The Relationship between Political Allyship and Agriculture Subsidies: Evidence from Taiwan

The Relationship between Political Allyship and Agriculture Subsidies: Evidence from Taiwan | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Research Article The Relationship between Political Allyship and Agriculture Subsidies: Evidence from Taiwan Ngou Teng Pun, Lin Lin This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-6542253/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This study examines how political alignment between local and central governments influences the distribution of agricultural subsidies in Taiwan. Drawing on panel data from 20 regions over the 2004-2023 period, we test predictions from political agency and distributive politics theories. Results show that regions governed by mayors aligned with the president’s party receive significantly larger subsidy shares, especially during Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations. This bias is concentrated in subsidies distributed via agricultural associations, suggesting intentional delegation to vote-mobilizing intermediaries. Contrary to expectations from the core voter model, subsidies are not higher in regions that supported the president electorally. Instead, regions politically opposed to the ruling party receive more support when electoral competitiveness is high consistent with a swing voter strategy. Further, while political donations show no significant relationship, party expenditures are positively associated with subsidy shares, indicating strategic investment over reward. These findings offer robust empirical support for the political economy of intergovernmental transfers and reveal asymmetric party behaviors in distributive politics under Taiwan democratic framework JEL: P26; P35; H53; H71 Agricultural economics Agriculture subsidies Political alignment Policy favoritism Full Text Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. As a division of Research Square Company, we’re committed to making research communication faster, fairer, and more useful. We do this by developing innovative software and high quality services for the global research community. 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Also discoverable on Platform About Our Team In Review Editorial Policies Advisory Board Help Center Resources Author Services Accessibility API Access RSS feed Manage Cookie Preferences © Research Square 2026 | ISSN 2693-5015 (online) Privacy Policy Terms of Service Do Not Sell My Personal Information {"props":{"pageProps":{"initialData":{"identity":"rs-6542253","acceptedTermsAndConditions":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"archivedVersions":[],"articleType":"Research Article","associatedPublications":[],"authors":[{"id":452918638,"identity":"8dc5720b-1331-4dfe-a651-d933fc06b142","order_by":0,"name":"Ngou Teng Pun","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"Universiti Sains Malaysia","correspondingAuthor":true,"prefix":"","firstName":"Ngou","middleName":"Teng","lastName":"Pun","suffix":""},{"id":452918639,"identity":"a9b0f542-da35-423e-9da0-03d72e39d283","order_by":1,"name":"Lin Lin","email":"","orcid":"","institution":"National Chi Nan University","correspondingAuthor":false,"prefix":"","firstName":"Lin","middleName":"","lastName":"Lin","suffix":""}],"badges":[],"createdAt":"2025-04-27 19:53:09","currentVersionCode":1,"declarations":"","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6542253/v1","doiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6542253/v1","draftVersion":[],"editorialEvents":[],"editorialNote":"","failedWorkflow":false,"files":[{"id":94560241,"identity":"705e8dcc-481e-4613-9075-fd742cef1d67","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-10-28 18:01:31","extension":"pdf","order_by":1,"title":"","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"manuscript-pdf","size":369300,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"","description":"","filename":"TaiwansubsidyblilndedmanuscriptPC.pdf","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-6542253/v1_covered_ec65f64f-ff2b-4c0f-b687-843ee6fbc32f.pdf"}],"financialInterests":"No competing interests reported.","formattedTitle":"The Relationship between Political Allyship and Agriculture Subsidies: Evidence from Taiwan","fulltext":[],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":false,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":true,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":true,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Agricultural economics, Agriculture subsidies, Political alignment, Policy favoritism","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-6542253/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-6542253/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis study examines how political alignment between local and central governments influences the distribution of agricultural subsidies in Taiwan. Drawing on panel data from 20 regions over the 2004-2023 period, we test predictions from political agency and distributive politics theories. Results show that regions governed by mayors aligned with the president’s party receive significantly larger subsidy shares, especially during Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations. This bias is concentrated in subsidies distributed via agricultural associations, suggesting intentional delegation to vote-mobilizing intermediaries. Contrary to expectations from the core voter model, subsidies are not higher in regions that supported the president electorally. Instead, regions politically opposed to the ruling party receive more support when electoral competitiveness is high consistent with a swing voter strategy. Further, while political donations show no significant relationship, party expenditures are positively associated with subsidy shares, indicating strategic investment over reward. 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