The effects of different governance regimes on the social and economic growth of Pakistan

The effects of different governance regimes on the social and economic growth of Pakistan | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The effects of different governance regimes on the social and economic growth of Pakistan Mubashir Rasool, Zawar Hussain, Muhammad Rashid, Khaysy Srithilat This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-4955457/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Through the historical records, it is proven that the democratic system fosters public interests while the dictatorship regime mends for a single man. Both regimes have their socio-economic advantages and disadvantages in society. The social as well as economic aspects remain a matter of business for the prevailing government setup. The main objective of this research is a comparative analysis of Pakistan’s socio-economic performance in democratic as well as dictatorial regimes (1947–2012). Some economic performance measures, including life expectancy, population growth, and literacy rates, as well as GDP growth, inflation, and head count ratio (HCR), have been taken for comparative analysis to check the performance. Statistical tests assist in this comparison. Our findings show that, in general, dictatorship regimes are better democratic governments in every aspect. Democratic Dictatorship Socioeconomic performance measures Literacy rate Figures Figure 1 1. Introduction The economic incompetency and corruption of political administrations are debatable issues among developing countries. Economic growth always starts with diverse and difficult situations. Sustainable economic growth is out of the question without the common interest of the nation [ 1 , 2 ]. Since Bangladesh's separation from Pakistan, there has been immense economic and social change, while in Pakistan, the economic and social situation has declined with time [ 3 , 4 ]. Economic development undoubtedly relies heavily on resources, but corruption or improper use can lead to their leakage. The military justified its coups by citing economic incompetence and corruption in society. They view these issues as significant challenges to the nation's unity [ 5 , 6 ]. As an institute, military men consider themselves better in all walks of life as compared to civilians. They are professionals in their field, but that does not mean that they can manage the economic affairs of our country [ 7 ]. In military regimes, bureaucrats and the elite class of society gain an advantage as compared to others because the life standard of military officials is quite high. The monetized amount of perks and subsidies makes the actual amount of salary quite high for high-ranking officers in the country [ 8 , 9 ]. Pakistan’s per capita income increased by 2% between 1947 and 1996, while social factors did not improve at the same pace. Figure 1 a summarizes the GDP growth rate of Pakistan from 1956 to 2009. The GDP growth rate was higher during the Military coup. More specifically, during all four military coups in Pakistan, the GDP growth rate was higher than that of the democratic regimes. Figure 1 b compares the GDP rate of Pakistan during the Four Military coups. There was a 6.7% increase in GDP during Ayyub Khan's regime. In his regime, the quality of the social sector was improved to a satisfactory level [ 10 ]. East Pakistan's autonomy created an environment of destabilization in the country. General Yahan Khan, the military head and president of Pakistan, appointed a military to suppress this movement, and economic growth declined [ 11 ]. The eleven years of Zia’s regime did not produce such significant improvement in the economic as well as social sectors. Pakistan's parliament system was not fully established due to an unstable political system, corruption, weak law enforcement agencies, crises of leadership, and professionalism [ 12 ]. Figure 1 (a) Overall GDP and GDP (b) during the military coup in paksitan. In the Musharaf regime, 11.8 million jobs were created, and Pakistan's reserves increased from US $ 1.2 billion to US $ 10.7 billion, but socially, his regime was not more than a military one. Democracy is more likely to experience smaller rates of economic growth because it leads to the stretched-out role of superior categories that inhabit the effective allocation of resources, ensuing growth. It always deems it necessary to provide justice, education, and health services to all without any discrimination [ 13 , 14 ]. In most developed countries, democracy exerts a positive impact on economic growth by ensuring liberty, poverty reduction, job availability, good governance, and better fiscal policies, but the democratic system is not as good as dictatorship in terms of reforms for retirement benefits, welfare, unemployment, health, and subsidies for the nation [ 15 ]. The dictators also seek motivation from perks and subsidies, such as wage earners. Pakistan's economic position was favorable, with significant growth in economic indicators. However, persistent increases in poverty and unemployment led to serious challenges for the country, despite assistance from the World Bank and IMF to address these issues. Social performance measures from the democratic era such as health, education, and poverty have mostly not changed [ 16 ]. It is an attempt to measure Pakistan's economic and social development aspects during democratic and dictatorial regimes. We use comparative analysis to investigate economic and social growth rates, utilizing secondary data for this purpose. The coefficient of variance (CV) is used to identify the level of variance between two regimes, while the T-test and F-test are used to analyze data. 2. Research Methodology 2.1 Description of Data To investigate the relationship between economic and social growth and democracy and dictatorship in Pakistan, data from 1947 to 2012 is used. GDP, inflation rate, and headcount rate are used as economic indicators, while population growth rate, literacy rate, and life expectancy rate are used as social indicators in both regimes. 