The Impossible Problem of Consciousness: An Argument for Mysterianism

This essay argues for a new, constructive interpretation of mysterianism, parallel to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, repositioning it not as a defeatist philosophy but as a necessary step toward a more productive inquiry into consciousness. The essay first critiques Colin McGinn’s original argument for mysterianism, identifying its limitations, particularly in light of more recent philosophical work. It then proposes a new framework for analyzing consciousness by distinguishing between first-person (introspective) and third-person (observational) approaches. Through a critique of both, the essay demonstrates that a complete theory linking physical processes to subjective experience is impossible due to inherent cognitive and epistemological limitations. Finally, it reframes mysterianism as a pathway forward, proposing two new, tractable research questions: the Intersubjectivity Question (why we intuitively project consciousness onto others) and the Awareness Question (what the physical correlates of the functional aspect of consciousness are).