Regional Economic Impact of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A Computable General Equilibrium Approach

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We employ a Computable General Equilibrium model, calibrated with Ethiopia's 2022 Social Accounting Matrix constructed from national accounts, household surveys, and energy sector data, to evaluate scenarios incorporating climate variability and political risk. Simulations indicate full GERD operation could increase Ethiopia’s GDP by 2.1–3.5% annually, create over 1.2 million jobs, and generate roughly $ 1.2 billion in yearly electricity exports under optimal conditions. However, these benefits are highly conditional. Climate variability could reduce gains by 40%, while political instability in importing nations might cut export revenues by 30%. Critically, the realization of these economic outcomes is fundamentally contingent upon resolving the Nile water allocation conflict and establishing cooperative basin-wide frameworks. The GERD’s potential as a catalyst for regional integration depends on transforming the current hydro-political stalemate into a formal benefit-sharing agreement. Success requires simultaneous progress on diplomatic resolution of water rights, development of regional energy market institutions, and strategic infrastructure investment. Policy interventions should therefore prioritize creating transparent operational rules and building trust through incremental technical cooperation. hydropower economics transboundary water governance CGE modeling Nile Basin benefit-sharing regional integration energy diplomacy Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Figure 6 1. Introduction The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), inaugurated in September 2025, stands as Africa's largest hydropower project with an installed capacity of 5,150 MW and projected annual generation of 15,692 GWh [ 1 , 2 ]. Completed through domestic financing estimated at $ 4.8 billion, raised primarily from bonds and taxes, it represents not only an engineering achievement but also a transformative intervention in the political economy of the Nile Basin, marking a significant shift in African infrastructure financing paradigms away from dependence on international donors. Despite Ethiopia's remarkable economic growth averaging 9.4% annually from 2010–2019 [ 3 ], energy poverty has remained a persistent development challenge, with 64% of the population lacking electricity access as recently as 2018. The GERD constitutes the centrepiece of Ethiopia's national strategy to achieve universal electricity access by 2030 while orchestrating a strategic transition from chronic energy deficits to potential regional energy exporter status [ 4 ]. Beyond its national significance, the dam's monumental scale more than doubles Ethiopia's generation capacity, directly addressing what has been a critical constraint on sustained economic development and industrialization. The GERD occupies a critical nexus in the complex interrelationships between water, energy, and regional politics in a basin characterized by both immense developmental potential and profound governance challenges. Eastern Africa suffers from some of the world's most acute rates of energy poverty, with electrification rates as low as 7.2% in South Sudan and approximately 53% in Sudan [ 5 ]. This pervasive energy deficit severely constrains industrial development, compromises the delivery of essential social services, and stifles broader economic growth. Simultaneously, the Nile Basin has witnessed decades of hydro-political tensions centered on competing claims between upstream and downstream states over water allocation and utilization rights [ 6 , 7 ]. This study advances the literature on transboundary water management and energy economics in several significant ways, addressing key limitations in existing research. While previous economic assessments of the GERD have been conducted, they often treat political factors as exogenous constraints and provide limited distributional or comparative analysis [ 8 , 9 , 10 ]. This research makes three distinct contributions to the growing body of GERD scholarship: Methodological Innovation : We provide a comprehensive economy-wide assessment using an enhanced Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling framework that explicitly and endogenously incorporates political and institutional constraints through comprehensive scenario design. Unlike previous CGE applications [ 9 , 10 ], this analysis quantifies the costs of non-cooperation and the premium associated with political risk, bridging the quantitative tradition of economic modeling with insights from institutional economics [ 11 ] and hydro-political theory [ 12 ]. The model is calibrated using the most recent 2022 Social Accounting Matrix for Ethiopia, constructed from national accounts, household surveys, and energy sector data [ 13 , 14 ]. Integration of Recent Scholarship: We situate economic analysis within the hydro-political realities of the Nile Basin, treating economic outcomes as conditional upon specific cooperation scenarios rather than guaranteed results. The analysis incorporates and engages with the most recent 2024–2025 scholarship, including [ 15 ] on operational hydrology, [ 16 ] on regional governance frameworks, and [ 17 ] on evolving benefit-sharing paradigms. Enhanced Distributional and Policy Analysis : We deliver detailed analysis of how different cooperation scenarios affect the distribution of economic benefits across geographic, income, and gender dimensions, quantifying the costs of conflict including investment uncertainty and risk premiums, and developing phased policy pathways grounded in political feasibility. This addresses a persistent gap identified in the literature [ 18 , 19 ] regarding the need for more granular understanding of who benefits from large infrastructure projects. These contributions collectively provide more realistic, policy-relevant insights into potential pathways for transforming the Nile Basin's persistent hydro-political conflict into sustainable cooperation. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an integrated literature review encompassing both hydro-political context and economic assessment methodologies, with expanded engagement with 2024–2025 scholarship. Section 3 details the enhanced CGE methodology and scenario framework, providing expanded justification for model choices and parameter specifications based on the 2022 Social Accounting Matrix. Section 4 presents result across macroeconomic, sectoral, distributional, and regional dimensions. Section 5 discusses these findings in comparative and theoretical perspective. Section 6 concludes with policy implications and research directions. 2. Literature Review 2.1 Hydro-Political and Institutional Context of the Nile Basin The governance of the Nile River, the world's longest international watercourse, has been fundamentally shaped by a historical legacy of asymmetric power relations, colonial-era treaties, and competing legal paradigms. This context is not merely background but a critical determinant of the economic potential of any major infrastructure project like the GERD. Historical Foundations and Legal Frameworks: The contemporary legal disputes trace back to the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which granted Egypt veto power over any upstream projects that could affect its water share, and the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which allocated the entire average annual flow of 84 BCM between them (55.5 BCM to Egypt, 18.5 BCM to Sudan), rendering Ethiopia the source of ~ 86% of the Nile's waters a "non-riparian" in the eyes of downstream states [ 20 , 21 ]. Ethiopia consistently rejected these agreements as non-binding, having not been a signatory. This clash embodies the central legal tension in international water law: the conflict between the principle of "historic rights and current use" (favored by Egypt) and the principle of "equitable and reasonable utilization" without causing significant harm, as codified in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention [ 22 ]. The Rise of Upstream Agency and Institutional Fragmentation: The geopolitical landscape began shifting in the 1990s with the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, a transitional mechanism aiming for a Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The decade-long CFA negotiations ultimately failed to achieve consensus, primarily due to irreconcilable differences over Article 14(b) concerning water security [ 23 ]. The CFA's entry into force in 2024, ratified by a minimum six upstream states but without Egypt or Sudan, created a critical institutional divide. This fragmentation means the GERD operates within a basin lacking a universally accepted, overarching legal and institutional framework, injecting profound uncertainty into long-term operational planning and regional benefit-sharing. The GERD as a Catalyst for Hydro-Political Realignment: The dam's announcement in 2011 fundamentally altered basin dynamics. Scholars analyze this through different theoretical lenses. [ 24 ] applies a "hydro-hegemony" framework, examining how Egypt's historical dominance is being challenged by Ethiopia's material power (the dam itself) and ideational power (framing the project as a sovereign right to development). [ 7 , 25 ] explore the potential for the GERD to transition discussions from zero-sum water allocation to positive-sum benefit-sharing, where cooperation on hydropower, flood control, and sedimentation could yield net gains for all. However, the process has been characterized by "securitization," where technical issues are elevated to the realm of national security, hindering compromise [ 12 ]. The tripartite negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, while producing a Declaration of Principles in 2015, have repeatedly stalled on technical details of filling and long-term operation, demonstrating the difficulty of translating political agreement into operational rules. Implications for Economic Modeling: This complex institutional landscape has direct, quantifiable economic consequences that must be incorporated into any realistic assessment. It generates: Investment Risk Premiums: Uncertainty over operational rules and the threat of conflict raise the cost of capital for associated transmission infrastructure and complementary industrial investments. Transaction Costs: Prolonged, high-stakes diplomatic negotiations consume significant financial and human resources. Suboptimal Market Development: The lack of a stable cooperative framework delays the development of integrated regional energy markets, preventing the realization of comparative advantages and economies of scale. Delayed Benefits: Political stalemate can postpone the dam's full economic integration for years, incurring significant opportunity costs. Therefore, a credible economic model of the GERD cannot treat political and institutional factors as externalities; they are endogenous variables that condition the size, distribution, and timing of all economic outcomes. 2.2 Economic Assessments of Large Hydropower Project The economics of large dams has been a contentious field, with methodological approaches evolving significantly in response to critiques and changing developmental paradigms. From Cost-Benefit Analysis to Integrated Assessment: Early appraisals, common in the mid-20th century, relied heavily on traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), often narrowly focusing on direct financial returns from energy sales and irrigation. These studies were frequently criticized for systematic biases: overestimating benefits (demand forecasts, indirect growth), underestimating costs (especially resettlement, environmental degradation, and sedimentation), and employing discount rates that undervalued long-term impacts [ 26 , 27 ]. The WCD report marked a paradigm shift, advocating for a comprehensive, multi-criteria assessment framework prioritizing participatory decision-making, equity, and sustainability. Subsequent methodologies have become more integrative. Hydro-economic modeling links hydrological simulations with economic optimization to identify efficient allocation strategies under scarcity [ 28 ]. Input-Output (I-O) models capture sectoral interdependencies but are limited by their linear, fixed-coefficient assumptions and inability to model price responses [ 29 ]. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models address these limitations by simulating economy-wide responses through market clearing and behavioral equations, making them particularly suitable for analyzing large shocks like the GERD [ 30 ]. The African Context and the Sustainability Debate: In Africa, the dam debate is especially polarized. Proponents highlight the continent's vast unmet energy needs, low electrification rates, and the role of reliable, low-cost hydropower in fostering industrialization and climate resilience (through storage). Critics point to the poor historical track record of large dams in delivering promised benefits, their vulnerability to climate change, and their disproportionate social and environmental costs, often borne by marginalized communities [ 31 , 19 ]. The GERD sits at the heart of this debate, magnified by its transboundary nature. Recent literature thus calls for analyses that are not only economically rigorous but also explicit about distributional outcomes, political feasibility, and environmental trade-offs [ 18 ]. 2.3 CGE Applications to Infrastructure and Energy in Africa CGE modeling has established itself as a premier tool for economy-wide policy analysis in developing countries due to its ability to trace the ripple effects of a policy shock through production, consumption, trade, and factor markets. Foundational Models and African Adaptations: The standard reference model developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) provides a flexible, transparent framework widely used for development policy analysis [ 32 ]. This model has been extensively adapted and applied across Africa. [ 33 ] and later [ 34 ] demonstrated its utility in South Africa and Ethiopia, respectively, for analyzing trade liberalization and climate shocks. For infrastructure, [ 35 ] and [ 36 ] used CGE frameworks to quantify the growth impacts of infrastructure investments, highlighting the critical role of complementary policies and maintenance. Energy and Hydropower-Specific Applications: Within the energy sector, African CGE applications have grown. Studies have examined fuel subsidy reforms [ 37 ], renewable energy policies [ 38 ], and the economy-wide impacts of electricity constraints. For hydropower specifically, [ 39 ] used a CGE model to assess the impacts of climate-induced hydrological changes on the Egyptian economy. [ 40 ] Integrated detailed agriculture-energy linkages to analyze growth strategies in Ethiopia and Uganda. The State of Multi-Country and Transboundary CGE Analysis: Analyzing transboundary impacts requires moving beyond single-country models. Multi-country CGE models, such as those based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, have been used to assess regional integration and trade policies in Africa [ 41 ]. For water-related issues, [ 8 , 9 ] pioneered the application of a multi-country CGE model linked to a hydrological model to estimate the economic impacts of the GERD on Nile Basin economies under different climate scenarios. [ 10 ] employed a similar approach to focus on Sudan's gains from electricity imports and sediment reduction. However, these advanced models often still treat the political constraints on cooperation as a binary switch (cooperation vs. non-cooperation) rather than a spectrum of scenarios reflecting nuanced political realities. 2.4 Previous Economic Analyses of the GERD The economic literature on the GERD has evolved in sophistication, mirroring the dam's progression from announcement to near-completion. Early Projections and Government Estimates: Initial assessments by Ethiopian government agencies were understandably optimistic, projecting GDP growth impacts of 5–7% based on the dam's potential to eliminate load-shedding, reduce energy costs, and fuel export-led industrialization [ 42 , 43 ]. These studies, often based on growth accounting or simple I-O multipliers, provided a vision but lacked the mechanism to model market adjustments, price effects, and the trade-offs between domestic use and exports. Independent Academic Studies: Independent scholars introduced more cautious and nuanced analyses. [ 44 ] provided a comprehensive critical review, estimating a more probable GDP impact range of 3.2–4.1%, factoring in implementation delays, grid absorption capacity, and export market risks. He highlighted the critical importance of "software" (institutions, regulations, skilled labor) alongside "hardware." Advanced Modeling Efforts: The last five years have seen a leap in methodological rigor: [ 8 , 9 ] were among the first to apply a linked hydro-economic-CGE model, quantifying benefits for Ethiopia and costs/benefits for downstream states under various climate scenarios. Their work was foundational in establishing the magnitude of potential gains and climate vulnerabilities. [ 10 ] provided a detailed CGE-based assessment for Sudan, quantifying benefits from cheaper electricity (~ $ 200 million annual savings) and agricultural productivity gains from regulated flows and reduced sedimentation. [ 45 ] used a hydro-economic optimization model to demonstrate that cooperative, adaptive operation of the GERD with Sudanese and Egyptian dams could increase basin-wide energy generation and economic benefits by 15–20% compared to unilateral operation. [ 46 ] focused on risk management, using stochastic hydrological modeling to show how cooperative filling and operating rules could mitigate risks of downstream shortages during droughts. [ 15 ] provided the most comprehensive hydrological analysis to date, examining the dam's operational implications under various climate scenarios and concluding that adaptive management frameworks are essential for optimizing benefits while minimizing downstream risks. Persistent Gaps in the Literature: Despite these advances, significant gaps remain that this study aims to address: Shallow Integration of Politics: Most models treat the political environment as a boundary condition. Few explicitly model how varying degrees of political conflict or cooperation from technical data-sharing to full market integration translate into different economic outcomes. Limited Distributional Analysis: While macroeconomic aggregates are common, detailed analysis of how benefits and costs are distributed across household types (urban/rural, income quintiles, gender), regions, and sectors within Ethiopia is sparse. Static Frameworks: The predominant use of comparative static CGE models captures the new equilibrium but not the dynamic transition path, including investment lags, learning-by-doing, and the potential for Dutch disease effects from large export revenues. Narrow Focus: Many studies focus either on Ethiopia or a single downstream country. A holistic analysis that simultaneously considers Ethiopia's domestic transformation and its role within a nascent regional energy market is needed. 