Lifetime-Aware Kernel Object Isolation Using Temporal Protection Windows
preprint
OA: closed
Abstract
Memory objects in the kernel often remain accessible long after their safe lifetime, leading to use-after-free exploits. We present a lifetime-aware isolation model that assigns temporal protection windows to kernel objects. PKS permissions are revoked when objects exit valid lifetime states. Applied to six kernel allocators (SLUB, SLOB, SLAB), the technique eliminates 67% of UAF exploitability cases** and shortens exposure windows by 72%. Benchmarking shows ≤4% overhead across memory-intensive workloads. This temporal model adds a new dimension to kernel compartmentalization by aligning memory protection with object lifecycles.
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- europepmc
- last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00