2.2 Data analysis Descriptive as well as inferential statistical techniques are used for the analysis of the data. The central tendency, variances, and standard deviation are determined through descriptive statistics. The T-test is used to determine the performance of two regimes in terms of economic and social indicators, while the F-test is used to verify the assumptions of equality of variances. Further, its validity is confirmed through ANOVA [ 17 , 18 ]. 2.3 The Sample The Pakistan Economic Surveys in their various editions (2005, 2004, 2003, 2000, 1995, 1990, 1988) and a book released by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, were the main sources of information used to compile the data for the selected variables. A convenience sampling technique was employed to select the data. The data was divided into two categories: democratic government and dictatorship regimes, using stratified random sampling. 3. Results and Discussions The primary concern of this paper is to compare the economic as well as social performances of democratic and Dictatorship governments. For this purpose, the results are given in Table 1 . Table 1 Comparison of Socio-economic Indicators of Democratic and Dictatorship Governments Indicators Mean SD CV T-test F-Test D M D M D M T P-value F P-value E GDP Growth Rate 4.29 5.82 1.96 1.78 45.77 30.63 -2.59 0.0135 1.22 0.6808 E Inflation Rate 12.1 7.83 5.88 4.05 48.57 51.71 2.67 0.0111 2.11 0.1149 E Head CR 26.75 24.14 6.69 3.73 24.99 15.45 1.51 0.1386 3.21 0.0152 S Population 118.37 114.14 37.99 30.71 32.09 26.91 0.3882 0.6999 1.53 0.3656 S Literacy Rate 38.73 38.09 13.63 13.11 35.18 34.41 0.1537 0.8786 1.08 0.8749 S Life Expectancy 60.54 61.05 4.49 2.73 7.42 4.47 -0.426 0.6725 2.71 0.0371 S Population Growth Rate 2.55 2.74 0.47 0.75 18.31 27.24 0.9876 0.3294 0.39 0.0415 S Fertility Rate 5.41 5.51 1.05 1.14 19.36 20.7 -0.2871 0.7794 0.84 0.7031 S Mortality Rate 132.31 133.79 30.57 26.41 23.1 19.74 -0.1646 0.8701 1.34 0.5358 D = Democratic, M = Military From Table 1 , we find that the average GDP of a Dictatorship is better than that of Democratic regimes. While the variation in the GDP of dictatorship is smaller than that of Democratic regimes. The coefficient of variation (CV) indicated consistency. From our results, considering CV, we observed that GDP in a Dictatorship is more consistent than that of a Democratic government. The T-test shows that there is a difference between the average GDP of both regimes (p-value = 0.0135). While the F-test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the two regimes variations. Same as with Inflation rates; variation in inflation rate remained less in Dictatorship tenures as compared to democratic. The average inflation rates of the two regimes differ statistically, according to the T-test (p-value = 0.0111). While the F-test indicated that there is no statistical difference between the variations of both regimes.HRC (Head Count Ratio) remained good in democratic governments. While considering CV, it indicates that a Dictatorship government is more consistent as compared to a democratic government; the T-test indicates that there is no statistical difference (p-value = 0.1386), while the F-test indicates variation in both regimes (p-value0.0152). Concerning social indicators: as far as the literacy rate is concerned, the average literacy rate remained a little bit good in democratic regimes as compared to Dictatorship regimes; CV indicates consistency between dictatorship governments; T-test and F-test show that there is no statistically significant difference between the average literacy rates. The average life expectancy rate is better in democratic governments because the smaller value of CV indicates the consistency of dictatorship governments as compared to democratic ones. The T-test shows no statistical difference, while the F-test (p-value = 0.0371) shows a statistical difference between the variations of both regimes. The population growth rate is better in dictatorships. The T-test shows no statistical difference, while the F-test (p-value = 0.0415) shows a statistical difference between the variations of both regimes. 4. Conclusion and discussion The T-test and ANOVA test results support the overall findings, which showed a significant difference in the rates of life expectancy and literacy in the two regimes. It is inculcated from our findings that a dictatorship regime is better than a democratic regime. In actuality, though, the dictatorship regime's GDP rate was more valuable than that of a democratic one because of the openness with which the available resources were used. It is observed that the inflation rate was not stable in the Dictatorship regime; therefore, the purchasing power of the nation is better in a democratic regime. The headcount ratio was observed to be better in the Dictatorship regime as compared to democratic governments. The population growth rate remained much better in a democratic regime as compared to a dictatorship regime. However, the population remained under the control of the Dictatorship regime. In the case of the fertility rate, democratic governments remained better, while the mortality rate was good in dictatorship regimes. Three of the nine metrics rate of population growth, the rate of inflation, and the rate of fertility—remained higher under a democratic government than they were under a dictatorship. The progress and prosperity of any nation depend on GDP, so the GDP growth rate was good in the Dictatorship regime. Based on these six economic and social performance measures, it is easy for researchers to predict that two dictatorship regimes were much better than democratic regimes. But based on the findings, we can conclude that, in terms of national development, dictatorship regimes are more suitable than democratic regimes in Pakistan. However, social life continued to be reasonably positive under a democratic government. Declarations I, Mubashir Rasool, being the 1 st and corresponding author declare that: Ethical approval and Consent to participate