A stochastic evolutionary game model of green credit participation behavior among banks and enterprises
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This study models the green credit participation of banks and enterprises, finding that external stochastic disturbances accelerate strategy stabilization, while improved enterprise fulfillment and government subsidies encourage participation, with carbon trading prices also positively influencing enterprise choices.
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The paper studies banks’ and enterprises’ motivations to participate in green credit using a stochastic evolutionary game model that analyzes their dynamic strategic interactions under environmental uncertainty. It formulates replicated dynamic equations with Gaussian white noise to represent external disturbances and then applies numerical simulation to track how the two-dimensional game evolves toward stable strategy behavior. The results indicate that stochastic disturbances increase the fluctuation range and speed up convergence to stability; as enterprises’ fulfillment levels improve, both parties’ strategies converge toward (implement, participate), with banks converging faster. Government subsidies can shift behavior toward green credit up to a threshold beyond which additional subsidy changes have little effect, and higher carbon trading prices encourage enterprises to choose green credit, with the main caveat that findings rely on model-based numerical simulation rather than empirical validation. The paper does not explicitly discuss endometriosis or adenomyosis; it was included in the corpus via a keyword match in the upstream search index.
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Abstract
With the growing severity of environmental problems, green credit has become an important means of promoting low-carbon development, however, the motivation of banks and enterprises to participate in green credit is insufficient. In order to effectively guide banks and enterprises to actively participate in green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model for banks and enterprises to participate in green credit, and analyzed the dynamic game relationship between banks and enterprises. Due to the uncertainty of the external environment, we introduce Gaussian white noise in the replicated dynamic equations, and finally, we use numerical simulation to describe the dynamic evolution trend of the two-dimensional game system. The results show that the stochastic disturbances from external uncertainties amplify the fluctuation range of the game between banks and enterprises and shortening the time to achieve a stable strategy. As enterprises’ fulfillment levels improve, the strategic choices of both banks and enterprises gradually converge to (implement, participate), with banks converging more swiftly. When the government provides certain subsidies, both banks and enterprises tend to opt for green credit, however, after subsidies reach a certain threshold, increasing them no longer significantly impacts strategic choices. An escalation in carbon trading prices also spurs enterprises to choose green credit.
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In order to effectively guide banks and enterprises to actively participate in green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model for banks and enterprises to participate in green credit, and analyzed the dynamic game relationship between banks and enterprises. Due to the uncertainty of the external environment, we introduce Gaussian white noise in the replicated dynamic equations, and finally, we use numerical simulation to describe the dynamic evolution trend of the two-dimensional game system. The results show that the stochastic disturbances from external uncertainties amplify the fluctuation range of the game between banks and enterprises and shortening the time to achieve a stable strategy. As enterprises’ fulfillment levels improve, the strategic choices of both banks and enterprises gradually converge to (implement, participate), with banks converging more swiftly. When the government provides certain subsidies, both banks and enterprises tend to opt for green credit, however, after subsidies reach a certain threshold, increasing them no longer significantly impacts strategic choices. An escalation in carbon trading prices also spurs enterprises to choose green credit. Green credit enterprise fulfillment level government subsidies and penalties carbon trading price stochastic evolutionary game Full Text Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Reviewers agreed at journal 13 Feb, 2025 Reviewers invited by journal 12 Jan, 2024 Editor invited by journal 14 Dec, 2023 First submitted to journal 30 Nov, 2023 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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