From Soviet Active Measures to Russian Information Warfare

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Abstract

In the past decade, or longer – but especially since the illegal invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 -- Russia has expanded and moved rapidly to improve its ability to employ “disinformation,” or “information warfare” [information that combines truth with falsehood] as an effective instrument in to accomplish its more specific foreign policy objectives. Despite many years of preparation for cyber conflict against critical U.S. infrastructure and military forces, the U.S. government and cybersecurity industry were unprepared for Russian information operations targeting the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In the present essay we intend to track the reemergence and development of the information warfare and disinformation component of Russian policy after Putin came to power, including its deep roots in Soviet “active measures.” As relations with the West deteriorated, disinformation was an important part of Russian policy and the breadth of its target audiences and the issues covered increased. Finally, we look at the responses to Russian disinformation policy of the targets – especially the post-communist states.
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last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00