Perceived Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness as Drivers of Corruption Prevention in Local Government: Evidence from Somalia

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This study examines how perceived transparency, perceived accountability, and perceived responsiveness influence corruption reduction in the local government of Mogadishu, Somalia. A quantitative approach was employed using convenience sampling, yielding 330 respondents who completed an online structured questionnaire. Data were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to assess measurement validity and estimate structural relationships. The results show that all three governance constructs significantly reduce corruption, with perceived accountability exerting the strongest influence, followed by perceived transparency and perceived responsiveness. These findings underscore the importance of strengthening accountability mechanisms, enhancing transparency, and improving responsiveness to mitigate corruption in fragile post-conflict contexts. The study provides practical implications for policymakers and civil society actors working to improve local governance and anti-corruption initiatives in Somalia. Business and commerce/Business and management Social science/Business and management Social science/Politics and international relations Good governance corruption local government Somalia fragile state Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Introduction Corruption entails the unethical or illegal exploitation of delegated authority for personal or group advantage (Han & Kim, 2025 ), often undermining institutional integrity, public trust, and equitable governance (Amegavi et al., 2021 ). It manifests in multiple, interrelated forms that critically weaken governance and erode public confidence. Common forms include bribery, misappropriation of public resources, abuse of official power for personal gain, nepotism in public appointments, bureaucratic inefficiencies used for rent-seeking, the deliberate protection of corrupt actors, and illicit use of confidential government information (Pan et al., 2023; Purnamasari et al., 2025 ; Wahyono & Narmaditya, 2022 ). Addressing corruption is particularly challenging as it spans legal, political, economic, social, and moral dimensions, garnering increasing attention from scholars and policymakers. The persistent prevalence of corruption within local government structures has prompted growing scholarly interest in the role of good governance as a strategic mechanism for its mitigation (Koeswayo et al., 2024 ). Systemic corruption reflects deep-rooted institutional failures that extend beyond individual misconduct, complicating reform efforts (DeSouza et al., 2025 ). Key drivers of corruption include a lack of ethical leadership, insufficient political will, politicization of corruption cases, selective enforcement of prosecutions, weak regulatory oversight, greed, and underfunding of anti-corruption agencies (Langnel, 2025 ). Consequently, good local governance, characterized by transparency, accountability, ethical conduct, and public participation, is widely recognized as a foundational approach to curbing corruption and enhancing public service delivery (Mudey & Arshad 2024 ). Studies consistently demonstrate that strong internal control systems and governance frameworks are pivotal in reducing opportunities for corrupt behavior among public officials (Arifin et al., 2015 ). The integration of good governance principles into local administrative structures has been shown to influence public sector integrity significantly. For instance, in Ebonyi State, Nigeria, governance practices emphasizing accountability and transparency reduced financial and bureaucratic corruption, improved service delivery, and reinforced public trust in governmental institutions (Aloysius & Vincent. 2016) Similarly, evidence from Spanish municipalities such as Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vallès illustrates how professionalization of local administrations, including the appointment of city managers, can create fiduciary relationships that insulate bureaucratic functions from political interference, thereby promoting transparency and effective management (Drápalová & Di Mascio, 2020 ). However, decentralization of fiscal responsibilities without complementary governance mechanisms may paradoxically exacerbate corruption. Fiscal decentralization, in the absence of strong oversight, can create loopholes that are exploited for personal gain, reinforcing the need for robust governance frameworks alongside administrative devolution (Ratmono & Darsono, 2022 ). In other contexts, such as Indonesian village governments, significant governance weaknesses, including inadequate internal controls, lack of transparency, and limited community engagement, have been documented, highlighting the need for urgent reforms in accounting, auditing, and internal regulatory systems to preempt and address corruption effectively (Putri et al., 2023 ). Similarly, Albania's central-local government relationships have contributed to inadequate service delivery and created fertile ground for corrupt practices (Muçollari, 2018 ). Broadly, transparency, accountability, and civic participation are essential components of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, as they create an enabling environment for ethical governance and reduce discretionary power among public officials (Salihu, 2021 ; Muktiyanto et al., 2019 ). The importance of accountability as a deterrent to corruption is further illustrated by the Mbozi District Council in Tanzania, where enhanced accountability measures correlated with lower corruption levels (Kivyiro & Mokaya, 2018 ). Likewise, transparent recruitment and procurement processes, combined with active civic engagement, are critical in fostering ethical behavior and preventing the misappropriation of public resources (Miroslav & Marián 2021) Proactive approaches to corruption prevention, such as cultivating a zero-tolerance culture, strengthening audit oversight, and reinforcing transparency mechanisms, have been shown to bolster governance integrity (Purcell, 2014 ; Beshi & Kaur, 2020 ). Nevertheless, challenges persist; for example, in Budhanilkantha Municipality, high awareness of governance norms has not translated into effective anti-corruption outcomes due to limited public participation and inconsistent transparency (Sapkota, 2024 ). Similarly, in Vietnam, empirical evidence demonstrates a strong negative correlation between corruption and attributes such as accountability, transparency, and civic involvement (Nguyen et al., 2017 ). Despite extensive literature on good governance and its role in mitigating corruption in diverse local government contexts, including Nigeria (Aloysius & Vincent 2016) Indonesia (Putri et al., 2023 ), Albania (Muçollari, 2018 ), and Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2017 ), few studies have explored how these principles operate within fragile or post-conflict urban settings such as Mogadishu, Somalia. Most existing research focuses on relatively stable governance environments or emerging democracies with established institutional frameworks. Consequently, the unique challenges of Mogadishu's prolonged political instability, weak institutions, security risks, and limited citizen trust remain largely underexplored. Moreover, although transparency, accountability, and citizen participation are frequently highlighted as practical governance tools against corruption, there is a paucity of empirical research examining their interaction and practical implementation within Somalia's local governance structures. This study addresses this gap by adopting a 'public perspectives' framework, conceptualizing public perspectives as the aggregate of citizens' subjective beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations regarding the performance of local authorities. This approach is theoretically central, as subjective perceptions, rather than solely objective institutional realities, directly shape public trust, legitimacy, and citizen behavior, including the willingness to report corruption (Beshi & Kaur, 2020 ; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011 ). Accordingly, the study investigates three key governance attributes: transparency, accountability, and responsiveness through the lens of public perception (i.e., perceived transparency, perceived accountability, perceived responsiveness). While other dimensions of good governance, such as rule of law and equity, are important, these three attributes represent the most direct and tangible interface between citizens and local government and have the strongest theoretical link to corruption prevention from a citizen's perspective. Somalia, and specifically its capital, Mogadishu, constitutes a critical case for examining the foundations of anti-corruption governance. The context is characterized by a profound institutional void following decades of state collapse, forcing nascent local administrations to construct accountability mechanisms from scratch, often in parallel with enduring traditional clan structures. This creates a hybrid governance model where formal accountability mechanisms compete with informal loyalties. Additionally, the operational landscape is heavily influenced by a pervasive international presence and donor-dependent public financing, engendering competing accountability structures where officials may prioritize responsiveness to donors over domestic constituents, potentially distorting public perceptions of accountability. These conditions make Mogadishu an exemplary setting to investigate whether canonical governance principles can retain their anti-corruption efficacy in an environment marked by fragmented authority and externally mediated state-building. To address this research gap, this study empirically investigates the perceived transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of local government in Mogadishu in relation to corruption prevention from the citizens' perspective. Using a quantitative research design, data were collected via a structured questionnaire from residents of Mogadishu and analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to test the hypothesized relationships. The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction, the next section reviews the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses, followed by methodology, results, and discussion linking the findings to broader scholarly discourse. The paper concludes by highlighting the study's implications, acknowledging its limitations, and suggesting directions for future research. Literature review Conceptualizing Governance, Corruption, and the Public Perspective The Multifaceted construct of good governance . The concept of good governance has evolved from a prescriptive policy tool promoted by international financial institutions into a central analytical framework in public administration, political science, and development studies (Williams & Young, 2012 ). While no single definition is universally accepted, it is broadly understood as the traditions, processes, and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, including how governments are selected, monitored, and replaced, as well as their capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010 ). The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators operationalize this through six key dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank, 2022 ). Grindle ( 2004 ) usefully distinguishes between the minimal conditions of good governance (e.g., curbing corruption, establishing the rule of law, and basic administrative competence) and the more complex second-generation reforms (e.g., enhancing civil society participation, strengthening legislative oversight). This study operates within the realm of the minimal, foundational conditions, which are most critical for establishing legitimacy and basic functionality in contexts where the state-citizen relationship is being rebuilt from a legacy of conflict and statelessness (Brinkerhoff, 2008 ). For the purpose of this research, narrow the focus to three interdependent pillars of good governance: transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. This selection is not to dismiss the importance of other dimensions but is a deliberate theoretical choice. These three represent the most direct and perceptible manifestations of governance from a citizen's standpoint, forming the core of the governance-citizen interface where abstract principles translate into tangible experiences that shape public trust and perceptions of integrity (Beshi & Kaur, 2020 ; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2011 ). Defining corruption and its operationalization . Corruption is classically defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2024). This broad definition encompasses a wide spectrum of activities, from grand corruption that distorts central government policy and high-level decision-making, to petty corruption involving the everyday exploitation of power by low- and mid-level officials in their interactions with citizens (Heidenheimer & Johnston, 2017 ). (Karklins 2007 ) expands on this by framing corruption as a systemic failure of institutions, where public office is used for personal or political party advantage, undermining both the means and ends of governance. In the context of local government, the focus of this study corruption often manifests as bribery for routine services, nepotism in hiring, favoritism in procurement, and the misallocation of local public funds (Koeswayo et al., 2024 ; Aloysius & Vincent. 2016) Consistent with the public perspective lens, this study operationalizes corruption through the perceived prevalence of corrupt practices within local government operations. The measure what citizens believe to be true about the integrity of their local officials, as these perceptions directly affect their trust and engagement (Olken, 2009 ). As Nguyen et al. ( 2017 ) demonstrated in Vietnam, public perception of corruption is a powerful indicator of governance failure, often correlating strongly with actual experiences of corrupt exchanges and serving as a significant constraint on public service quality. This approach is validated by the methodology of prominent indices like Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, which aggregates expert and business leader assessments to gauge corruption levels. The Centrality of the Public Perspective . In line with the focus on the governance-citizen interface, this study adopts a public perspective lens. This refers to the subjective beliefs, attitudes, and evaluations held by citizens regarding the conduct, processes, and performance of their government officials and institutions (Rieznik & Lee, 2021 ; Van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003 ). This perspective is crucial because, as Rieznik and Lee ( 2021 ) argue, it is the perception of governance, rather than its objective reality, that most directly influences citizen behavior, including their willingness to comply with laws, pay taxes, and trust public institutions. Rothstein & Teorell ( 2008 ) further posit that the quality of government is ultimately a matter of how citizens perceive it, as these perceptions determine the government's social legitimacy. This is especially critical in a context like Somalia. In post-conflict and fragile states, there is often a significant gap between de jure institutional frameworks (what is formally on paper) and de facto governance practices (what actually occurs) (North, 1990 ). Official reports and government audits may be scarce, unreliable, or non-existent (Putri et al., 2023 ). Therefore, the lived experience and perceptions of the citizenry become a vital, albeit subjective, barometer of governance (Andrews, 2013 ). By prioritizing the public perspective, this study captures the reality of governance as experienced by those it is meant to serve, providing insights that purely institutional or top-down analyses would miss, and acknowledging that the public's perception is the public's reality in the political arena (Van de Walle, 2017 ). Theoretical Justification for the Triad: Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness The selection of three core constructs is theoretically grounded in their established, synergistic relationship in combating corruption. They form a logical chain that moves from enabling oversight to enforcing consequences and, finally, to building systemic legitimacy. Perceived transparency is the degree to which government information on rules, procedures, plans, and expenditures is accessible, understandable, and usable by the public (Kolstad & Wiig, 2008; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012 ). It functions as a primary antidote to corruption by reducing information asymmetry, a key enabler of corrupt deals that thrive in secrecy (Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010 ). When government actions are open to scrutiny by citizens, civil society, and the media, the risks and costs of engaging in corruption increase. However, as Nagriwum et al. ( 2023 ) and Peisakhin & Pinto ( 2010 ) caution, transparency alone is insufficient; it must be actionable, meaning it must be coupled with mechanisms that allow the revealed information to be used effectively to demand answers. Perceived accountability refers to the belief that public officials are answerable for their actions and will face consequences for misconduct (Sari et al., 2024; Schedler, 1999 ). It is the mechanism that gives transparency its teeth. Accountability imposes potential costs on corrupt behavior through oversight institutions, audits, and electoral or legal sanctions (Funk & Owen, 2020 ). A system may be transparent, but without accountability, revelations of wrongdoing have no consequence, rendering transparency a performative exercise that creates an illusion of openness without altering corrupt incentives (Wojtasik & Trembaczowski, 2024 ). As Fox ( 2015 ) argues, accountability requires both answerability (the obligation to inform and justify) and enforcement (the capacity to impose sanctions). Perceived responsiveness captures the extent to which citizens believe government institutions