2.4.1 Synthesis and Research Gap Synthesizing the literature reveals three persistent gaps that this study addresses: Gap Identified Previous Literature This Study's Contribution Political factors are treated as exogenous [ 8 , 9 , 10 ] Endogenous political constraints through scenario design; quantification of cooperation costs Limited distributional analysis [ 44 , 45 ] 10 household groups by urban/rural and income; regional and gender implications Insufficient integration of recent hydropolitical scholarship Predominantly pre-2023 studies Engagement with [15,16, 17,47] 2.5 Political Economy and Benefit-Sharing Frameworks The impasse over the GERD cannot be resolved by economics or engineering alone; it requires engaging with political economy and institutional theory. From Water Allocation to Benefit-Sharing: The traditional approach to transboundary water disputes focuses on allocating a fixed volume of water a quintessential zero-sum game. The benefit-sharing paradigm, championed by [ 48 , 49 ], proposes a shift in focus. Instead of dividing the resource, riparian states should collaborate to maximize the total net benefits derived from the water system be they economic, social, environmental, or political and then negotiate how to share those generated benefits. Applied to the Nile, this could mean cooperating to optimize a system that includes the GERD, Sudanese dams, and Egyptian infrastructure for maximal energy production, flood protection, drought resilience, and reduced sedimentation, with the resulting gains (financial, energy, agricultural) shared among parties [ 50 ]. [ 17 ] argues that the GERD's operationalization creates unprecedented opportunities for benefit-sharing, but realizing this potential requires institutional innovations that have yet to emerge. The Role of Power Asymmetry and Hegemony: However, benefit-sharing does not occur in a power vacuum [ 12 ]. "Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus" and [ 24 ] work on "hydro-hegemony" emphasize that power asymmetries (material, bargaining, ideational) fundamentally shape cooperation. Egypt's historical hegemony was maintained not just by military power but through legal discourse (historic rights), knowledge production (dominance in hydrological data), and external alliances. The GERD represents a material shift in power, giving Ethiopia bargaining leverage. [ 16 ] analyze how this shift is playing out in regional governance forums, noting that while Ethiopia's position has strengthened, institutional path dependence continues to constrain cooperative outcomes. The question is whether this leads to conflict, a re-negotiated hegemony, or transformative cooperation [ 22 ]. Institutions as Solutions and Constraints: [ 11 ] defines institutions as the "rules of the game" formal (laws, treaties) and informal (norms, customs) that structure political and economic interactions. The lack of a robust, basin-wide institution like a fully ratified CFA or a Nile River Basin Commission is a critical constraint. It raises transaction costs, fosters mistrust, and prevents the credible commitments needed for long-term infrastructure planning and market development. [47] argue that successful cooperation would require building institutions that are not only technically sound but also perceived as legitimate and equitable by all major riparian states. This institutional deficit is a primary reason why the economic potential identified in Section 4 remains conditional on political progress. 3. Methodology and Data 3.1 Enhanced CGE Model Structure We employ a single-country, static CGE model for Ethiopia based on the standard IFPRI framework [ 32 ] with modifications to explicitly capture electricity sector dynamics and cross-border power trade. The model encompasses 35 production sectors, 35 commodity groups, and 10 representative household groups, categorized by urban/rural location 3.1.1 Justification for the Enhanced CGE Approach Several considerations justify the choice of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework. First, CGE models capture economy-wide linkages, unlike partial equilibrium or input–output models, by incorporating price-mediated adjustments across all markets, which is essential for analyzing shocks as large as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) [ 51 ]. Second, they rest on strong behavioral foundations, modeling optimizing behavior by firms and households, thereby ensuring theoretically consistent responses to policy shocks [ 30 ]. Third, CGE models enable distributional analysis, as their disaggregated household sector allows researchers to examine how benefits and costs are distributed across socioeconomic groups [ 32 ]. Finally, they have high policy relevance, since they allow simulation of counterfactual scenarios, providing valuable insights for policymakers in evaluating alternative strategies [ 52 ]. These strengths make CGE frameworks indispensable for assessing the broad and complex economic impacts of large-scale infrastructure projects such as the GERD. This enhanced version improves upon standard CGE models by : Explicitly modeling electricity trade with multiple regional partners, capturing differentiated prices and transmission constraints Incorporating political risk through a premium affecting investment decision (Eq. 4) Providing detailed sectoral disaggregation (35 sectors) to capture differential impacts across energy-intensive and other industries Integrating climate scenarios to assess vulnerability to hydrological variability Production Structure Each activity employs a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. The top level combines value-added and aggregate intermediate inputs with fixed coefficients (Leontief specification). Value-added is a CES function of primary factors (labor and capital) \(QV{A}_{a}={\alpha}_{a}^{va}{\left[{\delta}_{a}^{va}{L}_{a}^{-{\rho}_{a}^{va}}+(1-{\delta}_{a}^{va}){K}_{a}^{-{\rho}_{a}^{va}}\right]}^{-1/{\rho}_{a}^{va}}\) -------------------------------------------------(1) where \(QV{A}_{a}\) is value-added in activity \(a\) , \({L}_{a}\) and \({K}_{a}\) are labor and capital inputs, \({\alpha}_{a}^{va}\) is an efficiency parameter, \({\delta}_{a}^{va}\) is the labor share parameter, and \({\rho}_{a}^{va}\) is derived from the elasticity of substitution \({\sigma}_{a}^{va}\) as \({\rho}_{a}^{va}=(1/{\sigma}_{a}^{va})-1\) . Household Behavior Household consumption follows a Linear Expenditure System derived from Stone-Geary utility maximization \(Q{H}_{c,h}={\gamma}_{c,h}+\frac{{\beta}_{c,h}}{{P}_{c}}\left(E{H}_{h}−\sum_{{c}^{{\prime}}}{P}_{{c}^{{\prime}}}{\gamma}_{{c}^{{\prime}},h}\right)\) ------------------------------------------------------------(2) where \(Q{H}_{c,h}\) is consumption of commodity \(c\) by household \(h\) , \({\gamma}_{c,h}\) is subsistence consumption, \({\beta}_{c,h}\) is marginal budget share, \({P}_{c}\) is commodity price, and \(E{H}_{h}\) is household expenditure. International Trade We assume imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported goods (Armington assumption) and imperfect transformability between domestic and export markets (CET function). GERD Implementation The dam's operationalization is modeled through sector-specific productivity shocks in electricity generation and explicit export quantity increases. The productivity shock (GShock = 3.45, representing 345% capacity increase) is implemented as \({\alpha}_{elec,t+1}^{va}={\alpha}_{elec,t}^{va}(1+GShock)\) --------------------------------------------------------------------(3) Political Risk Incorporation a political risk premium introduced \({\theta}_{p}\) affecting investment decisions \(I=\frac{S}{r+{\theta}_{p}+\delta}\) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- where, higher \({\theta}_{p}\) reduces investment for given savings \(S\) , interest rate \(r\) , and depreciation \(\delta\) . This formulation allows quantification of how political uncertainty directly affects capital accumulation and growth. 3.2 Data Sources and Social Accounting Matrix The core dataset is a 2022 Social Accounting Matrix for Ethiopia constructed from multiple sources: national accounts from the Central Statistical Agency, household surveys, input-output tables, energy sector data from Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, and trade data from UN COMTRADE and East African Community statistics. GERD-specific parameters include generation capacity (5,150 MW), annual generation (15,692 GWh), construction cost ( $ 4.8 billion), and transmission investment requirements ( $ 1.2–1.8 billion based on [ 53 ]. 3.3 Scenario Design We implement four scenarios to capture different dimensions of GERD impacts: Base Scenario : Business-as-usual trajectory without GERD electricity GERD Operational Scenario : Introduces 15,692 GWh annual electricity supply with 40% allocated to domestic use and 60% for export to Sudan (6,500 GWh), Kenya (2,200 GWh), Djibouti (500 GWh), and other EAPP members (1,000 GWh) Climate Variability Scenario : Reduces GERD electricity output by 30% to simulate drought conditions Political Risk Scenario : Eliminates electricity exports to Sudan to reflect impacts of civil war and infrastructure destruction 3.4 Sensitivity Analysis We conduct sensitivity analyses on key parameters, particularly Armington elasticities ( \({\sigma}_{q}\) ) and export transformation elasticities ( \({\sigma}_{e}\) ). Results show qualitative robustness with GDP impacts varying within ± 15% under different elasticity assumptions. The complete sensitivity analysis is presented in Section 4.1.6 . 3.5 Model Solution The model, comprising approximately 5,000 equations, is solved using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) with PATH solver. Equilibrium is defined as a vector of prices and quantities satisfying all behavioral equations, market clearance conditions, and macroeconomic balances. 4. Results and Discussion 4.1. Results 4.1.1. Macroeconomic Impacts on Ethiopia The GDP growth trajectory exhibits notable temporal dynamics (Fig. 1 ), with initial modest impacts of 1.2% in Year 1 accelerating to 2.4% by Year 5 as industries adjust to lower-cost power. The steady-state impact of 3.5% emerges after approximately 10–12 years, reflecting the time required for full industrial restructuring. The projected 3.5% increase in Ethiopia's real GDP at steady state reflects a compound effect across multiple channels. Direct effects account for approximately 40% of this growth, arising from the value added in electricity generation and the capital returns on the dam investment. Indirect effects (approximately 35%) arise from backward linkages to construction, the manufacturing of electrical equipment, and professional services during both the construction and operational phases. Induced effects (the remaining 25%) emerge from household spending on increased incomes and government reinvestment of additional revenues (Table 1 ). Table 1 Key Macroeconomic Indicators under GERD Operational Scenario (Percentage change from Base Scenario) Indicator Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Steady State Real GDP + 1.2% + 2.4% + 3.1% + 3.5% Household Consumption + 0.8% + 2.1% + 2.9% + 3.3% Total Investment + 3.5% + 5.8% + 6.2% + 6.0% Government Revenue + 1.5% + 3.2% + 4.0% + 4.5% Consumer Price Index -0.5% -1.1% -1.0% -0.8% Source: Author's CGE model simulations The GDP growth trajectory exhibits notable temporal dynamics. The initial year shows a modest 1.2% increase primarily from the activation of generation capacity and initial export flows. By year 5, growth accelerates to 2.4% as energy-intensive industries complete their adjustment to lower-cost power and expand production. The steady-state impact of 3.5% emerges after approximately 10–12 years, reflecting the time required for full industrial restructuring and for regional energy markets to mature. Investment dynamics , show the strongest initial response (+ 3.5% in year 1), reflecting both public investment in complementary transmission infrastructure and private sector anticipation of improved energy reliability. This investment surge tapers to a sustained 6% above baseline, representing a permanent increase in Ethiopia's capital stock and productive capacity. Price effects , deserve particular attention. The Consumer Price Index declines by 1.1% at peak impact, primarily driven by reduced production costs in energy-intensive sectors. This deflationary effect is most pronounced in manufactured goods prices (-1.8% for metals, -1.5% for chemicals) and modest in services (-0.7%) and agriculture (-0.3%). Lower inflation effectively increases real household incomes, contributing to the welfare gains documented in Section 4.3. Government fiscal position , improves significantly, with revenues increasing by 4.5% in steady state. This stems from multiple sources: direct taxes from the electricity sector (25% of the increase), corporate taxes from expanding industries (40%), trade taxes on electricity exports (20%), and indirect taxes from heightened economic activity (15%). This revenue enhancement creates fiscal space for complementary investments in rural electrification, technical education, and economic diversification. 4.1.2. Sectoral Transformation As shown in Fig. 2 , the electricity sector experiences dramatic expansion (+ 28%), but its true significance lies in enabling broader industrialization through strong multiplier effects, The sectoral results reveal a fundamental restructuring of Ethiopia's economy toward more energy-intensive and value-added activities. The electricity sector's 28% expansion represents the most dramatic change, but its true significance lies in its enabling function for broader industrialization. Table 2 Sectoral Output Growth and Employment Impact (Year 10, percentage change from Base Scenario) Sector Output Growth Employment Impact ('000 jobs) Utilities (Electricity) + 28.0% + 285 Manufacturing (Metals & Machinery) + 7.8% + 210 Manufacturing (Textiles) + 4.5% + 185 Construction + 4.0% + 150 Services (ICT) + 4.0% + 175 Services (Trade) + 3.0% + 145 Manufacturing (Food) + 2.0% + 95 Agriculture + 0.7% + 40 Total Economy + 3.1% + 1,285 Source: Author's CGE model simulations Energy-intensive manufacturing shows the strongest response outside the utilities sector. Metals production increases by 7.8%, chemicals by 6.2%, and non-metallic minerals by 5.1%. These sectors benefit disproportionately due to their high electricity cost shares (15–25% of total production costs) and their role as intermediate inputs to construction and other expanding sectors. The model reveals significant intersectoral linkages: each 1% increase in electricity sector output generates approximately 0.4% growth in metals and 0.3% in chemicals through direct consumption and downstream demand effects. Employment impacts warrant careful interpretation. The reported 1.285 million jobs represent sectoral reallocation within a fixed total labor endowment rather than net employment creation. The model assumes full employment, so these figures indicate structural transformation from lower- to higher-productivity sectors. Agriculture shows minimal employment gains (+ 40,000 jobs, or + 0.4%) despite accounting for approximately 70% of current employment, reflecting its low electricity intensity and limited direct linkage to the GERD. This suggests that without targeted policies, the dam may accelerate urbanization and sectoral shifts without substantially benefiting the rural majority. Skill composition changes significantly. The electricity sector expansion creates demand for technical skills (engineers, technicians, grid operators), while manufacturing growth increases demand for both skilled production workers and managers. Services employment growth concentrates in trade logistics, financial services, and professional/technical services supporting the expanding industrial base. This has important implications for education and training policies. 4.1.3. Distributional Analysis Figure 3 results in complex welfare patterns with important equity implications. Urban households gain 3.8–4.2% in equivalent variation, while rural households gain only 2.1–2.7%. This urban bias stems from three factors: (1) urban households consume more manufactured goods and services whose prices decline most significantly; (2) urban employment is more concentrated in expanding sectors; (3) initial electrification rates and electricity consumption are higher in urban areas. As shown in Table 3 , within urban areas, the mild progressivity (higher gains for higher-income quintiles) reflects differential access to investment opportunities and skilled employment. Higher-income households own more capital, which earns higher returns as the economy expands. They also have skills that are more complementary to the expanding sectors. However, lower-income urban households still gain substantially (3.8% for Q1) through consumption price reductions and increased demand for lower-skilled services employment. Table 3 Household Welfare Impacts by Group (Equivalent variation, percentage change) Household Group GERD Operational Scenario Climate Variability Scenario Political Constraints Scenario Urban Q1 (lowest) + 3.8% + 2.3% + 2.7% Urban Q2 + 3.9% + 2.4% + 2.8% Urban Q3 + 4.0% + 2.4% + 2.9% Urban Q4 + 4.1% + 2.5% + 3.0% Urban Q5 (highest) + 4.2% + 2.5% + 3.1% Rural Q1 + 2.1% + 1.3% + 1.5% Rural Q2 + 2.3% + 1.4% + 1.6% Rural Q3 + 2.5% + 1.5% + 1.8% Rural Q4 + 2.6% + 1.6% + 1.9% Rural Q5 + 2.7% + 1.6% + 2.0% National Average + 3.3% + 2.0% + 2.4% Source: Author's CGE model simulations Regional disparities emerge when analyzing subnational impacts. Addis Ababa shows the highest gains (4.3% average welfare increase) due to its concentration of industrial and services activities. Industrial zones along transmission corridors (e.g., Dire Dawa, Hawassa) gain approximately 3.8-4.0%. Peripheral agricultural regions gain only 1.8–2.2%. These geographic disparities could exacerbate existing regional inequalities unless addressed through targeted infrastructure and industrial policies. Gender dimensions , though not explicitly modeled in household categorization, can be inferred through sectoral employment patterns. Male employment dominates in construction, utilities, and heavy manufacturing the sectors showing strongest expansion. Female employment is more concentrated in textiles, food processing, and services sectors showing moderate growth. This suggests that without targeted interventions, the GERD may reinforce gender disparities in employment and earnings. 4.1.4. Electricity Trade and Regional Impacts Electricity trade projections (Fig. 4 ) reveal both economic opportunities and geopolitical complexities, with Sudan being the recipient of 64% of exports but also the most politically sensitive market. The electricity trade projections reveal both economic opportunities and geopolitical complexities. The $ 1.22 billion in annual export revenue represents a substantial diversification of Ethiopia's export basket, currently dominated by agricultural commodities. This would increase the share of services (including electricity exports) in total exports from approximately 15% to 28%. Table 4 Projected Annual Electricity Exports and Revenue Importing Country Projected Demand (GWh) Export Price ( $ /kWh) Annual Revenue (Million USD) Sudan 6,500 0.05 325 Kenya 2,200 0.06 132 Djibouti 500 0.07 35 Other EAPP* 1,000 0.055 55 Total 10,200 ~ 1,220 *Other EAPP includes South Sudan, Tanzania, and potentially others as grid expands Source: Projections based on [ 53 ] Master Plan and author's calculations Country-specific analyses reveal differentiated benefits and challenges: Sudan represents the largest market (6,500 GWh, 64% of exports) but also the most politically sensitive. Beyond the direct $ 325 million in export revenue to Ethiopia, Sudan gains approximately $ 200 million annually in avoided thermal generation costs (at $ 0.12/kWh for diesel generation) and additional benefits from reduced sedimentation in its dams ( $ 50–80 million annually). However, Sudan's internal conflict and infrastructure destruction create delivery risks. The model suggests that each year of disrupted exports to Sudan reduces Ethiopia's GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points. Kenya offers higher prices ( $ 0.06/kWh) but faces grid integration challenges. The existing Ethiopia-Kenya transmission line has 400 MW capacity, sufficient for only 2,000 GWh annually at 57% capacity factor. Expanding this to accommodate the projected 2,200 GWh requires additional investment estimated at $ 300–400 million. Kenya's benefits include enhanced grid stability, reduced dry-season power deficits, and avoided investments in peak-load generation estimated at $ 150 million annually. Djibouti presents a special case as both an electricity importer and port services provider for Ethiopian trade. The $ 35 million in electricity exports complements Djibouti's role in handling Ethiopian cargo, creating mutual interdependencies. Djibouti reduces its diesel dependence from 85% to approximately 65% of generation, saving $ 25–30 million annually in fuel costs. Other EAPP members represent growth potential but require substantial transmission investments. South Sudan offers immediate potential but faces political instability. Tanzania presents longer-term potential through the proposed Ethiopia-Tanzania interconnector (estimated cost: $ 1.2 billion). Price sensitivity analysis shows that a 10% reduction in export prices (due to competition or negotiation pressures) would reduce export revenues by $ 122 million annually and GDP impact by approximately 0.3 percentage points. This highlights the importance of developing competitive advantages beyond low generation costs, including reliability, grid services, and seasonal complementarities. 