Education and the Recalibration of Pull Factors: Ukrainian Exceptionalism in Forced Migration?

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Yuzva Liudmyla, Piotr Długosz This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6617214/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 14 Feb, 2026 Read the published version in Journal of International Migration and Integration → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This article explores the migration and settlement decisions of Ukrainian refugees in Germany following the 2022 Russian invasion. Applying Everett Lee’s push–pull theory, it focuses on women with children—the largest displaced group—and investigates whether access to children’s education emerges not only as a domain of integration but as a significant pull factor within a broader constellation of drivers shaping settlement intentions. The analysis draws on original survey data collected in late 2024 (n = 1075), using an SMS-recruited online questionnaire administered across several host countries. Findings indicate that while war-related threats (e.g., bombardments, destruction of housing) were the primary push factors prompting departure from Ukraine, the decision to settle in Germany was strongly influenced by pull factors such as safety, social support, and access to schooling. Respondents in Germany were more likely to cite long-term motives—such as improved living standards and educational prospects—than those in neighboring countries. Education emerges not only as a sphere of integration but also as a migration driver. Dual-schooling models (local and Ukrainian), parental assessments of system quality, and children’s adaptation shaped settlement choices. These dynamics underscore the role of education in refugee agency and family strategy. The article argues that Ukrainian migration to Germany illustrates the interplay between structural pressures and personal decision-making. Push factors triggered large-scale displacement; pull factors and individual evaluations shaped longer-term trajectories. These findings contribute to migration theory by demonstrating the centrality of education in forced migration contexts and by highlighting the heterogeneity of refugee profiles within a single national cohort. Ukrainian refugees push–pull theory Germany education forced migration integration women with children Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 Figure 7 Introduction Despite the proclaimed triumph of humanitarian values and civilizational progress in the 21st century, armed conflicts continue to shape the global socio-political landscape. As of spring 2025, multiple high- and medium-intensity wars persist across the globe—in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Myanmar. Europe, by contrast, is affected by only one ongoing armed conflict: the full-scale war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022 and is recognized as the sole active military conflict in Europe according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2025). These wars have triggered massive waves of forced displacement. While the scale of migration varies across regions, Syria, Ukraine, and Afghanistan have produced the highest numbers of international refugees in the past decade. According to UNHCR, approximately 6.2 million Ukrainians had fled abroad by 2024, primarily to EU countries, Canada, and the United States (UNHCR, 2024: 2–3), and over 3.6 million became internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Ukraine (IOM Ukraine, 2024). By November 2024, 4.2 million Ukrainians had obtained temporary protection status within the European Union (Eurostat, 2025), with the largest host countries being Germany (1,152,620 or 27.2%), Poland (987,925 or 23.3%), and the Czech Republic (385,190 or 9.1%). Germany in particular has emerged as a key destination for Ukrainian refugees. As of March 2024, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF ) reported 1.65 million registered Ukrainian refugees in the country (DER SPIEGEL, 2024). This figure is part of Germany’s record-high total of 3.48 million individuals seeking humanitarian protection. These numbers underline the exceptional scale of Ukrainian displacement into Germany and indicate that this migration process is still ongoing three years into the war. However, what distinguishes this refugee wave is not only its magnitude and suddenness, but also its distinct demographic and social profile—what can be described as a case of “Ukrainian exceptionalism.” Unlike many other refugee movements, the Ukrainian outflow was characterized by a predominantly female composition, often including mothers with children and older women with grandchildren. According to the German Federal Statistical Office, women constitute approximately 80% of working-age Ukrainians who arrived in Germany since 2022 (Radio Svoboda, 2024). In 2023, 40% of Ukrainian refugees in Germany were either single parents (15%) or their children (25%) (Ozturk, 2023). In addition to its gendered character, this migration wave stands out for its pronounced educational dimension—driven by the needs and aspirations of school-aged children. This specific composition raises further questions regarding integration, long-term settlement, and the role of state institutions in host countries. Within this context, the present study poses a central question: what are the key factors—or the constellation of factors— that motivate Ukrainian women with children not only to flee to Germany, but to remain there? What role do gender and parental status play in shaping these migration decisions? How does access to education intersect with broader aspirations for safety and stability? This article operates within the theoretical framework of push–pull migration theory. It hypothesizes that among the dominant pull factors influencing the decision to remain in Germany is the availability and perceived quality of education for children. Given the strong demographic presence of women with children among Ukrainian refugees, child-related educational opportunities may serve not only as a tool for integration but as a foundational anchor for long-term settlement and future-making in exile. Theoretical Framework The empirical question guiding this article invites a deeper conceptual inquiry: What motivates Ukrainian women with children, displaced by war, to remain in Germany rather than return or move elsewhere? For most Ukrainian refugees, especially women with children, the initial decision to flee Ukraine was driven by immediate physical danger due to Russia’s full-scale invasion. This decision was further reinforced by maternal responsibility and the desire to protect children from violence and trauma. While some refugees returned to Ukraine between 2022 and 2024, many—particularly mothers with children—have remained abroad, and new cases of displacement continue to emerge as the war persists. Ongoing airstrikes across the country, the mobility of the front line, and the continued destruction and occupation of new territories, have sustained the perception of Ukraine as a high-risk environment. Although such dynamics explain the initial decision to leave, the determinants of long-term settlement in host countries—such as Germany—are less well studied. In particular, little is known about which specific factors act as dominant forces encouraging women with children to remain abroad. This study adopts the theoretical lens of Everett S. Lee’s (1966) push–pull theory of migration, which remains foundational in migration research. According to Lee, migration decisions emerge from the interplay between push factors—conditions in the country of origin that drive people away (e.g., armed conflict, economic hardship, insecurity)—and pull factors—conditions in the destination country that attract migrants (e.g., better living standards, employment, education, or welfare provisions). Importantly, Lee emphasized that the same objective conditions may be perceived differently by different individuals, depending on their demographic and social characteristics (Lee, 1966: 49). In the context of Ukrainian war-related migration, push factors are evident and include physical insecurity, economic collapse, and the breakdown of essential services. However, this article argues that among the key pull factors influencing decisions to remain in Germany is the availability and perceived quality of education for children—though this effect is context-dependent and operates in conjunction with broader institutional and family-based considerations. This perspective aligns with Lee’s insight that pull factors become more decisive when initial threats have stabilized, and migrants begin to evaluate their long-term prospects. Thus, the hypothesis tested here is that educational opportunities for children represent a dominant pull factor in the decision-making of Ukrainian women who remain in Germany beyond the initial emergency phase of displacement. While this article draws on the foundational framework proposed by Everett S. Lee, recent scholarship suggests important modifications and extensions are needed to fully capture the dynamics of forced migration. Although Lee’s model—based on the dichotomy of push and pull factors—remains central to migration theory, contemporary researchers emphasize its limitations in explaining the complexity of refugee movements. As already noted by early critical migration theorists, Lee’s emphasis on rational individual decision-making underestimates the influence of culture, emotion, and family obligations (Samers, 2010; Castles et al., 2014). Moreover, the classical binary distinction between “refugees” and “economic migrants” has come under critique. Crawley and Skleparis (2018) argue that real-world decisions are shaped by mixed motives, where physical insecurity, economic pressure, and long-term aspirations intersect. In response to such limitations, Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long (2018) propose a “push–pull plus” model, which introduces four interacting types of migration drivers: predisposing, proximate, precipitating, and mediating. This conceptual expansion better accounts for the layered and sequential nature of displacement, including conflict-affected flows from Afghanistan and Somalia. Other authors highlight refugee agency, illustrating how individuals strategically navigate constraints: for example, Belloni (2016) describes Eritrean refugees as actors balancing risk, hope, and moral economy in their journeys. Gender-sensitive applications of push–pull theory are also gaining ground. As Freedman (2010) and Donato et al. (2006) show, women and men experience migration differently—not only because of differentiated vulnerabilities (e.g., exposure to gender-based violence) but also due to structural inequalities limiting women’s mobility. In some contexts, poverty acts as a stronger push factor for women, yet long-distance travel poses greater risks, especially for those traveling with children or lacking legal documents. Interestingly, the Ukrainian case diverges from many historical patterns: it is women, particularly mothers, who formed the core of the refugee flow—challenging assumptions that women are always less mobile than men in conflict settings. According to the Brücker et al. in 2022, approximately 80% of Ukrainian refugees in Germany were women, and nearly half of them were accompanied by young children (Brücker et al., 2023). Literature and Research Review In the context of the full-scale war that began in Ukraine in 2022, decisions about emigration have been predominantly shaped by the interplay of push and pull factors. During the initial stages of the war, primary push factors included immediate threats to life: active fighting in areas of residence, aerial bombardments, occupation, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure (Tokariuk, 2025; Sologub, 2024). Surveys conducted among Ukrainian refugees abroad indicate that approximately one-quarter of respondents cited such factors as their main reason for leaving the country. As the war has persisted, the range of push factors has expanded to include not only ongoing insecurity but also economic collapse, disruption of public services (healthcare, education, social protection), infrastructural damage, and political instability. Other mentioned drivers include fear of conscription, loss of trust in government, and deteriorating living conditions, such as lack of electricity or heating (Sologub, 2024; Tokariuk, 2025). Amid these drivers, the issue of education has emerged as a particularly salient push factor, especially for women with children—the primary demographic group among Ukrainian migrants to the EU. According to a study by the Centre for Economic Strategy (Vakhitov et al., 2025), 63% of surveyed women believed that their children would have better developmental opportunities abroad , while an equal proportion identified education (their own and their children’s) as a significant motive for emigration. At the same time, some mothers expressed reluctance to leave Ukraine for educational reasons, noting their preference for the familiar linguistic and cultural context and confidence in the quality of Ukrainian schooling. This ambivalence is compounded by a broader crisis in education. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the war have severely disrupted learning. The 2022 PISA assessment showed a significant drop in Ukrainian students’ scores compared to 2018: a decline of 12 points in mathematics, 38 points in reading, and 19 points in science (Bychko et al., 2023). UNICEF has further reported that over 50% of teachers observed learning loss in core subjects, including Ukrainian language, mathematics, and foreign languages (UNICEF, 2023). These setbacks have motivated many families to seek more stable educational conditions abroad, where continuous schooling and support services are available. Germany has emerged as a primary destination for Ukrainian refugees due to its combination of robust pull factors. First, social networks played an important role: 43% of respondents in the EWL survey cited existing acquaintances or relatives in Germany as a reason for choosing it (Madzhumdar, 2023; Mykolaienko, 2025). Second, Germany’s strong system of social support—including access to housing, healthcare, education, and financial aid under the EU’s Temporary Protection Directive—was a major attraction. These benefits were highlighted by 42% of respondents. Third, the country’s economic stability and employment prospects offered a path to financial independence: 38% of migrants noted the opportunity to save money as a decisive factor in choosing Germany, and 27% emphasized higher earnings compared to other destinations. Finally, Germany’s political and legal stability was cited as a background factor underpinning migrants’ trust in their future security and rights. Within this broader context, the educational dimension of refugee integration has received particular attention in scholarly research. CEDOS, a Ukrainian think tank, has documented the complex migration trajectories of Ukrainian families and the responses of receiving education systems (Filipchuk & Syrbu, 2022). In Germany, a dual pattern of adaptation has emerged: while some children have been successfully integrated into local schools, others continue to study remotely in Ukrainian institutions. Approximately 20% of Ukrainian children in Germany remain in the Ukrainian school system, and a further share combine local and online learning—a practice that imposes significant cognitive and emotional strain on both children and parents. According to CEDOS, this "educational mobility" is becoming a structural feature of forced migration and requires systemic policy responses, including adaptive curricula and cross-border coordination of educational standards (Kabanets, 2022). Despite the scale of this phenomenon, there remains a notable lack of systematic research on how access to education shapes integration trajectories of refugees in Germany—a gap that this article seeks to partially address. In sum, education appears not only as a background issue in displacement but as a key terrain where personal strategies of adaptation, institutional policies, and long-term integration trajectories converge. For many Ukrainian women with children, schooling conditions for their children are not just a factor among many, but may function as a decisive anchor shaping their settlement intentions. Understanding how education operates as a pull factor in this context is therefore crucial for both migration theory and host-country policy design. Methodology This study draws on original data collected through a survey of Ukrainian refugees conducted by the research agency Info Sapiens on behalf of the Centre for Economic Strategy (Mykhailyshyna et al., 2025: 7). The analysis is based on the fourth wave of the longitudinal panel survey carried out in November–December 2024. For contextual depth and comparison, the study also acknowledges the preceding waves conducted in November–December 2022 (Wave 1), April–May 2023 (Wave 2), and December 2023 – January 2024 (Wave 3). In Wave 4, a total of 1,075 Ukrainian refugees living abroad were surveyed. The sample excluded individuals residing in the Russian Federation or Belarus. Respondents were recruited using SMS invitations with a link to an online questionnaire. As in previous waves, phone numbers were selected randomly from among subscribers of the mobile operators Kyivstar and Vodafone, provided that the geolocation of the number indicated the user was located outside Ukraine (excluding Russia and Belarus). To ensure representativeness, geographic quotas were applied to reflect the actual distribution of Ukrainian refugees abroad. These quotas were based on up-to-date Eurostat data and supplemented by official statistics on the number of Ukrainian nationals who relocated to the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. This sampling strategy enhances the generalizability of findings by aligning the sample with the real-world distribution of Ukrainian refugees across host countries (Fig. 1 ). Source: Authors, based on visualization created with Napkin Research Results The survey data reveal both general and country-specific migration drivers among Ukrainian refugees. When asked about the primary push factors that led them to leave Ukraine, respondents most frequently cited the destruction of housing (31%), loss of employment or income (29%), and the presence of active combat in their area of residence (26% ). However, disaggregated analysis for the subgroup residing in Germany indicates a somewhat different configuration . Among Ukrainian refugees in Germany, the top-ranked reason was the perception that living conditions and future prospects—for themselves or their children—would be better abroad (30%). The economic push factor remained prominent (27%), and shelling or bombardment of home areas, even without ground combat, ranked third (26%) ( Fig. 2 ) . Source: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper These findings suggest that, while the war remains a central reason for flight among those who ultimately reached Germany, their motivations are more multifaceted. Refugees in Germany, compared to the broader sample, are less likely to have fled direct combat zones—many of whom settled in neighboring countries or internally in Ukraine—and more likely to cite structural and forward-looking concerns. Specifically, 30% of the German subgroup mentioned the lack of opportunities or poor quality of life in Ukraine as a key motive, compared to just 10% across the full sample. Similarly, political disillusionment, including frustration with corruption or governance, was reported more frequently in the German group (7–8% vs. less than 1%). Avoidance of military conscription also emerged more strongly among Germany-based refugees (6% vs. ~1%), reflecting the presence of men of conscription age or their families, for whom avoiding enlistment was a critical consideration. These findings can be further interpreted through the lens of the “push–pull plus” model, which identifies four types of migration drivers. First, predisposing drivers—such as economic instability, regional inequality, chronic underfunding of education and healthcare, and widespread distrust in government—were already present before 2022 and shaped a latent readiness to migrate. These are indirectly echoed in the 27% citing income loss and 30% who reported poor living conditions as motives. Second, proximate drivers—including shelling and destroyed housing—formed the immediate war-related threats that made emigration unavoidable for many. Third, precipitating drivers—specific triggers like blackouts (20%) and family reunification (6%)—helped explain why people left when they did. Finally, mediating drivers—such as social networks (43%), visa-free access, and institutional support—enabled the feasibility of migration and determined destination choice. Taken together, these patterns suggest that Ukrainian refugees who migrated to Germany were not only driven by war-related trauma but also by the aspiration for long-term stability and better life opportunities. Their motivations were more likely to include a combination of safety concerns and a strategic assessment of future well-being, which aligns with the push–pull logic of migration theory. Institutional pull factors also played a significant role. Empirical data on received support underscore major differences across host countries. Ukrainian refugees in Germany reported substantially higher access to social benefits, including child allowances (63%), housing assistance (60%), and language courses (57%), compared to averages across all host countries (35%, 27%, and 35% respectively). Support for employment (31% vs. 17%) and help with documentation (30% vs. 20%) were also more frequently reported ( Fig. 3 ) . Source: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper Only 20% of Ukrainian refugees in Germany stated they received no assistance, compared to 38% overall, highlighting Germany’s relatively comprehensive support system. From a theoretical perspective, these results reaffirm the significance of institutional support as a robust pull factor. While initial decisions to migrate may be prompted by push factors such as war and economic collapse, visible and accessible support in host countries—especially Germany—contributes decisively to settlement decisions. Integration-oriented services, such as language courses, employment counseling, and family-friendly provisions, not only facilitate adaptation but also influence initial country choice, as information about available assistance circulates via social networks and digital channels. In this sense, support is not merely a post-migration benefit, but an active component of the migratory calculus. Ukrainian refugees’ expectations regarding their integration prospects further illustrate the dual logic of migration. Violin plots of perceived likelihoods of encountering difficulties show that the majority feel confident in their ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency: 39% believed they would definitely not face such problems, and another 15% deemed this unlikely. In contrast, concerns about integration and institutional barriers are more pronounced. Around 20% of respondents expressed apprehension about language acquisition and cultural adaptation, and 18% voiced concern about difficulties with local norms and customs ( Fig. 4 ) . Source: Authors, based on visualization created with Flourish Particular attention should be paid to access to education. Although 51% of respondents were confident they would be able to secure quality education for their children, 12% doubted this was possible. A similar split applies to healthcare: while 46% anticipated no problems, 15% rated potential difficulties in the mid to high range. These findings suggest a need for targeted integration policies in areas such as schooling, language acquisition, and access to basic services. Additional data on children’s actual participation in education offer further insights. In Germany, 58% of Ukrainian children attend in-person schooling in local institutions—a figure