve the public interest but are also unfair and inequitable. The results revealed, to a lesser extent, frustration and distrust in the tax system, followed by the perception of taxes as a burden and characterized by complexity and coercion. Next came some participants' trust in the tax system. A small number of responses indicated that some citizens do not comply with tax payments, and we found only a few indications of corruption. We also found some indications among respondents' responses of a lack of knowledge about the tax system and the perception of taxes as a contribution. The table also highlights some responses that we were unable to classify as prominent themes in this analysis. The results of the qualitative data analysis indicate that the social representation of taxes that occurs most frequently is "public interest," at 27.27% (105 responses out of 386). In second place was "unfairness" at 25.64% (99 responses), followed by "frustration" at 8,03% (31 responses). Finally, "Distrust" was the least frequently selected option, with 7.27% of participants (30 responses). In fifth and sixth place were "burden" at 6.99% (27 responses out of 386) and "complexity" at 6.73% (26 responses out of 386). Seventh place is also occupied by "obligation," with 5.44% (21 responses out of 386). Following closely behind are "non-compliance" and "corruption," with an equivalent rate of 1.03% for the former (4 responses out of 386) and 0.51% for the latter (2 responses out of 386). In the same position, we found tax knowledge with 0.51% (2 responses out of 386), followed by contribution with 0.25% (2 responses out of 386) and finally non-categorized responses with 5.18% (20 responses out of 386). Table 3 Overall distribution of sample responses to the questions of the tool N Public interest Trust Unfairness Frustration Distrust Burden Complexity Obligation Non-compliance Corruption Tax knowledge Contribution Non-categorized 100 27.20 4.66 25.64 8.03 7.77 6.99 6.73 5.44 1.03 0.51 0.51 0.25 5.18 When the data were analyzed based on sex, it appears clear that there is a convergence in participants' representations and feelings toward taxes and the tax system (see table 4, figure 3), with men slightly outnumbering those who viewed taxes as a public interest and unfair. Women were twice as likely as men to be disappointed with taxes. There was also significant convergence between the two sexes regarding distrust in the tax system, as well as considering it as a burden, a complex system, and a coercive system. It was later revealed that a few responses referred to non-compliance with tax payments and corruption. Almost the same impression was expressed in regard with regard to tax knowledge and contribution. Table 4 Representations and feelings of participants toward tax and the tax system according to sex Sex N Public interest Trust Unfairness Frustration Distrust Burden Complexity Obligation Non-compliance Corruption Tax knowledge Contribution Non-categorized F 61 24.18 5.32 24.59 9.01 7.37 6.55 6.14 5.73 1.22 0.40 0.40 0 5.73 M 39 29.48 3.20 25 5.76 7.69 7.05 7.05 4.48 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 3.84 The third level of analysis focuses on the age variable of the study participants (See, table 5; figure 4). Thereupon, the sample was divided into three age groups, as shown in Table 5. It became clear that the age of the participants clearly influenced their perceptions and feelings regarding taxes and the tax system, in favor of the younger group with regard to considering taxation a public interest. Nevertheless, concerning the unfairness of taxation, there was a convergence in the beliefs of the young and older groups, who considered the tax system as unfair, in contrast to the middle-aged group, who expressed a lower level of feeling of unfairness. It was also clear that there was a convergence between the age groups regarding feelings of frustration with the tax system. In contrast, it was found that the younger were less confident in the tax system than other age groups, but the middle-aged group believed that taxes were a burden more than the other age groups. Compared to the older groups, the young one considered the tax system complex, while the older group viewed taxation as coercive. There was similarity between the age groups concerning non-compliance with taxes, with the middle-age group believing that corruption is rampant in the tax system (see figure 4). Table 5 Representations and feelings of participants according to age Age N Public interest Trust Unfairness Frustration Distrust Burden Complexity Obligation Non-compliance Corruption Tax knowledge Contribution Non-categorized 20-29 yrs 77 37.01 5.76 33.17 10.57 11.53 9.13 11.05 6.25 0.96 0.48 0.96 0.48 9.61 30-40 yrs 13 28.84 7.69 28.84 9.61 7.69 11.53 3.84 3.84 1.92 28.84 0 0 0 + 40 yrs 10 25 5 37,5 10 5 5 2.5 15 2.5 2.5 0 0 0 The fourth level of analysis addressed the variable of the participants’ profession (See, table 6; figure 5). In relation to the view that tax is a public interest, a large percentage of participants embraced this tendency. Furthermore, regarding trust in the tax system, employees and non-employees showed a similar level of trust. On the other hand, employed participants expressed a lower degree of distrust in the tax system as well as considering it a burden and characterized by complexity, in contrast to their view that tax is marked by coercion compared to non-employed ones. Although the participants’ attitude on not paying tax was weak, employees did not indicate that people did not commit to paying tax. The feeling that the tax system is corrupt was weak as well as similar between employed and non-employed participants (see figure 5). Table 6 Distribution of participants’ responses according to professional status Profession N Public interest Trust Unfairness Frustration Distrust Burden Complexity Obligation Non-compliance Corruption Tax knowledge Contribution Non-categorized Employed 43 27.90 4.65 26.74 7.55 5.23 5.81 3.48 7.55 0 0.58 0 0 6.39 Unemployed 57 25 4.38 23.24 7.89 9.21 7.45 8.77 3.50 1.75 0.43 0.87 0.43 3.94 Analysis of the data according to the participants’ attitude As previously noted, the content analysis revealed 13 categories in the participants' responses. A closer examination of these categories reveals that they fall into three broad positions on taxes and the tax system: positive, negative, and neutral. Therefore, this further analysis of the results aims to uncover the participants' general attitudes toward taxes in Morocco. Positive attitude towards tax The positive attitude about tax and the tax system of the participants highlights worthwhile representations and feelings about tax and promotes the legitimacy of taxes. The categories encompassed by this theme are public interest and trust in the tax system. The analysis indicates a high level of positive view of tax and tax policy, which shows a notable emphasis on the positive aspects of taxation (see table 3). Negative attitude towards tax Regarding negative attitudes toward taxes and the tax system, content analysis revealed the largest number of negative categories (8 out of 13) compared to other attitudes (positive and neutral), which somewhat highlights the participants' negative bias toward taxes. The category of "tax fairness" received the largest number of negative responses, followed by "lack of trust," then "frustration," and finally, "the prevalence of bribery in the tax system." Neutral attitude towards tax The neutral theme encompasses general fiscal associations without describing appreciated or rejected emotions. The categories contained within this theme are tax knowledge and contribution. It should be noted that the number of fiscal associations in the neutral theme totaled 0.77% (i.e., 3 of the 386 codes). Discussion After analyzing the content of the participants' responses, a set of representations and feelings regarding the tax system in Morocco was revealed. These responses were summarized into a set of themes and categories, which showed positive, negative, and neutral trends. On the positive side, it appeared that Moroccans believe that taxation serves the public interest, and it was also evident that they have some confidence in the Moroccan tax system. Conversely, there was a strong feeling of unfairness about this tax system and a lack of trust in it; a sense of frustration and the prevalence of corruption were also classified along with coercion. In addition, there were some neutral signals, such as considering taxation as a contribution along with knowledge of taxation. These results indicate an awareness of the importance of taxation as a public interest. Therefore, Moroccans' representations and attitudes toward taxes reflect a realistic view of taxes and the tax system. Participants in this study agreed on two basic characteristics of taxes: the public interest and unfairness or injustice of tax policy. The other characteristics did not receive the same level of frequency and repetition among researchers. Participants' responses also expressed distrust and frustration with the Moroccan tax system. This attitude, which links taxes to public interest, is based on the belief that taxes must be paid and cannot be evaded in order to serve the nation’s aspirations. The data demonstrate that the majority of participants interpret taxes as a civic duty to serve the general interest. This prompts questions regarding the Moroccan citizen's awareness of the true utilization of taxes. It is a responsibility assumed as a member of the Moroccan community. This subjective perception is based on the conviction that taxes fulfill a useful function