The evolution of Zero-Determinant Strategies in Public Goods Games

The evolution of Zero-Determinant Strategies in Public Goods Games | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The evolution of Zero-Determinant Strategies in Public Goods Games Desheng Lin, Panfei Sun This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7508634/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract How self-interested individuals spontaneously evolve cooperative behavior remains a central question across sociology, economics, and evolutionary biology. Since the discovery of zero-determinant (ZD) strategies, there has been growing interest in understanding how these strategies promote cooperation and their evolutionary characteristics. However, the evolutionary dynamics of ZD strategies in public goods games remain largely unexplored.In this study, we investigate the performance of ZD strategies when interacting with unconditional cooperators, focusing on both the early-stage payoff advantage and the time required to reach evolutionary steady states, as influenced by the extortion factor. Our results reveal that higher extortion factors can significantly promote cooperative behavior. Furthermore, in the context of multi-player, multi-strategy interactions, we find that while extortionate strategies can facilitate cooperation in small populations , they are highly vulnerable to invasion in large populations. Evolutionary dynamics in such settings overwhelmingly favor strategies that promote mutual cooperation rather than exploitation.These findings offer new insights into the limitations and potential of ZD strategies in more complex social dilemmas and highlight the critical role of population structure and strategic diversity in the emergence of cooperation. Zero-determinant strategies evolution of cooperation evolutionary stability Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7508634","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":511167312,"identity":"b5ac441d-2564-4cb3-a369-abb216534464","order_by":0,"name":"Desheng Lin","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Northwestern Polytechnical University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Desheng","middleName":"","lastName":"Lin","suffix":""},{"id":511167313,"identity":"59ff8cd1-59b7-4451-afee-19ba8d72a603","order_by":1,"name":"Panfei Sun","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Northwestern Polytechnical University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Panfei","middleName":"","lastName":"Sun","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-09-01 12:53:33","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7508634/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7508634/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":92781938,"identity":"9e9f36b8-84d7-422c-acc4-cfab57786705","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-04 18:23:34","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":832310,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"Theevolutionofzerodeterminantstrategiesinpublicgoodsgames.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7508634/v1_covered_54edb7d6-f5c7-40da-9b6c-f83a72878934.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The evolution of Zero-Determinant Strategies in Public Goods Games","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Zero-determinant strategies,evolution of cooperation, evolutionary stability","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7508634/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7508634/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"How self-interested individuals spontaneously evolve cooperative behavior remains a central question across sociology, economics, and evolutionary biology. 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