higher than the average of 54% across all countries—indicating relatively successful educational integration. However, 20% of children continue distance learning with Ukrainian institutions, potentially hindering social and linguistic adaptation. A further 7% are not enrolled in any form of education ( Fig. 5 ) . Source: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper These results support qualitative reports of concern about educational access. While Germany’s overall integration efforts appear effective, the persistence of a "transitional" educational status for some children suggests room for improvement. The presence of dual schooling arrangements—local and remote—may reduce educational loss but does not resolve the deeper issue of integration. Expectations for the future underscore the persistent sense of uncertainty. When asked where they envisioned themselves in three years, 44% of respondents were unsure. Approximately one-third hoped to stay in Germany, and only 18% intended to return to Ukraine ( Fig. 6 ) . Source: Authors, based on visualization created with Flourish This ambivalence correlates with previously identified pull factors—housing, benefits, and integration services—which have rooted many families in place. In terms of employment trajectories, responses were highly diverse. Around one-third hoped to continue in their previous profession, while another third remained undecided. Others planned to retrain or study, reflecting both flexibility and challenges related to skill transfer and credential recognition. Despite these uncertainties, over half expected their standard of living to improve. Only 9% anticipated a decline ( Fig. 7 ) . Source: Authors, based on visualization created with Excel At the same time, more than 60% believed the war would continue in some form, including as a "frozen" conflict, and only 22% foresaw a complete resolution. These expectations reflect a shift toward pragmatic, medium-term planning and a preference for remaining in host countries with secure infrastructure and institutional reliability. Discussion The findings presented above align closely with Everett Lee’s classic theory of migration, which conceptualizes mobility as the outcome of opposing forces: push factors in the country of origin that drive individuals away, and pull factors in the receiving country that attract them (Kumar, 2023). Ukrainian displacement triggered by the 2022 full-scale invasion offers a textbook illustration of this model. In Ukraine, immediate dangers linked to war—physical insecurity, economic collapse, and the breakdown of infrastructure—functioned as powerful push factors. Refugees responded by seeking countries where these threats could be mitigated by corresponding pull factors: safety, access to social protection, and the possibility of building a stable life. The empirical results confirm this dynamic. Each negative condition experienced in Ukraine often had a perceived “mirror” positive in destination countries. For example, those who had lost employment sought countries with job opportunities and higher wages; those fleeing violence looked for peace and rule of law. In this sense, the migration of Ukrainians to Germany reflects not only an urgent need for refuge but a structured response to the promise of resolution and support abroad. Germany, in particular, combined strong pull factors—generous welfare, comprehensive integration policies, economic opportunity—which made it a key destination. Lee’s framework also includes the role of “intervening obstacles” and “personal factors,” both of which are highly relevant in this case. Despite its distance from Ukraine compared to neighboring states, Germany became accessible due to EU visa liberalization and the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive. Yet some barriers remained: men of military age were restricted from leaving the country under martial law, contributing to a demographic skew among the displaced. Women with children dominate the refugee population abroad (Sologub, 2024), reflecting a migration process heavily shaped by both structural constraints and individual life circumstances. Personal resources—such as education level, language proficiency, and pre-existing social ties—also influenced individual trajectories. Refugees with relatives in Germany or prior experience with the country were more likely to choose it as their destination. These diverse micro-level variables reinforce Lee’s proposition that migration decisions are multifactorial: not all individuals respond to push factors in the same way. Some remain internally displaced, others choose nearby countries, and still others travel farther west, depending on the balance of constraints and capabilities. In this context, the German case also invites comparison with previous cohorts of forcibly displaced children. The German case illustrates how pull factors can translate into integration pathways. Comparative studies of refugee cohorts from Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine suggest that Germany’s demographic structure has benefited from these waves of migration, particularly in light of low fertility rates and population aging (Cilek et al., 2025). As of late 2024, more than 357,000 Ukrainian minors were living in Germany, most of whom were enrolled in local schools. Research from the Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB) shows that a large share of these children acquired German language proficiency within a short time frame—an important marker of successful integration (Gambaro et al., 2025). Nonetheless, challenges remain. While language acquisition has been largely successful, a sense of belonging is more fragile. In a comparative study, 84.3% of Ukrainian pupils in Ukraine reported feeling part of their school community, whereas in Germany this figure dropped to 76.2% (Otterbein, 2025). German schools have adopted various models to support integration, including “welcome classes” designed to familiarize students with local norms before transitioning into mainstream education. However, qualitative research suggests that differences in pedagogical culture—from teacher-centered approaches in Ukraine to student-centered methods in Germany—may pose challenges for both children and their parents (Pidgorna, 2024). While not universally decisive, children’s education often plays a meaningful role in shaping settlement intentions—particularly for mothers prioritizing stability and development. For some families, access to high-quality education in Germany functions as a compelling incentive to remain; for others, the desire to return to the Ukrainian school system—perceived as culturally familiar and pedagogically preferable—motivates repatriation (Chargaziia, 2025). This ambivalence reinforces the idea that education operates not merely as a sectoral domain of integration but as a key variable in the migration calculus, deeply entangled with questions of identity, security, and future planning. Returning to the “push–pull plus” model proposed by Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long (2018), the Ukrainian displacement following the 2022 invasion can be disaggregated along four types of migration drivers: Predisposing drivers were in place long before the full-scale invasion. Structural conditions—economic volatility, regional inequality, chronic underfunding of education and healthcare, and widespread distrust in state institutions—created a latent openness to migration. The ongoing hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine since 2014 also shaped expectations and made families more receptive to temporary migration or labor mobility. These background conditions are indirectly reflected in the survey results, for instance, in the 27% who cited income loss and 30% who reported poor life prospects as reasons for leaving (World Bank, 2019; Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, 2020; World Bank, 2021; NDI Ukraine, 2021). Proximate drivers relate to the conditions that made displacement a necessity. The Russian invasion erased the assumption that violence was limited to Donbas or Crimea, producing a national sense of existential insecurity. Active combat, urban destruction, and the collapse of public services led many to perceive emigration as the only path to safety. In our data, 26% of respondents mentioned bombardments, and 31% had lost housing—these indicate proximate drivers pushing people out of Ukraine. Precipitating drivers refer to specific triggers—sudden events or experiences that prompted the final decision to flee. These included direct attacks on schools or neighborhoods, prolonged blackouts, and rumors or personal calls about mobilization. Among Ukrainian respondents in Germany, 20% cited electricity outages, and over 6% noted family reunification as an immediate factor—illustrating the tipping point logic of precipitating drivers. Mediating drivers shaped the route, destination, and feasibility of departure. EU visa-free access, volunteer evacuations, open borders, and informal networks all facilitated out-migration. Many women received direct invitations from friends or family in Germany, reducing both informational and logistical barriers. In our sample, the strong presence of social ties (as reported by 43% of German-based respondents) and widespread access to housing and education point to a strong mediating influence. Conclusions The distinction between general and Germany-specific migration motives reveals the multidimensionality of Ukrainian displacement. From a sociological perspective, the migration wave of 2022–2023 cannot be reduced to a homogenous category of “war refugees.” Despite the shared macro-trigger—the full-scale Russian invasion—there are multiple profiles within this movement. At the one extreme, forced migrants are driven primarily by immediate push factors such as fear, violence, and material destruction. Many in this group fled to the nearest safe countries, responding to the urgency of the situation. At the other extreme are what may be called “opportunity migrants”—individuals who, while escaping war, simultaneously sought long-term improvement in living standards. This second category is more likely to reach destinations such as Germany. For them, migration decisions were shaped not only by push factors but also by strong pull factors: they actively chose countries that offered greater prospects for safety, employment, and personal development. This differentiation is empirically evident. For instance, the motivation “better quality of life” was more frequently cited by those who settled in Germany than by those who remained closer to Ukraine. The push–pull model is thus not only affirmed but also refined. Push factors such as war and collapse trigger large-scale displacement; however, the direction and character of that movement are shaped by pull factors and individual agency. Sociological analysis shows that strong pull factors can redirect migration flows farther than what push dynamics alone would predict. Many Ukrainians initially settled in neighboring countries, but later relocated to Germany in search of better support systems, particularly those with generous welfare benefits (Madzhumdar, 2023). This pattern of secondary migration illustrates how comparative advantage among host countries influences refugee decisions once the initial shock of flight subsides. These motivational differences also carry implications for integration and return intentions. Those who left Ukraine solely due to wartime threat may be more likely to return once conditions stabilize. In contrast, migrants drawn by Germany’s quality of life may remain abroad long-term or even settle permanently, particularly if their departure was also driven by systemic dissatisfaction—issues not easily resolved in the short term. Research has shown that many Ukrainian refugees abroad maintain strong emotional and social ties to their homeland, but their decision to return will depend on whether the underlying causes of migration are adequately addressed (Tokariuk, 2025). Should Ukraine succeed in ensuring security, reconstruction, and economic