for the collective well-being. This perception fosters a sense of justification and reasonableness regarding tax obligations. This viewpoint has a positive impact on tax compliance. The results of this exploratory study showed the importance of taking psychological factors into account when managing tax compliance and improving the performance of the tax system, which is consistent with the results of many previous studies (Cullis & Lewis, 1985 ; Dornstein, 1987 ; Elffers & Hessing, 1997 ; Eriksen & Lars Fallan, 1996 ; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010 ; James et al., 2005 ; Lewis, 1982 , 2008 ; Kirchler, 1998, 2007 ; Kirchler et al., 2008 ; Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001 ; Schmolders, 1959 ; Trivedi et al., 2005 ). Additionally, it appears that behavioral intentions of taxpayers depended on subjective norms (Ajzen, 1991 ; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980 ). In light of the results, it is imperative to seize on these opportunities to fortify the foundation of favorable perceptions concerning taxation in Morocco. It is therefore useful to develop strategies aimed at improving positive attitudes and beliefs towards taxes, which go along with increasing tax compliance behavior. This attitude reconnects with Karakostas and Zizzo's (2016) assertion that highlights the sense of duty and hierarchical social pressure exerted by the authorities can be employed as a strategy to encourage taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations through public advertising. Additionally, the intricacy of tax regulations and reporting processes for financing taxes is identified as a non-financial constraint. The study by Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui ( 2006 ) found that the complexity of tax bureaucracy can lead to a reduction in tax compliance. Furthermore, analysis by age reveals that the majority of respondents are over 20, with a percentage of over 73%. Moreover, the perception of injustice or inequity, particularly in terms of the direct benefits of tax declarations and the lack of transparency in tax use, is a key concern. Unfairness remains a major concern in social representations of taxation (Kirchler, 2007 ). Additionally, Schmölders (2006) has highlighted the fact that perceptions of unfairness related to tax treatment in relation to others, or in relation to the benefits of public goods, are linked to taxpayer morale. In accordance with results from previous studies, it appears that the Moroccan’s taxpayer behavior is also related to tax knowledge (Langham et al., 2012 ), emotions (Fochmann et al., 2025 ), and trust in the tax system (Appiah et al., 2024 ; Baru, 2016 ; Batrancea et al., 2019 ), as well as its fairness (Perumal, 2008 ) and culture (Richardson, 2008 ). This unequal trade-off between taxpayer and tax authorities can lead to feelings of mistrust and frustration. This, in turn, can lead to a decline in the motivation to comply with tax obligations. Consequently, these elements (high tax rates, excessive tax burden, complexity, and corruption) may potentially contribute to a weakening of the intention to comply with tax obligations. Nevertheless, the tax authority in Morocco is making considerable efforts in this regard, notably through the media. In addition, a variety of events, both formal and informal, have been organized, as well as so-called "below the line" strategies and the sensitization about tax. Nevertheless, we can conclude from the participants’ responses that there is a lack in the empirical evaluation of communication strategies deployed to raise tax awareness and encourage compliance. Overall, the results of this study highlight that the perceptions and feelings of taxpayers in Morocco do not differ significantly from those revealed in different social and cultural contexts. Although the behavior of taxpayers in Morocco was shaped over the long history of the Moroccan state, along with the influence of the geopolitical transformations that the world experienced during the colonial era, which demolished or modified the old tax collection systems. Conclusion The present study aimed to uncover the Moroccans’s representations and feelings about tax and the tax system. The results provide valuable insights about the effect of tax representation and feeling on tax behavior. An analysis of Moroccans' perceptions and feelings toward taxes has revealed the extent of the fluctuations in the relationship between Moroccans and taxes. However, it does not differ from those found in other studies in different social and cultural contexts. On the one hand, they consider it a public interest that everyone should adhere to. On the other hand, many Moroccans see it as a public interest but complain about its unfairness and are frustrated about the functioning of the tax system. In the context of taxation, individuals draw upon a range of representations and feelings to interpret taxes from diverse perspectives, including informative, technical, positive, and negative viewpoints. Besides, the results of this study indicate that Moroccans oscillate between positive, negative, and neutral attitudes and beliefs concerning tax and fiscal system. Accordingly, it is important to emphasize the importance of in-depth exploration of the psychological processes influencing taxpayers’ behavior. This can only be achieved through a comprehensive inventory of the underlying representations and feelings that determine attitudes toward taxes and the tax system in Morocco. This will allow for the reform of the tax system and, consequently, overcome some negative representations of taxes, such as their unfairness and lack of trust in the tax system. It will also strengthen positive representations and feelings about taxes as a tool to serve citizens and the nation. Such research will shed light on the underlying causes of the strained relationship between taxpayers and the tax system, and exploiting its findings may contribute to strengthening trust between the two sides. The importance of such exploratory studies lies not only in their results but also in the fact that they raise interest in some phenomena that are neglected despite their importance in understanding human behavior, in this case the representations and feelings that determine the taxpayers’ behavior and their attitudes toward the tax system. Recommendations Given that the current study is the first step in a project to gain greater insight into Moroccans' perceptions and feelings regarding taxes and the tax system, we recommend the following: - Deepen research into Moroccans' beliefs and perceptions about taxes, in addition to identifying the feelings that express their attitudes toward the tax system; - Expand the scope of the study to include other dimensions of the psychological aspects of taxes, such as tax decision-making, cognitive dissonance...; - Rely on a large sample from diverse geographical, social, and cultural backgrounds. Study Limitations - The small size of the sample limits the generalizability of results to the broader Moroccan population; - Other experimental tools should be used to explore the psychological aspects of taxation; - Data collection methods should combine self-report measures and interviews in order to increase the validity and reliability of the results. Declarations Declaration of conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Funding The authors received no financial support for the research authorship, and publication of this article. Author Contribution Mohamme El-Mir: A.B.. C.D. ; 1-3Khalid Bouzelmat: A.B.. C.D. ; 1-3 Data Availability All data used in this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. References Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50 (2), 179–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T Ajzen, I. & Fishbein, M. (1980). 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Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316676349.014 Perumal, K.A. (2008). Tax Fairness Dimensions and Tax Compliance in an Asian Context: The Malaysian Perspective. International Review of Business Research Papers, 4 (5), 11-19. Picur, R. D., & Riahi-Belkaoui, A. (2006). The impact of bureaucracy, corruption and tax compliance. Review of Accounting and Finance, 5 (2), 174–180. https://doi.org/10.1108/14757700610668985 Richardson, G. (2008). The Relationship between Culture and Tax Evasion across Countries: Additional Evidence and Extensions. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 17 (2), 67-78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2008.07.002 Schmolders, G. (1959). Fiscal Psychology: A New Branch of Public Finance. National Tax Journal, 15 , 184- 193. Trivedi, V. U., Shehata, M., dan Mastelman, S. (2005). Attitudes, Incentives, And Tax Compliance . Journal of Economic Psychology, 5 , 371-384. Weigel, R. H., Hessing, D. J., & Elffers, H. (1987). Tax evasion research: A critical appraisal and theoretical model. Journal of Economic Psychology, 8 (2), 215–235. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-4870(87)90021-3 Yayuk, N. R., Margono, S., Eka, A. T., & Sudjatno. (2017). The role of taxpayer awareness, tax regulation and understanding in taxpayer compliance. Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 9 (10), 139–146. https://doi.org/10.5897/jat2017.0267 Young, M. L., & Odbert, H. S. (1959). Government support of psychological research: Fiscal year 1958. American Psychologist, 14 (8), 497–500. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0045138 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 24 Nov, 2025 Reviews received at journal 06 Oct, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 06 Oct, 2025 Reviews received at journal 04 Oct, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 22 Sep, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 23 Jul, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 22 Jul, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 22 Jul, 2025 Editor invited by journal 15 Jul, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 15 Jul, 2025 First submitted to journal 27 Jun, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6994357","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":490226747,"identity":"3c07a4f1-b906-4420-b587-6a3a6d7f3bef","order_by":0,"name":"Mohammed El-Mir","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Mohammed","middleName":"","lastName":"El-Mir","suffix":""},{"id":490226751,"identity":"c09d6556-ccb0-450d-b8de-330f56429906","order_by":1,"name":"Khalid Bouzelmat","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Mohammed V University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Khalid","middleName":"","lastName":"Bouzelmat","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-06-27 20:53:12","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6994357/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6994357/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":87693687,"identity":"3b85c2f6-cb4d-40a3-8d7f-3a7a463ad4cb","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-28 05:33:46","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":56161,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eChanges in the categories’ repetitions detected in the participants' responses\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6994357/v1/baa03827b44d92cfab648760.png"},{"id":87693694,"identity":"f7ad8810-4c37-4112-8d05-e9e118e1b7ea","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-28 05:33:46","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":58223,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGraphical representation of the general participants’ responses\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6994357/v1/3a0b9f311df3668d9adb2faf.png"},{"id":87693688,"identity":"30de1fd5-215a-4796-ada5-59fc9d228b91","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-28 05:33:46","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":65781,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eIllustration of the sex tendencies concerning tax\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6994357/v1/a4d79ee1241a342f77e156bd.png"},{"id":87693695,"identity":"299bc7e4-0b81-4e52-b005-cf2653834399","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-28 05:33:46","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":81913,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEffect of age on the representations and feelings of the participants\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6994357/v1/dba60d39be6c0da0f7f836f6.png"},{"id":87694946,"identity":"d8991d76-58e3-4fe0-a397-f52f7dde6aff","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-28 05:49:46","extension":"png","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":71735,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eRepresentation of the participants’ trends regarding tax professional status\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"5.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6994357/v1/d00f04bebba0fdb521085e36.png"},{"id":87695724,"identity":"afbb7944-866b-4dc1-98e6-e50673c262f1","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-07-28 05:57:46","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1028983,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6994357/v1/2bd38040-5d93-4973-b7fb-21f368b6a068.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Psychological Aspects of Taxation: A Preliminary Study in Morocco","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003ePsychology has acquired a huge impact on understanding human behavior in different contexts, from this perspective, we intend in this study to explore how this discipline could contribute to apprehending psychological factors that influence the taxpayer’s behavior. Such data collection will build bridges between psychologists and economists, especially those interested in the tax field.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFiscal psychology examines the attitudes and beliefs of taxpayers in order to understand their behavior. Furthermore, attitudes and norms are main determinants of tax compliance. While some researchers highlighted the importance of taking into account psychological aspects when dealing with taxpayer behavior (e.g., Fishbein \u0026amp; Ajzen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; Lewis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1982\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e), social representations of taxation remain little investigated, especially the question of how psychological factors of taxation emerged (Dornstein, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1987\u003c/span\u003e; Elffers \u0026amp; Hessing, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e; James et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e; Kirchler, 1998, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Kirchler \u0026amp; Maciejovsky, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e; Schmolders, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1959\u003c/span\u003e; Trivedi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). However, some findings concluded that psychological factors are important aspects that determine tax behavior. It appears from those studies that tax attitude depends on the perceived use of funds collected (e.g., Cullis \u0026amp; Lewis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1985\u003c/span\u003e; Eriksen \u0026amp; Lars Fallan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e; Kirchler et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOn the other side, behavioral intentions of taxpayers are also determined by subjective norms (Ajzen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1991\u003c/span\u003e). It was stated that norms are behavioral standards on three different levels (i.e., individual level, social level, \u0026amp; national level). One of the seminal works in this discipline is proposed by Ajzen and Fishbein (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1980\u003c/span\u003e), who indicated that attitudes are unbiased indicators of real behavior. Additionally, Hessing et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1988\u003c/span\u003e), after reviewing ten theoretical models of fiscal psychology, divided them into two broad categories: those concerning aspects of tax policy and those focusing mainly on the representations, attitudes, and beliefs of individuals (Lubian \u0026amp; Zarri \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe psychological model of Lewis (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1982\u003c/span\u003e) tried to bridge the gap between the previous factors; it contemplates tax behavior as a profile of taxpayers with high propensities to evade, which can potentially be developed from an examination of taxpayer attitudes and beliefs. This profile might include background factors like age, sex, socioeconomic background, education, and occupation. Hopefully, from the examination of attitudes and beliefs, some of the reasons why taxpayers evade tax can be identified and appropriate measures taken in an attempt to change those attitudes and beliefs. Lewis (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1982\u003c/span\u003e, p. 132), in contrasting the fiscal psychology and early economic deterrence models, states that the central frame of reference should be what taxpayer perceptions actually are, rather than what they are assumed to be on the basis of rational and self-interest assumptions. However, he argues that theoretical analyses are important, as these provide an underpinning of relationships to be tested in behavioral research. Lewis comprehensively reviews tax evasion social surveys completed in the 1970’s; hence this section discusses a sample of empirical studies that are considered illustrative of current behavioral work.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTax compliance depends on a number of variables, such as tax knowledge (Langham et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e), emotions (Fochmann et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), and trust in the tax system (Appiah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Baru, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Batrancea et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), as well as on its fairness (Perumal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) and the culture of taxpayers (Richardson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFurthermore, other tax psychology theorists adopt an approach that combines deterrence and tax psychology models in order to strengthen tax compliance behavior and combat tax evasion (Hasseldine \u0026amp; Bebbington, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1991\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis study is pioneering in the Moroccan social context; in this sense, we consider that the results of this work will shed light on psychological nuances concerning the beliefs and feelings of the Moroccan taxpayer, which will probably contribute to a better understanding of citizens' perceptions of taxes and tax policy. For this reason, we will try to form a clear vision of the Moroccan society's representations of taxation.