4.1.5. Alternative Scenario Results The climate variability scenario (Fig. 5 ) demonstrates the GERD's vulnerability to hydrological conditions, with 30% output reduction decreasing GDP impacts by 40%. This nonlinear response reflects threshold effects in industrial operations. Climate Variability Scenario : Reducing GERD output by 30% decreases GDP impact by approximately 40%, highlighting the project's vulnerability to hydrological conditions. This nonlinear response reflects threshold effects in industrial operations: energy-intensive industries require reliable power and may not operate at all if supply falls below certain thresholds. The results suggest that each 1% reduction in GERD output reduces GDP impact by approximately 1.33%, indicating increasing marginal costs of output reductions. Political Risk Scenario : Eliminating exports to Sudan reduces overall benefits by 25% (GDP impact falls from 3.5% to 2.6%). This scenario likely underestimates total political costs, as it excludes: (1) increased military/security expenditures; (2) investor risk premiums on other projects; (3) opportunity costs of diplomatic resources diverted to conflict management; and (4) losses from foregone cooperation in other sectors (trade, transport, water management). Combined scenarios (climate variability plus political constraints) show interactive effects. GDP impact falls to 1.5%—a 57% reduction from the full cooperation scenario. This suggests that political and climate risks may reinforce each other, as conflict reduces capacity for cooperative drought management while climate stress exacerbates water-related tensions. 4.1.6. Sensitivity Analysis: Robustness and Key Parameters The three strategic policy pathways (Fig. 6 ) provide a pragmatic roadmap: domestic optimization (capturing 60–70% of benefits within 0–5 years), regional integration (achieving $ 800M- $ 1.2B exports within 5–10 years), and basin-wide cooperation (realizing $ 1.5- $ 2.0B regional benefits within 10–15 years). Parameter sensitivity testing confirms the qualitative robustness of results while quantifying uncertainty ranges. Key findings include: Armington elasticities (substitution between domestic and imported goods) have the strongest influence on results. Increasing these elasticities from 1.5 to 3.0 raises GDP impacts from 3.1% to 3.9%, as the economy becomes more responsive to price changes. This highlights the importance of complementary trade policies to maximize GERD benefits. Export transformation elasticities affect the distribution between domestic and export markets. Higher elasticities (greater transformability) increase export orientation, raising foreign earnings but reducing domestic price impacts. Factor mobility assumptions significantly influence employment reallocation. Assuming perfect mobility across sectors increases employment shifts by 25% compared to the baseline with moderate mobility constraints. This suggests that labor market policies (retraining, relocation support) could enhance benefits. Savings-investment closure rules affect growth dynamics. Alternative closures (savings-driven vs. investment-driven) change the temporal pattern but not the steady-state magnitude of impacts. The overall deduction from sensitivity analysis is that while quantitative estimates show moderate variation (± 15% for key indicators), qualitative conclusions remain robust across all plausible parameter values. The GERD consistently shows substantial positive impacts under cooperation scenarios, significant vulnerability to climate and political risks, and distributional patterns that favors the urban and industrial sectors. 4.2. Discussions This study's findings, derived from an enhanced CGE model integrating political economy constraints, offer both convergence with and substantive divergence from existing literature on large-scale hydropower projects in transboundary basins. The discussion below situates each key finding within its relevant theoretical and empirical context. 4.2.1. Macroeconomic Impacts The estimated 2.1–3.5% GDP growth potential, with a 3.5% steady-state impact under full cooperation, occupies a critical middle ground in the spectrum of existing projections. This finding converges with the growing skepticism in the literature regarding the often-overstated benefits of megaprojects [ 27 , 26 ], yet remains more optimistic than purely pessimistic critiques. Our estimate is notably more conservative than the 5–7% GDP growth projected in official Ethiopian planning documents [ 42 ], which typically employ input-output models with high multipliers and assume optimal, frictionless implementation. Such models often neglect crucial constraints like implementation lags, export market access, and price elasticity of demand factors explicitly accounted for in our CGE framework. Conversely, our results align closely with independent analyses by [ 44 ], who estimated a 3.2–4.1% impact, thereby validating the use of economy-wide models for such assessments. The 3.5% steady-state estimate also falls within the range suggested by [ 9 ] under cooperative scenarios, though our explicit modeling of political constraints provides more detailed conditional estimates. However, the key advancement here is the conditional nature of this estimate. The significant reduction in benefits under climate variability (-40%) and political risk (-15% in GDP impact) scenarios provides a critical quantification of what institutional economists like [ 11 ] theorize: that institutional frameworks fundamentally condition economic performance. The 31% reduction in overall economic potential due to political constraints is a direct empirical test of this theory, demonstrating that the "rules of the game" (e.g., unresolved water treaties, regional instability) can reduce the value of a $ 4.8 billion investment by nearly one-third. This finding directly supports the arguments of [47] regarding the economic costs of legal and institutional fragmentation in the Nile Basin. 4.2.2. Sectoral Reallocation and Structural Transformation The projected 28% expansion in electricity sector output and the strong multiplier effects in energy-intensive manufacturing (metals: +7.8%) align with established theories of infrastructure-led growth and forward linkages [54, 35 ]. However, our sectoral results provide nuance to these theories The finding that services (ICT, Trade) benefit nearly as much as some manufacturing sectors (+ 3–4%) challenges the simplistic narrative that cheap hydropower solely drives industrialization. It supports more contemporary frameworks of structural transformation that emphasize the role of modern services and the intertwining of manufacturing and service value chains [ 40 ]. This aligns with [ 38 ] findings on the growing importance of services in African structural transformation. The limited direct impact on agriculture (+ 0.7%) is consistent with findings from other African CGE studies, such as those by [ 34 ] on climate impacts, which show weak linkages between utility-scale infrastructure and smallholder agriculture in the short-to-medium term. [ 15 ] similarly note that while the GERD's indirect benefits to agriculture through improved rural electrification and agro-processing potential are significant, they require complementary investments in distribution infrastructure and agricultural extension. This underscores the necessity for complementary, targeted policies (e.g., rural electrification, agro-processing) to ensure the GERD contributes to broad-based rural development, a point emphasized in the inclusive growth literature but often missing from macroeconomic dam assessments. 4.2.3. Distributional Effects The welfare analysis revealing urban households gaining 3.8–4.2% compared to 2.1–2.7% for rural households provides critical empirical support for political economy critiques of large dams [ 31 , 19 ]. This finding directly engages with recent scholarship by [ 16 ], who argue that without deliberate policy interventions, large infrastructure projects in Africa tend to reinforce existing spatial inequalities. This urban bias is not an artifact of the model but a reflection of existing economic structures: urban households consume more electricity-intensive goods and services and are better positioned to capitalize on new economic opportunities. This finding directly engages with the benefit-sharing literature [ 48 ], which advocates for mechanisms to ensure equitable distribution of project gains. Our quantification of the disparity provides a clear metric for policymakers: without corrective measures, the GERD could exacerbate spatial inequalities. [ 17 ] extends this argument, suggesting that benefit-sharing frameworks must operate not only between countries but also within them, addressing domestic distributional outcomes. Interestingly, the mildly progressive pattern within urban areas (higher gains for higher quintiles) contrasts with studies that often find infrastructure benefits to be proportionally larger for the poor. This can be explained by our model's incorporation of investment effects, which tend to favor capital owners, and consumption patterns where luxury goods (with higher income elasticity) may see greater price reductions. This nuanced finding suggests that pro-poor policies, such as lifeline electricity tariffs or targeted job programs, are essential not only for equity but also for building and maintaining the domestic political coalition necessary for such a monumental national project. 4.2.4. Regional Electricity Trade The projection of $ 1.22 billion in potential annual export revenue under optimal conditions aligns with the vision of the East African Power Pool [ 53 ] and the theoretical premise of benefit-sharing through electricity trade rather than water reallocation [ 23 ]. The modeling of distinct export markets (Sudan, Kenya, etc.) allows us to go beyond aggregate figures and assess vulnerability. The finding that losing the Sudanese market due to conflict cuts export revenues by ~ 30% provides a stark, quantified example of how regional instability a key theme in the hydro-political literature [ 6 , 20 ] translates into direct economic losses. This result critically engages with the theory of hydro-hegemony [ 12 ]. Our "political constraints scenario" can be interpreted as modelling either continued hegemonic resistance or regional fragmentation. The significant economic cost demonstrates that the maintenance of asymmetric power relations (or their breakdown into conflict) is not cost-free for the upstream state either. This provides empirical support for [47]'s argument that all basin states face substantial opportunity costs from non-cooperation. This provides a potent economic argument for all basin states to move toward the cooperative, benefit-sharing frameworks advocated by scholars like [ 48 ], where the total pie is enlarged for all, rather than engaging in zero-sum conflict over a fixed resource. 4.2.5. Climate Vulnerability The 40% reduction in economic benefits under the climate variability scenario provides critical empirical weight to growing concerns about climate resilience in Nile Basin hydrology [ 46 , 55 ]. It moves the discussion from qualitative vulnerability assessments to a quantified "hydrological risk premium." This finding aligns closely with [ 15 ] hydrological analysis, which emphasizes the need for adaptive management frameworks that can respond to interannual variability and long-term climate trends. The nonlinear response (30% output reduction causing 40% benefit reduction) highlights the importance of reliability for industrial users. This finding strongly supports the argument for diversified and resilient energy systems. It suggests that the business case for complementing the GERD with large-scale solar and wind investments, which are less vulnerable to precipitation variability, is compelling not only environmentally but also economically, to hedge against the dam's underperformance during droughts. This aligns with broader calls in the climate adaptation literature [ 54 ] for infrastructure systems designed with redundancy and flexibility. 4.2.6 Synthesis: The Conditional Economics of Cooperation Ultimately, this study's most significant contribution is to demonstrate that the GERD's economics are fundamentally conditional on politics and institutions. The divergence between the "full cooperation" and "constrained" scenarios (over 30% in value) is a powerful empirical finding that bridges disciplines. It shows that the elegant economic models of regional optimality (e.g., [ 8 , 9 , 10 ]) describe a potential equilibrium that is unattainable without parallel progress in the diplomatic and institutional realms. This validates the core premise of integrated water resources management (IWRM) and the benefit-sharing paradigm: technical and economic solutions are necessary but insufficient without cooperative governance. This finding resonates with recent scholarship by [ 16 ], who argue that the GERD's legacy will be determined not by its engineering specifications but by the institutional frameworks within which it operates. The quantified costs of non-cooperation provide a powerful incentive for compromise. The detailed distributional analysis highlights where compensatory policies are needed to ensure inclusive growth. The climate risk assessment underscores the imperative for adaptive, resilient planning. 5. Policy Implications and Conclusion 5.1 Policy Implications The economic benefits of the GERD are not automatic; they are contingent upon coordinated action across political, institutional, and infrastructural domains. This study highlights three interdependent pillars that must advance simultaneously: 1. Diplomatic Resolution of Water Rights Conflicts Action: Establish a basin-wide negotiation framework that moves beyond zero-sum water allocation toward benefit-sharing. Rationale: Without credible agreements on filling and operation rules, investment risk premiums remain high and export revenues uncertain. Priority: Incremental trust-building measures such as joint technical committees and transparent data-sharing can pave the way for broader political compromise. 2. Development of Regional Energy Market Institutions Action: Strengthen the East African Power Pool (EAPP) through harmonized regulations, transparent pricing mechanisms, and enforceable contracts. Rationale: Integrated energy markets are essential to absorb surplus electricity, stabilize revenues, and distribute benefits equitably across countries. Priority: Create credible enforcement mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and ensure long-term market stability. 3. Strategic Infrastructure Investment Action: Expand transmission networks, grid absorption capacity, and complementary industrial infrastructure. Rationale: Physical connectivity is the backbone of regional integration; without it, electricity exports remain theoretical. Priority: Mobilize blended financing (public, private, regional development banks) while ensuring maintenance and sustainability to avoid stranded assets. Roadmap Short-term priorities include transparent operational rules, incremental cooperation on technical issues, and targeted transmission investments. Long-term success depends on embedding GERD within a basin-wide institutional framework that transforms historic conflict into cooperative development. Only by advancing all three pillars together can GERD evolve from a national project into a regional catalyst for growth and integration. Limitations and Future Research Agenda While the study advances the literature by embedding political economy considerations into CGE modelling, its findings should be interpreted as indicative rather than predictive. Future research could employ dynamic, multi-country CGE frameworks with updated datasets and integrated environmental modules to provide a more comprehensive assessment of GERD’s long-term regional impacts. Future research may advance toward dynamic, multi-country, and politically integrated models with updated datasets will deepen understanding of GERD’s conditional impacts. Such research can guide policymakers in transforming the dam from a contested national project into a cornerstone of cooperative regional development. 5.2 Conclusion The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents more than concrete and turbines it embodies Africa's development aspirations and the complex realities of transboundary cooperation. This study confirms its substantial economic potential: under optimal conditions, Ethiopia could gain 3.5% in GDP, create over 1.2 million jobs through sectoral reallocation, and generate $ 1.2 billion in annual export revenues. Regional partners would benefit from reduced energy costs, enhanced grid stability, and environmental co-benefits. However, these outcomes are fundamentally conditional on political choices and institutional development. The 31% reduction in economic benefits under political constraints demonstrates that technical potential alone cannot guarantee development impact. The GERD thus presents a critical test case for whether Nile Basin states can transition from historical conflict to cooperative management. The policy pathways outlined from domestic optimization through regional integration to basin-wide cooperation offer a pragmatic roadmap. Each pathway delivers substantial benefits while building trust and capacity for deeper cooperation. The key insight is that cooperation need not be all-or-nothing; incremental progress can yield significant economic returns while creating foundations for more comprehensive agreements. Looking beyond the GERD, this analysis suggests broader lessons for infrastructure-led development in contested basins: Economic interdependence created by infrastructure can change political calculations, but must be carefully managed to ensure mutual benefits Complementary policies in industrial development, human capital, and institutional reform are essential to maximize infrastructure impacts Adaptive governance is needed to address climate uncertainty and changing socioeconomic conditions Inclusive benefit-sharing is critical for social sustainability and political acceptance The GERD's ultimate legacy will be determined not in its powerhouse but in the boardrooms, negotiating tables, and policy forums where cooperation frameworks are designed and implemented. With strategic vision, pragmatic diplomacy, and commitment to mutual benefit, it could catalyze a new era of cooperation in the Nile Basin. Without these, it risks becoming another chapter in the long history of transboundary water conflict. The economic evidence is clear; the political choices remain. The coming years will reveal whether Nile Basin states can harness the GERD's potential to power not just turbines but regional cooperation, sustainable development, and shared prosperity. Declarations Competing interests The authors declare no competing interests. Assistance of AI Declaration AI tools were employed solely for linguistic refinement. The author assumes full responsibility for the scholarly content. Clinical trial number not applicable Ethics, Consent to Participate, and Consent to Publish declarations not applicable Funding Not applicable Author Contribution The author solely conceived, designed, conducted, and wrote the manuscript. Acknowledgements .Not applicable Data Availability The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-9034239","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":611774259,"identity":"af5176f7-a8e8-4011-abff-2b1d6e2b2fce","order_by":0,"name":"Wogene Markos Dumo","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Hawassa University","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Wogene","middleName":"Markos","lastName":"Dumo","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2026-03-04 23:23:17","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9034239/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9034239/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":105454071,"identity":"03845926-f3ea-43df-bbca-63b3653bad03","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-26 08:52:56","extension":"png","order_by":1,"title":"Figure 1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":217281,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eMacroeconomic Impact Trajectories under four scenarios\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image1.