opportunity, it may transform current push factors into future pull factors for return migration. For now, however, the migration process continues, shaped by the logic of comparative advantage: people settle where they perceive more benefits than drawbacks—precisely as predicted by Everett Lee’s theory. Ukrainian migration to Germany thus exemplifies the interplay between structural forces and individual decision-making: the acute pressure of war initiated mass movement, while cross-country differences in social conditions filtered and guided that movement. Even in the context of forced migration, the gradations of motivation—from pure push to mixed push–pull—remain analytically significant, influencing not only migrants’ current trajectories but also the broader dynamics of migration over time. Regarding the hypothesis that access to education serves as a dominant pull factor in the decision of Ukrainian refugee mothers to remain in Germany, the findings offer partial confirmation . The data clearly indicate that education is an important consideration: over half of respondents were confident they could secure schooling for their children, and Germany's relatively high rate of school attendance among Ukrainian children supports this perception. However, the evidence does not unequivocally position education above all other pull factors. Instead, it functions in conjunction with other elements—such as safety, housing, and institutional support—to influence settlement choices. The continued prevalence of dual schooling models and parental uncertainty about integration outcomes also point to the contingent and context-dependent nature of education’s pull effect. Policy implications The findings suggest the need for sustained investment in education-based integration infrastructure. Host countries, particularly Germany, should focus not only on access to schooling but on improving the quality of educational inclusion by addressing transitional arrangements, linguistic adaptation, and psychological support for children in dual systems. At a broader level, coordination between Ukrainian and German educational authorities could ensure greater continuity and recognition for children who may return. Future research directions Further studies should examine comparative educational integration outcomes between Ukrainian children and other refugee cohorts (e.g., Syrian or Afghan minors), as well as longitudinal trajectories of children who remain in dual schooling environments. Special attention should be paid to how parental perceptions of educational quality influence repatriation or long-term settlement, and to gendered migration strategies where women act as primary decision-makers in displacement contexts. Declarations Ethics Approval Not applicable. Informed Consent Not applicable. Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Author Contribution Liudmyla Yuzva: conceptualization, methodology, investigation, visualization, data curation, writing—review and editing. Piotr Długosz: conceptualization, methodology, investigation, writing—review and editing. Acknowledgement The authors would like to thank the Centre for Economic Strategy (https://ces.org.ua/) for providing access to the SPSS dataset from the fourth wave of the survey “Ukrainian Refugees After Three Years Abroad.” References UCDP (2025). UCDP Encyclopedia of Armed Conflicts . Uppsala Conflict Data Program. March 3, 2025, from https://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia UNHCR. (2025). 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Future subnational population change in Germany: The role of internal and international migration. Population, Space and Place, 31 (1), e2871. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2871 Gambaro, L., Spieß, C. K., Daelen, A., & Ette, A. (2025). Geflüchtete Kinder und Jugendliche aus der Ukraine [Refugee children and young people from Ukraine]. BiB.Aktuell, 2/2025 . Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung. Retrieved April 8, 2025, from https://www.bib.bund.de/Publikation/2025/BiB-Aktuell-2025-2.html Otterbein, V. L. (2025). Viele Kinder aus der Ukraine fühlen sich an deutschen Schulen nicht zugehörig [Many children from Ukraine do not feel a sense of belonging at German schools]. Frankfurter Allgemeine . Retrieved April 10, 2025, from https://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/menschen/neue-studie-viele-kinder-aus-der-ukraine-fuehlen-sich-an-deutschen-schulen-nicht-zugehoerig-110364810.html Pidgorna, H. (2024). Education across borders: Ukrainian refugees’ perceptions of German schools . Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS). Retrieved April 8, 2025, from https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/education-across-borders-ukrainian-refugees-perceptions-of-german-schools Chargaziia, L., & Panchenko, T. (2025). Adaptation models of Ukrainian refugees in Germany. Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 38 (1), 193–219. https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2025.2467220 World Bank. (2019). Review of the education sector in Ukraine: Moving toward effectiveness, equity and efficiency (RESUME3). Retrieved April 14, 2025, from https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/884261568662566134/pdf/Review-of-the-Education-Sector-in-Ukraine-Moving-toward-Effectiveness-Equity-and-Efficiency-RESUME3.pdf Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. (2020). Accounting Chamber report for 2019. Retrieved April 14, 2025, from https://rp.gov.ua/upload-files/Activity/Reports/2019/Zvit_RP_2019_eng.pdf World Bank. (2021). Ukraine growth study: Faster, lasting and kinder. Retrieved April 14, 2025, from https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/543041554211825812/pdf/Ukraine-Growth-Study-Final-Document-Faster-Lasting-and-Kinder.pdf NDI Ukraine. (2021). Public opinion survey: Residents of Ukraine, July 2021. Retrieved April 17, 2025, from https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Ukraine%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20%20Residents%20of%20Ukraine%20%20July%202021%20%20English.pdf Footnotes The official source from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees continuously provides up-to-date statistical data on the number of Ukrainian refugees in the country (BAMF, 2025). For the sample of 1,075 respondents across all countries studied. For the sample of 198 respondents in Germany. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Published Journal Publication published 14 Feb, 2026 Read the published version in Journal of International Migration and Integration → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. 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07:26:47","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":49653,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eReceived support: Germany vs. other countries (percentage of respondents reporting access to different types of assistance)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6617214/v1/f256d2ba99b3da0e5028bfdb.png"},{"id":96244823,"identity":"d09409c3-9fe1-4c33-ae67-73affd469ead","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-19 07:19:21","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":70661,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eExpected difficulties in integration among Ukrainian refugees in Germany (percentage distribution by perceived likelihood)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Flourish\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6617214/v1/40870c3e1311f7a8e9392399.png"},{"id":96022620,"identity":"a98f996c-aa5a-4bf9-9842-2e9a23609969","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-16 16:29:54","extension":"png","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":32145,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eEducational participation of Ukrainian children in Germany compared to all host countries (percentage distribution by type of education)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage5.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6617214/v1/da1cf295f8df0f7516613eac.png"},{"id":96022615,"identity":"485a6892-d75f-41a1-b44c-ccf13daf3b87","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-16 16:29:54","extension":"png","order_by":6,"title":"Figure 6","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":107556,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eAnticipated difficulties upon return to Ukraine (distribution by probability of occurrence)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Flourish\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage6.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6617214/v1/d77bc4ce0349ca89fc4dbfd7.png"},{"id":96022626,"identity":"bf207db0-bf34-49f6-a2f9-b930413216ad","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-11-16 16:29:54","extension":"png","order_by":7,"title":"Figure 7","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":210272,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eMigration intentions of Ukrainian refugees in Germany (3-year horizon: residence, employment, living standards, and war expectations)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Excel\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"floatimage7.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6617214/v1/f83b45e8b0e368cd9f176284.png"},{"id":102786577,"identity":"984ba847-5c90-4701-86a8-cb9ad5aff063","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-02-16 16:14:18","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":993975,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6617214/v1/45f50fe5-ac32-4384-8544-f626c1cdaece.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"\u003cp\u003eEducation and the Recalibration of Pull Factors: Ukrainian Exceptionalism in Forced Migration?\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eDespite the proclaimed triumph of humanitarian values and civilizational progress in the 21st century, armed conflicts continue to shape the global socio-political landscape. As of spring 2025, multiple high- and medium-intensity wars persist across the globe\u0026mdash;in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Myanmar. Europe, by contrast, is affected by only one ongoing armed conflict: the full-scale war in Ukraine, which began in February 2022 and is recognized as the sole active military conflict in Europe according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese wars have triggered massive waves of forced displacement. While the scale of migration varies across regions, Syria, Ukraine, and Afghanistan have produced the highest numbers of international refugees in the past decade. According to UNHCR, approximately 6.2\u0026nbsp;million Ukrainians had fled abroad by 2024, primarily to EU countries, Canada, and the United States (UNHCR, 2024: 2\u0026ndash;3), and over 3.6\u0026nbsp;million became internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Ukraine (IOM Ukraine, 2024). By November 2024, 4.2\u0026nbsp;million Ukrainians had obtained temporary protection status within the European Union (Eurostat, 2025), with the largest host countries being Germany (1,152,620 or 27.2%), Poland (987,925 or 23.3%), and the Czech Republic (385,190 or 9.1%).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGermany in particular has emerged as a key destination for Ukrainian refugees. As of March 2024, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF\u003ca class=\"FNLink\" href=\"#Fn1\" id=\"#FNLinkFn1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e) reported 1.65\u0026nbsp;million registered Ukrainian refugees in the country (DER SPIEGEL, 2024). This figure is part of Germany\u0026rsquo;s record-high total of 3.48\u0026nbsp;million individuals seeking humanitarian protection. These numbers underline the exceptional scale of Ukrainian displacement into Germany and indicate that this migration process is still ongoing three years into the war.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHowever, what distinguishes this refugee wave is not only its magnitude and suddenness, but also its distinct demographic and social profile\u0026mdash;what can be described as a case of \u0026ldquo;Ukrainian exceptionalism.