and officials respond to their needs and grievances in a timely and appropriate manner (Potipiroon, 2024 ). It is a key determinant of political trust and system legitimacy. When governments are responsive, they signal to citizens that the state works for them, thereby fostering a sense of shared interest and collective ownership (Arkorful et al., 2021 ). This, in turn, reduces public tolerance for corruption and builds the social capital necessary for collective anti-corruption action. Potipiroon's (2024) implicit exchange hypothesis reveals a critical nuance: a responsive government can, paradoxically, garner public trust even amidst corruption, but more importantly, it shows that unresponsiveness is a key driver of public alienation and a permissive environment for corruption to flourish. In combination, these three pillars form a robust and theoretically coherent framework. Transparency exposes wrongdoing, accountability punishes it, and responsiveness builds the public trust that makes corruption socially unacceptable and strengthens the demand-side pressure for clean government (Kolstad & Wiig, 2008). While other dimensions like the rule of law and citizen participation are vital, this triad represents the most direct perceptual pathway through which citizens judge the integrity of their local government, making it the most pertinent focus for a study on the public perspective in a fragile state like Somalia. Theoretical Framework Understanding corruption in local government requires an analytical lens capable of explaining how institutional arrangements, information structures, and behavioral incentives shape the actions of public officials. Principal-agent theory provides a foundational framework for examining these dynamics, while alternative governance perspectives enrich the analysis by highlighting the roles of transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in mitigating corruption (Hartanto & Siregar 2021 ; Jiménez & Albalate 2018 ). Together, these perspectives explain not only why corruption occurs but also how governance reforms can disrupt the incentive structures that enable it. Building on this foundation, principal-agent theory conceptualizes corruption as a product of misaligned incentives and information asymmetries between principals, typically citizens, elected officials, or oversight bodies, and agents, namely bureaucrats or local government officials. Because agents possess superior information and often exercise substantial discretion, they may exploit these advantages to pursue private gains at the expense of public interests (Hartanto & Siregar 2021 ; Nieto-Morales & Ríos 2021 ; Hartanto et al. 2021 ). This theoretical framing underscores that corruption prevention must focus on rebalancing information and power between principals and agents. Consequently, reforms emphasize reducing information asymmetry, strengthening monitoring mechanisms, and realigning incentives to ensure compliance with public goals. Within this framework, transparency emerges as a central mechanism for counteracting information asymmetries. By making government actions observable, transparency limits opportunities for hidden corruption and enhances principals' ability to detect misconduct. Empirical evidence consistently shows that greater transparency is associated with lower corruption and higher public trust; however, these benefits depend on citizens' capacity and institutional avenues to interpret and act upon disclosed information (Phan 2025 ; Schillemans & Busuioc 2014 ; Rieznik & Lee 2021 ). This conditional impact of transparency highlights that information disclosure should be complemented by additional governance mechanisms to be effective. Accountability mechanisms provide this essential complement by creating enforceable consequences for agent misconduct. Instruments such as audits, human resource management systems, and participatory oversight increase the likelihood that corrupt actions will be detected and sanctioned, reinforcing the deterrent effects necessary for sustained compliance (Schillemans & Busuioc 2014 ; Nieto-Morales & Ríos 2021 ). However, accountability is not automatically effective. It can fail due to forum drift when principals do not utilize existing accountability channels or institutional weaknesses that compromise enforcement capacity (Rajala & Harri Jalonen 2025). These limitations demonstrate that transparency and accountability are mutually dependent: information must be matched with credible enforcement. Responsiveness completes this governance triad by shaping how transparency and accountability are perceived and interpreted by citizens. It reflects a government’s willingness and ability to address public needs and concerns, thereby strengthening legitimacy and reinforcing the broader effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. When citizens perceive local governments as responsive, they are more likely to trust transparency initiatives and view accountability processes as meaningful, which in turn strengthens compliance and reduces incentives for corrupt behavior (Hartanto & Siregar 2021 ; Han et al. 2024 ; Abdi et al. 2025 ). In this way, responsiveness acts as an intermediary variable that binds the governance system together, ensuring that both information and enforcement generate real improvements in perceived and actual integrity. Hypothesis development Perceived transparency. The degree to which government activities are viewed as open, accessible, and understandable by the public has emerged as a cornerstone of good governance and an effective deterrent against corruption. According to Rieznik & Lee ( 2021 ), they provided compelling statistical evidence showing that perceived transparency significantly influences public trust and perceptions of corruption in newly formed local governments. Their use of a regression-based bootstrapping model revealed that citizens who perceive higher levels of openness in government operations are more likely to express confidence in their local institutions and less likely to believe those institutions are corrupt. This suggests that transparency, even as a perception, serves a critical deterrent function against corruption. Meanwhile, empirical work in Slovakia by Miroslav & Marián (2021) underlined that transparency's effectiveness is profoundly shaped by how it is perceived and communicated to the public. Their survey-based study found that while many municipalities had formal mechanisms in place for disclosing public information, the public’s emotional and subjective interpretations of those mechanisms often shaped their views on whether the system was truly transparent. This observation aligns with broader literature suggesting that transparency must be both procedural and experiential to reduce corruption (Kolstad & Wiig, 2008). Building on this, Nagriwum et al. ( 2023 ) conducted a case study in Ghana, which found that although local government financial disclosures were available, their impact on corruption was minimal in the absence of accountability and enforcement mechanisms. The authors highlighted that transparency without institutional consequences does little to prevent corrupt practices a finding echoed in other African and Southeast Asian contexts. Digital transparency has also emerged as a key theme in recent studies. In Indonesia, Pribadi et al. (2024) explored the integration of digital platforms in local governance. Their structural equation modelling analysis revealed that digitalization significantly enhanced perceived transparency and indirectly reduced opportunities for corrupt behaviour. By improving access to information and simplifying administrative procedures, digital tools reduced bureaucratic discretion and made misconduct more visible to both regulators and citizens. However, some scholars caution against over-reliance on transparency as a standalone anti-corruption measure. Wojtasik & Trembaczowski ( 2024 ), examining the views of local officials in Poland, found that transparency, when not embedded in broader accountability and civic engagement systems, could become performative, creating the illusion of openness without altering corrupt incentives. Their research reinforces the importance of coupling transparency with institutional checks and active civil society involvement. H1 perceived transparency in local government significantly reduces corruption Perceived accountability. The extent to which public officials are viewed as answerable to citizens and oversight institutions is increasingly recognized as a vital factor in curbing corruption in local governments. Accountability fosters an environment where public servants are expected to justify their actions, comply with ethical standards, and face consequences for malfeasance. In Indonesia, Sari et al. (2024) investigated the relationship between internal control systems and potential corruption in local governments. Their study, using path analysis, found that strong internal control mechanisms enhance accountability, which in turn significantly reduces the potential for corruption. These findings emphasize the role of institutional checks in reinforcing ethical governance behaviors and mitigating corrupt tendencies (Sari et al., 2024). Woodhouse ( 2022 ), analyzing a political scandal in Italy, provided evidence that accountability interventions at the national level can have unintended effects at the local level. Increased scrutiny of national politicians correlated with increased corrupt activity among local officials, suggesting that accountability mechanisms must be systemic rather than isolated to prevent displacement of corrupt practices across governance levels (Woodhouse, 2022 ). In Brazil, Funk & Owen ( 2020 ) examined the impact of randomized anti-corruption audits on municipal governance. Their difference-in-differences analysis across over 5,000 municipalities revealed that audits improved not only transparency but also service delivery performance. The study found that formal accountability interventions, particularly those exposing corrupt practices, can lead to better governance outcomes even in decentralized systems (Funk & Owen, 2020 ). Further supporting these findings, Cho ( 2022 ) analyzed corruption types in local government contracts in South Korea. This research highlighted that accountability failures, particularly during procurement processes, are a significant avenue for corruption, and recommended strengthening internal audit systems, clarifying legal frameworks, and enhancing civil servant training as key reforms to improve local accountability and reduce corruption risks (Cho, 2022 ). Meanwhile, Widiyastuti & Winarna ( 2024 ) examined the role of public monitoring and corruption control measures in improving government accountability in Indonesia. Their regression analysis of 961 local government observations indicated that while public oversight and risk management enhance accountability, corruption control policies alone showed limited effectiveness without robust implementation frameworks. This underscores the importance of citizen engagement in reinforcing accountability systems (Widiyastuti & Winarna, 2024 ). H2 perceived accountability in local government significantly reduces corruption Perceived responsiveness . It is foundational to cultivating public trust, as it demonstrates that local governments are attentive and accountable to citizen needs. Without timely and appropriate action, even well-designed governance frameworks risk losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Yassin 2024 ). A central empirical contribution to this discourse is offered by Potipiroon ( 2024 ), who tested the implicit exchange hypothesis using survey data from business owners in Thailand. The study found that while corruption negatively affected public trust, perceived political responsiveness had a positive effect. Strikingly, responsiveness moderated the negative impact of corruption on trust. Citizens were more forgiving of corrupt but responsive politicians compared to their less corrupt but unresponsive counterparts. This paradox underscores how perceived responsiveness can obscure or even justify corrupt behavior in the eyes of the electorate (Potipiroon, 2024 ). The responsiveness-corruption nexus is also evident in the context of local governance in Metro Manila, Philippines. Buenaflor (2024) examined solid waste management programs across urbanized cities and found that governance failures characterized by a lack of responsiveness, transparency, and participation exacerbated both inequitable service provision and opportunities for corruption. The research emphasized the need for inclusive and responsive administrative practices to minimize governance gaps that breed corrupt outcomes (EnP Katherine, 2024 ) In China, Ma et al. ( 2022 ) employed a difference-in-differences approach to assess whether regional decrees enhance local government responsiveness. They found that government directives mandating online public forums significantly improved responsiveness and public engagement. While the study primarily assessed administrative behavior, it indirectly suggested that increased responsiveness contributes to reducing governance opacity, a precondition for tackling corruption (Ma et al., 2022 ). Julfiker ( 2025 ) evaluated local governance after a significant political transition, highlighting how poor responsiveness in local government correlates with persistent corruption. The study identified responsiveness as a key component of good governance reform, stressing that without systematic feedback loops and citizen engagement, local officials face weak incentives to avoid corrupt practices (Julfiker, 2025 ). Lastly, research by Yohanes et al. ( 2024 ) in Indonesia found that responsiveness positively influences trust in local government policies, specifically in the context of the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. The study indicated that public perception of government responsiveness, not just actual service delivery, significantly contributes to the legitimacy of governance processes and may suppress corruption by increasing scrutiny and expectations of ethical conduct (Yohanes et al., 2024 ). Conceptual frameworks of the study were developed (Fig. 1 ) based on the literature H3 perceived responsiveness in local government significantly reduces corruption Methodology Research Context and Design . This study was conducted in Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, which serves as the country's political, economic, and cultural hub and is home to an estimated 3.5 million residents. A quantitative, cross-sectional research design was adopted to examine the relationships among the study variables at a single point in time. This design is particularly suitable for capturing public perceptions and empirically testing hypothesized associations within a defined population (Bryman, 2016 ). Population, Sampling, and Data Collection Procedure . Conducting systematic research in a post-conflict environment such as Mogadishu presents considerable practical obstacles, including the absence of reliable sampling frames, ongoing security concerns, and limited logistical capacity. In response to these constraints, a non-probability convenience sampling technique was employed to recruit participants residing in Mogadishu. Although this sampling approach limits the generalizability of the findings, it remains a pragmatic and frequently used method in fragile-state contexts where probability-based sampling is not feasible. Data collection was undertaken using a structured questionnaire distributed digitally through widely used social media platforms. The questionnaire was disseminated primarily via Facebook and WhatsApp, selected because of their high penetration and daily usage rates among urban populations in Somalia. These platforms provided an efficient means for reaching a broad and diverse audience within Mogadishu (Digital 2024 : Somalia DataReportal – Global Digital Insights 2024). Recruitment involved posting the survey link in large, public Facebook groups and WhatsApp communities focused on civic affairs, local news, and community discussions related to Mogadishu. Snowball sampling was also encouraged by inviting early respondents to share the survey within their own social networks, thereby expanding its reach (Baltar & Brunet, 2012 ). In total, 523 questionnaires were distributed, and 330 complete and valid responses were retrieved, resulting in an effective response rate of approximately 63%. The digital distribution method proved effective in engaging participants from various demographic backgrounds, although inherent limitations remain and are discussed subsequently. Some measures were implemented to mitigate potential biases inherent in online convenience sampling and to enhance the overall quality of the data. The introductory section of the survey clearly specified that participation was restricted to adults aged 18 and above who currently resided in Mogadishu. Following data collection, responses were screened for straight-lining patterns and implausibly short completion times, and such entries were removed to maintain data integrity (Meade & Craig, 2012 ). Data Analysis . The collected data were cleaned, coded, and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25 and Microsoft Excel. The analysis comprised two major stages. First, descriptive statistics were generated to summarize the demographic characteristics of the respondents. Second, inferential analysis was conducted using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) with SmartPLS 4 software. PLS-SEM was selected due to its robustness in handling complex predictive models, suitability for studies with relatively smaller sample sizes, and minimal assumptions regarding data normality (Hair et al., 2019 a; Ringle et al., 2020 ). The application of PLS-SEM is appropriate for the study design; however, the rationale for selecting this technique over covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM) should be made explicit. PLS-SEM is particularly well-suited for exploratory research, theory development, and studies that prioritize prediction rather than strict theory testing (Hair et al. 2019 d; Henseler et al. 2015 ). Unlike CB-SEM, which requires large sample sizes and normally distributed data, PLS-SEM is more