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9034239/v1/f48b89269f805363b76b0717.png"},{"id":105565603,"identity":"94cf5daa-ea3f-4800-9d70-e88a3e336aa8","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-27 12:53:43","extension":"png","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":151000,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eSectoral Output growth and Employment Reallocation\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image2.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9034239/v1/b38344b9496ca3aaeec4d293.png"},{"id":105454073,"identity":"c44460fc-d44f-448b-a97f-ffc325a20335","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-26 08:52:56","extension":"png","order_by":3,"title":"Figure 3","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":196102,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eHousehold welfare Distribution and Equity implication\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image3.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9034239/v1/c864e79a7dd70cfe9f6b0b2c.png"},{"id":105565568,"identity":"afa26a23-9338-480d-9c9b-3a1f65e55d3d","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-27 12:53:37","extension":"png","order_by":4,"title":"Figure 4","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":183778,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eElectricity Trade and Reginal Integration Impacts\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image4.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9034239/v1/10ba3307ddaca27376b2c86b.png"},{"id":105566770,"identity":"ee66fb49-d515-44de-b1c7-133676e3c2b3","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-27 12:57:16","extension":"png","order_by":5,"title":"Figure 5","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":204489,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eRisk Analysis\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image5.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9034239/v1/19c1fdd3ddd80ce0557515da.png"},{"id":105454072,"identity":"2638a4b4-8f20-4f55-9d50-8cb681196f20","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-26 08:52:56","extension":"png","order_by":6,"title":"Figure 6","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":235509,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eThree Strategic pathways with specific time Horizons\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"image6.png","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9034239/v1/fa877678141e008994669db8.png"},{"id":105570313,"identity":"b473977b-e5ea-4728-b05f-66847d737d56","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-27 13:16:03","extension":"pdf","order_by":0,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":2554047,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"manuscript.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-9034239/v1/fcdf0d7f-d4ed-459e-ab41-bccdfeefb375.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"Regional Economic Impact of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A Computable General Equilibrium Approach","fulltext":[{"header":"1. Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), inaugurated in September 2025, stands as Africa's largest hydropower project with an installed capacity of 5,150 MW and projected annual generation of 15,692 GWh [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR1\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e]. Completed through domestic financing estimated at \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e4.8\u0026nbsp;billion, raised primarily from bonds and taxes, it represents not only an engineering achievement but also a transformative intervention in the political economy of the Nile Basin, marking a significant shift in African infrastructure financing paradigms away from dependence on international donors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eDespite Ethiopia's remarkable economic growth averaging 9.4% annually from 2010\u0026ndash;2019 [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR3\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e], energy poverty has remained a persistent development challenge, with 64% of the population lacking electricity access as recently as 2018. The GERD constitutes the centrepiece of Ethiopia's national strategy to achieve universal electricity access by 2030 while orchestrating a strategic transition from chronic energy deficits to potential regional energy exporter status [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR4\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e]. Beyond its national significance, the dam's monumental scale more than doubles Ethiopia's generation capacity, directly addressing what has been a critical constraint on sustained economic development and industrialization.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe GERD occupies a critical nexus in the complex interrelationships between water, energy, and regional politics in a basin characterized by both immense developmental potential and profound governance challenges. Eastern Africa suffers from some of the world's most acute rates of energy poverty, with electrification rates as low as 7.2% in South Sudan and approximately 53% in Sudan [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e]. This pervasive energy deficit severely constrains industrial development, compromises the delivery of essential social services, and stifles broader economic growth. Simultaneously, the Nile Basin has witnessed decades of hydro-political tensions centered on competing claims between upstream and downstream states over water allocation and utilization rights [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study advances the literature on transboundary water management and energy economics in several significant ways, addressing key limitations in existing research. While previous economic assessments of the GERD have been conducted, they often treat political factors as exogenous constraints and provide limited distributional or comparative analysis [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]. This research makes three distinct contributions to the growing body of GERD scholarship:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eMethodological Innovation\u003c/b\u003e: We provide a comprehensive economy-wide assessment using an enhanced Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling framework that explicitly and endogenously incorporates political and institutional constraints through comprehensive scenario design. Unlike previous CGE applications [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e], this analysis quantifies the costs of non-cooperation and the premium associated with political risk, bridging the quantitative tradition of economic modeling with insights from institutional economics [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e] and hydro-political theory [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. The model is calibrated using the most recent 2022 Social Accounting Matrix for Ethiopia, constructed from national accounts, household surveys, and energy sector data [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntegration of Recent Scholarship: We situate economic analysis within the hydro-political realities of the Nile Basin, treating economic outcomes as conditional upon specific cooperation scenarios rather than guaranteed results. The analysis incorporates and engages with the most recent 2024\u0026ndash;2025 scholarship, including [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e] on operational hydrology, [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e] on regional governance frameworks, and [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e] on evolving benefit-sharing paradigms.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eEnhanced Distributional and Policy Analysis\u003c/b\u003e: We deliver detailed analysis of how different cooperation scenarios affect the distribution of economic benefits across geographic, income, and gender dimensions, quantifying the costs of conflict including investment uncertainty and risk premiums, and developing phased policy pathways grounded in political feasibility. This addresses a persistent gap identified in the literature [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e] regarding the need for more granular understanding of who benefits from large infrastructure projects.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThese contributions collectively provide more realistic, policy-relevant insights into potential pathways for transforming the Nile Basin's persistent hydro-political conflict into sustainable cooperation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe paper is structured as follows. Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e presents an integrated literature review encompassing both hydro-political context and economic assessment methodologies, with expanded engagement with 2024\u0026ndash;2025 scholarship. Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec9\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e details the enhanced CGE methodology and scenario framework, providing expanded justification for model choices and parameter specifications based on the 2022 Social Accounting Matrix. Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec16\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e presents result across macroeconomic, sectoral, distributional, and regional dimensions. Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec31\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e discusses these findings in comparative and theoretical perspective. Section 6 concludes with policy implications and research directions.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Literature Review","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec3\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.1 Hydro-Political and Institutional Context of the Nile Basin\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe governance of the Nile River, the world's longest international watercourse, has been fundamentally shaped by a historical legacy of asymmetric power relations, colonial-era treaties, and competing legal paradigms. This context is not merely background but a critical determinant of the economic potential of any major infrastructure project like the GERD.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHistorical Foundations and Legal Frameworks: The contemporary legal disputes trace back to the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which granted Egypt veto power over any upstream projects that could affect its water share, and the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which allocated the entire average annual flow of 84 BCM between them (55.5 BCM to Egypt, 18.5 BCM to Sudan), rendering Ethiopia the source of ~\u0026thinsp;86% of the Nile's waters a \"non-riparian\" in the eyes of downstream states [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR21\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e]. Ethiopia consistently rejected these agreements as non-binding, having not been a signatory. This clash embodies the central legal tension in international water law: the conflict between the principle of \"historic rights and current use\" (favored by Egypt) and the principle of \"equitable and reasonable utilization\" without causing significant harm, as codified in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Rise of Upstream Agency and Institutional Fragmentation: The geopolitical landscape began shifting in the 1990s with the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, a transitional mechanism aiming for a Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). The decade-long CFA negotiations ultimately failed to achieve consensus, primarily due to irreconcilable differences over Article 14(b) concerning water security [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e]. The CFA's entry into force in 2024, ratified by a minimum six upstream states but without Egypt or Sudan, created a critical institutional divide. This fragmentation means the GERD operates within a basin lacking a universally accepted, overarching legal and institutional framework, injecting profound uncertainty into long-term operational planning and regional benefit-sharing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe GERD as a Catalyst for Hydro-Political Realignment: The dam's announcement in 2011 fundamentally altered basin dynamics. Scholars analyze this through different theoretical lenses. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e] applies a \"hydro-hegemony\" framework, examining how Egypt's historical dominance is being challenged by Ethiopia's material power (the dam itself) and ideational power (framing the project as a sovereign right to development). [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR7\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR25\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e] explore the potential for the GERD to transition discussions from zero-sum water allocation to positive-sum benefit-sharing, where cooperation on hydropower, flood control, and sedimentation could yield net gains for all. However, the process has been characterized by \"securitization,\" where technical issues are elevated to the realm of national security, hindering compromise [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. The tripartite negotiations between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, while producing a Declaration of Principles in 2015, have repeatedly stalled on technical details of filling and long-term operation, demonstrating the difficulty of translating political agreement into operational rules.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eImplications for Economic Modeling: This complex institutional landscape has direct, quantifiable economic consequences that must be incorporated into any realistic assessment. It generates:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eInvestment Risk Premiums: Uncertainty over operational rules and the threat of conflict raise the cost of capital for associated transmission infrastructure and complementary industrial investments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eTransaction Costs: Prolonged, high-stakes diplomatic negotiations consume significant financial and human resources.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eSuboptimal Market Development: The lack of a stable cooperative framework delays the development of integrated regional energy markets, preventing the realization of comparative advantages and economies of scale.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eDelayed Benefits: Political stalemate can postpone the dam's full economic integration for years, incurring significant opportunity costs.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eTherefore, a credible economic model of the GERD cannot treat political and institutional factors as externalities; they are endogenous variables that condition the size, distribution, and timing of all economic outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec4\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.2 Economic Assessments of Large Hydropower Project\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe economics of large dams has been a contentious field, with methodological approaches evolving significantly in response to critiques and changing developmental paradigms.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom Cost-Benefit Analysis to Integrated Assessment: Early appraisals, common in the mid-20th century, relied heavily on traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), often narrowly focusing on direct financial returns from energy sales and irrigation. These studies were frequently criticized for systematic biases: overestimating benefits (demand forecasts, indirect growth), underestimating costs (especially resettlement, environmental degradation, and sedimentation), and employing discount rates that undervalued long-term impacts [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e]. The WCD report marked a paradigm shift, advocating for a comprehensive, multi-criteria assessment framework prioritizing participatory decision-making, equity, and sustainability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eSubsequent methodologies have become more integrative. Hydro-economic modeling links hydrological simulations with economic optimization to identify efficient allocation strategies under scarcity [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR28\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e]. Input-Output (I-O) models capture sectoral interdependencies but are limited by their linear, fixed-coefficient assumptions and inability to model price responses [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR29\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e]. Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models address these limitations by simulating economy-wide responses through market clearing and behavioral equations, making them particularly suitable for analyzing large shocks like the GERD [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe African Context and the Sustainability Debate: In Africa, the dam debate is especially polarized. Proponents highlight the continent's vast unmet energy needs, low electrification rates, and the role of reliable, low-cost hydropower in fostering industrialization and climate resilience (through storage). Critics point to the poor historical track record of large dams in delivering promised benefits, their vulnerability to climate change, and their disproportionate social and environmental costs, often borne by marginalized communities [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e]. The GERD sits at the heart of this debate, magnified by its transboundary nature. Recent literature thus calls for analyses that are not only economically rigorous but also explicit about distributional outcomes, political feasibility, and environmental trade-offs [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR18\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec5\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.3 CGE Applications to Infrastructure and Energy in Africa\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eCGE modeling has established itself as a premier tool for economy-wide policy analysis in developing countries due to its ability to trace the ripple effects of a policy shock through production, consumption, trade, and factor markets.