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTaxes and taxation have a long history in Moroccan society, so in order to have an idea about taxation in Moroccan history, it is important to distinguish between different significant stages that the Moroccan tax system went through. In the pre-protectorate period, a distinction was made between taxes and levies that were religious in nature (e.g., Zakat, Achour, Jezya, and Kharaj) and those that were not (e.g., Hédya, Harka, Mouna, Sokhra, Ghorama and Touiza, Meks, and Tertib).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eDuring the protectorate, taxation became the main instrument of economic intervention in Morocco (Fair Tax monitor, October 2020). this lead to the establishment of a tax system inspired by the French system. This policy made taxes systematic in nature and freed them from their purely religious nature. After Morocco's independence, the tax system inherited from the protectorate period was consolidated and legitimized. Consequently, taxes are now collected in accordance with the universal principles that consider them as a part of the deductions that serve the public interest.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTherefore, the concept of tax is not linked to the protectorate period, as the latter contributed to the institutionalization of taxes and stripped them to some extent of their lasting religious character.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTherefore, this research seeks to explore Moroccans' perceptions and feelings toward taxes and the tax system, with the goal of uncovering how Moroccans perceive taxes. The data collected through this study will allow us to build a clear picture of Moroccans' attitudes and expectations regarding tax policy. In this perspective, this exploratory work aims to inventory Moroccans' perceptions and beliefs about taxes and their relationship to their tax behavior.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo achieve the objectives of this study, we will attempt to analyze Moroccans’s perceptions and feelings about taxes and the tax system. Based on the above, we expect that the Moroccan taxpayer has a conflictual conception about tax and taxation policy. This attitude doesn’t convince the taxpayers in Morocco to be confident with the tax administration.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Method","content":"\u003cp\u003eWe adopted in this study a descriptive qualitative method that consisted of exploring the characteristics of a phenomenon rather than explaining the underlying causes or mechanisms. Therefore, in this study, we will attempt to explore Moroccans' perceptions and attitudes toward taxes and the tax system, based on the responses given by the respondents regarding their views on tax policy. This allows us to delve into subconscious beliefs about taxes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this study, we relied on a random sample of 100 participants from different socio-cultural groups, including 61 females and 39 males, aged between 20 and 62 years (See Table \u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e). A more detailed exam of the sample revealed that females constitute 61% of the sample subjects, with a total of 61 participants, while males represent 39% of the participants, with a total of 39 subjects. Additionally, 43% of the participants are employed (43 participants), while 57% are not employed (57 participants). Regarding the age of the participants, the majority of them are between 20 and 29 (77%, 77 participants), followed by the 30–40 age group (13%, 13 participants), and finally the + 40 age group (10%, 10 participants). All methods were carried out in accordance with relevant guidelines and regulations. Informed consent was obtained from all the participants. Additionally, the study was approved by the Ethical Committee of “Psychological and Thinking Studies Laboratory”.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn order to gain access to the participants’ representations and feelings regarding tax and the tax system, we used a brief questionnaire consisting of four questions, which are: what do you think about tax? What do you think about Moroccan tax policy? What are your feelings about taxes? What are your feelings about Moroccan tax policy?\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eDemographic characteristics of the study sample\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSex\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProfession\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eFemales\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMales\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e20–29 yrs\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e30–40 yrs\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003e+ 40 yrs\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eEmployed\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eUnemployed\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e61\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e39\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e77\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e43\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e57\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn order to analyze the data collected from the participants in this study, we relied on a content analysis technique, which focuses on the themes and categories within which the participants\u0026apos;s responses fall (See table 2, figure 1). We identified 13 categories that summarize the Moroccans\u0026apos; perceptions and feelings about taxes and the tax system, which are public interest, trust, unfairness, distrust, complexity, burden, obligation, non-compliance, corruption, frustration tax knowledge, contribution, non-categorized (see table 1).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIt should be noted that while analyzing the content of the responses, we found that the participants presented more than one theme while answering a specific question, in addition to some themes that were mentioned when answering a specific question that we found as answers to other items in the questionnaire. Therefore, the number of repetitions of the answers reflects the number of times the theme was mentioned in the participants\u0026rsquo; responses to the questionnaire items.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003eThematic distribution of the participants\u0026rsquo; responses\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eThemes\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCategories\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNumber of responses\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePositive associations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePublic interest\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e105\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTrust\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNeutral associations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTax Knowledge\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eContribution\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"8\" style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNegative associations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eUnfairness\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e99\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFrustration\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e31\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDistrust\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e30\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBurden\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eComplexity\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e26\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eObligation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e21\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNon-compliance\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCorruption\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNon-categorized associations\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eNon-categorized\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e20\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 622px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTotal responses\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 311px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e386\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAnalysis of the data\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSo as to ensure an objective data analysis, we converted the raw data into standard data, specifically percentages, which allow a reliable interpretation of the results and the extraction of participants\u0026apos; attitudes toward taxation and the tax system in Morocco. Furthermore, in order to obtain the greatest possible number of indications from participants\u0026apos; responses, the analysis proceeded at four different levels. The first level focused on a general analysis of participants\u0026apos; responses, regardless of their sex, age group, or sociocultural status. We then moved on to the sex variable to ascertain whether participants\u0026apos; attitudes and beliefs toward taxation changed based on this factor. The third level of the analysis of the results focused on distributing the participants\u0026apos; responses by age group. The aim of this analysis consisted in examining how responses were affected by the participants\u0026apos; age. The final level of analysis aimed to classify the participants\u0026apos; responses according to job variable. Through this dimension, we sought to explore whether participants\u0026apos; representations and feelings changed depending on their professional status.