All study participants provided informed consent, and the study was carried out with ethical approval. Consent for Publication All concerned authors have given their consent for the publication of the manuscript. Availability of supporting data The Pakistan Economic Surveys in their various editions (2005, 2004, 2003, 2000, 1995, 1990, 1988) and a book released by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, were the main sources of information used to compile the data for the selected variables. Competing Interest The authors declared that they have no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this work. Authors’ Contribution Author 1, contributed to the drafting, making conceptualization of the raw data, data collection, and proofreading of the manuscript, while other authors, contributed their prime efforts for drawing analysis from the available data. All the authors read and approved the manuscript repeatedly. Funding The research was not funded by any organization or individual in his or her capacity. References Mitra, D., Thomakos, D. D., & Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2002). Protection for sale in a developing country: democracy vs. dictatorship. Review of Economics and Statistics , 84 , 497–508. Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2002). Democracy and the variability of economic performance. Economics & Politics , 14 , 225–257. Quibria, M. (2003). Growth and Poverty Reduction Does Political Regime Matter?. Keech, W. R. (2004). Democracy, dictatorship and economic performance in Chile, Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, Santiago, Chile, July, pp. 28–30. Reenock, C., Bernhard, M., & Sobek, D. (2007). Regressive socioeconomic distribution and democratic survival. International Studies Quarterly , 51 , 677–699. Khilji, N. M., Mahmood, A., & Siddiqui, R. (1997). Military expenditures and economic growth in Pakistan [with Comments]. The Pakistan Development Review , 791–808. Keller, K., Poutvaara, P., & Wagener, A. (2009). Military draft and economic growth in OECD countries. Defence and Peace Economics , 20 , 373–393. Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public choice , 143 , 67–101. Memon, F., Bhutto, N. A., & Abbas, G. (2012). Capital structure and firm performance: A case of textile sector of Pakistan. Asian Journal of Business and Management Sciences , 1 , 9–15. Knutsen, C. H. Democracy, dictatorship and technological change, Governance and Knowledge, Routledge2012, pp. 13–28. Inderjit, S. The Pendulum of Leadership Change and Challenges of Civil Democracy and Military Rule in Pakistan. Ahmed, R., Vishnu, P., Ahmad, N., & Amin, M. (2014). Economic and Social Progress under Civilian & Military Set-ups in Pakistan, Developing Country Studies (pp. 2225–0565). ISSN. Qureshi, M. G., & Ahmed, E. (2015). The inter-linkages between democracy and per capita GDP growth: a cross country analysis. Research Journal Social Sciences , 4. Sen, K., Pritchett, L., Kar, S., & Raihan, S. (2018). Democracy versus dictatorship? The political determinants of growth episodes. Journal of Development Perspectives , 2 , 3–28. Ilyas, M., & Khan, M. A. (2019). Democracy versus dictatorship: An empirical investigation of determinants of unemployment. Pakistan Business Review , 20 , 525–534. Rizio, S. M., & Skali, A. (2020). How often do dictators have positive economic effects? Global evidence. The Leadership Quarterly , 31 , 1858–2010. Parmar, V., Azam, S. S., & A Comparative Analysis of Economic Performance in Two Eras. (2006). : Democratic Era (FY 89–FY99) & Military Rule (FY00–FY05), JISR management and social sciences & economics, 4 18–25. Desharnais, B., Camirand-Lemyre, F., Mireault, P., & Skinner, C. D. (2017). Procedure for the selection and validation of a calibration model II—theoretical basis. Journal of Analytical Toxicology , 41 , 269–276. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-4955457","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":344275374,"identity":"465b71df-d1f6-4c4d-90d4-dd58afb5097d","order_by":0,"name":"Mubashir Rasool","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Post Graduate Medical Institute","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Mubashir","middleName":"","lastName":"Rasool","suffix":""},{"id":344275377,"identity":"60dacaa9-8f10-4c94-b083-de006d18d6a5","order_by":1,"name":"Zawar Hussain","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Post Graduate Medical Institute","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Zawar","middleName":"","lastName":"Hussain","suffix":""},{"id":344275378,"identity":"fd7b4214-c099-4c7f-97fd-5360a14a5fe9","order_by":2,"name":"Muhammad Rashid","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Islamia University of Bahawalpur","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Muhammad","middleName":"","lastName":"Rashid","suffix":""},{"id":344275379,"identity":"0c122f20-b80b-4643-8d19-ca09637f94dd","order_by":3,"name":"Khaysy Srithilat","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"National University of Laos","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Khaysy","middleName":"","lastName":"Srithilat","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2024-08-22 06:02:23","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4955457/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4955457/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":65202039,"identity":"84a816e2-8186-4b3b-bdb1-89d0cfd53423","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-09-24 16:56:31","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":105378,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e(a) Overall GDP and \u0026nbsp;GDP (b) during the military coup in paksitan.\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4955457/v1/796c5c91f65f76dae38cdb43.png"},{"id":65202040,"identity":"cca43a85-5ac3-4b5b-8478-9d859405b6f5","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2024-09-24 16:56:36","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":448792,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-4955457/v1/b99101d7-0574-4568-8984-ff5901389b62.