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFoundational Models and African Adaptations: The standard reference model developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) provides a flexible, transparent framework widely used for development policy analysis [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e]. This model has been extensively adapted and applied across Africa. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR33\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e] and later [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e] demonstrated its utility in South Africa and Ethiopia, respectively, for analyzing trade liberalization and climate shocks. For infrastructure, [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e] and [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR36\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e] used CGE frameworks to quantify the growth impacts of infrastructure investments, highlighting the critical role of complementary policies and maintenance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEnergy and Hydropower-Specific Applications: Within the energy sector, African CGE applications have grown. Studies have examined fuel subsidy reforms [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR37\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e], renewable energy policies [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e], and the economy-wide impacts of electricity constraints. For hydropower specifically, [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e] used a CGE model to assess the impacts of climate-induced hydrological changes on the Egyptian economy. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e] Integrated detailed agriculture-energy linkages to analyze growth strategies in Ethiopia and Uganda.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe State of Multi-Country and Transboundary CGE Analysis: Analyzing transboundary impacts requires moving beyond single-country models. Multi-country CGE models, such as those based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database, have been used to assess regional integration and trade policies in Africa [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR41\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e]. For water-related issues, [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e] pioneered the application of a multi-country CGE model linked to a hydrological model to estimate the economic impacts of the GERD on Nile Basin economies under different climate scenarios. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e] employed a similar approach to focus on Sudan's gains from electricity imports and sediment reduction. However, these advanced models often still treat the political constraints on cooperation as a binary switch (cooperation vs. non-cooperation) rather than a spectrum of scenarios reflecting nuanced political realities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec6\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.4 Previous Economic Analyses of the GERD\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe economic literature on the GERD has evolved in sophistication, mirroring the dam's progression from announcement to near-completion.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eEarly Projections and Government Estimates: Initial assessments by Ethiopian government agencies were understandably optimistic, projecting GDP growth impacts of 5\u0026ndash;7% based on the dam's potential to eliminate load-shedding, reduce energy costs, and fuel export-led industrialization [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR43\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e]. These studies, often based on growth accounting or simple I-O multipliers, provided a vision but lacked the mechanism to model market adjustments, price effects, and the trade-offs between domestic use and exports.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndependent Academic Studies: Independent scholars introduced more cautious and nuanced analyses. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e] provided a comprehensive critical review, estimating a more probable GDP impact range of 3.2\u0026ndash;4.1%, factoring in implementation delays, grid absorption capacity, and export market risks. He highlighted the critical importance of \"software\" (institutions, regulations, skilled labor) alongside \"hardware.\"\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdvanced Modeling Efforts: The last five years have seen a leap in methodological rigor:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e] were among the first to apply a linked hydro-economic-CGE model, quantifying benefits for Ethiopia and costs/benefits for downstream states under various climate scenarios. Their work was foundational in establishing the magnitude of potential gains and climate vulnerabilities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e] provided a detailed CGE-based assessment for Sudan, quantifying benefits from cheaper electricity (~\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e200\u0026nbsp;million annual savings) and agricultural productivity gains from regulated flows and reduced sedimentation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e] used a hydro-economic optimization model to demonstrate that cooperative, adaptive operation of the GERD with Sudanese and Egyptian dams could increase basin-wide energy generation and economic benefits by 15\u0026ndash;20% compared to unilateral operation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e] focused on risk management, using stochastic hydrological modeling to show how cooperative filling and operating rules could mitigate risks of downstream shortages during droughts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e] provided the most comprehensive hydrological analysis to date, examining the dam's operational implications under various climate scenarios and concluding that adaptive management frameworks are essential for optimizing benefits while minimizing downstream risks.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePersistent Gaps in the Literature: Despite these advances, significant gaps remain that this study aims to address:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eShallow Integration of Politics: Most models treat the political environment as a boundary condition. Few explicitly model how varying degrees of political conflict or cooperation from technical data-sharing to full market integration translate into different economic outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eLimited Distributional Analysis: While macroeconomic aggregates are common, detailed analysis of how benefits and costs are distributed across household types (urban/rural, income quintiles, gender), regions, and sectors within Ethiopia is sparse.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eStatic Frameworks: The predominant use of comparative static CGE models captures the new equilibrium but not the dynamic transition path, including investment lags, learning-by-doing, and the potential for Dutch disease effects from large export revenues.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eNarrow Focus: Many studies focus either on Ethiopia or a single downstream country. A holistic analysis that simultaneously considers Ethiopia's domestic transformation \u003cem\u003eand\u003c/em\u003e its role within a nascent regional energy market is needed.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec7\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.4.1 Synthesis and Research Gap\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSynthesizing the literature reveals three persistent gaps that this study addresses:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"No\" id=\"Taba\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGap Identified\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrevious Literature\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis Study's Contribution\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolitical factors are treated as exogenous\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEndogenous political constraints through scenario design; quantification of cooperation costs\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eLimited distributional analysis\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR45\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e]\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10 household groups by urban/rural and income; regional and gender implications\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eInsufficient integration of recent hydropolitical scholarship\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePredominantly pre-2023 studies\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEngagement with [15,16, 17,47]\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec8\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e2.5 Political Economy and Benefit-Sharing Frameworks\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe impasse over the GERD cannot be resolved by economics or engineering alone; it requires engaging with political economy and institutional theory.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFrom Water Allocation to Benefit-Sharing: The traditional approach to transboundary water disputes focuses on allocating a fixed volume of water a quintessential zero-sum game. The benefit-sharing paradigm, championed by [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR48\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e], proposes a shift in focus. Instead of dividing the resource, riparian states should collaborate to maximize the total net benefits derived from the water system be they economic, social, environmental, or political and then negotiate how to share those generated benefits. Applied to the Nile, this could mean cooperating to optimize a system that includes the GERD, Sudanese dams, and Egyptian infrastructure for maximal energy production, flood protection, drought resilience, and reduced sedimentation, with the resulting gains (financial, energy, agricultural) shared among parties [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR49\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e]. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e] argues that the GERD's operationalization creates unprecedented opportunities for benefit-sharing, but realizing this potential requires institutional innovations that have yet to emerge.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Role of Power Asymmetry and Hegemony: However, benefit-sharing does not occur in a power vacuum [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. \"Transboundary Water Interaction Nexus\" and [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR24\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e] work on \"hydro-hegemony\" emphasize that power asymmetries (material, bargaining, ideational) fundamentally shape cooperation. Egypt's historical hegemony was maintained not just by military power but through legal discourse (historic rights), knowledge production (dominance in hydrological data), and external alliances. The GERD represents a material shift in power, giving Ethiopia bargaining leverage. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e] analyze how this shift is playing out in regional governance forums, noting that while Ethiopia's position has strengthened, institutional path dependence continues to constrain cooperative outcomes. The question is whether this leads to conflict, a re-negotiated hegemony, or transformative cooperation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR22\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInstitutions as Solutions and Constraints: [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e] defines institutions as the \"rules of the game\" formal (laws, treaties) and informal (norms, customs) that structure political and economic interactions. The lack of a robust, basin-wide institution like a fully ratified CFA or a Nile River Basin Commission is a critical constraint. It raises transaction costs, fosters mistrust, and prevents the credible commitments needed for long-term infrastructure planning and market development. [47] argue that successful cooperation would require building institutions that are not only technically sound but also perceived as legitimate and equitable by all major riparian states. This institutional deficit is a primary reason why the economic potential identified in Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec16\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e remains conditional on political progress.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"3. Methodology and Data","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1 Enhanced CGE Model Structure\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe employ a single-country, static CGE model for Ethiopia based on the standard IFPRI framework [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e] with modifications to explicitly capture electricity sector dynamics and cross-border power trade. The model encompasses 35 production sectors, 35 commodity groups, and 10 representative household groups, categorized by urban/rural location\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.1.1 Justification for the Enhanced CGE Approach\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eSeveral considerations justify the choice of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) framework. First, CGE models capture economy-wide linkages, unlike partial equilibrium or input\u0026ndash;output models, by incorporating price-mediated adjustments across all markets, which is essential for analyzing shocks as large as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR50\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e]. Second, they rest on strong behavioral foundations, modeling optimizing behavior by firms and households, thereby ensuring theoretically consistent responses to policy shocks [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR30\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e]. Third, CGE models enable distributional analysis, as their disaggregated household sector allows researchers to examine how benefits and costs are distributed across socioeconomic groups [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR32\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e]. Finally, they have high policy relevance, since they allow simulation of counterfactual scenarios, providing valuable insights for policymakers in evaluating alternative strategies [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR51\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e]. These strengths make CGE frameworks indispensable for assessing the broad and complex economic impacts of large-scale infrastructure projects such as the GERD.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eThis enhanced version improves upon standard CGE models by\u003c/b\u003e:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eExplicitly modeling electricity trade with multiple regional partners, capturing differentiated prices and transmission constraints\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIncorporating political risk through a premium affecting investment decision (Eq.\u0026nbsp;4)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eProviding detailed sectoral disaggregation (35 sectors) to capture differential impacts across energy-intensive and other industries\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eIntegrating climate scenarios to assess vulnerability to hydrological variability\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eProduction Structure\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eEach activity employs a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function. The top level combines value-added and aggregate intermediate inputs with fixed coefficients (Leontief specification). Value-added is a CES function of primary factors (labor and capital)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e \u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(QV{A}_{a}={\\alpha}_{a}^{va}{\\left[{\\delta}_{a}^{va}{L}_{a}^{-{\\rho}_{a}^{va}}+(1-{\\delta}_{a}^{va}){K}_{a}^{-{\\rho}_{a}^{va}}\\right]}^{-1/{\\rho}_{a}^{va}}\\)\u003c/span\u003e \u003c/span\u003e-------------------------------------------------(1)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ewhere \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(QV{A}_{a}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is value-added in activity \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(a\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({L}_{a}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({K}_{a}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are labor and capital inputs, \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\alpha}_{a}^{va}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is an efficiency parameter, \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\delta}_{a}^{va}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is the labor share parameter, and \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\rho}_{a}^{va}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is derived from the elasticity of substitution \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\sigma}_{a}^{va}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e as \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\rho}_{a}^{va}=(1/{\\sigma}_{a}^{va})-1\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eHousehold Behavior\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eHousehold consumption follows a Linear Expenditure System derived from Stone-Geary utility maximization\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e \u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(Q{H}_{c,h}={\\gamma}_{c,h}+\\frac{{\\beta}_{c,h}}{{P}_{c}}\\left(E{H}_{h}\u0026minus;\\sum_{{c}^{{\\prime}}}{P}_{{c}^{{\\prime}}}{\\gamma}_{{c}^{{\\prime}},h}\\right)\\)\u003c/span\u003e \u003c/span\u003e------------------------------------------------------------(2)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ewhere \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(Q{H}_{c,h}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is consumption of commodity \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(c\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by household \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(h\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\gamma}_{c,h}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is subsistence consumption, \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\beta}_{c,h}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is marginal budget share, \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({P}_{c}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is commodity price, and \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(E{H}_{h}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is household expenditure.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eInternational Trade\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe assume imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported goods (Armington assumption) and imperfect transformability between domestic and export markets (CET function).