robust in situations where sample sizes are small, data distributions are non-normal, or measurement models are complex (Hair et al. 2021 c). Additionally, PLS-SEM is advantageous when the research model includes formative constructs or when the primary objective is to maximize explained variance in key outcome variables conditions that align with the aims of this study (Sarstedt et al. 2014 ). Given the sampling constraints and the exploratory nature of analyzing governance variables in the context of Mogadishu, PLS-SEM provides greater flexibility and statistical power compared to CB-SEM. Demographic Profile of Respondents. Table 1 indicates that the majority of respondents fall within the 21–30 years age group, accounting for 77.3% (n = 255) of the total sample. There is a significant gender imbalance, with 85.5% (n = 282) of the respondents being male, in comparison only 14.5% (n = 48) were female a common limitation in online surveys in Somalia due to socio-digital divides. The respondents are highly educated, with a striking 97.3% (n = 321) having attained higher education. Only a small fraction reported secondary education (0.9%) and informal education (1.8%). This profile is consistent with the typical user demographics of social media platforms in the region and highlights the sample's limitation in representing the broader, less-educated populace and women. Table 1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents Variable Category Frequency Percent (%) Age Below 20 15 4.5 21–30 255 77.3 31–40 51 15.5 41–50 6 1.8 51–60 3 0.9 Gender Male 282 85.5 Female 48 14.5 Education Level Informal Education 6 1.8 Secondary Level 3 0.9 Higher Education 321 97.3 Source : author’s work Result and analysis In this study, Perceived Transparency is measured by assessing citizens' perceptions of the implementation of transparent practices in local government—items adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp ( 2011 ). Perceived Accountability refers to citizens' belief that holding officials answerable minimizes corruption—items adapted from Beshi and Kaur ( 2020 ) and Park and Blenkinsopp ( 2011 ). Perceived Responsiveness captures the belief that timely, fair responses reduce corruption—items adapted from Beshi and Kaur ( 2020 ). Corruption measures public views on the prevalence of corruption in local government—items adapted from Rieznik and Lee ( 2021 ). Responses are rated on a Likert scale (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). Measurement model assessment . The measurement model was evaluated for reliability and validity following established guidelines (Hair et al. 2019 a; Fornell & Larcker 1981 ). As summarized in Table 2 and illustrated in Fig. 2 , all standardized factor loadings exceeded the recommended 0.70 threshold, indicating strong indicator reliability. Composite reliability (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha (α) values for all constructs surpassed the 0.70 criterion, confirming internal consistency (Thorndike 1994 ; Tavakol & Dennick 2011 ). AVE values ranged from 0.644 to 0.766, exceeding the 0.50 benchmark and demonstrating adequate convergent validity (Fornell & Larcker 1981 ). PACC exhibited the highest reliability, whereas the CORR construct showed the strongest AVE, reflecting solid variance explanation across indicators. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values were below the recommended thresholds of 5.0 per Hair et al. ( 2021 c) and the more conservative 3.3 suggested by Diamantopoulos & Siguaw ( 2006 ), indicating no multicollinearity concerns. Overall, the measurement model demonstrates satisfactory reliability and validity across constructs, providing a robust foundation for the subsequent structural model analysis. Table 2 Measurement model evaluation of factor lauding, CR, α, AVE, and VIF Construct Item Factor lauding CR α AVE VIF Corruption CORR1 0.896 0.856 0.848 0.766 2.175 2.234 1.858 CORR2 0.884 CORR3 0.846 Perceived accountability PACC1 0.812 0.879 0.874 0.726 1.877 2.263 2.333 2.42 PACC2 0.860 PACC3 0.854 PACC4 0.881 Perceived responsiveness PER1 0.830 0.880 0.867 0.715 2.033 2.864 2.284 1.771 PER2 0.905 PER3 0.848 PER4 0.797 Perceived transparency PET1 0.815 0.816 0.816 0.644 1.779 1.79 1.579 1.651 ET2 0.808 PET3 0.785 PET4 0.801 Source : author’s work Furthermore, discriminant validity was examined using two widely recognized techniques: the Fornell–Larcker criterion and the Heterotrait–Monotrait (HTMT) ratio. Following Fornell and Larcker ( 1981 ), discriminant validity is confirmed when the square root of each construct's AVE exceeds its correlations with other constructs. As shown in Table 3, the AVE square roots for all constructs are consistently greater than their corresponding inter-construct correlations. For instance, each construct demonstrates a higher AVE square root than any of its shared correlations with other constructs, indicating that it explains more variance in its own indicators than it shares with external constructs. This consistent pattern provides strong evidence that the Fornell–Larcker criterion is fully satisfied, thereby confirming that discriminant validity is well established within the measurement model. Table 3. Discriminant validity using the Fornell-larcker criterion CORR PACC PER PET CORR 0.875 PACC 0.757 0.852 PER 0.732 0.744 0.846 PET 0.718 0.674 0.697 0.802 Source : author’s work In addition to the Fornell–Larcker assessment, the HTMT ratio was calculated to provide a more rigorous evaluation of discriminant validity. According to Hair et al. ( 2019 a), HTMT values below 0.90 indicate satisfactory discriminant validity, while values below 0.85 reflect a more conservative threshold. As shown in Table 4 , all HTMT values fall below the recommended 0.90 cut-off. Although a few values approach the more conservative boundary, they remain within acceptable limits, thereby offering further evidence that the constructs in the model are empirically distinct. This confirms that discriminant validity is well established based on the HTMT criterion. Table 4 Discriminant validity (HTMT) CORR PACC PER PET CORR PACC 0.873 PER 0.843 0.849 PET 0.857 0.794 0.829 Source : author’s work Structural model assessment Predictive capability assessment . Evaluating the predictive relevance of a structural model is a critical component of SEM analysis. In this study, the coefficient of determination (R²) was used to assess the model's explanatory power, reflecting the proportion of variance in the endogenous construct accounted for by its predictors (Hair et al., 2021 c). Higher R² values, particularly those approaching 1, indicate stronger predictive accuracy. As shown in Table 5 , the model demonstrates a substantial level of explanatory power, with the endogenous construct exhibiting an R² value of 0.675. In addition to R², the model's predictive relevance was examined using the PLS-Predict procedure in SmartPLS 4, which generates the Q² statistic. A Q² value greater than 0 indicates that the model has predictive relevance for the target endogenous construct. As presented in Table 5 , the obtained Q² value of 0.438 exceeds this threshold, providing strong evidence of predictive validity. Collectively, these results demonstrate that the model possesses robust predictive capability and effectively captures the underlying structural relationships within the study context. Table 5 R 2 and Q 2 of latent exogenous variables Exogenous variable R 2 Q 2 CORR 0.675 0.438 Source : author’s work. Notes: R 2 = co-efficient of determination; Q 2 = predictive relevance Hypothesis test. Table 6 and Fig. 3 present the results of hypothesis testing, examining good governance practices of three independent variables on corruption (CORR): (PACC), (PER), and (PET). All three hypotheses are statistically supported, as indicated by their respective beta coefficients, T-values, and p-values. Specifically, PACC exhibits the strongest positive effect on reducing corruption (β = 0.373, T = 7.563, p < 0.001), suggesting that heightened PACC significantly contributes to mitigating corrupt practices. PER also demonstrates a significant positive relationship with corruption reduction (β = 0.252, T = 4.444, p < 0.001). Lastly, PET exerts a substantial influence on corruption outcomes (β = 0.291, T = 5.636, p < 0.001), indicating that perceived transparency in local government fosters accountability and reduces opportunities for corrupt behaviour. In terms of the relative strength of the predictors, PACC clearly emerges as the most influential factor in reducing corruption, suggesting that mechanisms that enforce oversight and sanction misconduct are particularly effective. PER and PET also contribute meaningfully, though to a lesser extent, indicating that increasing information availability and improving governmental responsiveness help reduce corruption but may be most effective when paired with strong accountability structures. Table 6 Hypothesis testing Hypothesis Beta T values P values Decision H1: PACC -> CORR 0.373 7.563 0.000 Supported H2: PER -> CORR 0.252 4.444 0.000 Supported H3: PET -> CORR 0.291 5.636 0.000 Supported Source : author’s work Somalia's governance environment is characterized by weak oversight structures, political instability, and limited institutional capacity, all of which are identified as major drivers of corruption (Hassan 2023). In this context, citizens' perceptions that officials can be held accountable (accountability) are likely more influential in shaping corruption perceptions than transparency or responsiveness alone. Empirical evidence from the Banadir region demonstrates that accountability is positively linked to service delivery quality, with responsiveness and transparency also contributing, but to a lesser degree (Kulmie et al., 2025 ). Trust in local government further mediates these relationships, as citizens' confidence is bolstered when municipal performance reflects accountability and good governance (Abdi, 2023 ; Abdi & Abdul Rahman, 2025). While public participation can enhance perceived responsiveness, weak institutional capacity often limits its impact on actual anti-corruption outcomes, explaining the more modest association of responsiveness with corruption in this study's model (Abdi et al., 2025 ). Additionally, innovations such as digital accountability mechanisms in Somalia demonstrate that tangible accountability, even in insecure settings, can improve service delivery and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of state actors (Ahmed, 2025 ). Discussion (PACC) has been widely recognized as a crucial mechanism for curbing corruption. Ramesh and Vinayagathasan (2024) provide empirical evidence from Sri Lanka, confirming that institutional accountability alongside the rule of law and effective government expenditure plays a pivotal role in deterring corrupt practices and improving governance effectiveness. Their findings reinforce the idea that citizens and public officials alike respond to clear, enforceable accountability mechanisms. Similarly, Asomah et al. ( 2024 ), using survey data from Ghana, demonstrated that perceived government accountability substantially increases the likelihood of citizens reporting corrupt practices, highlighting the importance of transparent and accountable leadership in public office. Ratmono et al. ( 2021 ) further emphasized the relationship between weak internal controls and the prevalence of corruption in Indonesian government organizations, concluding that enhancing accountability systems significantly mitigates this risk. Ndururu et al. ( 2023 ) add to this narrative by showing that the leadership's commitment to transparent and accountable decision-making is a direct factor in lowering corruption perceptions within Kenya's judicial procurement systems. These findings are echoed globally by Astudillo-Rodas ( 2022 ), who argued that when public servants internalize accountability and transparency values, their willingness to report unethical conduct increases, thus forming a human-centered line of defense against corruption. Secondly, the concept of (PER) is equally critical in reducing corruption, as it reflects the government's ability to promptly and appropriately address the needs and concerns of its citizens. Arkorful et al. ( 2021 ) explored this dynamic in Ghana during the COVID-19 crisis, revealing that governments that respond swiftly and transparently to public demands inspire higher citizen trust, which in turn strengthens their collective resistance to corrupt practices. Their findings highlight that responsiveness is not merely about service delivery speed, but about an adaptive and fair administrative culture that discourages corruption by reducing bureaucratic bottlenecks and minimizing discretion among officials. Asomah et al. ( 2024 ) further confirm that fosters proactive citizen engagement in reporting and deterring corruption, particularly when paired with trust in institutions. This is consistent with the work of Ratmono et al. ( 2021 ), who note that responsiveness in administrative processes helps address grievances before they become breeding grounds for unethical behavior, reinforcing the role of timely government action in reducing corruption risks. Finally, a growing body of research underscores the pivotal role of transparency in curbing corruption. Astudillo-Rodas ( 2022 ) highlighted how the internalization of transparency values among Colombian public servants was a strong predictor of their likelihood to report corruption, demonstrating that visible, transparent systems shape both organizational culture and individual attitudes. Fang et al. ( 2024 ) used provincial-level data from China to examine how government auditing and transparency jointly influence corruption control, concluding that high levels of transparency not only increase audit effectiveness but also significantly reduce opportunities for hidden misconduct. Ndururu et al. ( 2023 ) emphasized that leadership transparency in Kenya's judiciary procurement departments considerably lowers the perceived levels of corruption, especially in public resource management. Asomah et al. ( 2024 ) and Arkorful et al. ( 2021 ) both reinforced the critical role of transparency in shaping citizens' perceptions of fairness, which in turn motivates them to take action against corruption. Overall, these empirical findings provide robust support for the theoretical argument that accountability, responsiveness, and transparency are interdependent pillars of good governance and effective anti-corruption strategies. Beyond confirming patterns established in diverse global contexts, this study extends existing knowledge by demonstrating how these governance mechanisms operate within post-conflict and fragile environments such as Mogadishu. While the literature confirms the universal importance of PACC, our findings indicate that in such a fragile state, these principles are not just administrative tools but foundational prerequisites for rebuilding basic state-citizen trust. The Somali context, with its legacy of institutional collapse and clan-based patronage networks, presents a critical test case. Our research extends the existing knowledge by revealing that in this environment, even incremental improvements in PACC can have a disproportionately large impact on disrupting entrenched corrupt systems, precisely because they offer a tangible alternative to the prevailing governance vacuum. These findings carry significant policy implications, particularly for local government institutions and civil society actors who are at the frontline of service delivery and citizen engagement in Somalia. For local governments, the imperative is to move beyond symbolic reforms and implement concrete, visible PACC mechanisms. This includes: Establishing public, easily accessible dashboards for local budgets and procurement contracts to enhance transparency. Creating formal, protected channels for citizens to report service failures and corruption without fear of reprisal, thereby improving responsiveness and implementing simplified accountability frameworks that track and publicly report on the performance of local departments in key service areas like sanitation, security, and education. For civil society organizations and international partners, our study underscores the need to support these local institutions by building their technical capacity for financial management and monitoring & evaluation. More importantly, they should focus on empowering community-based organizations to act as independent watchdogs, using the data provided by new transparency initiatives to hold local officials accountable. By championing PACC at the regional level, where citizens interact with the state most directly, stakeholders can help cultivate a culture of integrity from the ground up, which is essential for sustainable anti-corruption progress in Somalia's challenging context. Conclusion In conclusion, the study confirms that perceived accountability, responsiveness, and transparency significantly reduce corruption by enhancing the effectiveness of governance practices. The findings support all three assumptions, showing that these governance dimensions have a direct and positive impact on strengthening institutional integrity and reducing opportunities for unethical behaviour. Additionally, the perception of transparency and responsiveness reinforces the relationship between accountability and anti-corruption outcomes, highlighting the importance of both direct and indirect pathways. These results emphasise the need for public institutions to adopt accountable, responsive, and transparent systems to strengthen governance effectiveness and foster a culture of integrity and public trust. Limitation and future research Despite the valuable insights provided by this study, several limitations have been acknowledged, which also pave the way for future research opportunities. First, the study employed a non-probability convenience sampling technique due to contextual limitations in Mogadishu. While this approach allowed for a broader reach through digital platforms, it limits the generalizability of the findings beyond the sample population. Future studies should consider using probability-based sampling techniques or mixed-method approaches, including qualitative interviews or focus groups, to ensure a more comprehensive