Pro-Social Preferences Improve Climate Risk Management in Subsistence Farming Communities

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Using evolutionary game theory and data from Nepal and Ethiopia, this study demonstrates that pro-social preferences like altruism and solidarity enable subsistence farmers to overcome social dilemmas and achieve optimal climate risk management with formal insurance.

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This paper studies how the introduction of formal index-based climate insurance affects subsistence farmers’ risk management behavior, focusing on potential crowding out of informal risk transfer arrangements. Using an evolutionary game theory modeling framework parameterized with empirical data from Nepal and Ethiopia, the authors find that a socially optimal strategy—combining formal and informal risk transfer—cannot be sustained by a community of self-interested agents at moderate to high covariate risk levels, creating a social dilemma. They report that pro-social preferences, specifically moderate altruism and solidarity, help farmers reach the social optimum, and that behavioral cues to elicit such preferences could improve the efficiency of financial incentives, with savings estimated at about 5–15% of community agricultural income across risk levels. This paper is a preprint that is not peer reviewed by a journal. The paper does not explicitly discuss endometriosis or adenomyosis; it was included in the corpus via a keyword match in the upstream search index.

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Abstract

Abstract Several governments have tested formal index-based insurance to build climate resilience among smallholder farmers. Yet, adoption of such programs has generated concerns that insurance may crowd out long-established informal risk transfer arrangements. Understanding this phenomenon requires new analytic approaches that capture dynamics of human social behaviour when facing risky events. Here, we develop a modelling framework, based on evolutionary game theory and empirical data from Nepal and Ethiopia, to demonstrate that insurance may introduce a new social dilemma in farmer risk management strategies. We find that while socially optimal risk management is achieved when all farmers pursue a combination of formal and informal risk transfer, a community of self-interested agents is unable to maintain this coexistence at moderate to high covariate risks. We find that a combination of pro-social preferences - namely, moderate altruism and solidarity - helps farmers overcome these concerns and achieve the social optimum. Behavioural interventions that cue such preferences can render financial incentives more efficient in promoting optimal climate risk management, with potential savings worth approximately 5-15 percent of community agricultural income under a range of risk levels.
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Pro-Social Preferences Improve Climate Risk Management in Subsistence Farming Communities | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article Pro-Social Preferences Improve Climate Risk Management in Subsistence Farming Communities Nicolas Choquette-Levy, Matthias Wildemeersch, Fernando Santos, and 3 more This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-2845875/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Published Journal Publication published 14 Feb, 2024 Read the published version in Nature Sustainability → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Several governments have tested formal index-based insurance to build climate resilience among smallholder farmers. Yet, adoption of such programs has generated concerns that insurance may crowd out long-established informal risk transfer arrangements. Understanding this phenomenon requires new analytic approaches that capture dynamics of human social behaviour when facing risky events. Here, we develop a modelling framework, based on evolutionary game theory and empirical data from Nepal and Ethiopia, to demonstrate that insurance may introduce a new social dilemma in farmer risk management strategies. We find that while socially optimal risk management is achieved when all farmers pursue a combination of formal and informal risk transfer, a community of self-interested agents is unable to maintain this coexistence at moderate to high covariate risks. We find that a combination of pro-social preferences - namely, moderate altruism and solidarity - helps farmers overcome these concerns and achieve the social optimum. Behavioural interventions that cue such preferences can render financial incentives more efficient in promoting optimal climate risk management, with potential savings worth approximately 5-15 percent of community agricultural income under a range of risk levels. Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences/Climate-change adaptation Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences/Psychology and behaviour Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences/Climate-change policy Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences/Sustainability Earth and environmental sciences/Environmental social sciences/Environmental economics Full Text Additional Declarations There is NO Competing Interest. Supplementary Files ProSocialPreferencesandFarmerRiskTransferStrategiesSI.pdf Supplementary Information Cite Share Download PDF Status: Published Journal Publication published 14 Feb, 2024 Read the published version in Nature Sustainability → Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. Our growing team is made up of researchers and industry professionals working together to solve the most critical problems facing scientific publishing. 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