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eGERD Implementation\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe dam's operationalization is modeled through sector-specific productivity shocks in electricity generation and explicit export quantity increases. The productivity shock (GShock\u0026thinsp;=\u0026thinsp;3.45, representing 345% capacity increase) is implemented as\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e \u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\alpha}_{elec,t+1}^{va}={\\alpha}_{elec,t}^{va}(1+GShock)\\)\u003c/span\u003e \u003c/span\u003e--------------------------------------------------------------------(3)\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003ePolitical Risk Incorporation\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003ea political risk premium introduced \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\theta}_{p}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e affecting investment decisions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e \u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(I=\\frac{S}{r+{\\theta}_{p}+\\delta}\\)\u003c/span\u003e \u003c/span\u003e-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ewhere, higher \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\theta}_{p}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e reduces investment for given savings \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(S\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, interest rate \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(r\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and depreciation \u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\(\\delta\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This formulation allows quantification of how political uncertainty directly affects capital accumulation and growth.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec12\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.2 Data Sources and Social Accounting Matrix\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe core dataset is a 2022 Social Accounting Matrix for Ethiopia constructed from multiple sources: national accounts from the Central Statistical Agency, household surveys, input-output tables, energy sector data from Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation, and trade data from UN COMTRADE and East African Community statistics.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eGERD-specific parameters include generation capacity (5,150 MW), annual generation (15,692 GWh), construction cost (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e4.8\u0026nbsp;billion), and transmission investment requirements (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.2\u0026ndash;1.8\u0026nbsp;billion based on [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e].\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.3 Scenario Design\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe implement four scenarios to capture different dimensions of GERD impacts:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003col\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eBase Scenario\u003c/b\u003e: Business-as-usual trajectory without GERD electricity\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eGERD Operational Scenario\u003c/b\u003e: Introduces 15,692 GWh annual electricity supply with 40% allocated to domestic use and 60% for export to Sudan (6,500 GWh), Kenya (2,200 GWh), Djibouti (500 GWh), and other EAPP members (1,000 GWh)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eClimate Variability Scenario\u003c/b\u003e: Reduces GERD electricity output by 30% to simulate drought conditions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePolitical Risk Scenario\u003c/b\u003e: Eliminates electricity exports to Sudan to reflect impacts of civil war and infrastructure destruction\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/span\u003e \u003c/ol\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.4 Sensitivity Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eWe conduct sensitivity analyses on key parameters, particularly Armington elasticities (\u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\sigma}_{q}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) and export transformation elasticities (\u003cspan class=\"InlineEquation\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"mathinline\"\u003e\\({\\sigma}_{e}\\)\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e). Results show qualitative robustness with GDP impacts varying within \u0026plusmn;\u0026thinsp;15% under different elasticity assumptions. The complete sensitivity analysis is presented in Section \u003cspan refid=\"Sec23\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4.1.6\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e3.5 Model Solution\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe model, comprising approximately 5,000 equations, is solved using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) with PATH solver. Equilibrium is defined as a vector of prices and quantities satisfying all behavioral equations, market clearance conditions, and macroeconomic balances.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Results and Discussion","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1. Results\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.1. Macroeconomic Impacts on Ethiopia\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe GDP growth trajectory exhibits notable temporal dynamics (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e), with initial modest impacts of 1.2% in Year 1 accelerating to 2.4% by Year 5 as industries adjust to lower-cost power. The steady-state impact of 3.5% emerges after approximately 10\u0026ndash;12 years, reflecting the time required for full industrial restructuring.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe projected 3.5% increase in Ethiopia's real GDP at steady state reflects a compound effect across multiple channels. Direct effects account for approximately 40% of this growth, arising from the value added in electricity generation and the capital returns on the dam investment. Indirect effects (approximately 35%) arise from backward linkages to construction, the manufacturing of electrical equipment, and professional services during both the construction and operational phases. Induced effects (the remaining 25%) emerge from household spending on increased incomes and government reinvestment of additional revenues (Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eKey Macroeconomic Indicators under GERD Operational Scenario \u003cem\u003e(Percentage change from Base Scenario)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eIndicator\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear 1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear 5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eYear 10\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSteady State\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eReal GDP\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.2%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.4%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.1%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHousehold Consumption\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;0.8%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.1%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.9%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.3%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTotal Investment\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;5.8%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;6.2%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;6.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGovernment Revenue\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.2%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConsumer Price Index\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-1.1%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-1.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e-0.8%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Author's CGE model simulations\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe GDP growth trajectory exhibits notable temporal dynamics. The initial year shows a modest 1.2% increase primarily from the activation of generation capacity and initial export flows. By year 5, growth accelerates to 2.4% as energy-intensive industries complete their adjustment to lower-cost power and expand production. The steady-state impact of 3.5% emerges after approximately 10\u0026ndash;12 years, reflecting the time required for full industrial restructuring and for regional energy markets to mature.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eInvestment dynamics\u003c/b\u003e, show the strongest initial response (+\u0026thinsp;3.5% in year 1), reflecting both public investment in complementary transmission infrastructure and private sector anticipation of improved energy reliability. This investment surge tapers to a sustained 6% above baseline, representing a permanent increase in Ethiopia's capital stock and productive capacity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePrice effects\u003c/b\u003e, deserve particular attention. The Consumer Price Index declines by 1.1% at peak impact, primarily driven by reduced production costs in energy-intensive sectors. This deflationary effect is most pronounced in manufactured goods prices (-1.8% for metals, -1.5% for chemicals) and modest in services (-0.7%) and agriculture (-0.3%). Lower inflation effectively increases real household incomes, contributing to the welfare gains documented in Section 4.3.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eGovernment fiscal position\u003c/b\u003e, improves significantly, with revenues increasing by 4.5% in steady state. This stems from multiple sources: direct taxes from the electricity sector (25% of the increase), corporate taxes from expanding industries (40%), trade taxes on electricity exports (20%), and indirect taxes from heightened economic activity (15%). This revenue enhancement creates fiscal space for complementary investments in rural electrification, technical education, and economic diversification.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec19\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.2. Sectoral Transformation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, the electricity sector experiences dramatic expansion (+\u0026thinsp;28%), but its true significance lies in enabling broader industrialization through strong multiplier effects,\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe sectoral results reveal a fundamental restructuring of Ethiopia's economy toward more energy-intensive and value-added activities. The electricity sector's 28% expansion represents the most dramatic change, but its true significance lies in its enabling function for broader industrialization.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSectoral Output Growth and Employment Impact \u003cem\u003e(Year 10, percentage change from Base Scenario)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSector\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOutput Growth\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eEmployment Impact ('000 jobs)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUtilities (Electricity)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;28.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;285\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eManufacturing (Metals \u0026amp; Machinery)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;7.8%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;210\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eManufacturing (Textiles)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;185\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eConstruction\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;150\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eServices (ICT)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;175\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eServices (Trade)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;145\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eManufacturing (Food)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;95\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAgriculture\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;0.7%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;40\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTotal Economy\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.1%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1,285\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"3\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Author's CGE model simulations\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eEnergy-intensive manufacturing\u003c/b\u003e shows the strongest response outside the utilities sector. Metals production increases by 7.8%, chemicals by 6.2%, and non-metallic minerals by 5.1%. These sectors benefit disproportionately due to their high electricity cost shares (15\u0026ndash;25% of total production costs) and their role as intermediate inputs to construction and other expanding sectors. The model reveals significant intersectoral linkages: each 1% increase in electricity sector output generates approximately 0.4% growth in metals and 0.3% in chemicals through direct consumption and downstream demand effects.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eEmployment impacts\u003c/b\u003e warrant careful interpretation. The reported 1.285\u0026nbsp;million jobs represent sectoral reallocation within a fixed total labor endowment rather than net employment creation. The model assumes full employment, so these figures indicate structural transformation from lower- to higher-productivity sectors. Agriculture shows minimal employment gains (+\u0026thinsp;40,000 jobs, or +\u0026thinsp;0.4%) despite accounting for approximately 70% of current employment, reflecting its low electricity intensity and limited direct linkage to the GERD. This suggests that without targeted policies, the dam may accelerate urbanization and sectoral shifts without substantially benefiting the rural majority.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eSkill composition\u003c/b\u003e changes significantly. The electricity sector expansion creates demand for technical skills (engineers, technicians, grid operators), while manufacturing growth increases demand for both skilled production workers and managers. Services employment growth concentrates in trade logistics, financial services, and professional/technical services supporting the expanding industrial base. This has important implications for education and training policies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec20\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.3. Distributional Analysis\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eFigure \u003cspan refid=\"Fig3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e results in complex welfare patterns with important equity implications. Urban households gain 3.8\u0026ndash;4.2% in equivalent variation, while rural households gain only 2.1\u0026ndash;2.7%. This urban bias stems from three factors: (1) urban households consume more manufactured goods and services whose prices decline most significantly; (2) urban employment is more concentrated in expanding sectors; (3) initial electrification rates and electricity consumption are higher in urban areas.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAs shown in Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e, within urban areas, the mild progressivity (higher gains for higher-income quintiles) reflects differential access to investment opportunities and skilled employment. Higher-income households own more capital, which earns higher returns as the economy expands. They also have skills that are more complementary to the expanding sectors. However, lower-income urban households still gain substantially (3.8% for Q1) through consumption price reductions and increased demand for lower-skilled services employment.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHousehold Welfare Impacts by Group \u003cem\u003e(Equivalent variation, percentage change)\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eHousehold Group\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eGERD Operational Scenario\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eClimate Variability Scenario\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003ePolitical Constraints Scenario\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUrban Q1 (lowest)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.8%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.3%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.7%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUrban Q2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.9%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.4%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.8%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUrban Q3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.4%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.9%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUrban Q4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.1%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eUrban Q5 (highest)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;4.2%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.1%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRural Q1\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.1%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.3%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRural Q2\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.3%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.4%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.6%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRural Q3\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.5%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.8%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRural Q4\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.6%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.6%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.9%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eRural Q5\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.7%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;1.6%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eNational Average\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;3.3%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.0%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e+\u0026thinsp;2.4%\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"4\"\u003e\u003cem\u003eSource: Author's CGE model simulations\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eRegional disparities emerge when analyzing subnational impacts. Addis Ababa shows the highest gains (4.3% average welfare increase) due to its concentration of industrial and services activities. Industrial zones along transmission corridors (e.g., Dire Dawa, Hawassa) gain approximately 3.8-4.0%. Peripheral agricultural regions gain only 1.8\u0026ndash;2.2%. These geographic disparities could exacerbate existing regional inequalities unless addressed through targeted infrastructure and industrial policies.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eGender dimensions\u003c/b\u003e, though not explicitly modeled in household categorization, can be inferred through sectoral employment patterns. Male employment dominates in construction, utilities, and heavy manufacturing the sectors showing strongest expansion. Female employment is more concentrated in textiles, food processing, and services sectors showing moderate growth. This suggests that without targeted interventions, the GERD may reinforce gender disparities in employment and earnings.