understanding of the topic across diverse demographic and regional contexts. Second, the cross-sectional design of the study captures perceptions and relationships at a single point in time, making it difficult to infer causality or observe changes in governance perceptions and corruption practices over time. Future research could adopt longitudinal or panel study designs to track the evolution of public perceptions and institutional practices, especially in post-conflict societies like Somalia, where governance systems are fluid and evolving. Moreover, the study focused on three specific dimensions of good governance: Perceived Accountability, Responsiveness, and Transparency, while other essential governance factors such as the rule of law, citizen participation, institutional trust, and public sector ethics were not explored. Future studies could expand the model by incorporating these variables to develop a more holistic understanding of the mechanisms that underpin effective anti-corruption strategies in fragile states. Finally, the use of convenience sampling through social media, necessitated by security and logistical constraints in Mogadishu, likely biased the sample toward younger, urban, and more educated respondents, thereby limiting the generalizability of the findings. The demographic imbalance in the sample, particularly the disproportionately high number of male respondents, and high educated may further restrict representativeness, as gender and education can significantly shape perceptions of corruption. Declarations Disclosure Statement The authors declare no conflicts of interest in relation to this research. Data Availability Statement The data supporting the findings of this study are available upon reasonable request from the corresponding author. Funding This research received no funding. Ethical approval Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee at Jamhuriya University of Science and Technology, Somalia, under the reference number (JUREC/0139/ECOM/052024) on November 05, 2024. Informed consent Informed consent was secured from all participants prior to their involvement in the research. Consent was explicitly documented in written form through the digital questionnaire platform, where participants were required to acknowledge their understanding of the study's objectives, their voluntary participation. Informed consent was obtained from November 06, 2024 Strict measures were implemented to maintain participant anonymity and data confidentiality, with no personal identifiers collected during the process. Author Contribution Mudey, M.H.: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Formal analysis, Methodology, Project Administration, Software, Validation, Writing – Original Draft.Arshad, R.: Supervision, Review & Editing. 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Journal of Mathematics Instruction, Social Research and Opinion 4(1):59–74. https://doi.org/10.58421/misro.v4i1.320 Sarstedt M, Ringle CM, Smith D, Reams R, Hair JF (2014) Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM): a Useful Tool for Family Business Researchers. Journal of Family Business Strategy 5(1):105–115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfbs.2014.01.002 Schedler A (1999) Conceptualizing Accountability. Lynne Rienner Publishers eBooks :11–28. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685854133-003 Schillemans T, Busuioc M (2014) Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25(1):191–215. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muu024 Tavakol M, Dennick R (2011) Making Sense of Cronbach’s Alpha. International Journal of Medical Education 2(2):53–55. https://doi.org/10.5116/ijme.4dfb.8dfd Thorndike RM (1994) Book Review: Psychometric Theory (3rd ed.) by Jum Nunnally and Ira Bernstein New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994, xxiv + 752 pp. Applied Psychological Measurement 19(3):303–305. https://doi.org/10.1177/014662169501900308 Transparency International (2025) What Is Corruption? In: Transparency International. https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption Ulung Pribadi, Iqbal M, Ibrahim MA, None Juhari, Yujitia Ahdarrijal (2024) Nexus of public organization, transparency, and accountability in Indonesia’s digital governance. Journal of Public Affairs 24(3). https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2940 Van de Walle S (2017) Explaining Citizen Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with Public Services. The Palgrave Handbook of Public Administration and Management in Europe :227–241. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55269-3_11 Van de Walle S, Bouckaert G (2003) Public Service Performance and Trust in Government: The Problem of Causality. International Journal of Public Administration 26(8-9):891–913. https://doi.org/10.1081/pad-120019352 Wahyono H, Narmaditya BS (2022) Structural model of the application of anti-corruption values to local government bureaucrats. Social Sciences & Humanities Open 6(1):100346. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2022.100346 Widiyastuti M, Winarna J (2024) Risk Management, Corruption Control, and Public Monitoring: Do They Improve Government Performance Accountability? International Journal of Economics, Business and Management Research 08(10):132–147. https://doi.org/10.51505/ijebmr.2024.81010 Williams D, Young T (2012) Civil Society and the Liberal Project in Ghana and Sierra Leone. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 6(1):7–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2012.655565 Wojtasik W, Trembaczowski Ł (2024) Social determinants of corruption at the local level. Nowa Polityka Wschodnia 2024(Vol. 4(44)):30–47. https://doi.org/10.15804/npw20244403 Woodhouse EF (2022) Accountability and corruption displacement: evidence from Italy. Journal of Public Policy 24(4):1–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x22000113 World Bank (2022) WGI-Home. In: Worldbank.org. https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ Yassin A (2024) Impact of Governance on Public Trust in Mogadishu’s Municipal Leadership. Journal of Somali Studies 11(3):183–207. https://doi.org/10.31920/2056-5682/2024/v11n3a9 Yohanes Y, Elyta E, Apriyani E, Pribadi U, Istiqoh AE, Asriadi A (2024) Jambi Community Trust in Local Government; Mandatory Coronavirus-19 Vaccination. Jurnal Manajemen Pelayanan Publik 8(1):112–129. https://doi.org/10.24198/jmpp.v8i1.51778 Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Editorial decision: Revision requested 23 Mar, 2026 Reviews received at journal 04 Mar, 2026 Reviews received at journal 19 Feb, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 19 Feb, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 18 Feb, 2026 Reviewers invited by journal 18 Feb, 2026 Submission checks completed at journal 26 Nov, 2025 First submitted to journal 23 Nov, 2025 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-7251860","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":594110282,"identity":"9d578d9a-24ea-4b4f-a042-5dd43d0ebfea","order_by":0,"name":"Mohamed Hassan Mudey","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Jamhuriya University of Science and Technology","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Mohamed","middleName":"Hassan","lastName":"Mudey","suffix":""},{"id":594110283,"identity":"cbd4a7f4-4e2d-4df8-bbd0-9635c762825c","order_by":1,"name":"Rozita Arshad","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Universiti Utara Malaysia","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Rozita","middleName":"","lastName":"Arshad","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-07-30 10:38:32","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7251860/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7251860/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":103504375,"identity":"98f992a3-0790-4b1b-8af6-62cbe8e5db3a","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-26 13:19:34","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":95768,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eConceptual framework. \u003cem\u003eSource:\u003c/em\u003e author’s work\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7251860/v1/dd87ec9bfa3b0345e87e6dd8.png"},{"id":103090964,"identity":"3bbec502-4bae-444d-860c-6b6e6df12e08","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-20 16:48:17","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":36549,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMeasurement model. \u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eSource:\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e author’s work\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7251860/v1/1c1605de2681e6af640de43b.png"},{"id":103090966,"identity":"920290fb-192e-4778-8731-f07b34b6e6fe","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-20 16:48:17","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":35735,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eStructural model. \u003c/strong\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource:\u003c/em\u003e author's work\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7251860/v1/c07e48009ab9f477062d0102.png"},{"id":104779134,"identity":"bbfdf876-de91-4a0d-a8ee-5128ff4df563","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-17 07:35:34","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":1218902,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7251860/v1/d8930073-9202-426f-bc61-15a8b9dfccc2.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Perceived Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness as Drivers of Corruption Prevention in Local Government: Evidence from Somalia","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eCorruption entails the unethical or illegal exploitation of delegated authority for personal or group advantage (Han \u0026amp; Kim, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e), often undermining institutional integrity, public trust, and equitable governance (Amegavi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). It manifests in multiple, interrelated forms that critically weaken governance and erode public confidence. Common forms include bribery, misappropriation of public resources, abuse of official power for personal gain, nepotism in public appointments, bureaucratic inefficiencies used for rent-seeking, the deliberate protection of corrupt actors, and illicit use of confidential government information (Pan et al., 2023; Purnamasari et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR67\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Wahyono \u0026amp; Narmaditya, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR86\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Addressing corruption is particularly challenging as it spans legal, political, economic, social, and moral dimensions, garnering increasing attention from scholars and policymakers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe persistent prevalence of corruption within local government structures has prompted growing scholarly interest in the role of good governance as a strategic mechanism for its mitigation (Koeswayo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Systemic corruption reflects deep-rooted institutional failures that extend beyond individual misconduct, complicating reform efforts (DeSouza et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Key drivers of corruption include a lack of ethical leadership, insufficient political will, politicization of corruption cases, selective enforcement of prosecutions, weak regulatory oversight, greed, and underfunding of anti-corruption agencies (Langnel, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Consequently, good local governance, characterized by transparency, accountability, ethical conduct, and public participation, is widely recognized as a foundational approach to curbing corruption and enhancing public service delivery (Mudey \u0026amp; Arshad \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Studies consistently demonstrate that strong internal control systems and governance frameworks are pivotal in reducing opportunities for corrupt behavior among public officials (Arifin et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe integration of good governance principles into local administrative structures has been shown to influence public sector integrity significantly. For instance, in Ebonyi State, Nigeria, governance practices emphasizing accountability and transparency reduced financial and bureaucratic corruption, improved service delivery, and reinforced public trust in governmental institutions (Aloysius \u0026amp; Vincent. 2016)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSimilarly, evidence from Spanish municipalities such as Alcobendas and Sant Cugat del Vall\u0026egrave;s illustrates how professionalization of local administrations, including the appointment of city managers, can create fiduciary relationships that insulate bureaucratic functions from political interference, thereby promoting transparency and effective management (Dr\u0026aacute;palov\u0026aacute; \u0026amp; Di Mascio, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). However, decentralization of fiscal responsibilities without complementary governance mechanisms may paradoxically exacerbate corruption. Fiscal decentralization, in the absence of strong oversight, can create loopholes that are exploited for personal gain, reinforcing the need for robust governance frameworks alongside administrative devolution (Ratmono \u0026amp; Darsono, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR71\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn other contexts, such as Indonesian village governments, significant governance weaknesses, including inadequate internal controls, lack of transparency, and limited community engagement, have been documented, highlighting the need for urgent reforms in accounting, auditing, and internal regulatory systems to preempt and address corruption effectively (Putri et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, Albania's central-local government relationships have contributed to inadequate service delivery and created fertile ground for corrupt practices (Mu\u0026ccedil;ollari, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Broadly, transparency, accountability, and civic participation are essential components of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, as they create an enabling environment for ethical governance and reduce discretionary power among public officials (Salihu, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR75\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Muktiyanto et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR55\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe importance of accountability as a deterrent to corruption is further illustrated by the Mbozi District Council in Tanzania, where enhanced accountability measures correlated with lower corruption levels (Kivyiro \u0026amp; Mokaya, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Likewise, transparent recruitment and procurement processes, combined with active civic engagement, are critical in fostering ethical behavior and preventing the misappropriation of public resources (Miroslav \u0026amp; Mari\u0026aacute;n 2021)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eProactive approaches to corruption prevention, such as cultivating a zero-tolerance culture, strengthening audit oversight, and reinforcing transparency mechanisms, have been shown to bolster governance integrity (Purcell, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR66\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Beshi \u0026amp; Kaur, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Nevertheless, challenges persist; for example, in Budhanilkantha Municipality, high awareness of governance norms has not translated into effective anti-corruption outcomes due to limited public participation and inconsistent transparency (Sapkota, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR76\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Similarly, in Vietnam, empirical evidence demonstrates a strong negative correlation between corruption and attributes such as accountability, transparency, and civic involvement (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite extensive literature on good governance and its role in mitigating corruption in diverse local government contexts, including Nigeria (Aloysius \u0026amp; Vincent 2016)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndonesia (Putri et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e), Albania (Mu\u0026ccedil;ollari, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e), and Vietnam (Nguyen et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e), few studies have explored how these principles operate within fragile or post-conflict urban settings such as Mogadishu, Somalia. Most existing research focuses on relatively stable governance environments or emerging democracies with established institutional frameworks. Consequently, the unique challenges of Mogadishu's prolonged political instability, weak institutions, security risks, and limited citizen trust remain largely underexplored. Moreover, although transparency, accountability, and citizen participation are frequently highlighted as practical governance tools against corruption, there is a paucity of empirical research examining their interaction and practical implementation within Somalia's local governance structures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study addresses this gap by adopting a 'public perspectives' framework, conceptualizing public perspectives as the aggregate of citizens' subjective beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations regarding the performance of local authorities. This approach is theoretically central, as subjective perceptions, rather than solely objective institutional realities, directly shape public trust, legitimacy, and citizen behavior, including the willingness to report corruption (Beshi \u0026amp; Kaur, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Park \u0026amp; Blenkinsopp, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Accordingly, the study investigates three key governance attributes: transparency, accountability, and responsiveness through the lens of public perception (i.e., perceived transparency, perceived accountability, perceived responsiveness). While other dimensions of good governance, such as rule of law and equity, are important, these three attributes represent the most direct and tangible interface between citizens and local government and have the strongest theoretical link to corruption prevention from a citizen's perspective.