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The effects of different governance regimes on the social and economic growth of Pakistan","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe economic incompetency and corruption of political administrations are debatable issues among developing countries. Economic growth always starts with diverse and difficult situations. Sustainable economic growth is out of the question without the common interest of the nation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e]. Since Bangladesh's separation from Pakistan, there has been immense economic and social change, while in Pakistan, the economic and social situation has declined with time [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e]. Economic development undoubtedly relies heavily on resources, but corruption or improper use can lead to their leakage. The military justified its coups by citing economic incompetence and corruption in society. They view these issues as significant challenges to the nation's unity [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e]. As an institute, military men consider themselves better in all walks of life as compared to civilians. They are professionals in their field, but that does not mean that they can manage the economic affairs of our country [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e]. In military regimes, bureaucrats and the elite class of society gain an advantage as compared to others because the life standard of military officials is quite high. The monetized amount of perks and subsidies makes the actual amount of salary quite high for high-ranking officers in the country [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePakistan\u0026rsquo;s per capita income increased by 2% between 1947 and 1996, while social factors did not improve at the same pace. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003ea summarizes the GDP growth rate of Pakistan from 1956 to 2009. The GDP growth rate was higher during the Military coup. More specifically, during all four military coups in Pakistan, the GDP growth rate was higher than that of the democratic regimes. Figure\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003eb compares the GDP rate of Pakistan during the Four Military coups. There was a 6.7% increase in GDP during Ayyub Khan's regime. In his regime, the quality of the social sector was improved to a satisfactory level [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. East Pakistan's autonomy created an environment of destabilization in the country. General Yahan Khan, the military head and president of Pakistan, appointed a military to suppress this movement, and economic growth declined [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e]. The eleven years of Zia\u0026rsquo;s regime did not produce such significant improvement in the economic as well as social sectors. Pakistan's parliament system was not fully established due to an unstable political system, corruption, weak law enforcement agencies, crises of leadership, and professionalism [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eFigure \u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003e(a) Overall GDP and GDP (b) during the military coup in paksitan.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn the Musharaf regime, 11.8\u0026nbsp;million jobs were created, and Pakistan's reserves increased from US\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.2\u0026nbsp;billion to US\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e10.7\u0026nbsp;billion, but socially, his regime was not more than a military one. Democracy is more likely to experience smaller rates of economic growth because it leads to the stretched-out role of superior categories that inhabit the effective allocation of resources, ensuing growth. It always deems it necessary to provide justice, education, and health services to all without any discrimination [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e]. In most developed countries, democracy exerts a positive impact on economic growth by ensuring liberty, poverty reduction, job availability, good governance, and better fiscal policies, but the democratic system is not as good as dictatorship in terms of reforms for retirement benefits, welfare, unemployment, health, and subsidies for the nation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e]. The dictators also seek motivation from perks and subsidies, such as wage earners. Pakistan's economic position was favorable, with significant growth in economic indicators. However, persistent increases in poverty and unemployment led to serious challenges for the country, despite assistance from the World Bank and IMF to address these issues. Social performance measures from the democratic era such as health, education, and poverty have mostly not changed [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIt is an attempt to measure Pakistan's economic and social development aspects during democratic and dictatorial regimes. We use comparative analysis to investigate economic and social growth rates, utilizing secondary data for this purpose. The coefficient of variance (CV) is used to identify the level of variance between two regimes, while the T-test and F-test are used to analyze data.