Economics at the FTC: Estimating Harm from Deception and Analyzing Mergers

preprint OA: closed
View at publisher

Abstract

Economists in the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics perform economic analysis in support of the Commission’s dual missions to protect consumers and competition by preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through law enforcement, advocacy, and education. This article first presents summaries of analyses economists performed to estimate the consumer harm from two different types of deception involving misleading information about lease terms and suppression of negative product reviews. The essay next turns to economic analysis of mergers, first considering vertical issues that arose in a semiconductor merger and then, finally, a discussion of how complementarity between hospitals may impact the analysis of hospital mergers.

My notes (saved in your browser only)

Citation neighborhood (no data yet)

We don't have any in-corpus citations linked to this paper yet. The paper's references may be in our DB but unresolved to ``paper_id`` (resolution happens at ingest when the cited DOI matches a row we already have). Run the cross-source citation reconcile pass to retry.

Source provenance

europepmc
last seen: 2026-05-19T01:45:01.086888+00:00