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSomalia, and specifically its capital, Mogadishu, constitutes a critical case for examining the foundations of anti-corruption governance. The context is characterized by a profound institutional void following decades of state collapse, forcing nascent local administrations to construct accountability mechanisms from scratch, often in parallel with enduring traditional clan structures. This creates a hybrid governance model where formal accountability mechanisms compete with informal loyalties. Additionally, the operational landscape is heavily influenced by a pervasive international presence and donor-dependent public financing, engendering competing accountability structures where officials may prioritize responsiveness to donors over domestic constituents, potentially distorting public perceptions of accountability. These conditions make Mogadishu an exemplary setting to investigate whether canonical governance principles can retain their anti-corruption efficacy in an environment marked by fragmented authority and externally mediated state-building.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTo address this research gap, this study empirically investigates the perceived transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of local government in Mogadishu in relation to corruption prevention from the citizens' perspective. Using a quantitative research design, data were collected via a structured questionnaire from residents of Mogadishu and analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to test the hypothesized relationships. The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction, the next section reviews the relevant literature and develops the hypotheses, followed by methodology, results, and discussion linking the findings to broader scholarly discourse. The paper concludes by highlighting the study's implications, acknowledging its limitations, and suggesting directions for future research.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Literature review","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eConceptualizing Governance, Corruption, and the Public Perspective\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eThe Multifaceted construct of good governance\u003c/b\u003e. The concept of good governance has evolved from a prescriptive policy tool promoted by international financial institutions into a central analytical framework in public administration, political science, and development studies (Williams \u0026amp; Young, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR88\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). While no single definition is universally accepted, it is broadly understood as the traditions, processes, and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised, including how governments are selected, monitored, and replaced, as well as their capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound policies (Kaufmann, Kraay, \u0026amp; Mastruzzi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators operationalize this through six key dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR91\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Grindle (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2004\u003c/span\u003e) usefully distinguishes between the minimal conditions of good governance (e.g., curbing corruption, establishing the rule of law, and basic administrative competence) and the more complex second-generation reforms (e.g., enhancing civil society participation, strengthening legislative oversight). This study operates within the realm of the minimal, foundational conditions, which are most critical for establishing legitimacy and basic functionality in contexts where the state-citizen relationship is being rebuilt from a legacy of conflict and statelessness (Brinkerhoff, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor the purpose of this research, narrow the focus to three interdependent pillars of good governance: transparency, accountability, and responsiveness. This selection is not to dismiss the importance of other dimensions but is a deliberate theoretical choice. These three represent the most direct and perceptible manifestations of governance from a citizen's standpoint, forming the core of the governance-citizen interface where abstract principles translate into tangible experiences that shape public trust and perceptions of integrity (Beshi \u0026amp; Kaur, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e; Park \u0026amp; Blenkinsopp, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eDefining corruption and its operationalization\u003c/b\u003e. Corruption is classically defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2024). This broad definition encompasses a wide spectrum of activities, from grand corruption that distorts central government policy and high-level decision-making, to petty corruption involving the everyday exploitation of power by low- and mid-level officials in their interactions with citizens (Heidenheimer \u0026amp; Johnston, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e). (Karklins \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2007\u003c/span\u003e) expands on this by framing corruption as a systemic failure of institutions, where public office is used for personal or political party advantage, undermining both the means and ends of governance. In the context of local government, the focus of this study corruption often manifests as bribery for routine services, nepotism in hiring, favoritism in procurement, and the misallocation of local public funds (Koeswayo et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Aloysius \u0026amp; Vincent. 2016)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e Consistent with the public perspective lens, this study operationalizes corruption through the perceived prevalence of corrupt practices within local government operations. The measure what citizens believe to be true about the integrity of their local officials, as these perceptions directly affect their trust and engagement (Olken, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR61\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2009\u003c/span\u003e). As Nguyen et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR58\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrated in Vietnam, public perception of corruption is a powerful indicator of governance failure, often correlating strongly with actual experiences of corrupt exchanges and serving as a significant constraint on public service quality. This approach is validated by the methodology of prominent indices like Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, which aggregates expert and business leader assessments to gauge corruption levels.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eThe Centrality of the Public Perspective\u003c/b\u003e. In line with the focus on the governance-citizen interface, this study adopts a public perspective lens. This refers to the subjective beliefs, attitudes, and evaluations held by citizens regarding the conduct, processes, and performance of their government officials and institutions (Rieznik \u0026amp; Lee, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Van de Walle \u0026amp; Bouckaert, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR85\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e). This perspective is crucial because, as Rieznik and Lee (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) argue, it is the perception of governance, rather than its objective reality, that most directly influences citizen behavior, including their willingness to comply with laws, pay taxes, and trust public institutions. Rothstein \u0026amp; Teorell (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR74\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e) further posit that the quality of government is ultimately a matter of how citizens perceive it, as these perceptions determine the government's social legitimacy.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis is especially critical in a context like Somalia. In post-conflict and fragile states, there is often a significant gap between de jure institutional frameworks (what is formally on paper) and de facto governance practices (what actually occurs) (North, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR60\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1990\u003c/span\u003e). Official reports and government audits may be scarce, unreliable, or non-existent (Putri et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, the lived experience and perceptions of the citizenry become a vital, albeit subjective, barometer of governance (Andrews, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2013\u003c/span\u003e). By prioritizing the public perspective, this study captures the reality of governance as experienced by those it is meant to serve, providing insights that purely institutional or top-down analyses would miss, and acknowledging that the public's perception is the public's reality in the political arena (Van de Walle, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR84\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTheoretical Justification for the Triad: Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe selection of three core constructs is theoretically grounded in their established, synergistic relationship in combating corruption. They form a logical chain that moves from enabling oversight to enforcing consequences and, finally, to building systemic legitimacy. Perceived transparency is the degree to which government information on rules, procedures, plans, and expenditures is accessible, understandable, and usable by the public (Kolstad \u0026amp; Wiig, 2008; Grimmelikhuijsen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). It functions as a primary antidote to corruption by reducing information asymmetry, a key enabler of corrupt deals that thrive in secrecy (Lindstedt \u0026amp; Naurin, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e). When government actions are open to scrutiny by citizens, civil society, and the media, the risks and costs of engaging in corruption increase. However, as Nagriwum et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) and Peisakhin \u0026amp; Pinto (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR63\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2010\u003c/span\u003e) caution, transparency alone is insufficient; it must be actionable, meaning it must be coupled with mechanisms that allow the revealed information to be used effectively to demand answers.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerceived accountability refers to the belief that public officials are answerable for their actions and will face consequences for misconduct (Sari et al., 2024; Schedler, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR78\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1999\u003c/span\u003e). It is the mechanism that gives transparency its teeth. Accountability imposes potential costs on corrupt behavior through oversight institutions, audits, and electoral or legal sanctions (Funk \u0026amp; Owen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). A system may be transparent, but without accountability, revelations of wrongdoing have no consequence, rendering transparency a performative exercise that creates an illusion of openness without altering corrupt incentives (Wojtasik \u0026amp; Trembaczowski, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR89\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). As Fox (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e) argues, accountability requires both answerability (the obligation to inform and justify) and enforcement (the capacity to impose sanctions).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerceived responsiveness captures the extent to which citizens believe government institutions and officials respond to their needs and grievances in a timely and appropriate manner (Potipiroon, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). It is a key determinant of political trust and system legitimacy. When governments are responsive, they signal to citizens that the state works for them, thereby fostering a sense of shared interest and collective ownership (Arkorful et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). This, in turn, reduces public tolerance for corruption and builds the social capital necessary for collective anti-corruption action. Potipiroon's (2024) implicit exchange hypothesis reveals a critical nuance: a responsive government can, paradoxically, garner public trust even amidst corruption, but more importantly, it shows that unresponsiveness is a key driver of public alienation and a permissive environment for corruption to flourish.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn combination, these three pillars form a robust and theoretically coherent framework. Transparency exposes wrongdoing, accountability punishes it, and responsiveness builds the public trust that makes corruption socially unacceptable and strengthens the demand-side pressure for clean government (Kolstad \u0026amp; Wiig, 2008). While other dimensions like the rule of law and citizen participation are vital, this triad represents the most direct perceptual pathway through which citizens judge the integrity of their local government, making it the most pertinent focus for a study on the public perspective in a fragile state like Somalia.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eTheoretical Framework\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eUnderstanding corruption in local government requires an analytical lens capable of explaining how institutional arrangements, information structures, and behavioral incentives shape the actions of public officials. Principal-agent theory provides a foundational framework for examining these dynamics, while alternative governance perspectives enrich the analysis by highlighting the roles of transparency, accountability, and responsiveness in mitigating corruption (Hartanto \u0026amp; Siregar \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Jim\u0026eacute;nez \u0026amp; Albalate \u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e). Together, these perspectives explain not only why corruption occurs but also how governance reforms can disrupt the incentive structures that enable it.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuilding on this foundation, principal-agent theory conceptualizes corruption as a product of misaligned incentives and information asymmetries between principals, typically citizens, elected officials, or oversight bodies, and agents, namely bureaucrats or local government officials. Because agents possess superior information and often exercise substantial discretion, they may exploit these advantages to pursue private gains at the expense of public interests (Hartanto \u0026amp; Siregar \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Nieto-Morales \u0026amp; R\u0026iacute;os \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Hartanto et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). This theoretical framing underscores that corruption prevention must focus on rebalancing information and power between principals and agents. Consequently, reforms emphasize reducing information asymmetry, strengthening monitoring mechanisms, and realigning incentives to ensure compliance with public goals.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWithin this framework, transparency emerges as a central mechanism for counteracting information asymmetries. By making government actions observable, transparency limits opportunities for hidden corruption and enhances principals' ability to detect misconduct. Empirical evidence consistently shows that greater transparency is associated with lower corruption and higher public trust; however, these benefits depend on citizens' capacity and institutional avenues to interpret and act upon disclosed information (Phan \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e; Schillemans \u0026amp; Busuioc \u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Rieznik \u0026amp; Lee \u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). This conditional impact of transparency highlights that information disclosure should be complemented by additional governance mechanisms to be effective.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAccountability mechanisms provide this essential complement by creating enforceable consequences for agent misconduct. Instruments such as audits, human resource management systems, and participatory oversight increase the likelihood that corrupt actions will be detected and sanctioned, reinforcing the deterrent effects necessary for sustained compliance (Schillemans \u0026amp; Busuioc \u003cspan citationid=\"CR79\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e; Nieto-Morales \u0026amp; R\u0026iacute;os \u003cspan citationid=\"CR59\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). However, accountability is not automatically effective. It can fail due to forum drift when principals do not utilize existing accountability channels or institutional weaknesses that compromise enforcement capacity (Rajala \u0026amp; Harri Jalonen 2025). These limitations demonstrate that transparency and accountability are mutually dependent: information must be matched with credible enforcement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eResponsiveness completes this governance triad by shaping how transparency and accountability are perceived and interpreted by citizens. It reflects a government\u0026rsquo;s willingness and ability to address public needs and concerns, thereby strengthening legitimacy and reinforcing the broader effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. When citizens perceive local governments as responsive, they are more likely to trust transparency initiatives and view accountability processes as meaningful, which in turn strengthens compliance and reduces incentives for corrupt behavior (Hartanto \u0026amp; Siregar \u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e; Han et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e; Abdi et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). In this way, responsiveness acts as an intermediary variable that binds the governance system together, ensuring that both information and enforcement generate real improvements in perceived and actual integrity.