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec21\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.4. Electricity Trade and Regional Impacts\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eElectricity trade projections (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e) reveal both economic opportunities and geopolitical complexities, with Sudan being the recipient of 64% of exports but also the most politically sensitive market.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe electricity trade projections reveal both economic opportunities and geopolitical complexities. The \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.22\u0026nbsp;billion in annual export revenue represents a substantial diversification of Ethiopia's export basket, currently dominated by agricultural commodities. This would increase the share of services (including electricity exports) in total exports from approximately 15% to 28%.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e \u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eProjected Annual Electricity Exports and Revenue\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/caption\u003e \u003ccolgroup cols=\"4\"\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"char\" char=\".\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003cthead\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eImporting Country\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eProjected Demand (GWh)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eExport Price (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e/kWh)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eAnnual Revenue (Million USD)\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/th\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/thead\u003e \u003ctbody\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eSudan\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e6,500\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.05\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e325\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eKenya\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e2,200\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.06\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e132\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eDjibouti\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e500\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.07\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e35\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther EAPP*\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e1,000\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e0.055\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e55\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003ctr\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e \u003cp\u003eTotal\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"char\" char=\".\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e10,200\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e \u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e \u003cp\u003e~\u0026thinsp;1,220\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/td\u003e \u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tbody\u003e \u003c/colgroup\u003e \u003ctfoot\u003e \u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"4\"\u003e*Other EAPP includes South Sudan, Tanzania, and potentially others as grid expands\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e \u003c/tfoot\u003e \u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cem\u003eSource: Projections based on\u003c/em\u003e [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e] \u003cem\u003eMaster Plan and author's calculations\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eCountry-specific analyses reveal differentiated benefits and challenges:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eSudan represents the largest market (6,500 GWh, 64% of exports) but also the most politically sensitive. Beyond the direct \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e325\u0026nbsp;million in export revenue to Ethiopia, Sudan gains approximately \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e200\u0026nbsp;million annually in avoided thermal generation costs (at \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e0.12/kWh for diesel generation) and additional benefits from reduced sedimentation in its dams (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e50\u0026ndash;80\u0026nbsp;million annually). However, Sudan's internal conflict and infrastructure destruction create delivery risks. The model suggests that each year of disrupted exports to Sudan reduces Ethiopia's GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eKenya offers higher prices (\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e0.06/kWh) but faces grid integration challenges. The existing Ethiopia-Kenya transmission line has 400 MW capacity, sufficient for only 2,000 GWh annually at 57% capacity factor. Expanding this to accommodate the projected 2,200 GWh requires additional investment estimated at \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e300\u0026ndash;400\u0026nbsp;million. Kenya's benefits include enhanced grid stability, reduced dry-season power deficits, and avoided investments in peak-load generation estimated at \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e150\u0026nbsp;million annually.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eDjibouti presents a special case as both an electricity importer and port services provider for Ethiopian trade. The \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e35\u0026nbsp;million in electricity exports complements Djibouti's role in handling Ethiopian cargo, creating mutual interdependencies. Djibouti reduces its diesel dependence from 85% to approximately 65% of generation, saving \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e25\u0026ndash;30\u0026nbsp;million annually in fuel costs.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eOther EAPP members represent growth potential but require substantial transmission investments. South Sudan offers immediate potential but faces political instability. Tanzania presents longer-term potential through the proposed Ethiopia-Tanzania interconnector (estimated cost: \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.2\u0026nbsp;billion).\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003ePrice sensitivity analysis shows that a 10% reduction in export prices (due to competition or negotiation pressures) would reduce export revenues by \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e122\u0026nbsp;million annually and GDP impact by approximately 0.3 percentage points. This highlights the importance of developing competitive advantages beyond low generation costs, including reliability, grid services, and seasonal complementarities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec22\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.5. Alternative Scenario Results\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe climate variability scenario (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e) demonstrates the GERD's vulnerability to hydrological conditions, with 30% output reduction decreasing GDP impacts by 40%. This nonlinear response reflects threshold effects in industrial operations.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eClimate Variability Scenario\u003c/b\u003e: Reducing GERD output by 30% decreases GDP impact by approximately 40%, highlighting the project's vulnerability to hydrological conditions. This nonlinear response reflects threshold effects in industrial operations: energy-intensive industries require reliable power and may not operate at all if supply falls below certain thresholds. The results suggest that each 1% reduction in GERD output reduces GDP impact by approximately 1.33%, indicating increasing marginal costs of output reductions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003ePolitical Risk Scenario\u003c/b\u003e: Eliminating exports to Sudan reduces overall benefits by 25% (GDP impact falls from 3.5% to 2.6%). This scenario likely underestimates total political costs, as it excludes: (1) increased military/security expenditures; (2) investor risk premiums on other projects; (3) opportunity costs of diplomatic resources diverted to conflict management; and (4) losses from foregone cooperation in other sectors (trade, transport, water management).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eCombined scenarios\u003c/b\u003e (climate variability plus political constraints) show interactive effects. GDP impact falls to 1.5%\u0026mdash;a 57% reduction from the full cooperation scenario. This suggests that political and climate risks may reinforce each other, as conflict reduces capacity for cooperative drought management while climate stress exacerbates water-related tensions.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec23\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.1.6. Sensitivity Analysis: Robustness and Key Parameters\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe three strategic policy pathways (Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e) provide a pragmatic roadmap: domestic optimization (capturing 60\u0026ndash;70% of benefits within 0\u0026ndash;5 years), regional integration (achieving \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e800M-\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.2B exports within 5\u0026ndash;10 years), and basin-wide cooperation (realizing \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.5-\u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e2.0B regional benefits within 10\u0026ndash;15 years).\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eParameter sensitivity\u003c/b\u003e testing confirms the qualitative robustness of results while quantifying uncertainty ranges. Key findings include:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eArmington elasticities\u003c/b\u003e (substitution between domestic and imported goods) have the strongest influence on results. Increasing these elasticities from 1.5 to 3.0 raises GDP impacts from 3.1% to 3.9%, as the economy becomes more responsive to price changes. This highlights the importance of complementary trade policies to maximize GERD benefits.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eExport transformation elasticities\u003c/b\u003e affect the distribution between domestic and export markets. Higher elasticities (greater transformability) increase export orientation, raising foreign earnings but reducing domestic price impacts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eFactor mobility assumptions\u003c/b\u003e significantly influence employment reallocation. Assuming perfect mobility across sectors increases employment shifts by 25% compared to the baseline with moderate mobility constraints. This suggests that labor market policies (retraining, relocation support) could enhance benefits.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eSavings-investment closure rules\u003c/b\u003e affect growth dynamics. Alternative closures (savings-driven vs. investment-driven) change the temporal pattern but not the steady-state magnitude of impacts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe overall deduction from sensitivity analysis is that while quantitative estimates show moderate variation (\u0026plusmn;\u0026thinsp;15% for key indicators), qualitative conclusions remain robust across all plausible parameter values. The GERD consistently shows substantial positive impacts under cooperation scenarios, significant vulnerability to climate and political risks, and distributional patterns that favors the urban and industrial sectors.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec24\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2. Discussions\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis study's findings, derived from an enhanced CGE model integrating political economy constraints, offer both convergence with and substantive divergence from existing literature on large-scale hydropower projects in transboundary basins. The discussion below situates each key finding within its relevant theoretical and empirical context.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec25\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2.1. Macroeconomic Impacts\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe estimated 2.1\u0026ndash;3.5% GDP growth potential, with a 3.5% steady-state impact under full cooperation, occupies a critical middle ground in the spectrum of existing projections. This finding converges with the growing skepticism in the literature regarding the often-overstated benefits of megaprojects [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR27\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR26\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e], yet remains more optimistic than purely pessimistic critiques. Our estimate is notably more conservative than the 5\u0026ndash;7% GDP growth projected in official Ethiopian planning documents [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR42\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e], which typically employ input-output models with high multipliers and assume optimal, frictionless implementation. Such models often neglect crucial constraints like implementation lags, export market access, and price elasticity of demand factors explicitly accounted for in our CGE framework.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eConversely, our results align closely with independent analyses by [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR44\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e], who estimated a 3.2\u0026ndash;4.1% impact, thereby validating the use of economy-wide models for such assessments. The 3.5% steady-state estimate also falls within the range suggested by [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e] under cooperative scenarios, though our explicit modeling of political constraints provides more detailed conditional estimates. However, the key advancement here is the conditional nature of this estimate. The significant reduction in benefits under climate variability (-40%) and political risk (-15% in GDP impact) scenarios provides a critical quantification of what institutional economists like [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR11\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e] theorize: that institutional frameworks fundamentally condition economic performance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe 31% reduction in overall economic potential due to political constraints is a direct empirical test of this theory, demonstrating that the \"rules of the game\" (e.g., unresolved water treaties, regional instability) can reduce the value of a \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e4.8\u0026nbsp;billion investment by nearly one-third. This finding directly supports the arguments of [47] regarding the economic costs of legal and institutional fragmentation in the Nile Basin.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec26\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2.2. Sectoral Reallocation and Structural Transformation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe projected 28% expansion in electricity sector output and the strong multiplier effects in energy-intensive manufacturing (metals: +7.8%) align with established theories of infrastructure-led growth and forward linkages [54, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR35\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e]. However, our sectoral results provide nuance to these theories\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe finding that services (ICT, Trade) benefit nearly as much as some manufacturing sectors (+\u0026thinsp;3\u0026ndash;4%) challenges the simplistic narrative that cheap hydropower solely drives industrialization. It supports more contemporary frameworks of structural transformation that emphasize the role of modern services and the intertwining of manufacturing and service value chains [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR40\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e]. This aligns with [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR38\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e] findings on the growing importance of services in African structural transformation.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe limited direct impact on agriculture (+\u0026thinsp;0.7%) is consistent with findings from other African CGE studies, such as those by [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR34\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e] on climate impacts, which show weak linkages between utility-scale infrastructure and smallholder agriculture in the short-to-medium term.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e] similarly note that while the GERD's indirect benefits to agriculture through improved rural electrification and agro-processing potential are significant, they require complementary investments in distribution infrastructure and agricultural extension. This underscores the necessity for complementary, targeted policies (e.g., rural electrification, agro-processing) to ensure the GERD contributes to broad-based rural development, a point emphasized in the inclusive growth literature but often missing from macroeconomic dam assessments.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec27\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2.3. Distributional Effects\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe welfare analysis revealing urban households gaining 3.8\u0026ndash;4.2% compared to 2.1\u0026ndash;2.7% for rural households provides critical empirical support for political economy critiques of large dams [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR31\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR19\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e]. This finding directly engages with recent scholarship by [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e], who argue that without deliberate policy interventions, large infrastructure projects in Africa tend to reinforce existing spatial inequalities. This urban bias is not an artifact of the model but a reflection of existing economic structures: urban households consume more electricity-intensive goods and services and are better positioned to capitalize on new economic opportunities.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis finding directly engages with the benefit-sharing literature [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e], which advocates for mechanisms to ensure equitable distribution of project gains. Our quantification of the disparity provides a clear metric for policymakers: without corrective measures, the GERD could exacerbate spatial inequalities. [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR17\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e] extends this argument, suggesting that benefit-sharing frameworks must operate not only between countries but also within them, addressing domestic distributional outcomes.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eInterestingly, the mildly progressive pattern within urban areas (higher gains for higher quintiles) contrasts with studies that often find infrastructure benefits to be proportionally larger for the poor. This can be explained by our model's incorporation of investment effects, which tend to favor capital owners, and consumption patterns where luxury goods (with higher income elasticity) may see greater price reductions. This nuanced finding suggests that pro-poor policies, such as lifeline electricity tariffs or targeted job programs, are essential not only for equity but also for building and maintaining the domestic political coalition necessary for such a monumental national project.