\u0026rdquo; Unlike many other refugee movements, the Ukrainian outflow was characterized by a predominantly female composition, often including mothers with children and older women with grandchildren. According to the German Federal Statistical Office, women constitute approximately 80% of working-age Ukrainians who arrived in Germany since 2022 (Radio Svoboda, 2024). In 2023, 40% of Ukrainian refugees in Germany were either single parents (15%) or their children (25%) (Ozturk, 2023). In addition to its gendered character, this migration wave stands out for its pronounced educational dimension\u0026mdash;driven by the needs and aspirations of school-aged children. This specific composition raises further questions regarding integration, long-term settlement, and the role of state institutions in host countries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWithin this context, the present study poses a central question: what are the key factors\u0026mdash;or the constellation of factors\u0026mdash;\u003cem\u003ethat motivate Ukrainian women with children not only to flee to Germany, but to remain there? What role do gender and parental status play in shaping these migration decisions? How does access to education intersect with broader aspirations for safety and stability?\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis article operates within the theoretical framework of push\u0026ndash;pull migration theory. It hypothesizes that among the dominant pull factors influencing the decision to remain in Germany is the availability and perceived quality of education for children. Given the strong demographic presence of women with children among Ukrainian refugees, child-related educational opportunities may serve not only as a tool for integration but as a foundational anchor for long-term settlement and future-making in exile.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Theoretical Framework","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe empirical question guiding this article invites a deeper conceptual inquiry: What motivates Ukrainian women with children, displaced by war, to remain in Germany rather than return or move elsewhere? For most Ukrainian refugees, especially women with children, the initial decision to flee Ukraine was driven by immediate physical danger due to Russia\u0026rsquo;s full-scale invasion. This decision was further reinforced by maternal responsibility and the desire to protect children from violence and trauma. While some refugees returned to Ukraine between 2022 and 2024, many\u0026mdash;particularly mothers with children\u0026mdash;have remained abroad, and new cases of displacement continue to emerge as the war persists. Ongoing airstrikes across the country, the mobility of the front line, and the continued destruction and occupation of new territories, have sustained the perception of Ukraine as a high-risk environment.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAlthough such dynamics explain the initial decision to leave, the determinants of long-term settlement in host countries\u0026mdash;such as Germany\u0026mdash;are less well studied. In particular, little is known about which specific factors act as dominant forces encouraging women with children to remain abroad. This study adopts the theoretical lens of Everett S. Lee\u0026rsquo;s (1966) push\u0026ndash;pull theory of migration, which remains foundational in migration research. According to Lee, migration decisions emerge from the interplay between push factors\u0026mdash;conditions in the country of origin that drive people away (e.g., armed conflict, economic hardship, insecurity)\u0026mdash;and pull factors\u0026mdash;conditions in the destination country that attract migrants (e.g., better living standards, employment, education, or welfare provisions). Importantly, Lee emphasized that the same objective conditions may be perceived differently by different individuals, depending on their demographic and social characteristics (Lee, 1966: 49).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the context of Ukrainian war-related migration, push factors are evident and include physical insecurity, economic collapse, and the breakdown of essential services. However, this article argues that among the key pull factors influencing decisions to remain in Germany is the availability and perceived quality of education for children\u0026mdash;though this effect is context-dependent and operates in conjunction with broader institutional and family-based considerations. This perspective aligns with Lee\u0026rsquo;s insight that pull factors become more decisive when initial threats have stabilized, and migrants begin to evaluate their long-term prospects. Thus, the hypothesis tested here is that educational opportunities for children represent a dominant pull factor in the decision-making of Ukrainian women who remain in Germany beyond the initial emergency phase of displacement.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile this article draws on the foundational framework proposed by Everett S. Lee, recent scholarship suggests important modifications and extensions are needed to fully capture the dynamics of forced migration. Although Lee\u0026rsquo;s model\u0026mdash;based on the dichotomy of push and pull factors\u0026mdash;remains central to migration theory, contemporary researchers emphasize its limitations in explaining the complexity of refugee movements. As already noted by early critical migration theorists, Lee\u0026rsquo;s emphasis on rational individual decision-making underestimates the influence of culture, emotion, and family obligations (Samers, 2010; Castles et al., 2014). Moreover, the classical binary distinction between \u0026ldquo;refugees\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;economic migrants\u0026rdquo; has come under critique. Crawley and Skleparis (2018) argue that real-world decisions are shaped by mixed motives, where physical insecurity, economic pressure, and long-term aspirations intersect.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn response to such limitations, Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long (2018) propose a \u0026ldquo;push\u0026ndash;pull plus\u0026rdquo; model, which introduces four interacting types of migration drivers: predisposing, proximate, precipitating, and mediating. This conceptual expansion better accounts for the layered and sequential nature of displacement, including conflict-affected flows from Afghanistan and Somalia. Other authors highlight refugee agency, illustrating how individuals strategically navigate constraints: for example, Belloni (2016) describes Eritrean refugees as actors balancing risk, hope, and moral economy in their journeys.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGender-sensitive applications of push\u0026ndash;pull theory are also gaining ground. As Freedman (2010) and Donato et al. (2006) show, women and men experience migration differently\u0026mdash;not only because of differentiated vulnerabilities (e.g., exposure to gender-based violence) but also due to structural inequalities limiting women\u0026rsquo;s mobility. In some contexts, poverty acts as a stronger push factor for women, yet long-distance travel poses greater risks, especially for those traveling with children or lacking legal documents. Interestingly, the Ukrainian case diverges from many historical patterns: it is women, particularly mothers, who formed the core of the refugee flow\u0026mdash;challenging assumptions that women are always less mobile than men in conflict settings. According to the Br\u0026uuml;cker et al. in 2022, approximately 80% of Ukrainian refugees in Germany were women, and nearly half of them were accompanied by young children (Br\u0026uuml;cker et al., 2023).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003eLiterature and Research Review\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the context of the full-scale war that began in Ukraine in 2022, decisions about emigration have been predominantly shaped by the interplay of push and pull factors. During the initial stages of the war, primary push factors included immediate threats to life: active fighting in areas of residence, aerial bombardments, occupation, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure (Tokariuk, 2025; Sologub, 2024). Surveys conducted among Ukrainian refugees abroad indicate that approximately one-quarter of respondents cited such factors as their main reason for leaving the country. As the war has persisted, the range of push factors has expanded to include not only ongoing insecurity but also economic collapse, disruption of public services (healthcare, education, social protection), infrastructural damage, and political instability. Other mentioned drivers include fear of conscription, loss of trust in government, and deteriorating living conditions, such as lack of electricity or heating (Sologub, 2024; Tokariuk, 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAmid these drivers, the issue of education has emerged as a particularly salient push factor, especially for women with children\u0026mdash;the primary demographic group among Ukrainian migrants to the EU. According to a study by the Centre for Economic Strategy (Vakhitov et al., 2025), \u003cem\u003e63% of surveyed women believed that their children would have better developmental opportunities abroad\u003c/em\u003e, while an equal proportion identified education (their own and their children\u0026rsquo;s) as a significant motive for emigration. At the same time, some mothers expressed reluctance to leave Ukraine for educational reasons, noting their preference for the familiar linguistic and cultural context and confidence in the quality of Ukrainian schooling.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis ambivalence is compounded by a broader crisis in education. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the war have severely disrupted learning. The 2022 PISA assessment showed a significant drop in Ukrainian students\u0026rsquo; scores compared to 2018: a decline of 12 points in mathematics, 38 points in reading, and 19 points in science (Bychko et al., 2023). UNICEF has further reported that over 50% of teachers observed learning loss in core subjects, including Ukrainian language, mathematics, and foreign languages (UNICEF, 2023). These setbacks have motivated many families to seek more stable educational conditions abroad, where continuous schooling and support services are available.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eGermany has emerged as a primary destination for Ukrainian refugees due to its combination of robust pull factors. First, social networks played an important role: 43% of respondents in the EWL survey cited existing acquaintances or relatives in Germany as a reason for choosing it (Madzhumdar, 2023; Mykolaienko, 2025). Second, Germany\u0026rsquo;s strong system of social support\u0026mdash;including access to housing, healthcare, education, and financial aid under the EU\u0026rsquo;s Temporary Protection Directive\u0026mdash;was a major attraction. These benefits were highlighted by 42% of respondents. Third, the country\u0026rsquo;s economic stability and employment prospects offered a path to financial independence: 38% of migrants noted the opportunity to save money as a decisive factor in choosing Germany, and 27% emphasized higher earnings compared to other destinations. Finally, Germany\u0026rsquo;s political and legal stability was cited as a background factor underpinning migrants\u0026rsquo; trust in their future security and rights.