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRegarding the first level of analysis, which aims to provide a general tendency of the participants\u0026rsquo; responses (see table 3, figure 2), it was found that most participants believe that taxes serve the public interest but are also unfair and inequitable. The results revealed, to a lesser extent, frustration and distrust in the tax system, followed by the perception of taxes as a burden and characterized by complexity and coercion. Next came some participants\u0026apos; trust in the tax system. A small number of responses indicated that some citizens do not comply with tax payments, and we found only a few indications of corruption. We also found some indications among respondents\u0026apos; responses of a lack of knowledge about the tax system and the perception of taxes as a contribution. The table also highlights some responses that we were unable to classify as prominent themes in this analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe results of the qualitative data analysis indicate that the social representation of taxes that occurs most frequently is \u0026quot;public interest,\u0026quot; at 27.27% (105 responses out of 386). In second place was \u0026quot;unfairness\u0026quot; at 25.64% (99 responses), followed by \u0026quot;frustration\u0026quot; at 8,03% (31 responses). Finally, \u0026quot;Distrust\u0026quot; was the least frequently selected option, with 7.27% of participants (30 responses). In fifth and sixth place were \u0026quot;burden\u0026quot; at 6.99% (27 responses out of 386) and \u0026quot;complexity\u0026quot; at 6.73% (26 responses out of 386). Seventh place is also occupied by \u0026quot;obligation,\u0026quot; with 5.44% (21 responses out of 386). Following closely behind are \u0026quot;non-compliance\u0026quot; and \u0026quot;corruption,\u0026quot; with an equivalent rate of 1.03% for the former (4 responses out of 386) and 0.51% for the latter (2 responses out of 386). In the same position, we found tax knowledge with 0.51% (2 responses out of 386), followed by contribution with 0.25% (2 responses out of 386) and finally non-categorized responses with 5.18% (20 responses out of 386).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 3\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003eOverall distribution of sample responses to the questions of the tool\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv align=\"center\"\u003e\n \u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"100%\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 33px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eN\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 61px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublic interest\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUnfairness\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 78px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFrustration\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 54px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDistrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBurden\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 78px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eComplexity\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 72px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eObligation\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-compliance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 77px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCorruption\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 72px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTax knowledge\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 88px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eContribution\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 77px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-categorized\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 33px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e100\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 61px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27.20\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.66\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25.64\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 78px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8.03\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 54px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.77\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.99\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 78px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.73\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 72px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.44\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 76px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.03\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 77px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.51\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 72px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.51\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 88px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 77px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eWhen the data were analyzed based on sex, it appears clear that there is a convergence in participants\u0026apos; representations and feelings toward taxes and the tax system (see table 4, figure 3), with men slightly outnumbering those who viewed taxes as a public interest and unfair. Women were twice as likely as men to be disappointed with taxes. There was also significant convergence between the two sexes regarding distrust in the tax system, as well as considering it as a burden, a complex system, and a coercive system. It was later revealed that a few responses referred to non-compliance with tax payments and corruption. Almost the same impression was expressed in regard with regard to tax knowledge and contribution.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 4\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003eRepresentations and feelings of participants toward tax and the tax system according to sex\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv align=\"center\"\u003e\n \u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"100%\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSex\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 27px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eN\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 53px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublic interest\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 42px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUnfairness\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 74px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFrustration\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 52px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDistrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 54px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBurden\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 74px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eComplexity\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eObligation\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-compliance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCorruption\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTax knowledge\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 84px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eContribution\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-categorized\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eF\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 27px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e61\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 53px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24.18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 42px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.32\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24.59\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 74px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9.01\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 52px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.37\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 54px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.55\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 74px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.14\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.73\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.22\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.40\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.40\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 84px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.73\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eM\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 27px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e39\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 53px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e29.