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Research Methodology","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Description of Data\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo investigate the relationship between economic and social growth and democracy and dictatorship in Pakistan, data from 1947 to 2012 is used. GDP, inflation rate, and headcount rate are used as economic indicators, while population growth rate, literacy rate, and life expectancy rate are used as social indicators in both regimes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Data analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eDescriptive as well as inferential statistical techniques are used for the analysis of the data. The central tendency, variances, and standard deviation are determined through descriptive statistics. The T-test is used to determine the performance of two regimes in terms of economic and social indicators, while the F-test is used to verify the assumptions of equality of variances. Further, its validity is confirmed through ANOVA [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3 The Sample\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Pakistan Economic Surveys in their various editions (2005, 2004, 2003, 2000, 1995, 1990, 1988) and a book released by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, were the main sources of information used to compile the data for the selected variables. A convenience sampling technique was employed to select the data. The data was divided into two categories: democratic government and dictatorship regimes, using stratified random sampling.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Results and Discussions","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe primary concern of this paper is to compare the economic as well as social performances of democratic and Dictatorship governments. For this purpose, the results are given in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eComparison of Socio-economic Indicators of Democratic and Dictatorship Governments\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"12\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c9\" colnum=\"9\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c10\" colnum=\"10\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c11\" colnum=\"11\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c12\" colnum=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndicators\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCV\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eT-test\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eF-Test\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eM\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eM\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eD\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eM\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eT\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eP-value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eF\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eP-value\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGDP Growth Rate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.29\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.82\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.96\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.78\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e45.77\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e30.63\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-2.59\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0135\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.22\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.6808\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInflation Rate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e12.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.83\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.88\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.05\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e48.57\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e51.71\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.67\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0111\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.11\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.1149\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHead CR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e26.75\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e24.14\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6.69\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.73\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e24.99\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.45\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.51\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.1386\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3.21\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0152\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePopulation\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e118.37\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e114.14\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e37.99\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e30.71\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e32.09\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e26.91\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.3882\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.6999\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.53\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.3656\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLiteracy Rate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e38.73\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e38.09\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.63\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e13.11\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e35.18\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e34.41\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.1537\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.8786\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.08\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.8749\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLife Expectancy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e60.54\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e61.05\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.49\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.73\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.42\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.47\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.426\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.6725\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.71\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0371\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePopulation