Endogenous Market Size, Partial Privatization, and Urban Structure

Endogenous Market Size, Partial Privatization, and Urban Structure | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article Endogenous Market Size, Partial Privatization, and Urban Structure Tohru Naito This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-8831606/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Under Review Version 1 posted 8 You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This study integrates a mixed duopoly market into an open monocentric city model and proposes a general equilibrium framework in which the market size is endogenously determined through urban structure and household location behavior. Public and private firms compete in the manufacturing sector, which is located in the central business district. The study analyzes how public firm privatization affects the equilibrium price of manufactured goods and the equilibrium city size. Privatization increases the equilibrium price and reduces the city size. However, once the indirect effects of city size are considered, the welfare impact of privatization becomes ambiguous. Consequently, Matsumura’s (1998) conclusion that partial privatization always maximizes social welfare does not hold true. Numerical examples illustrate that full nationalization or full privatization can be optimal depending on the parameter values. JEL Classification: H42; R13; L13 Partial Privatization Mixed Duopoly Open City Model Endogenous Market Size General Equilibrium Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Under Review Version 1 posted Reviews received at journal 13 May, 2026 Reviews received at journal 02 May, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 19 Mar, 2026 Reviewers agreed at journal 18 Mar, 2026 Reviewers invited by journal 17 Mar, 2026 Editor assigned by journal 16 Mar, 2026 Submission checks completed at journal 12 Feb, 2026 First submitted to journal 09 Feb, 2026 You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-8831606","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":608322359,"identity":"4bb4570f-14e5-4fe7-9b45-aa3492e8f0b0","order_by":0,"name":"Tohru Naito","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Doshisha University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Tohru","middleName":"","lastName":"Naito","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-02-09 14:38:16","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8831606/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8831606/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":104949633,"identity":"7a31afee-50d7-4a97-9fc0-c9a86d48a152","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-19 06:27:35","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":670853,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"ARS.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-8831606/v1_covered_090cab00-0303-49ff-b353-e5b9f0c6ca5c.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Endogenous Market Size, Partial Privatization, and Urban Structure","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"the-annals-of-regional-science","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"arsc","sideBox":"Learn more about [The Annals of Regional Science](https://link.springer.com/journal/168)","snPcode":"168","submissionUrl":"https://submission.springernature.com/new-submission/168/3","title":"The Annals of Regional Science","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Springer Hybrid","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":false},"keywords":"Partial Privatization, Mixed Duopoly, Open City Model, Endogenous Market Size, General Equilibrium","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-8831606/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-8831606/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis study integrates a mixed duopoly market into an open monocentric city model and proposes a general equilibrium framework in which the market size is endogenously determined through urban structure and household location behavior. 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