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 42px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.20\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 74px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.76\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 52px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.69\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 54px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.05\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 74px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.05\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.64\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.64\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 69px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.64\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 84px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.64\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 73px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.84\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe third level of analysis focuses on the age variable of the study participants (See, table 5; figure 4). Thereupon, the sample was divided into three age groups, as shown in Table 5. It became clear that the age of the participants clearly influenced their perceptions and feelings regarding taxes and the tax system, in favor of the younger group with regard to considering taxation a public interest. Nevertheless, concerning the unfairness of taxation, there was a convergence in the beliefs of the young and older groups, who considered the tax system as unfair, in contrast to the middle-aged group, who expressed a lower level of feeling of unfairness. It was also clear that there was a convergence between the age groups regarding feelings of frustration with the tax system. In contrast, it was found that the younger were less confident in the tax system than other age groups, but the middle-aged group believed that taxes were a burden more than the other age groups. Compared to the older groups, the young one considered the tax system complex, while the older group viewed taxation as coercive. There was similarity between the age groups concerning non-compliance with taxes, with the middle-age group believing that corruption is rampant in the tax system (see figure 4).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 5\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003eRepresentations and feelings of participants according to age\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv align=\"center\"\u003e\n \u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"100%\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAge\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eN\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublic interest\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUnfairness\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFrustration\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 35px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDistrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 31px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBurden\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eComplexity\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eObligation\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-compliance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 36px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCorruption\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 32px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTax knowledge\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 34px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eContribution\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 41px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-categorized\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e20-29 yrs\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e77\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e37.01\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.76\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e33.17\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10.57\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 35px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11.53\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 31px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9.13\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11.05\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.96\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 36px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 32px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.96\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 34px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 41px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9.61\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e30-40 yrs\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e13\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28.84\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.69\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28.84\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9.61\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 35px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.69\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 31px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11.53\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.84\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.84\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.92\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 36px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e28.84\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 32px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 34px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 41px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e+ 40 yrs\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e10\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e37,5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 35px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 31px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 36px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.5\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 32px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 34px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 41px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe fourth level of analysis addressed the variable of the participants\u0026rsquo; profession (See, table 6; figure 5). In relation to the view that tax is a public interest, a large percentage of participants embraced this tendency. Furthermore, regarding trust in the tax system, employees and non-employees showed a similar level of trust. On the other hand, employed participants expressed a lower degree of distrust in the tax system as well as considering it a burden and characterized by complexity, in contrast to their view that tax is marked by coercion compared to non-employed ones. Although the participants\u0026rsquo; attitude on not paying tax was weak, employees did not indicate that people did not commit to paying tax. The feeling that the tax system is corrupt was weak as well as similar between employed and non-employed participants (see figure 5).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 6\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003eDistribution of participants\u0026rsquo; responses according to professional status\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv align=\"center\"\u003e\n \u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"101%\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eProfession\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eN\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003ePublic interest\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUnfairness\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFrustration\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDistrust\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eBurden\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eComplexity\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eObligation\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-compliance\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 31px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCorruption\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 44px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTax knowledge\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 29px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eContribution\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 37px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eNon-categorized\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEmployed\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e43\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e27.90\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.65\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e26.74\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.55\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.23\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5.81\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.48\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.55\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 31px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.58\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 44px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 