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWithin this broader context, the educational dimension of refugee integration has received particular attention in scholarly research. CEDOS, a Ukrainian think tank, has documented the complex migration trajectories of Ukrainian families and the responses of receiving education systems (Filipchuk \u0026amp; Syrbu, 2022). In Germany, a dual pattern of adaptation has emerged: while some children have been successfully integrated into local schools, others continue to study remotely in Ukrainian institutions. Approximately 20% of Ukrainian children in Germany remain in the Ukrainian school system, and a further share combine local and online learning\u0026mdash;a practice that imposes significant cognitive and emotional strain on both children and parents. According to CEDOS, this \"educational mobility\" is becoming a structural feature of forced migration and requires systemic policy responses, including adaptive curricula and cross-border coordination of educational standards (Kabanets, 2022). Despite the scale of this phenomenon, there remains a notable lack of systematic research on how access to education shapes integration trajectories of refugees in Germany\u0026mdash;a gap that this article seeks to partially address.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn sum, education appears not only as a background issue in displacement but as a key terrain where personal strategies of adaptation, institutional policies, and long-term integration trajectories converge. For many Ukrainian women with children, schooling conditions for their children are not just a factor among many, but may function as a decisive anchor shaping their settlement intentions. Understanding how education operates as a pull factor in this context is therefore crucial for both migration theory and host-country policy design.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Methodology","content":"\u003cp\u003eThis study draws on original data collected through a survey of Ukrainian refugees conducted by the research agency Info Sapiens on behalf of the Centre for Economic Strategy (Mykhailyshyna et al., 2025: 7). The analysis is based on the fourth wave of the longitudinal panel survey carried out in November\u0026ndash;December 2024. For contextual depth and comparison, the study also acknowledges the preceding waves conducted in November\u0026ndash;December 2022 (Wave 1), April\u0026ndash;May 2023 (Wave 2), and December 2023 \u0026ndash; January 2024 (Wave 3).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn Wave 4, a total of 1,075 Ukrainian refugees living abroad were surveyed. The sample excluded individuals residing in the Russian Federation or Belarus. Respondents were recruited using SMS invitations with a link to an online questionnaire. As in previous waves, phone numbers were selected randomly from among subscribers of the mobile operators Kyivstar and Vodafone, provided that the geolocation of the number indicated the user was located outside Ukraine (excluding Russia and Belarus).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTo ensure representativeness, geographic quotas were applied to reflect the actual distribution of Ukrainian refugees abroad. These quotas were based on up-to-date Eurostat data and supplemented by official statistics on the number of Ukrainian nationals who relocated to the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. This sampling strategy enhances the generalizability of findings by aligning the sample with the real-world distribution of Ukrainian refugees across host countries (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Napkin\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Research Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe survey data reveal both general and country-specific migration drivers among Ukrainian refugees. When asked about the primary push factors that led them to leave Ukraine, respondents most frequently cited the destruction of housing (31%), loss of employment or income (29%), and the presence of active combat in their area of residence (26%\u003ca class=\"FNLink\" href=\"#Fn2\" id=\"#FNLinkFn2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e). However, disaggregated analysis for the subgroup residing in Germany indicates a somewhat different configuration\u003ca class=\"FNLink\" href=\"#Fn3\" id=\"#FNLinkFn3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e. Among Ukrainian refugees in Germany, the top-ranked reason was the perception that living conditions and future prospects\u0026mdash;for themselves or their children\u0026mdash;would be better abroad (30%). The economic push factor remained prominent (27%), and shelling or bombardment of home areas, even without ground combat, ranked third (26%) \u003cem\u003e(\u003c/em\u003eFig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese findings suggest that, while the war remains a central reason for flight among those who ultimately reached Germany, their motivations are more multifaceted. Refugees in Germany, compared to the broader sample, are less likely to have fled direct combat zones\u0026mdash;many of whom settled in neighboring countries or internally in Ukraine\u0026mdash;and more likely to cite structural and forward-looking concerns. Specifically, 30% of the German subgroup mentioned the lack of opportunities or poor quality of life in Ukraine as a key motive, compared to just 10% across the full sample. Similarly, political disillusionment, including frustration with corruption or governance, was reported more frequently in the German group (7\u0026ndash;8% vs. less than 1%). Avoidance of military conscription also emerged more strongly among Germany-based refugees (6% vs. ~1%), reflecting the presence of men of conscription age or their families, for whom avoiding enlistment was a critical consideration.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese findings can be further interpreted through the lens of the \u0026ldquo;push\u0026ndash;pull plus\u0026rdquo; model, which identifies four types of migration drivers. First, predisposing drivers\u0026mdash;such as economic instability, regional inequality, chronic underfunding of education and healthcare, and widespread distrust in government\u0026mdash;were already present before 2022 and shaped a latent readiness to migrate. These are indirectly echoed in the 27% citing income loss and 30% who reported poor living conditions as motives. Second, proximate drivers\u0026mdash;including shelling and destroyed housing\u0026mdash;formed the immediate war-related threats that made emigration unavoidable for many. Third, precipitating drivers\u0026mdash;specific triggers like blackouts (20%) and family reunification (6%)\u0026mdash;helped explain why people left when they did. Finally, mediating drivers\u0026mdash;such as social networks (43%), visa-free access, and institutional support\u0026mdash;enabled the feasibility of migration and determined destination choice.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTaken together, these patterns suggest that Ukrainian refugees who migrated to Germany were not only driven by war-related trauma but also by the aspiration for long-term stability and better life opportunities. Their motivations were more likely to include a combination of safety concerns and a strategic assessment of future well-being, which aligns with the push\u0026ndash;pull logic of migration theory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eInstitutional pull factors also played a significant role. Empirical data on received support underscore major differences across host countries. Ukrainian refugees in Germany reported substantially higher access to social benefits, including child allowances (63%), housing assistance (60%), and language courses (57%), compared to averages across all host countries (35%, 27%, and 35% respectively). Support for employment (31% vs. 17%) and help with documentation (30% vs. 20%) were also more frequently reported \u003cem\u003e(\u003c/em\u003eFig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOnly 20% of Ukrainian refugees in Germany stated they received no assistance, compared to 38% overall, highlighting Germany\u0026rsquo;s relatively comprehensive support system. From a theoretical perspective, these results reaffirm the significance of institutional support as a robust pull factor. While initial decisions to migrate may be prompted by push factors such as war and economic collapse, visible and accessible support in host countries\u0026mdash;especially Germany\u0026mdash;contributes decisively to settlement decisions. Integration-oriented services, such as language courses, employment counseling, and family-friendly provisions, not only facilitate adaptation but also influence initial country choice, as information about available assistance circulates via social networks and digital channels. In this sense, support is not merely a post-migration benefit, but an active component of the migratory calculus.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eUkrainian refugees\u0026rsquo; expectations regarding their integration prospects further illustrate the dual logic of migration. Violin plots of perceived likelihoods of encountering difficulties show that the majority feel confident in their ability to achieve economic self-sufficiency: 39% believed they would definitely not face such problems, and another 15% deemed this unlikely. In contrast, concerns about integration and institutional barriers are more pronounced. Around 20% of respondents expressed apprehension about language acquisition and cultural adaptation, and 18% voiced concern about difficulties with local norms and customs \u003cem\u003e(\u003c/em\u003eFig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Flourish\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eParticular attention should be paid to access to education. Although 51% of respondents were confident they would be able to secure quality education for their children, 12% doubted this was possible. A similar split applies to healthcare: while 46% anticipated no problems, 15% rated potential difficulties in the mid to high range. These findings suggest a need for targeted integration policies in areas such as schooling, language acquisition, and access to basic services.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAdditional data on children\u0026rsquo;s actual participation in education offer further insights. In Germany, 58% of Ukrainian children attend in-person schooling in local institutions\u0026mdash;a figure higher than the average of 54% across all countries\u0026mdash;indicating relatively successful educational integration. However, 20% of children continue distance learning with Ukrainian institutions, potentially hindering social and linguistic adaptation. A further 7% are not enrolled in any form of education \u003cem\u003e(\u003c/em\u003eFig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Datawrapper\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese results support qualitative reports of concern about educational access. While Germany\u0026rsquo;s overall integration efforts appear effective, the persistence of a \"transitional\" educational status for some children suggests room for improvement. The presence of dual schooling arrangements\u0026mdash;local and remote\u0026mdash;may reduce educational loss but does not resolve the deeper issue of integration.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eExpectations for the future underscore the persistent sense of uncertainty. When asked where they envisioned themselves in three years, 44% of respondents were unsure. Approximately one-third hoped to stay in Germany, and only 18% intended to return to Ukraine \u003cem\u003e(\u003c/em\u003eFig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Flourish\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis ambivalence correlates with previously identified pull factors\u0026mdash;housing, benefits, and integration services\u0026mdash;which have rooted many families in place. In terms of employment trajectories, responses were highly diverse. Around one-third hoped to continue in their previous profession, while another third remained undecided. Others planned to retrain or study, reflecting both flexibility and challenges related to skill transfer and credential recognition. Despite these uncertainties, over half expected their standard of living to improve. Only 9% anticipated a decline \u003cem\u003e(\u003c/em\u003eFig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem\u003e)\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSource: Authors, based on visualization created with Excel\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eAt the same time, more than 60% believed the war would continue in some form, including as a \"frozen\" conflict, and only 22% foresaw a complete resolution. These expectations reflect a shift toward pragmatic, medium-term planning and a preference for remaining in host countries with secure infrastructure and institutional reliability.