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eHypothesis development\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePerceived transparency.\u003c/b\u003e The degree to which government activities are viewed as open, accessible, and understandable by the public has emerged as a cornerstone of good governance and an effective deterrent against corruption. According to Rieznik \u0026amp; Lee (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e), they provided compelling statistical evidence showing that perceived transparency significantly influences public trust and perceptions of corruption in newly formed local governments. Their use of a regression-based bootstrapping model revealed that citizens who perceive higher levels of openness in government operations are more likely to express confidence in their local institutions and less likely to believe those institutions are corrupt. This suggests that transparency, even as a perception, serves a critical deterrent function against corruption. Meanwhile, empirical work in Slovakia by Miroslav \u0026amp; Mari\u0026aacute;n (2021) underlined that transparency's effectiveness is profoundly shaped by how it is perceived and communicated to the public. Their survey-based study found that while many municipalities had formal mechanisms in place for disclosing public information, the public\u0026rsquo;s emotional and subjective interpretations of those mechanisms often shaped their views on whether the system was truly transparent. This observation aligns with broader literature suggesting that transparency must be both procedural and experiential to reduce corruption (Kolstad \u0026amp; Wiig, 2008).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBuilding on this, Nagriwum et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR56\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) conducted a case study in Ghana, which found that although local government financial disclosures were available, their impact on corruption was minimal in the absence of accountability and enforcement mechanisms. The authors highlighted that transparency without institutional consequences does little to prevent corrupt practices a finding echoed in other African and Southeast Asian contexts. Digital transparency has also emerged as a key theme in recent studies. In Indonesia, Pribadi et al. (2024) explored the integration of digital platforms in local governance. Their structural equation modelling analysis revealed that digitalization significantly enhanced perceived transparency and indirectly reduced opportunities for corrupt behaviour. By improving access to information and simplifying administrative procedures, digital tools reduced bureaucratic discretion and made misconduct more visible to both regulators and citizens.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, some scholars caution against over-reliance on transparency as a standalone anti-corruption measure. Wojtasik \u0026amp; Trembaczowski (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR89\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), examining the views of local officials in Poland, found that transparency, when not embedded in broader accountability and civic engagement systems, could become performative, creating the illusion of openness without altering corrupt incentives. Their research reinforces the importance of coupling transparency with institutional checks and active civil society involvement.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eH1\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eperceived transparency in local government significantly reduces corruption\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePerceived accountability.\u003c/b\u003e The extent to which public officials are viewed as answerable to citizens and oversight institutions is increasingly recognized as a vital factor in curbing corruption in local governments. Accountability fosters an environment where public servants are expected to justify their actions, comply with ethical standards, and face consequences for malfeasance. In Indonesia, Sari et al. (2024) investigated the relationship between internal control systems and potential corruption in local governments. Their study, using path analysis, found that strong internal control mechanisms enhance accountability, which in turn significantly reduces the potential for corruption. These findings emphasize the role of institutional checks in reinforcing ethical governance behaviors and mitigating corrupt tendencies (Sari et al., 2024).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWoodhouse (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR90\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), analyzing a political scandal in Italy, provided evidence that accountability interventions at the national level can have unintended effects at the local level. Increased scrutiny of national politicians correlated with increased corrupt activity among local officials, suggesting that accountability mechanisms must be systemic rather than isolated to prevent displacement of corrupt practices across governance levels (Woodhouse, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR90\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). In Brazil, Funk \u0026amp; Owen (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) examined the impact of randomized anti-corruption audits on municipal governance. Their difference-in-differences analysis across over 5,000 municipalities revealed that audits improved not only transparency but also service delivery performance. The study found that formal accountability interventions, particularly those exposing corrupt practices, can lead to better governance outcomes even in decentralized systems (Funk \u0026amp; Owen, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurther supporting these findings, Cho (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) analyzed corruption types in local government contracts in South Korea. This research highlighted that accountability failures, particularly during procurement processes, are a significant avenue for corruption, and recommended strengthening internal audit systems, clarifying legal frameworks, and enhancing civil servant training as key reforms to improve local accountability and reduce corruption risks (Cho, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e). Meanwhile, Widiyastuti \u0026amp; Winarna (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR87\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) examined the role of public monitoring and corruption control measures in improving government accountability in Indonesia. Their regression analysis of 961 local government observations indicated that while public oversight and risk management enhance accountability, corruption control policies alone showed limited effectiveness without robust implementation frameworks. This underscores the importance of citizen engagement in reinforcing accountability systems (Widiyastuti \u0026amp; Winarna, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR87\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eH2\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eperceived accountability in local government significantly reduces corruption\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePerceived responsiveness\u003c/b\u003e. It is foundational to cultivating public trust, as it demonstrates that local governments are attentive and accountable to citizen needs. Without timely and appropriate action, even well-designed governance frameworks risk losing legitimacy in the eyes of the public (Yassin \u003cspan citationid=\"CR92\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). A central empirical contribution to this discourse is offered by Potipiroon (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), who tested the implicit exchange hypothesis using survey data from business owners in Thailand. The study found that while corruption negatively affected public trust, perceived political responsiveness had a positive effect. Strikingly, responsiveness moderated the negative impact of corruption on trust. Citizens were more forgiving of corrupt but responsive politicians compared to their less corrupt but unresponsive counterparts. This paradox underscores how perceived responsiveness can obscure or even justify corrupt behavior in the eyes of the electorate (Potipiroon, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR65\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e The responsiveness-corruption nexus is also evident in the context of local governance in Metro Manila, Philippines. Buenaflor (2024) examined solid waste management programs across urbanized cities and found that governance failures characterized by a lack of responsiveness, transparency, and participation exacerbated both inequitable service provision and opportunities for corruption. The research emphasized the need for inclusive and responsive administrative practices to minimize governance gaps that breed corrupt outcomes (EnP Katherine, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn China, Ma et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) employed a difference-in-differences approach to assess whether regional decrees enhance local government responsiveness. They found that government directives mandating online public forums significantly improved responsiveness and public engagement. While the study primarily assessed administrative behavior, it indirectly suggested that increased responsiveness contributes to reducing governance opacity, a precondition for tackling corruption (Ma et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eJulfiker (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e) evaluated local governance after a significant political transition, highlighting how poor responsiveness in local government correlates with persistent corruption. The study identified responsiveness as a key component of good governance reform, stressing that without systematic feedback loops and citizen engagement, local officials face weak incentives to avoid corrupt practices (Julfiker, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Lastly, research by Yohanes et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) in Indonesia found that responsiveness positively influences trust in local government policies, specifically in the context of the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. The study indicated that public perception of government responsiveness, not just actual service delivery, significantly contributes to the legitimacy of governance processes and may suppress corruption by increasing scrutiny and expectations of ethical conduct (Yohanes et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR93\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e). Conceptual frameworks of the study were developed (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e) based on the literature\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eH3\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eperceived responsiveness in local government significantly reduces corruption\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eResearch Context and Design\u003c/b\u003e. This study was conducted in Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, which serves as the country's political, economic, and cultural hub and is home to an estimated 3.5\u0026nbsp;million residents. A quantitative, cross-sectional research design was adopted to examine the relationships among the study variables at a single point in time. This design is particularly suitable for capturing public perceptions and empirically testing hypothesized associations within a defined population (Bryman, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2016\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePopulation, Sampling, and Data Collection Procedure\u003c/b\u003e. Conducting systematic research in a post-conflict environment such as Mogadishu presents considerable practical obstacles, including the absence of reliable sampling frames, ongoing security concerns, and limited logistical capacity. In response to these constraints, a non-probability convenience sampling technique was employed to recruit participants residing in Mogadishu. Although this sampling approach limits the generalizability of the findings, it remains a pragmatic and frequently used method in fragile-state contexts where probability-based sampling is not feasible.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eData collection was undertaken using a structured questionnaire distributed digitally through widely used social media platforms. The questionnaire was disseminated primarily via Facebook and WhatsApp, selected because of their high penetration and daily usage rates among urban populations in Somalia. These platforms provided an efficient means for reaching a broad and diverse audience within Mogadishu (Digital \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e: Somalia DataReportal \u0026ndash; Global Digital Insights 2024). Recruitment involved posting the survey link in large, public Facebook groups and WhatsApp communities focused on civic affairs, local news, and community discussions related to Mogadishu. Snowball sampling was also encouraged by inviting early respondents to share the survey within their own social networks, thereby expanding its reach (Baltar \u0026amp; Brunet, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn total, 523 questionnaires were distributed, and 330 complete and valid responses were retrieved, resulting in an effective response rate of approximately 63%. The digital distribution method proved effective in engaging participants from various demographic backgrounds, although inherent limitations remain and are discussed subsequently. Some measures were implemented to mitigate potential biases inherent in online convenience sampling and to enhance the overall quality of the data. The introductory section of the survey clearly specified that participation was restricted to adults aged 18 and above who currently resided in Mogadishu. Following data collection, responses were screened for straight-lining patterns and implausibly short completion times, and such entries were removed to maintain data integrity (Meade \u0026amp; Craig, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eData Analysis\u003c/b\u003e. The collected data were cleaned, coded, and analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 25 and Microsoft Excel. The analysis comprised two major stages. First, descriptive statistics were generated to summarize the demographic characteristics of the respondents. Second, inferential analysis was conducted using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) with SmartPLS 4 software. PLS-SEM was selected due to its robustness in handling complex predictive models, suitability for studies with relatively smaller sample sizes, and minimal assumptions regarding data normality (Hair et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003ea; Ringle et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR73\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe application of PLS-SEM is appropriate for the study design; however, the rationale for selecting this technique over covariance-based SEM (CB-SEM) should be made explicit. PLS-SEM is particularly well-suited for exploratory research, theory development, and studies that prioritize prediction rather than strict theory testing (Hair et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003ed; Henseler et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2015\u003c/span\u003e). Unlike CB-SEM, which requires large sample sizes and normally distributed data, PLS-SEM is more robust in situations where sample sizes are small, data distributions are non-normal, or measurement models are complex (Hair et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003ec). Additionally, PLS-SEM is advantageous when the research model includes formative constructs or when the primary objective is to maximize explained variance in key outcome variables conditions that align with the aims of this study (Sarstedt et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR77\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2014\u003c/span\u003e). Given the sampling constraints and the exploratory nature of analyzing governance variables in the context of Mogadishu, PLS-SEM provides greater flexibility and statistical power compared to CB-SEM.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eDemographic Profile of Respondents.\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e indicates that the majority of respondents fall within the 21\u0026ndash;30 years age group, accounting for 77.3% (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;255) of the total sample. There is a significant gender imbalance, with 85.5% (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;282) of the respondents being male, in comparison only 14.5% (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;48) were female a common limitation in online surveys in Somalia due to socio-digital divides. The respondents are highly educated, with a striking 97.3% (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;321) having attained higher education. Only a small fraction reported secondary education (0.9%) and informal education (1.8%). This profile is consistent with the typical user demographics of social media platforms in the region and highlights the sample's limitation in representing the broader, less-educated populace and women.