29px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 37px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e6.39\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eUnemployed\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e57\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4.38\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e23.24\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.89\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e9.21\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 28px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e7.45\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8.77\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.75\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 31px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.43\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 44px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.87\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 29px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.43\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd style=\"width: 37px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.94\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAnalysis of the data according to the participants\u0026rsquo; attitude\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs previously noted, the content analysis revealed 13 categories in the participants\u0026apos; responses. A closer examination of these categories reveals that they fall into three broad positions on taxes and the tax system: positive, negative, and neutral. Therefore, this further analysis of the results aims to uncover the participants\u0026apos; general attitudes toward taxes in Morocco.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003ePositive attitude towards tax\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe positive attitude about tax and the tax system of the participants highlights worthwhile representations and feelings about tax and promotes the legitimacy of taxes. The categories encompassed by this theme are public interest and trust in the tax system. The analysis indicates a high level of positive view of tax and tax policy, which shows a notable emphasis on the positive aspects of taxation (see table 3).\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eNegative attitude towards tax\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eRegarding negative attitudes toward taxes and the tax system, content analysis revealed the largest number of negative categories (8 out of 13) compared to other attitudes (positive and neutral), which somewhat highlights the participants\u0026apos; negative bias toward taxes. The category of \u0026quot;tax fairness\u0026quot; received the largest number of negative responses, followed by \u0026quot;lack of trust,\u0026quot; then \u0026quot;frustration,\u0026quot; and finally, \u0026quot;the prevalence of bribery in the tax system.\u0026quot;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u003cem\u003eNeutral attitude towards tax\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe neutral theme encompasses general fiscal associations without describing appreciated or rejected emotions. The categories contained within this theme are tax knowledge and contribution. It should be noted that the number of fiscal associations in the neutral theme totaled 0.77% (i.e., 3 of the 386 codes).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eAfter analyzing the content of the participants' responses, a set of representations and feelings regarding the tax system in Morocco was revealed. These responses were summarized into a set of themes and categories, which showed positive, negative, and neutral trends. On the positive side, it appeared that Moroccans believe that taxation serves the public interest, and it was also evident that they have some confidence in the Moroccan tax system. Conversely, there was a strong feeling of unfairness about this tax system and a lack of trust in it; a sense of frustration and the prevalence of corruption were also classified along with coercion. In addition, there were some neutral signals, such as considering taxation as a contribution along with knowledge of taxation. These results indicate an awareness of the importance of taxation as a public interest. Therefore, Moroccans' representations and attitudes toward taxes reflect a realistic view of taxes and the tax system. Participants in this study agreed on two basic characteristics of taxes: the public interest and unfairness or injustice of tax policy. The other characteristics did not receive the same level of frequency and repetition among researchers. Participants' responses also expressed distrust and frustration with the Moroccan tax system. This attitude, which links taxes to public interest, is based on the belief that taxes must be paid and cannot be evaded in order to serve the nation\u0026rsquo;s aspirations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe data demonstrate that the majority of participants interpret taxes as a civic duty to serve the general interest. This prompts questions regarding the Moroccan citizen's awareness of the true utilization of taxes. It is a responsibility assumed as a member of the Moroccan community. This subjective perception is based on the conviction that taxes fulfill a useful function for the collective well-being. This perception fosters a sense of justification and reasonableness regarding tax obligations. This viewpoint has a positive impact on tax compliance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe results of this exploratory study showed the importance of taking psychological factors into account when managing tax compliance and improving the performance of the tax system, which is consistent with the results of many previous studies (Cullis \u0026amp; Lewis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1985\u003c/span\u003e; Dornstein, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1987\u003c/span\u003e; Elffers \u0026amp; Hessing, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1997\u003c/span\u003e; Eriksen \u0026amp; Lars Fallan, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1996\u003c/span\u003e; Fishbein \u0026amp; Ajzen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e; James et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e; Lewis, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1982\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Kirchler, 1998, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e; Kirchler et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e; Kirchler \u0026amp; Maciejovsky, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2001\u003c/span\u003e; Schmolders, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1959\u003c/span\u003e; Trivedi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). Additionally, it appears that behavioral intentions of taxpayers depended on subjective norms (Ajzen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1991\u003c/span\u003e; Ajzen and Fishbein, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1980\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn light of the results, it is imperative to seize on these opportunities to fortify the foundation of favorable perceptions concerning taxation in Morocco. It is therefore useful to develop strategies aimed at improving positive attitudes and beliefs towards taxes, which go along with increasing tax compliance behavior. This attitude reconnects with Karakostas and Zizzo's (2016) assertion that highlights the sense of duty and hierarchical social pressure exerted by the authorities can be employed as a strategy to encourage taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations through public advertising.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAdditionally, the intricacy of tax regulations and reporting processes for financing taxes is identified as a non-financial constraint. The study by Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e) found that the complexity of tax bureaucracy can lead to a reduction in tax compliance. Furthermore, analysis by age reveals that the majority of respondents are over 20, with a percentage of over 73%.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the perception of injustice or inequity, particularly in terms of the direct benefits of tax declarations and the lack of transparency in tax use, is a key concern. Unfairness remains a major concern in social representations of taxation (Kirchler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e). Additionally, Schm\u0026ouml;lders (2006) has highlighted the fact that perceptions of unfairness related to tax treatment in relation to others, or in relation to the benefits of public goods, are linked to taxpayer morale.