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec28\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2.4. Regional Electricity Trade\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe projection of \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.22\u0026nbsp;billion in potential annual export revenue under optimal conditions aligns with the vision of the East African Power Pool [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR52\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e] and the theoretical premise of benefit-sharing through electricity trade rather than water reallocation [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR23\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e]. The modeling of distinct export markets (Sudan, Kenya, etc.) allows us to go beyond aggregate figures and assess vulnerability. The finding that losing the Sudanese market due to conflict cuts export revenues by ~\u0026thinsp;30% provides a stark, quantified example of how regional instability a key theme in the hydro-political literature [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR6\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR20\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e] translates into direct economic losses.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis result critically engages with the theory of hydro-hegemony [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e]. Our \"political constraints scenario\" can be interpreted as modelling either continued hegemonic resistance or regional fragmentation. The significant economic cost demonstrates that the maintenance of asymmetric power relations (or their breakdown into conflict) is not cost-free for the upstream state either. This provides empirical support for [47]'s argument that all basin states face substantial opportunity costs from non-cooperation. This provides a potent economic argument for all basin states to move toward the cooperative, benefit-sharing frameworks advocated by scholars like [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR47\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e], where the total pie is enlarged for all, rather than engaging in zero-sum conflict over a fixed resource.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec29\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2.5. Climate Vulnerability\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe 40% reduction in economic benefits under the climate variability scenario provides critical empirical weight to growing concerns about climate resilience in Nile Basin hydrology [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR46\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR54\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e]. It moves the discussion from qualitative vulnerability assessments to a quantified \"hydrological risk premium.\" This finding aligns closely with [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e] hydrological analysis, which emphasizes the need for adaptive management frameworks that can respond to interannual variability and long-term climate trends. The nonlinear response (30% output reduction causing 40% benefit reduction) highlights the importance of reliability for industrial users.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis finding strongly supports the argument for diversified and resilient energy systems. It suggests that the business case for complementing the GERD with large-scale solar and wind investments, which are less vulnerable to precipitation variability, is compelling not only environmentally but also economically, to hedge against the dam's underperformance during droughts. This aligns with broader calls in the climate adaptation literature [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR53\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e] for infrastructure systems designed with redundancy and flexibility.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec30\" class=\"Section3\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e4.2.6 Synthesis: The Conditional Economics of Cooperation\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eUltimately, this study's most significant contribution is to demonstrate that the GERD's economics are fundamentally conditional on politics and institutions. The divergence between the \"full cooperation\" and \"constrained\" scenarios (over 30% in value) is a powerful empirical finding that bridges disciplines. It shows that the elegant economic models of regional optimality (e.g., [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR8\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR10\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e]) describe a potential equilibrium that is unattainable without parallel progress in the diplomatic and institutional realms. This validates the core premise of integrated water resources management (IWRM) and the benefit-sharing paradigm: technical and economic solutions are necessary but insufficient without cooperative governance.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThis finding resonates with recent scholarship by [\u003cspan citationid=\"CR16\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e], who argue that the GERD's legacy will be determined not by its engineering specifications but by the institutional frameworks within which it operates. The quantified costs of non-cooperation provide a powerful incentive for compromise. The detailed distributional analysis highlights where compensatory policies are needed to ensure inclusive growth. The climate risk assessment underscores the imperative for adaptive, resilient planning.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Policy Implications and Conclusion","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec32\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.1 Policy Implications\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe economic benefits of the GERD are not automatic; they are contingent upon coordinated action across political, institutional, and infrastructural domains. This study highlights three interdependent pillars that must advance simultaneously:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e1. Diplomatic Resolution of Water Rights Conflicts\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAction: Establish a basin-wide negotiation framework that moves beyond zero-sum water allocation toward benefit-sharing.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eRationale: Without credible agreements on filling and operation rules, investment risk premiums remain high and export revenues uncertain.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePriority: Incremental trust-building measures such as joint technical committees and transparent data-sharing can pave the way for broader political compromise.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e2. Development of Regional Energy Market Institutions\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAction: Strengthen the East African Power Pool (EAPP) through harmonized regulations, transparent pricing mechanisms, and enforceable contracts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eRationale: Integrated energy markets are essential to absorb surplus electricity, stabilize revenues, and distribute benefits equitably across countries.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePriority: Create credible enforcement mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and ensure long-term market stability.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003e3. Strategic Infrastructure Investment\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAction: Expand transmission networks, grid absorption capacity, and complementary industrial infrastructure.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eRationale: Physical connectivity is the backbone of regional integration; without it, electricity exports remain theoretical.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003ePriority: Mobilize blended financing (public, private, regional development banks) while ensuring maintenance and sustainability to avoid stranded assets.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eRoadmap\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eShort-term priorities include transparent operational rules, incremental cooperation on technical issues, and targeted transmission investments. Long-term success depends on embedding GERD within a basin-wide institutional framework that transforms historic conflict into cooperative development. Only by advancing all three pillars together can GERD evolve from a national project into a regional catalyst for growth and integration.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eLimitations and Future Research Agenda\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eWhile the study advances the literature by embedding political economy considerations into CGE modelling, its findings should be interpreted as indicative rather than predictive. Future research could employ dynamic, multi-country CGE frameworks with updated datasets and integrated environmental modules to provide a more comprehensive assessment of GERD\u0026rsquo;s long-term regional impacts.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eFuture research may advance toward dynamic, multi-country, and politically integrated models with updated datasets will deepen understanding of GERD\u0026rsquo;s conditional impacts. Such research can guide policymakers in transforming the dam from a contested national project into a cornerstone of cooperative regional development.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e \u003cdiv id=\"Sec33\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e \u003ch2\u003e5.2 Conclusion\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam represents more than concrete and turbines it embodies Africa's development aspirations and the complex realities of transboundary cooperation. This study confirms its substantial economic potential: under optimal conditions, Ethiopia could gain 3.5% in GDP, create over 1.2\u0026nbsp;million jobs through sectoral reallocation, and generate \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.2\u0026nbsp;billion in annual export revenues. Regional partners would benefit from reduced energy costs, enhanced grid stability, and environmental co-benefits.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eHowever, these outcomes are fundamentally conditional on political choices and institutional development. The 31% reduction in economic benefits under political constraints demonstrates that technical potential alone cannot guarantee development impact. The GERD thus presents a critical test case for whether Nile Basin states can transition from historical conflict to cooperative management.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe policy pathways outlined from domestic optimization through regional integration to basin-wide cooperation offer a pragmatic roadmap. Each pathway delivers substantial benefits while building trust and capacity for deeper cooperation. The key insight is that cooperation need not be all-or-nothing; incremental progress can yield significant economic returns while creating foundations for more comprehensive agreements.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eLooking beyond the GERD, this analysis suggests broader lessons for infrastructure-led development in contested basins:\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cul\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eEconomic interdependence created by infrastructure can change political calculations, but must be carefully managed to ensure mutual benefits\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eComplementary policies in industrial development, human capital, and institutional reform are essential to maximize infrastructure impacts\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eAdaptive governance is needed to address climate uncertainty and changing socioeconomic conditions\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003cli\u003e \u003cp\u003eInclusive benefit-sharing is critical for social sustainability and political acceptance\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/li\u003e \u003c/ul\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe GERD's ultimate legacy will be determined not in its powerhouse but in the boardrooms, negotiating tables, and policy forums where cooperation frameworks are designed and implemented. With strategic vision, pragmatic diplomacy, and commitment to mutual benefit, it could catalyze a new era of cooperation in the Nile Basin. Without these, it risks becoming another chapter in the long history of transboundary water conflict. The economic evidence is clear; the political choices remain. The coming years will reveal whether Nile Basin states can harness the GERD's potential to power not just turbines but regional cooperation, sustainable development, and shared prosperity.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e \u003ch2\u003eCompeting interests\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cb\u003eAssistance of AI Declaration\u003c/b\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003eAI tools were employed solely for linguistic refinement. The author assumes full responsibility for the scholarly content.\u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eClinical trial number\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003enot applicable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e \u003cp\u003e \u003cstrong\u003eEthics, Consent to Participate, and Consent to Publish declarations\u003c/strong\u003e \u003cp\u003enot applicable\u003c/p\u003e \u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eFunding\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003eNot applicable\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe author solely conceived, designed, conducted, and wrote the manuscript.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgements\u003c/h2\u003e \u003cp\u003e.Not applicable\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eData Availability\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan\u003eBihon Y, Mohammed A, Ayele E. 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Cambridge University Press; 2023. \u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003ehttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157896\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.1017/9781009157896\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":false,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-environment","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Environment](https://www.springer.com/44274/)","snPcode":"44274","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/44274/3","title":"Discover Environment","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"hydropower economics, transboundary water governance, CGE modeling, Nile Basin, benefit-sharing, regional integration, energy diplomacy","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9034239/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-9034239/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis study provides a comprehensive economy-wide assessment of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), analyzing its macroeconomic and regional integration impacts under realistic hydro-political constraints. We employ a Computable General Equilibrium model, calibrated with Ethiopia's 2022 Social Accounting Matrix constructed from national accounts, household surveys, and energy sector data, to evaluate scenarios incorporating climate variability and political risk. Simulations indicate full GERD operation could increase Ethiopia\u0026rsquo;s GDP by 2.1\u0026ndash;3.5% annually, create over 1.2\u0026nbsp;million jobs, and generate roughly \u003cspan\u003e$\u003c/span\u003e1.2\u0026nbsp;billion in yearly electricity exports under optimal conditions. However, these benefits are highly conditional. Climate variability could reduce gains by 40%, while political instability in importing nations might cut export revenues by 30%. Critically, the realization of these economic outcomes is fundamentally contingent upon resolving the Nile water allocation conflict and establishing cooperative basin-wide frameworks. The GERD\u0026rsquo;s potential as a catalyst for regional integration depends on transforming the current hydro-political stalemate into a formal benefit-sharing agreement. Success requires simultaneous progress on diplomatic resolution of water rights, development of regional energy market institutions, and strategic infrastructure investment. Policy interventions should therefore prioritize creating transparent operational rules and building trust through incremental technical cooperation.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"Regional Economic Impact of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: A Computable General Equilibrium Approach","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2026-03-26 08:52:52","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-9034239/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0},{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2026-05-04T06:58:18+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-04-08T23:36:56+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-04-07T18:42:43+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvitedReview","content":"","date":"2026-04-04T16:58:07+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"288746538257917961194597244643171145456","date":"2026-03-30T10:57:25+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"113949264669168435731297064871631174443","date":"2026-03-29T10:18:24+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewerAgreed","content":"186081068638969032935414392289428394026","date":"2026-03-27T01:40:32+00:00","index":"hide","fulltext":""},{"type":"reviewersInvited","content":"","date":"2026-03-24T13:43:36+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorInvited","content":"","date":"2026-03-20T12:25:43+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"editorAssigned","content":"","date":"2026-03-08T04:14:01+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"checksComplete","content":"","date":"2026-03-08T04:13:42+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""},{"type":"submitted","content":"Discover Environment","date":"2026-03-04T23:11:31+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"discover-environment","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":false,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"Learn more about [Discover Environment](https://www.springer.com/44274/)","snPcode":"44274","submissionUrl":"https://submission.nature.com/new-submission/44274/3","title":"Discover Environment","twitterHandle":"","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":true,"editorialSystem":"stoa","reportingPortfolio":"Discover Series","inReviewEnabled":true,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"3d79faa8-c88d-40a7-bd3c-27a0cd799ee3","owner":[],"postedDate":"March 26th, 2026","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[{"type":"decision","content":"Revision requested","date":"2026-05-04T06:58:18+00:00","index":"","fulltext":""}],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"under-review","subjectAreas":[],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-05-13T19:23:05+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2026-03-26 08:52:52","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-9034239","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-9034239","identity":"rs-9034239","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"XKTyCvWXoU3ODBz1xrDgd","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}