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDemographic Characteristics of Respondents\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCategory\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrequency\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePercent (%)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAge\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBelow 20\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e15\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e21\u0026ndash;30\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e255\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e77.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e31\u0026ndash;40\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e51\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e15.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e41\u0026ndash;50\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e51\u0026ndash;60\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.9\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGender\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMale\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e282\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e85.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFemale\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e48\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e14.5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEducation Level\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInformal Education\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.8\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecondary Level\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.9\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHigher Education\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e321\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e97.3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"4\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource\u003c/em\u003e: author\u0026rsquo;s work\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eResult and analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn this study, Perceived Transparency is measured by assessing citizens' perceptions of the implementation of transparent practices in local government\u0026mdash;items adapted from Park and Blenkinsopp (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Perceived Accountability refers to citizens' belief that holding officials answerable minimizes corruption\u0026mdash;items adapted from Beshi and Kaur (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e) and Park and Blenkinsopp (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR62\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). Perceived Responsiveness captures the belief that timely, fair responses reduce corruption\u0026mdash;items adapted from Beshi and Kaur (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). Corruption measures public views on the prevalence of corruption in local government\u0026mdash;items adapted from Rieznik and Lee (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR72\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e). Responses are rated on a Likert scale (1\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Strongly Disagree to 5\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;Strongly Agree).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eMeasurement model assessment\u003c/b\u003e. The measurement model was evaluated for reliability and validity following established guidelines (Hair et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003ea; Fornell \u0026amp; Larcker \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1981\u003c/span\u003e). As summarized in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e and illustrated in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, all standardized factor loadings exceeded the recommended 0.70 threshold, indicating strong indicator reliability. Composite reliability (CR) and Cronbach\u0026rsquo;s alpha (α) values for all constructs surpassed the 0.70 criterion, confirming internal consistency (Thorndike \u003cspan citationid=\"CR81\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1994\u003c/span\u003e; Tavakol \u0026amp; Dennick \u003cspan citationid=\"CR80\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2011\u003c/span\u003e). AVE values ranged from 0.644 to 0.766, exceeding the 0.50 benchmark and demonstrating adequate convergent validity (Fornell \u0026amp; Larcker \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1981\u003c/span\u003e). PACC exhibited the highest reliability, whereas the CORR construct showed the strongest AVE, reflecting solid variance explanation across indicators. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values were below the recommended thresholds of 5.0 per Hair et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003ec) and the more conservative 3.3 suggested by Diamantopoulos \u0026amp; Siguaw (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2006\u003c/span\u003e), indicating no multicollinearity concerns. Overall, the measurement model demonstrates satisfactory reliability and validity across constructs, providing a robust foundation for the subsequent structural model analysis.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eMeasurement model evaluation of factor lauding, CR, α, AVE, and VIF\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"7\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstruct\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eItem\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eFactor lauding\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eα\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAVE\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eVIF\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCorruption\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.896\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.856\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.848\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.766\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\" morerows=\"2\" rowspan=\"3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.175\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.234\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.858\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.884\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.846\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerceived accountability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.812\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.879\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.874\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.726\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.877\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.263\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.333\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.42\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.860\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.854\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.881\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerceived responsiveness\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.830\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.880\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.867\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.715\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.033\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.864\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e2.284\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.771\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.905\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.848\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.797\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePerceived transparency\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePET1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.815\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.816\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.816\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c6\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.644\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c7\" morerows=\"3\" rowspan=\"4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.779\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.79\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.579\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e1.651\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eET2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.808\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePET3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.785\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePET4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.801\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"7\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource\u003c/em\u003e: author\u0026rsquo;s work\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFurthermore, discriminant validity was examined using two widely recognized techniques: the Fornell\u0026ndash;Larcker criterion and the Heterotrait\u0026ndash;Monotrait (HTMT) ratio. Following Fornell and Larcker (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1981\u003c/span\u003e), discriminant validity is confirmed when the square root of each construct's AVE exceeds its correlations with other constructs. As shown in Table\u0026nbsp;3, the AVE square roots for all constructs are consistently greater than their corresponding inter-construct correlations. For instance, each construct demonstrates a higher AVE square root than any of its shared correlations with other constructs, indicating that it explains more variance in its own indicators than it shares with external constructs. This consistent pattern provides strong evidence that the Fornell\u0026ndash;Larcker criterion is fully satisfied, thereby confirming that discriminant validity is well established within the measurement model.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;3.\u003c/b\u003e Discriminant validity using the Fornell-larcker criterion\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"No\" id=\"Taba\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePET\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.875\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.757\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.852\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.732\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.744\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.846\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePET\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.718\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.674\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.697\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.802\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource\u003c/em\u003e: author\u0026rsquo;s work\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn addition to the Fornell\u0026ndash;Larcker assessment, the HTMT ratio was calculated to provide a more rigorous evaluation of discriminant validity. According to Hair et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003ea), HTMT values below 0.90 indicate satisfactory discriminant validity, while values below 0.85 reflect a more conservative threshold. As shown in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e, all HTMT values fall below the recommended 0.90 cut-off. Although a few values approach the more conservative boundary, they remain within acceptable limits, thereby offering further evidence that the constructs in the model are empirically distinct. This confirms that discriminant validity is well established based on the HTMT criterion.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDiscriminant validity (HTMT)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePET\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePACC\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.873\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePER\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.843\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.849\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePET\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.857\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.794\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.829\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource\u003c/em\u003e: author\u0026rsquo;s work\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eStructural model assessment\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePredictive capability assessment\u003c/b\u003e. Evaluating the predictive relevance of a structural model is a critical component of SEM analysis. In this study, the coefficient of determination (R\u0026sup2;) was used to assess the model's explanatory power, reflecting the proportion of variance in the endogenous construct accounted for by its predictors (Hair et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003ec). Higher R\u0026sup2; values, particularly those approaching 1, indicate stronger predictive accuracy. As shown in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, the model demonstrates a substantial level of explanatory power, with the endogenous construct exhibiting an R\u0026sup2; value of 0.675. In addition to R\u0026sup2;, the model's predictive relevance was examined using the PLS-Predict procedure in SmartPLS 4, which generates the Q\u0026sup2; statistic. A Q\u0026sup2; value greater than 0 indicates that the model has predictive relevance for the target endogenous construct. As presented in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e, the obtained Q\u0026sup2; value of 0.438 exceeds this threshold, providing strong evidence of predictive validity. Collectively, these results demonstrate that the model possesses robust predictive capability and effectively captures the underlying structural relationships within the study context.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 5\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eR\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e and Q\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e of latent exogenous variables\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExogenous variable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eR\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eQ\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eCORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.675\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.438\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"3\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource\u003c/em\u003e: author\u0026rsquo;s work. Notes: R\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;co-efficient of determination; Q\u003csup\u003e2\u003c/sup\u003e\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;predictive relevance\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eHypothesis test.\u003c/b\u003e Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e and Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e present the results of hypothesis testing, examining good governance practices of three independent variables on corruption (CORR): (PACC), (PER), and (PET). All three hypotheses are statistically supported, as indicated by their respective beta coefficients, T-values, and p-values. Specifically, PACC exhibits the strongest positive effect on reducing corruption (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.373, T\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;7.563, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.001), suggesting that heightened PACC significantly contributes to mitigating corrupt practices. PER also demonstrates a significant positive relationship with corruption reduction (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.252, T\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;4.444, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.001). Lastly, PET exerts a substantial influence on corruption outcomes (β\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;0.291, T\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;5.636, p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.001), indicating that perceived transparency in local government fosters accountability and reduces opportunities for corrupt behaviour.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIn terms of the relative strength of the predictors, PACC clearly emerges as the most influential factor in reducing corruption, suggesting that mechanisms that enforce oversight and sanction misconduct are particularly effective. PER and PET also contribute meaningfully, though to a lesser extent, indicating that increasing information availability and improving governmental responsiveness help reduce corruption but may be most effective when paired with strong accountability structures.