The Way Forward for Grounded Cognition - Invariant Representations in Abstract Concept Grounding

Grounded cognition states that mental representations of concepts consist of experiential aspects. For example, the concept ‘cup’ consists of the sensorimotor experiences from interactions with cups. Typical modalities in which concepts are grounded are: The sensorimotor system (incl. interoception), emotion, action, language, and social aspects. Here we argue that this list should be expanded to include physical invariants (unchanging features of physical motion; e.g., gravity, momentum, friction). Research on causal perception and physical reasoning consistently demonstrates that physical invariants are represented as fundamentally as other grounding substrates, and therefore should qualify. We assess several theories of concept representation (simulation, conceptual metaphor, conceptual spaces, predictive processing) and their positions on physical invariants. Significant problems in the current state of grounded cognition theories become evident. We outline a solution based on a minimalist account of grounded cognition, which is epistemologically secure and likely to foster falsifiable empirical work. We conclude that, with a reduced scope, and by including physical invariants, grounded cognition can progress past its impasse and seriously contend with established theoretical frameworks, providing a valuable contribution to understanding human cognition.