Growth Rate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.55\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.74\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.47\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.75\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e18.31\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e27.24\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.9876\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.3294\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.39\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.0415\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFertility Rate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.41\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.51\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.05\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.14\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.36\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e20.7\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.2871\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.7794\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.84\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.7031\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eS\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMortality Rate\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e132.31\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e133.79\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e30.57\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e26.41\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e23.1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c8\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e19.74\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c9\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.1646\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c10\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.8701\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c11\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.34\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c12\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.5358\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eD\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Democratic, M\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Military\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, we find that the average GDP of a Dictatorship is better than that of Democratic regimes. While the variation in the GDP of dictatorship is smaller than that of Democratic regimes. The coefficient of variation (CV) indicated consistency. From our results, considering CV, we observed that GDP in a Dictatorship is more consistent than that of a Democratic government. The T-test shows that there is a difference between the average GDP of both regimes (p-value\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0135). While the F-test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the two regimes variations. Same as with Inflation rates; variation in inflation rate remained less in Dictatorship tenures as compared to democratic. The average inflation rates of the two regimes differ statistically, according to the T-test (p-value\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0111). While the F-test indicated that there is no statistical difference between the variations of both regimes.HRC (Head Count Ratio) remained good in democratic governments. While considering CV, it indicates that a Dictatorship government is more consistent as compared to a democratic government; the T-test indicates that there is no statistical difference (p-value\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.1386), while the F-test indicates variation in both regimes (p-value0.0152).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConcerning social indicators: as far as the literacy rate is concerned, the average literacy rate remained a little bit good in democratic regimes as compared to Dictatorship regimes; CV indicates consistency between dictatorship governments; T-test and F-test show that there is no statistically significant difference between the average literacy rates. The average life expectancy rate is better in democratic governments because the smaller value of CV indicates the consistency of dictatorship governments as compared to democratic ones. The T-test shows no statistical difference, while the F-test (p-value\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0371) shows a statistical difference between the variations of both regimes. The population growth rate is better in dictatorships. The T-test shows no statistical difference, while the F-test (p-value\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.0415) shows a statistical difference between the variations of both regimes.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"4. Conclusion and discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe T-test and ANOVA test results support the overall findings, which showed a significant difference in the rates of life expectancy and literacy in the two regimes. It is inculcated from our findings that a dictatorship regime is better than a democratic regime. In actuality, though, the dictatorship regime's GDP rate was more valuable than that of a democratic one because of the openness with which the available resources were used. It is observed that the inflation rate was not stable in the Dictatorship regime; therefore, the purchasing power of the nation is better in a democratic regime. The headcount ratio was observed to be better in the Dictatorship regime as compared to democratic governments. The population growth rate remained much better in a democratic regime as compared to a dictatorship regime. However, the