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 6\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHypothesis testing\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHypothesis\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeta\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eT values\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eP values\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDecision\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eH1: PACC -\u0026gt; CORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.373\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e7.563\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSupported\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eH2: PER -\u0026gt; CORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.252\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e4.444\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSupported\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eH3: PET -\u0026gt; CORR\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.291\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e5.636\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSupported\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource\u003c/em\u003e: author\u0026rsquo;s work\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSomalia's governance environment is characterized by weak oversight structures, political instability, and limited institutional capacity, all of which are identified as major drivers of corruption (Hassan 2023). In this context, citizens' perceptions that officials can be held accountable (accountability) are likely more influential in shaping corruption perceptions than transparency or responsiveness alone. Empirical evidence from the Banadir region demonstrates that accountability is positively linked to service delivery quality, with responsiveness and transparency also contributing, but to a lesser degree (Kulmie et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Trust in local government further mediates these relationships, as citizens' confidence is bolstered when municipal performance reflects accountability and good governance (Abdi, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e; Abdi \u0026amp; Abdul Rahman, 2025). While public participation can enhance perceived responsiveness, weak institutional capacity often limits its impact on actual anti-corruption outcomes, explaining the more modest association of responsiveness with corruption in this study's model (Abdi et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e). Additionally, innovations such as digital accountability mechanisms in Somalia demonstrate that tangible accountability, even in insecure settings, can improve service delivery and reinforce the perceived legitimacy of state actors (Ahmed, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2025\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003e(PACC) has been widely recognized as a crucial mechanism for curbing corruption. Ramesh and Vinayagathasan (2024) provide empirical evidence from Sri Lanka, confirming that institutional accountability alongside the rule of law and effective government expenditure plays a pivotal role in deterring corrupt practices and improving governance effectiveness. Their findings reinforce the idea that citizens and public officials alike respond to clear, enforceable accountability mechanisms. Similarly, Asomah et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e), using survey data from Ghana, demonstrated that perceived government accountability substantially increases the likelihood of citizens reporting corrupt practices, highlighting the importance of transparent and accountable leadership in public office. Ratmono et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) further emphasized the relationship between weak internal controls and the prevalence of corruption in Indonesian government organizations, concluding that enhancing accountability systems significantly mitigates this risk. Ndururu et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) add to this narrative by showing that the leadership's commitment to transparent and accountable decision-making is a direct factor in lowering corruption perceptions within Kenya's judicial procurement systems. These findings are echoed globally by Astudillo-Rodas (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e), who argued that when public servants internalize accountability and transparency values, their willingness to report unethical conduct increases, thus forming a human-centered line of defense against corruption.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSecondly, the concept of (PER) is equally critical in reducing corruption, as it reflects the government's ability to promptly and appropriately address the needs and concerns of its citizens. Arkorful et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) explored this dynamic in Ghana during the COVID-19 crisis, revealing that governments that respond swiftly and transparently to public demands inspire higher citizen trust, which in turn strengthens their collective resistance to corrupt practices. Their findings highlight that responsiveness is not merely about service delivery speed, but about an adaptive and fair administrative culture that discourages corruption by reducing bureaucratic bottlenecks and minimizing discretion among officials. Asomah et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) further confirm that fosters proactive citizen engagement in reporting and deterring corruption, particularly when paired with trust in institutions. This is consistent with the work of Ratmono et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR70\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e), who note that responsiveness in administrative processes helps address grievances before they become breeding grounds for unethical behavior, reinforcing the role of timely government action in reducing corruption risks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFinally, a growing body of research underscores the pivotal role of transparency in curbing corruption. Astudillo-Rodas (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2022\u003c/span\u003e) highlighted how the internalization of transparency values among Colombian public servants was a strong predictor of their likelihood to report corruption, demonstrating that visible, transparent systems shape both organizational culture and individual attitudes. Fang et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) used provincial-level data from China to examine how government auditing and transparency jointly influence corruption control, concluding that high levels of transparency not only increase audit effectiveness but also significantly reduce opportunities for hidden misconduct. Ndururu et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR57\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2023\u003c/span\u003e) emphasized that leadership transparency in Kenya's judiciary procurement departments considerably lowers the perceived levels of corruption, especially in public resource management. Asomah et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2024\u003c/span\u003e) and Arkorful et al. (\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2021\u003c/span\u003e) both reinforced the critical role of transparency in shaping citizens' perceptions of fairness, which in turn motivates them to take action against corruption. Overall, these empirical findings provide robust support for the theoretical argument that accountability, responsiveness, and transparency are interdependent pillars of good governance and effective anti-corruption strategies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eBeyond confirming patterns established in diverse global contexts, this study extends existing knowledge by demonstrating how these governance mechanisms operate within post-conflict and fragile environments such as Mogadishu. While the literature confirms the universal importance of PACC, our findings indicate that in such a fragile state, these principles are not just administrative tools but foundational prerequisites for rebuilding basic state-citizen trust. The Somali context, with its legacy of institutional collapse and clan-based patronage networks, presents a critical test case. Our research extends the existing knowledge by revealing that in this environment, even incremental improvements in PACC can have a disproportionately large impact on disrupting entrenched corrupt systems, precisely because they offer a tangible alternative to the prevailing governance vacuum.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese findings carry significant policy implications, particularly for local government institutions and civil society actors who are at the frontline of service delivery and citizen engagement in Somalia. For local governments, the imperative is to move beyond symbolic reforms and implement concrete, visible PACC mechanisms. This includes: Establishing public, easily accessible dashboards for local budgets and procurement contracts to enhance transparency. Creating formal, protected channels for citizens to report service failures and corruption without fear of reprisal, thereby improving responsiveness and implementing simplified accountability frameworks that track and publicly report on the performance of local departments in key service areas like sanitation, security, and education.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFor civil society organizations and international partners, our study underscores the need to support these local institutions by building their technical capacity for financial management and monitoring \u0026amp; evaluation. More importantly, they should focus on empowering community-based organizations to act as independent watchdogs, using the data provided by new transparency initiatives to hold local officials accountable. By championing PACC at the regional level, where citizens interact with the state most directly, stakeholders can help cultivate a culture of integrity from the ground up, which is essential for sustainable anti-corruption progress in Somalia's challenging context.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn conclusion, the study confirms that perceived accountability, responsiveness, and transparency significantly reduce corruption by enhancing the effectiveness of governance practices. The findings support all three assumptions, showing that these governance dimensions have a direct and positive impact on strengthening institutional integrity and reducing opportunities for unethical behaviour. Additionally, the perception of transparency and responsiveness reinforces the relationship between accountability and anti-corruption outcomes, highlighting the importance of both direct and indirect pathways. These results emphasise the need for public institutions to adopt accountable, responsive, and transparent systems to strengthen governance effectiveness and foster a culture of integrity and public trust.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003eLimitation and future research\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite the valuable insights provided by this study, several limitations have been acknowledged, which also pave the way for future research opportunities. First, the study employed a non-probability convenience sampling technique due to contextual limitations in Mogadishu. While this approach allowed for a broader reach through digital platforms, it limits the generalizability of the findings beyond the sample population. Future studies should consider using probability-based sampling techniques or mixed-method approaches, including qualitative interviews or focus groups, to ensure a more comprehensive understanding of the topic across diverse demographic and regional contexts. Second, the cross-sectional design of the study captures perceptions and relationships at a single point in time, making it difficult to infer causality or observe changes in governance perceptions and corruption practices over time. Future research could adopt longitudinal or panel study designs to track the evolution of public perceptions and institutional practices, especially in post-conflict societies like Somalia, where governance systems are fluid and evolving. Moreover, the study focused on three specific dimensions of good governance: Perceived Accountability, Responsiveness, and Transparency, while other essential governance factors such as the rule of law, citizen participation, institutional trust, and public sector ethics were not explored. Future studies could expand the model by incorporating these variables to develop a more holistic understanding of the mechanisms that underpin effective anti-corruption strategies in fragile states. Finally, the use of convenience sampling through social media, necessitated by security and logistical constraints in Mogadishu, likely biased the sample toward younger, urban, and more educated respondents, thereby limiting the generalizability of the findings. The demographic imbalance in the sample, particularly the disproportionately high number of male respondents, and high educated may further restrict representativeness, as gender and education can significantly shape perceptions of corruption.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDisclosure Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no conflicts of interest in relation to this research.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability Statement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe data supporting the findings of this study are available upon reasonable request from the corresponding author.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis research received no funding.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthical approval\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEthical clearance for the study was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee at Jamhuriya University of Science and Technology, Somalia, under the reference number (JUREC/0139/ECOM/052024) on November 05, 2024.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInformed consent\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eInformed consent was secured from all participants prior to their involvement in the research. Consent was explicitly documented in written form through the digital questionnaire platform, where participants were required to acknowledge their understanding of the study's objectives, their voluntary participation. Informed consent was obtained from November 06, 2024 Strict measures were implemented to maintain participant anonymity and data confidentiality, with no personal identifiers collected during the process.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eMudey, M.H.: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Formal analysis, Methodology, Project Administration, Software, Validation, Writing \u0026ndash; Original Draft.Arshad, R.: Supervision, Review \u0026amp; Editing.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eAbas Omar Hassan (2023) Political Instability and Institutional Weakness: A Study of Administrative Corruption in Mogadishu-Somalia. 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Jurnal Manajemen Pelayanan Publik 8(1):112\u0026ndash;129. https://doi.org/10.24198/jmpp.v8i1.51778\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Good governance, corruption, local government, Somalia, fragile state","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7251860/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7251860/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eCorruption remains a significant challenge to effective governance, particularly in fragile states where institutional weaknesses and limited public oversight undermine accountability. This study examines how perceived transparency, perceived accountability, and perceived responsiveness influence corruption reduction in the local government of Mogadishu, Somalia. A quantitative approach was employed using convenience sampling, yielding 330 respondents who completed an online structured questionnaire. Data were analyzed using Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) to assess measurement validity and estimate structural relationships. The results show that all three governance constructs significantly reduce corruption, with perceived accountability exerting the strongest influence, followed by perceived transparency and perceived responsiveness. These findings underscore the importance of strengthening accountability mechanisms, enhancing transparency, and improving responsiveness to mitigate corruption in fragile post-conflict contexts. The study provides practical implications for policymakers and civil society actors working to improve local governance and anti-corruption initiatives in Somalia.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Perceived Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness as Drivers of Corruption Prevention in Local Government: Evidence from Somalia","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-02-20 16:48:09","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7251860/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2026-03-23T12:16:28+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-03-04T13:41:37+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-02-20T02:37:48+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"166033046380578953399120028156322328273","date":"2026-02-19T20:52:32+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"77605151204724477180015457580276702695","date":"2026-02-18T08:01:37+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-02-18T07:32:19+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2025-11-26T06:09:16+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","date":"2025-11-24T02:36:01+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"humanities-and-social-sciences-communications","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"palcomms","sideBox":"Learn more about [Humanities \u0026 Social Sciences Communications](http://www.nature.com/palcomms/)","snPcode":"41599","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/41599/3","title":"Humanities and Social Sciences Communications","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Nature AJ","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"4043f25e-76de-4254-b305-5929ec737348","owner":[],"postedDate":"February 20th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[{"id":63224257,"name":"Business and commerce/Business and management"},{"id":63224258,"name":"Social science/Business and management"},{"id":63224259,"name":"Social science/Politics and international relations"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-03-31T13:38:37+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-02-20 16:48:09","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7251860","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7251860","identity":"rs-7251860","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}