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe findings presented above align closely with Everett Lee\u0026rsquo;s classic theory of migration, which conceptualizes mobility as the outcome of opposing forces: push factors in the country of origin that drive individuals away, and pull factors in the receiving country that attract them (Kumar, 2023). Ukrainian displacement triggered by the 2022 full-scale invasion offers a textbook illustration of this model. In Ukraine, immediate dangers linked to war\u0026mdash;physical insecurity, economic collapse, and the breakdown of infrastructure\u0026mdash;functioned as powerful push factors. Refugees responded by seeking countries where these threats could be mitigated by corresponding pull factors: safety, access to social protection, and the possibility of building a stable life.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe empirical results confirm this dynamic. Each negative condition experienced in Ukraine often had a perceived \u0026ldquo;mirror\u0026rdquo; positive in destination countries. For example, those who had lost employment sought countries with job opportunities and higher wages; those fleeing violence looked for peace and rule of law. In this sense, the migration of Ukrainians to Germany reflects not only an urgent need for refuge but a structured response to the promise of resolution and support abroad. Germany, in particular, combined strong pull factors\u0026mdash;generous welfare, comprehensive integration policies, economic opportunity\u0026mdash;which made it a key destination.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eLee\u0026rsquo;s framework also includes the role of \u0026ldquo;intervening obstacles\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;personal factors,\u0026rdquo; both of which are highly relevant in this case. Despite its distance from Ukraine compared to neighboring states, Germany became accessible due to EU visa liberalization and the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive. Yet some barriers remained: men of military age were restricted from leaving the country under martial law, contributing to a demographic skew among the displaced. Women with children dominate the refugee population abroad (Sologub, 2024), reflecting a migration process heavily shaped by both structural constraints and individual life circumstances.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePersonal resources\u0026mdash;such as education level, language proficiency, and pre-existing social ties\u0026mdash;also influenced individual trajectories. Refugees with relatives in Germany or prior experience with the country were more likely to choose it as their destination. These diverse micro-level variables reinforce Lee\u0026rsquo;s proposition that migration decisions are multifactorial: not all individuals respond to push factors in the same way. Some remain internally displaced, others choose nearby countries, and still others travel farther west, depending on the balance of constraints and capabilities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this context, the German case also invites comparison with previous cohorts of forcibly displaced children. The German case illustrates how pull factors can translate into integration pathways. Comparative studies of refugee cohorts from Syria, Afghanistan, and Ukraine suggest that Germany\u0026rsquo;s demographic structure has benefited from these waves of migration, particularly in light of low fertility rates and population aging (Cilek et al., 2025). As of late 2024, more than 357,000 Ukrainian minors were living in Germany, most of whom were enrolled in local schools. Research from the Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB) shows that a large share of these children acquired German language proficiency within a short time frame\u0026mdash;an important marker of successful integration (Gambaro et al., 2025).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eNonetheless, challenges remain. While language acquisition has been largely successful, a sense of belonging is more fragile. In a comparative study, 84.3% of Ukrainian pupils in Ukraine reported feeling part of their school community, whereas in Germany this figure dropped to 76.2% (Otterbein, 2025). German schools have adopted various models to support integration, including \u0026ldquo;welcome classes\u0026rdquo; designed to familiarize students with local norms before transitioning into mainstream education. However, qualitative research suggests that differences in pedagogical culture\u0026mdash;from teacher-centered approaches in Ukraine to student-centered methods in Germany\u0026mdash;may pose challenges for both children and their parents (Pidgorna, 2024).\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWhile not universally decisive, children\u0026rsquo;s education often plays a meaningful role in shaping settlement intentions\u0026mdash;particularly for mothers prioritizing stability and development. For some families, access to high-quality education in Germany functions as a compelling incentive to remain; for others, the desire to return to the Ukrainian school system\u0026mdash;perceived as culturally familiar and pedagogically preferable\u0026mdash;motivates repatriation (Chargaziia, 2025). This ambivalence reinforces the idea that education operates not merely as a sectoral domain of integration but as a key variable in the migration calculus, deeply entangled with questions of identity, security, and future planning.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eReturning to the \u0026ldquo;push\u0026ndash;pull plus\u0026rdquo; model proposed by Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long (2018), the Ukrainian displacement following the 2022 invasion can be disaggregated along four types of migration drivers:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003ePredisposing drivers were in place long before the full-scale invasion. Structural conditions\u0026mdash;economic volatility, regional inequality, chronic underfunding of education and healthcare, and widespread distrust in state institutions\u0026mdash;created a latent openness to migration. The ongoing hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine since 2014 also shaped expectations and made families more receptive to temporary migration or labor mobility. These background conditions are indirectly reflected in the survey results, for instance, in the 27% who cited income loss and 30% who reported poor life prospects as reasons for leaving (World Bank, 2019; Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, 2020; World Bank, 2021; NDI Ukraine, 2021).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eProximate drivers relate to the conditions that made displacement a necessity. The Russian invasion erased the assumption that violence was limited to Donbas or Crimea, producing a national sense of existential insecurity. Active combat, urban destruction, and the collapse of public services led many to perceive emigration as the only path to safety. In our data, 26% of respondents mentioned bombardments, and 31% had lost housing\u0026mdash;these indicate proximate drivers pushing people out of Ukraine.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003ePrecipitating drivers refer to specific triggers\u0026mdash;sudden events or experiences that prompted the final decision to flee. These included direct attacks on schools or neighborhoods, prolonged blackouts, and rumors or personal calls about mobilization. Among Ukrainian respondents in Germany, 20% cited electricity outages, and over 6% noted family reunification as an immediate factor\u0026mdash;illustrating the tipping point logic of precipitating drivers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cp\u003eMediating drivers shaped the route, destination, and feasibility of departure. EU visa-free access, volunteer evacuations, open borders, and informal networks all facilitated out-migration. Many women received direct invitations from friends or family in Germany, reducing both informational and logistical barriers. In our sample, the strong presence of social ties (as reported by 43% of German-based respondents) and widespread access to housing and education point to a strong mediating influence.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusions","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe distinction between general and Germany-specific migration motives reveals the multidimensionality of Ukrainian displacement. From a sociological perspective, the migration wave of 2022\u0026ndash;2023 cannot be reduced to a homogenous category of \u0026ldquo;war refugees.\u0026rdquo; Despite the shared macro-trigger\u0026mdash;the full-scale Russian invasion\u0026mdash;there are multiple profiles within this movement. At the one extreme, forced migrants are driven primarily by immediate push factors such as fear, violence, and material destruction. Many in this group fled to the nearest safe countries, responding to the urgency of the situation. At the other extreme are what may be called \u0026ldquo;opportunity migrants\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;individuals who, while escaping war, simultaneously sought long-term improvement in living standards. This second category is more likely to reach destinations such as Germany. For them, migration decisions were shaped not only by push factors but also by strong pull factors: they actively chose countries that offered greater prospects for safety, employment, and personal development.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis differentiation is empirically evident. For instance, the motivation \u0026ldquo;better quality of life\u0026rdquo; was more frequently cited by those who settled in Germany than by those who remained closer to Ukraine. The push\u0026ndash;pull model is thus not only affirmed but also refined. Push factors such as war and collapse trigger large-scale displacement; however, the direction and character of that movement are shaped by pull factors and individual agency. Sociological analysis shows that strong pull factors can redirect migration flows farther than what push dynamics alone would predict. Many Ukrainians initially settled in neighboring countries, but later relocated to Germany in search of better support systems, particularly those with generous welfare benefits (Madzhumdar, 2023). This pattern of secondary migration illustrates how comparative advantage among host countries influences refugee decisions once the initial shock of flight subsides.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThese motivational differences also carry implications for integration and return intentions. Those who left Ukraine solely due to wartime threat may be more likely to return once conditions stabilize. In contrast, migrants drawn by Germany\u0026rsquo;s quality of life may remain abroad long-term or even settle permanently, particularly if their departure was also driven by systemic dissatisfaction\u0026mdash;issues not easily resolved in the short term. Research has shown that many Ukrainian refugees abroad maintain strong emotional and social ties to their homeland, but their decision to return will depend on whether the underlying causes of migration are adequately addressed (Tokariuk, 2025). Should Ukraine succeed in ensuring security, reconstruction, and economic opportunity, it may transform current push factors into future pull factors for return migration.