Expression of prestige through authentic pride, not dominance through hubristic pride, promotes fairness in ultimatum bargaining

preprint OA: closed
View at publisher

Abstract

This study explores how non-verbal displays of high social rank influence observers’ decision-making in dyadic negotiations. We hypothesized that recipients’ displays of both dominance and prestige would increase a negotiator’s likelihood of proposing a fair offer, with dominance being effective only when power asymmetry heightens compliance pressure. In a pre-registered experiment (N = 309), participants played the role of the proposer in an Ultimatum Game after competing with another person in three tasks that determined social rank. We found that participants (proposers) were more likely to offer a fair share of money to a responder displaying prestige after being outperformed in the tasks. In contrast, when faced with a dominant-displaying responder who outperformed them, participants did not increase their offers compared to a neutral condition without power asymmetry, suggesting that dominance did not elicit fairness even under compliance pressure. A path model revealed that the responder’s display of authentic (but not hubristic) pride mediated the impact of rank differentiation on proposers’ fairness-driven decision-making. These results suggest that prestige, rather than dominance, is more effective in facilitating negotiation within a power hierarchy.

My notes (saved in your browser only)

Citation neighborhood (no data yet)

We don't have any in-corpus citations linked to this paper yet. This is a recent paper (2024) — citers typically take a year or two to land, and the OpenAlex reference graph may still be filling in.

Source provenance

europepmc
last seen: 2026-05-20T01:45:00.602351+00:00