Product and Quality Differentiation in Endogenous  Choices of Delegation under Mixed Markets

Product and Quality Differentiation in Endogenous Choices of Delegation under Mixed Markets | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Product and Quality Differentiation in Endogenous Choices of Delegation under Mixed Markets Kangsik Choi This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-9155286/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 11 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract We analyze the effects of product and quality differentiation on endogenous delegation under Cournot competition in a mixed duopoly. Regardless of which firm produces the high-quality product, asymmetric delegation always arises: the public firm delegates while the private firm does not, unless the quality level of either the private or public firm is very low. However, when the quality of either firm is sufficiently low, the private firm delegates while the public firm does not. Consequently, irrespective of which firm produces the high-quality product, social welfare and consumer surplus are higher when only the private firm hires a manager than when only the public firm does, whereas producer surplus is lower. These results remain robust even when cost asymmetry between firms is introduced. JEL Classification: D43, L13, M21. Product and Quality Differentiation Asymmetric Delegation Cournot Mixed Market Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 05 May, 2026 Reviews received at journal 05 May, 2026 Reviews received at journal 20 Apr, 2026 Reviews received at journal 02 Apr, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 20 Mar, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 18 Mar, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 18 Mar, 2026 Reviewers invited by journal 18 Mar, 2026 Editor assigned by journal 18 Mar, 2026 Submission checks completed at journal 18 Mar, 2026 First submitted to journal 18 Mar, 2026 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-9155286","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":609264393,"identity":"4d1974a6-7955-4059-8e26-a956f9fd4b9c","order_by":0,"name":"Kangsik Choi","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Pusan National University, Graduate School of International Studies","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Kangsik","middleName":"","lastName":"Choi","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-03-18 06:23:28","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9155286/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9155286/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":105563434,"identity":"4cb2a351-7c28-4bcb-93db-9c12db45196d","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-27 12:47:00","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":422351,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"26318EGSymenidisMixedPaper.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9155286/v1_covered_236e60ee-16e2-4bce-a6de-266364d7532e.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Product and Quality Differentiation in Endogenous Choices of Delegation under Mixed Markets","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"economics-of-governance","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"eogo","sideBox":"Learn more about [Economics of Governance](http://link.springer.com/journal/10101)","snPcode":"10101","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/10101/3","title":"Economics of Governance","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"em","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Product and Quality Differentiation, Asymmetric Delegation, Cournot, Mixed Market","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9155286/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9155286/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eWe analyze the effects of product and quality differentiation on endogenous delegation under Cournot competition in a mixed duopoly. 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