We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

Models of consciousness need to explain both objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. In this article, we develop some points of contention with recent work on integrated information theory (IIT). In particular, we identify ambiguities regarding the directionality of the explanation, i.e. important tensions between IIT's purported ontological, epistemological and causal primacy of experience, and its explanatory aim of accounting for consciousness in mechanistic terms. Across the text, we propose several ways to avoid these issues and eventually revise or replace the model. In our final section, we introduce alternative explanatory paths: mathematical, processual, and autonomy-based type of explanations. These novel and sound explanatory strategies may better inspire the next generation of models of consciousness.