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFor now, however, the migration process continues, shaped by the logic of comparative advantage: people settle where they perceive more benefits than drawbacks\u0026mdash;precisely as predicted by Everett Lee\u0026rsquo;s theory. Ukrainian migration to Germany thus exemplifies the interplay between structural forces and individual decision-making: the acute pressure of war initiated mass movement, while cross-country differences in social conditions filtered and guided that movement. Even in the context of forced migration, the gradations of motivation\u0026mdash;from pure push to mixed push\u0026ndash;pull\u0026mdash;remain analytically significant, influencing not only migrants\u0026rsquo; current trajectories but also the broader dynamics of migration over time.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eRegarding the hypothesis that access to education serves as a dominant pull factor in the decision of Ukrainian refugee mothers to remain in Germany, \u003cem\u003ethe findings offer partial confirmation\u003c/em\u003e. The data clearly indicate that education is an important consideration: over half of respondents were confident they could secure schooling for their children, and Germany's relatively high rate of school attendance among Ukrainian children supports this perception. However, the evidence does not unequivocally position education above all other pull factors. Instead, it functions in conjunction with other elements\u0026mdash;such as safety, housing, and institutional support\u0026mdash;to influence settlement choices. The continued prevalence of dual schooling models and parental uncertainty about integration outcomes also point to the contingent and context-dependent nature of education\u0026rsquo;s pull effect.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003ePolicy implications\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe findings suggest the need for sustained investment in education-based integration infrastructure. Host countries, particularly Germany, should focus not only on access to schooling but on improving the quality of educational inclusion by addressing transitional arrangements, linguistic adaptation, and psychological support for children in dual systems. At a broader level, coordination between Ukrainian and German educational authorities could ensure greater continuity and recognition for children who may return.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003ch3\u003eFuture research directions\u003c/h3\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFurther studies should examine comparative educational integration outcomes between Ukrainian children and other refugee cohorts (e.g., Syrian or Afghan minors), as well as longitudinal trajectories of children who remain in dual schooling environments. Special attention should be paid to how parental perceptions of educational quality influence repatriation or long-term settlement, and to gendered migration strategies where women act as primary decision-makers in displacement contexts.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEthics Approval\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eInformed Consent\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eNot applicable.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eLiudmyla Yuzva: conceptualization, methodology, investigation, visualization, data curation, writing\u0026mdash;review and editing. Piotr Długosz: conceptualization, methodology, investigation, writing\u0026mdash;review and editing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgement\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authors would like to thank the Centre for Economic Strategy (https://ces.org.ua/) for providing access to the SPSS dataset from the fourth wave of the survey \u0026ldquo;Ukrainian Refugees After Three Years Abroad.\u0026rdquo;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUCDP (2025). \u003cem\u003eUCDP Encyclopedia of Armed Conflicts\u003c/em\u003e. Uppsala Conflict Data Program. March 3, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://ucdp.uu.se/encyclopedia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eUNHCR. 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Retrieved March 7, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://www.tutorialspoint.com/lee-rsquo-s-theory-of-migration\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eCilek, L., Loichinger, E., Swiaczny, F., Schl\u0026ouml;mer, C., Hoymann, J., \u0026amp; Maretzke, S. (2025). Future subnational population change in Germany: The role of internal and international migration. \u003cem\u003ePopulation, Space and Place, 31\u003c/em\u003e(1), e2871. \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2871\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eGambaro, L., Spie\u0026szlig;, C. K., Daelen, A., \u0026amp; Ette, A. (2025). \u003cem\u003eGefl\u0026uuml;chtete Kinder und Jugendliche aus der Ukraine\u003c/em\u003e [Refugee children and young people from Ukraine]. \u003cem\u003eBiB.Aktuell, 2/2025\u003c/em\u003e. Bundesinstitut f\u0026uuml;r Bev\u0026ouml;lkerungsforschung. Retrieved April 8, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://www.bib.bund.de/Publikation/2025/BiB-Aktuell-2025-2.html\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eOtterbein, V. L. (2025). Viele Kinder aus der Ukraine f\u0026uuml;hlen sich an deutschen Schulen nicht zugeh\u0026ouml;rig [Many children from Ukraine do not feel a sense of belonging at German schools]. \u003cem\u003eFrankfurter Allgemeine\u003c/em\u003e. Retrieved April 10, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/menschen/neue-studie-viele-kinder-aus-der-ukraine-fuehlen-sich-an-deutschen-schulen-nicht-zugehoerig-110364810.html\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003ePidgorna, H. (2024). \u003cem\u003eEducation across borders: Ukrainian refugees\u0026rsquo; perceptions of German schools\u003c/em\u003e. Centre for East European and International Studies (ZOiS). Retrieved April 8, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/education-across-borders-ukrainian-refugees-perceptions-of-german-schools\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eChargaziia, L., \u0026amp; Panchenko, T. (2025). Adaptation models of Ukrainian refugees in Germany. \u003cem\u003eInnovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 38\u003c/em\u003e(1), 193\u0026ndash;219. \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2025.2467220\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWorld Bank. (2019). \u003cem\u003eReview of the education sector in Ukraine: Moving toward effectiveness, equity and efficiency (RESUME3).\u003c/em\u003e Retrieved April 14, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/884261568662566134/pdf/Review-of-the-Education-Sector-in-Ukraine-Moving-toward-Effectiveness-Equity-and-Efficiency-RESUME3.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eAccounting Chamber of Ukraine. (2020). \u003cem\u003eAccounting Chamber report for 2019.\u003c/em\u003e Retrieved April 14, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://rp.gov.ua/upload-files/Activity/Reports/2019/Zvit_RP_2019_eng.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWorld Bank. (2021). \u003cem\u003eUkraine growth study: Faster, lasting and kinder.\u003c/em\u003e Retrieved April 14, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/543041554211825812/pdf/Ukraine-Growth-Study-Final-Document-Faster-Lasting-and-Kinder.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eNDI Ukraine. (2021). \u003cem\u003ePublic opinion survey: Residents of Ukraine, July 2021.\u003c/em\u003e Retrieved April 17, 2025, from \u003cspan type=\"Underline\" class=\"Underline\" name=\"Emphasis\"\u003ehttps://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Ukraine%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20%20Residents%20of%20Ukraine%20%20July%202021%20%20English.pdf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Footnotes","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e The official source from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees continuously provides up-to-date statistical data on the number of Ukrainian refugees in the country (BAMF, 2025).\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e For the sample of 1,075 respondents across all countries studied.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003e For the sample of 198 respondents in Germany.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":true,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":true,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Ukrainian refugees, push–pull theory, Germany, education, forced migration, integration, women with children","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6617214/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6617214/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis article explores the migration and settlement decisions of Ukrainian refugees in Germany following the 2022 Russian invasion. Applying Everett Lee\u0026rsquo;s push\u0026ndash;pull theory, it focuses on women with children\u0026mdash;the largest displaced group\u0026mdash;and investigates whether access to children\u0026rsquo;s education emerges not only as a domain of integration but as a significant pull factor within a broader constellation of drivers shaping settlement intentions. The analysis draws on original survey data collected in late 2024 (n\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;1075), using an SMS-recruited online questionnaire administered across several host countries. Findings indicate that while war-related threats (e.g., bombardments, destruction of housing) were the primary push factors prompting departure from Ukraine, the decision to settle in Germany was strongly influenced by pull factors such as safety, social support, and access to schooling. Respondents in Germany were more likely to cite long-term motives\u0026mdash;such as improved living standards and educational prospects\u0026mdash;than those in neighboring countries. Education emerges not only as a sphere of integration but also as a migration driver. Dual-schooling models (local and Ukrainian), parental assessments of system quality, and children\u0026rsquo;s adaptation shaped settlement choices. These dynamics underscore the role of education in refugee agency and family strategy. The article argues that Ukrainian migration to Germany illustrates the interplay between structural pressures and personal decision-making. Push factors triggered large-scale displacement; pull factors and individual evaluations shaped longer-term trajectories. These findings contribute to migration theory by demonstrating the centrality of education in forced migration contexts and by highlighting the heterogeneity of refugee profiles within a single national cohort.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Education and the Recalibration of Pull Factors: Ukrainian Exceptionalism in Forced Migration?","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-11-16 16:29:49","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6617214/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"8ff666a7-fc5e-4fd8-ae34-d217a0ec28fb","owner":[],"postedDate":"November 16th, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-02-16T16:14:07+00:00","versionOfRecord":{"articleIdentity":"rs-6617214","link":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-026-01361-6","journal":{"identity":"journal-of-international-migration-and-integration","isVorOnly":false,"title":"Journal of International Migration and Integration"},"publishedOn":"2026-02-14 15:57:55","publishedOnDateReadable":"February 14th, 2026"},"versionCreatedAt":"2025-11-16 16:29:49","video":"","vorDoi":"10.1007/s12134-026-01361-6","vorDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-026-01361-6","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-6617214","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-6617214","identity":"rs-6617214","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}