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn accordance with results from previous studies, it appears that the Moroccan\u0026rsquo;s taxpayer behavior is also related to tax knowledge (Langham et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e), emotions (Fochmann et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), and trust in the tax system (Appiah et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Baru, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e; Batrancea et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), as well as its fairness (Perumal, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) and culture (Richardson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis unequal trade-off between taxpayer and tax authorities can lead to feelings of mistrust and frustration. This, in turn, can lead to a decline in the motivation to comply with tax obligations. Consequently, these elements (high tax rates, excessive tax burden, complexity, and corruption) may potentially contribute to a weakening of the intention to comply with tax obligations. Nevertheless, the tax authority in Morocco is making considerable efforts in this regard, notably through the media. In addition, a variety of events, both formal and informal, have been organized, as well as so-called \"below the line\" strategies and the sensitization about tax. Nevertheless, we can conclude from the participants\u0026rsquo; responses that there is a lack in the empirical evaluation of communication strategies deployed to raise tax awareness and encourage compliance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOverall, the results of this study highlight that the perceptions and feelings of taxpayers in Morocco do not differ significantly from those revealed in different social and cultural contexts. Although the behavior of taxpayers in Morocco was shaped over the long history of the Moroccan state, along with the influence of the geopolitical transformations that the world experienced during the colonial era, which demolished or modified the old tax collection systems.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe present study aimed to uncover the Moroccans\u0026rsquo;s representations and feelings about tax and the tax system. The results provide valuable insights about the effect of tax representation and feeling on tax behavior. An analysis of Moroccans' perceptions and feelings toward taxes has revealed the extent of the fluctuations in the relationship between Moroccans and taxes. However, it does not differ from those found in other studies in different social and cultural contexts. On the one hand, they consider it a public interest that everyone should adhere to. On the other hand, many Moroccans see it as a public interest but complain about its unfairness and are frustrated about the functioning of the tax system.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the context of taxation, individuals draw upon a range of representations and feelings to interpret taxes from diverse perspectives, including informative, technical, positive, and negative viewpoints. Besides, the results of this study indicate that Moroccans oscillate between positive, negative, and neutral attitudes and beliefs concerning tax and fiscal system.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAccordingly, it is important to emphasize the importance of in-depth exploration of the psychological processes influencing taxpayers\u0026rsquo; behavior. This can only be achieved through a comprehensive inventory of the underlying representations and feelings that determine attitudes toward taxes and the tax system in Morocco. This will allow for the reform of the tax system and, consequently, overcome some negative representations of taxes, such as their unfairness and lack of trust in the tax system. It will also strengthen positive representations and feelings about taxes as a tool to serve citizens and the nation. Such research will shed light on the underlying causes of the strained relationship between taxpayers and the tax system, and exploiting its findings may contribute to strengthening trust between the two sides.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe importance of such exploratory studies lies not only in their results but also in the fact that they raise interest in some phenomena that are neglected despite their importance in understanding human behavior, in this case the representations and feelings that determine the taxpayers\u0026rsquo; behavior and their attitudes toward the tax system.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eRecommendations\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGiven that the current study is the first step in a project to gain greater insight into Moroccans' perceptions and feelings regarding taxes and the tax system, we recommend the following:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Deepen research into Moroccans' beliefs and perceptions about taxes, in addition to identifying the feelings that express their attitudes toward the tax system;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Expand the scope of the study to include other dimensions of the psychological aspects of taxes, such as tax decision-making, cognitive dissonance...;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Rely on a large sample from diverse geographical, social, and cultural backgrounds.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eStudy Limitations\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e- The small size of the sample limits the generalizability of results to the broader Moroccan population;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Other experimental tools should be used to explore the psychological aspects of taxation;\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003e- Data collection methods should combine self-report measures and interviews in order to increase the validity and reliability of the results.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003ch2\u003eDeclaration of conflict of interest\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFunding\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authors received no financial support for the research authorship, and publication of this article.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eMohamme El-Mir: A.B.. C.D. ; 1-3Khalid Bouzelmat: A.B.. C.D. ; 1-3\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eAll data used in this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAjzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human \u003cem\u003eDecision Processes, 50\u003c/em\u003e(2), 179\u0026ndash;211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(91)90020-T\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAjzen, I. \u0026amp; Fishbein, M. (1980). \u003cem\u003eUnderstanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior\u003c/em\u003e. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAlm, J. (2021). 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Government support of psychological research: Fiscal year 1958. \u003cem\u003eAmerican Psychologist, 14\u003c/em\u003e(8), 497\u0026ndash;500. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0045138\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"fiscal psychology, representations, feelings, taxpayer, public interest, unfairness","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6994357/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6994357/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThe current study explored the psychological aspects of taxation in Morocco. In this sense, we aimed to analyze the Moroccan taxpayer beliefs and feelings, in addition to drawing a broad psychological view of the trade-off between the Moroccans and the tax policy. For this reason, we adopted a descriptive method that consisted of collecting data from a sample of adult Moroccans that consisted of 100 participants, aged between 20 and more 40 years, using a qualitative procedure in which the above sample responded to a short questionnaire that consisted of 4 questions that targeted psychological fiscal representations and feelings. After analyzing the collected data, it appears that there are different representations and feelings towards tax and tax policy. Mainly, there is a tendency to consider tax as a public interest, which is at the same time characterized by unfairness. We concluded that the Moroccans like other nations, share the same representations and feelings about tax and tax policy.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Psychological Aspects of Taxation: A Preliminary Study in Morocco","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-07-28 05:33:41","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6994357/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2025-11-24T09:19:15+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-10-06T14:41:20+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"178656736503264998950132616821679250024","date":"2025-10-06T12:19:23+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-10-04T08:09:01+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"323565988030604678524004441431639989737","date":"2025-09-22T07:47:36+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"292492300929918469526568326286214324031","date":"2025-07-23T06:35:28+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-07-23T03:37:39+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-07-23T03:27:07+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-07-15T11:18:52+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-07-15T05:05:32+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Scientific Reports","date":"2025-06-27T20:51:36+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"ccbb9e1a-8ece-4d85-ac05-db70d7b87c66","owner":[],"postedDate":"July 28th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[{"id":52051347,"name":"Health sciences/Health care"},{"id":52051349,"name":"Biological sciences/Psychology"},{"id":52051350,"name":"Social science/Psychology"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-04-19T01:23:20+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-07-28 05:33:41","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6994357","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6994357","identity":"rs-6994357","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}