population remained under the control of the Dictatorship regime. In the case of the fertility rate, democratic governments remained better, while the mortality rate was good in dictatorship regimes. Three of the nine metrics rate of population growth, the rate of inflation, and the rate of fertility\u0026mdash;remained higher under a democratic government than they were under a dictatorship. The progress and prosperity of any nation depend on GDP, so the GDP growth rate was good in the Dictatorship regime. Based on these six economic and social performance measures, it is easy for researchers to predict that two dictatorship regimes were much better than democratic regimes. But based on the findings, we can conclude that, in terms of national development, dictatorship regimes are more suitable than democratic regimes in Pakistan. However, social life continued to be reasonably positive under a democratic government.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003eI, Mubashir Rasool, being the 1\u003csup\u003est\u003c/sup\u003e and corresponding author declare that:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical approval and Consent to participate\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll study participants provided informed consent, and the study was carried out with ethical approval.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsent for Publication\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll concerned authors have given their consent for the publication of the manuscript.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAvailability of supporting data\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Pakistan Economic Surveys in their various editions (2005, 2004, 2003, \u0026nbsp; \u0026nbsp;2000, 1995, 1990, 1988) and a book released by the Federal Bureau of \u0026nbsp;Statistics, Government of Pakistan, were the main sources of information used to compile the data for the selected variables.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting Interest\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declared that they have no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this work.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eAuthors\u0026rsquo; Contribution\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAuthor 1, contributed to the drafting, making conceptualization of the raw data, data collection, and proofreading of the manuscript, while other authors, contributed their prime efforts for drawing analysis from the available data. All the authors read and approved the manuscript repeatedly.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe research was not funded by any organization or individual in his or her capacity. \u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eMitra, D., Thomakos, D. D., \u0026amp; Ulubaşoğlu, M. A. (2002). Protection for sale in a developing country: democracy vs. dictatorship. \u003cem\u003eReview of Economics and Statistics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e84\u003c/em\u003e, 497\u0026ndash;508.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAlmeida, H., \u0026amp; Ferreira, D. (2002). Democracy and the variability of economic performance. \u003cem\u003eEconomics \u0026amp; Politics\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e14\u003c/em\u003e, 225\u0026ndash;257.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eQuibria, M. (2003). 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(2006). : Democratic Era (FY 89\u0026ndash;FY99) \u0026amp; Military Rule (FY00\u0026ndash;FY05), JISR management and social sciences \u0026amp; economics, 4 18\u0026ndash;25.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eDesharnais, B., Camirand-Lemyre, F., Mireault, P., \u0026amp; Skinner, C. D. (2017). Procedure for the selection and validation of a calibration model II\u0026mdash;theoretical basis. \u003cem\u003eJournal of Analytical Toxicology\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003e41\u003c/em\u003e, 269\u0026ndash;276.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Democratic, Dictatorship, Socioeconomic performance measures, Literacy rate","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4955457/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-4955457/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThrough the historical records, it is proven that the democratic system fosters public interests while the dictatorship regime mends for a single man. Both regimes have their socio-economic advantages and disadvantages in society. The social as well as economic aspects remain a matter of business for the prevailing government setup. The main objective of this research is a comparative analysis of Pakistan\u0026rsquo;s socio-economic performance in democratic as well as dictatorial regimes (1947\u0026ndash;2012). Some economic performance measures, including life expectancy, population growth, and literacy rates, as well as GDP growth, inflation, and head count ratio (HCR), have been taken for comparative analysis to check the performance. Statistical tests assist in this comparison. Our findings show that, in general, dictatorship regimes are better democratic governments in every aspect.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"The effects of different governance regimes on the social and economic growth of Pakistan","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2024-09-24 16:56:27","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-4955457/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"408960db-079a-481b-80a3-22c27c11465d","owner":[],"postedDate":"September 24th, 2024","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2024-09-24T16:56:27+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2024-09-24 16:56:27","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-4955457","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-4955457","identity":"rs-4955457","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"qtupq5eGEP_6zYnWcrvyt","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}