Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy

Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy Hong-Yu Han, Zhaohui Dang This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8063107/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 31 Mar, 2026 Read the published version in Scientific Reports → Version 1 posted 14 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This paper investigates deception in orbital games, focusing on how maneuverable decoys can manipulate players’ perception, forcing probabilistic decision-making. This paper distinguishes between physical-level concealment (stealth and camouflage) and cognitive-level deception (simulation and dissimulation), modeling it as a balance of expectation shaping, mixed strategies, and information entropy manipulation. The study proposes a game-theoretic framework that integrates perfect rationality, common knowledge, and mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, enabling the pursuer and evader to reason over probabilistic outcomes under incomplete information. A two-phase model is constructed: (1) a single-step game where agents can only maneuver once, and (2) a multi-step game involving Boyd-cycles, belief updates, and active target switching. The framework is extended to accommodate imperfect decoys through a realism coefficient, analyzing how distinguishability impacts the Nash equilibrium. Results under geostationary orbit indicate that, when the evader faces an overwhelming pursuer (maneuverability 6:1), introducing a decoy can increase the probability of its survival from almost zero to 30.8%. This study offers a foundational perspective on orbital deception beyond evasive scenarios, including feints and deception scenarios where both teams employ decoys. Findings emphasize the tactical value of cognitive deception in space security and point to future directions in robust, belief-aware game design under uncertainty. Physical sciences/Engineering Physical sciences/Mathematics and computing Physical sciences/Physics Biological sciences/Psychology Social science/Psychology Non-cooperative target Orbital maneuver Orbital game Game theory Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Published Journal Publication published 31 Mar, 2026 Read the published version in Scientific Reports → Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 10 Feb, 2026 Reviews received at journal 06 Feb, 2026 Reviews received at journal 02 Feb, 2026 Reviews received at journal 29 Jan, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 27 Jan, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 23 Jan, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 21 Jan, 2026 Reviews received at journal 01 Dec, 2025 Reviewers agreed at journal 01 Dec, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 01 Dec, 2025 Editor assigned by journal 15 Nov, 2025 Editor invited by journal 13 Nov, 2025 Submission checks completed at journal 12 Nov, 2025 First submitted to journal 12 Nov, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8063107","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":553532397,"identity":"a73838d3-1588-490f-b681-fb6d4025d37b","order_by":0,"name":"Hong-Yu Han","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Northwestern Polytechnical University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Hong-Yu","middleName":"","lastName":"Han","suffix":""},{"id":553532398,"identity":"4fefe773-5f02-4b3b-b8ed-0fc7e8b086fb","order_by":1,"name":"Zhaohui Dang","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Northwestern Polytechnical University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Zhaohui","middleName":"","lastName":"Dang","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-11-08 09:53:30","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8063107/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8063107/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[{"content":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-46097-6","type":"published","date":"2026-03-31T15:59:49+00:00"}],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":97331465,"identity":"53f44cc9-a816-44e0-9bf0-1bb72aa43ad9","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 09:22:40","extension":"json","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"acdc-reference","size":4384,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"01c55d7b95854770b154155e8861e5e1.json","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8063107/v1/72e47fc47d7823747af3e238.json"},{"id":106344537,"identity":"e7ab6188-742b-4251-8a9d-218c2707d8d5","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-04-07 16:15:32","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":2973037,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"DeceptioninOPEGV4.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8063107/v1_covered_f4dcccc0-ae19-44c3-81ae-4d847093f515.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Non-cooperative target, Orbital maneuver, Orbital game, Game theory","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8063107/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8063107/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"This paper investigates deception in orbital games, focusing on how maneuverable decoys can manipulate players’ perception, forcing probabilistic decision-making. This paper distinguishes between physical-level concealment (stealth and camouflage) and cognitive-level deception (simulation and dissimulation), modeling it as a balance of expectation shaping, mixed strategies, and information entropy manipulation. The study proposes a game-theoretic framework that integrates perfect rationality, common knowledge, and mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, enabling the pursuer and evader to reason over probabilistic outcomes under incomplete information. A two-phase model is constructed: (1) a single-step game where agents can only maneuver once, and (2) a multi-step game involving Boyd-cycles, belief updates, and active target switching. The framework is extended to accommodate imperfect decoys through a realism coefficient, analyzing how distinguishability impacts the Nash equilibrium. Results under geostationary orbit indicate that, when the evader faces an overwhelming pursuer (maneuverability 6:1), introducing a decoy can increase the probability of its survival from almost zero to 30.8%. This study offers a foundational perspective on orbital deception beyond evasive scenarios, including feints and deception scenarios where both teams employ decoys. Findings emphasize the tactical value of cognitive deception in space security and point to future directions in robust, belief-aware game design under uncertainty.","manuscriptTitle":"Deception in orbital games: simulation and dissimulation with a maneuverable decoy","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-12-03 09:22:35","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8063107/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2026-02-10T15:37:33+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-02-06T05:09:07+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-02-02T19:24:34+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-01-29T14:14:34+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"294318172402829063971082219468206232113","date":"2026-01-28T04:56:30+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"157083685998372124452692234199337847284","date":"2026-01-23T10:07:05+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"72065158625555621994286859359017997826","date":"2026-01-21T12:38:00+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2025-12-01T15:26:19+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"169727823653260473031173358242404055448","date":"2025-12-01T07:06:46+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2025-12-01T06:37:53+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2025-11-15T11:16:25+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2025-11-13T10:47:47+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-11-12T07:47:34+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Scientific Reports","date":"2025-11-12T07:46:00+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"scientific-reports","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"scirep","sideBox":"Learn more about [Scientific Reports](http://www.nature.com/srep/)","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"","title":"Scientific Reports","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Scientific Reports","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"3d8be2d0-a678-4ece-b7c2-eb2115167c6b","owner":[],"postedDate":"December 3rd, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"published-in-journal","subjectAreas":[{"id":58900672,"name":"Physical sciences/Engineering"},{"id":58900673,"name":"Physical sciences/Mathematics and computing"},{"id":58900674,"name":"Physical sciences/Physics"},{"id":58900675,"name":"Biological sciences/Psychology"},{"id":58900676,"name":"Social science/Psychology"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-04-07T16:06:44+00:00","versionOfRecord":{"articleIdentity":"rs-8063107","link":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-46097-6","journal":{"identity":"scientific-reports","isVorOnly":false,"title":"Scientific Reports"},"publishedOn":"2026-03-31 15:59:49","publishedOnDateReadable":"March 31st, 2026"},"versionCreatedAt":"2025-12-03 09:22:35","video":"","vorDoi":"10.1038/s41598-026-46097-6","vorDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-026-46097-6","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-8063107","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-8063107","identity":"rs-8063107","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}