What drives corruption amongst private entities? A multidimensional Model based on Ethical, Relational and Institutional Frames

What drives corruption amongst private entities? 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A multidimensional Model based on Ethical, Relational and Institutional Frames Jesús Palomo, Manuel Villoria This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7138277/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract This article aims to address a key question on business-to-business (B2B) corruption research: what determines corrupt behaviors among managers in a national setting? Insofar as managers can develop favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward bribery based on the decision frame through which the options are evaluated, we analyze the economic, relational, and ethical frames that explain, in interaction with cultural factors, their behavior vis-à-vis B2B-bribery. To this end, we propose a theoretical model that provides a robust systematization of the determinants of B2B-corruption and their interactions. It supports that the level of B2B-corruption is mainly influenced by four dimensions: managers’ individual moral development, opportunities, deterrent factors, and frictions. The model operates as a complex multidimensional process where the individual’s ethical beliefs, the economic and relational environment, and the institutional and social norms frames interact. The empirical analysis is based on a survey with the greatest representativeness to date of Spanish managers; it shows that moral development is the cornerstone, and that frictions and corruption costs (deterrents) mediates the impact of the perceived opportunities of corruption. This is a milestone in the quest for empirical knowledge of the determinants of B2B-corruption among managers and shed some light on the most effective anti-corruption managerial measures. Based on these results, we offer implications for the government and business professionals and further research avenues. Behavioral Economics private-to-private corruption moral development business ethics corporate governance bribery corporate compliance corporate social responsibility (CSR) Introduction Corruption has become one of the world’s most relevant challenges, a situation deemed unthinkable only thirty years ago, when the word “corruption” scarcely appeared in the media or social research. There have been political and ideological reasons for that change, and both are likely interconnected. Politically speaking, the end of the Cold War and the triumph of capitalism have reduced the need to support corrupt regimes that favored one of the two blocks, thereby allowing journalists to report on corruption scandals (see Palau & Palomo 2021). All of this has enabled civil society around the world to establish thousands of new organizations devoted to denouncing and fighting corruption, the most important of which is probably Transparency International (TI). Today, reducing corruption has become a global battle to achieve good governance (Rose & Pfeiffer 2018) and sustainable development (Argandoña 2017). All these changes have caused corruption to become one of the most prominent research topics in social sciences in recent years, with 28,283 articles published in peer-reviewed journals by 2024, an exponential increase since 1980 (Palomo et al. 2017). Some topics include the concept of corruption itself (e.g. Heidenheimer & Johnston 2002; Rothstein & Varraich 2017), its measurement (Sequeira 2012; Sampford et al. 2017; Weber Abramo 2007; Lambsdorff 2006a; Andersson & Heywood 2009); its causes (Klitgaard 1988; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Persson et al. 2013); and its economic and social consequences, for example, on: GDP per capita (Mauro, 1996; Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000); Abed & Davoodi 2000; economic growth and foreign investment (Méon & Sekkat 2005); inequality and poverty (Gupta et al. 2000); human development (Akçay, 2006; Holmberg et al. 2012); or happiness and subjective welfare (Frey & Stutzer 2000). Despite this high level of academic productivity, most studies constrain the scope of research inquiry to the public sector -although private sector corruption is often acknowledged (Hodgson & Jiang 2007)-, and the relationships between private companies and corrupt national and foreign governments because of their social, political, and ethical consequences. However, private or business-to-business (B2B) corruption has been relatively neglected and only recently started to receive the attention it deserves (e.g. Argandoña, 2003). Given the relative novelty of these studies, there are still relevant shortcomings, such as its definition, typology, measurement, causes and consequences. This article fills some of these gaps, improving the knowledge on B2B-corruption, by characterizing the determinants of corrupt behaviors among entrepreneurs (in small companies) and managers in a national setting. Insofar as managers can develop favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward bribery based on the decision frame through which the options are evaluated (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we try to analyze the economic, relational, and ethical frames (Liu et al. 2017) that explain, in interaction with cultural factors, their behavior vis-à-vis B2B-bribery. To this end, we propose a theoretical model that provides a robust systematization of the determinants of B2B-bribery and their interactions; this sets the basis for potential subsequent measurements and comparative studies in different countries. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the relevant literature on the concept of B2B-corruption, its measurement and consequences. Then, we present a theoretical framework, the research questions and a set of hypotheses. Finally, based on empirical study, we contrast the proposed model along with the hypotheses, and end up with some discussions about the empirical findings and concluding remarks. Literature review The concept One of the main obstacles to conducting an empirical study of B2B-corruption is the very concept thereof. According to Bracking (2013), a range of practices have emerged that can be understood as new types of corporate corruption (e.g. deliberate bankruptcy, thin capitalization, illicit financial flows, etc.) so it is very difficult to have a definition which encompasses all of them (Wu & Huang 2013). Probably, some of them are fraud and not corruption. Anyway, the most widely used general concepts of corruption -i.e. abuse of entrusted power for private benefit - are difficult to apply to the private realm (e.g. TI, 2015; Friedman, 1970; Andersson & Heywood, 2009). And some specific concepts (for example, Argandoña, 2003) run the risk of overlooking unethical actions for the company’s benefit that could be as damaging to society as those identified as clearly corrupt. Furthermore, cultural differences are also important. Corruption can occur, for example, when a representative is seeking a reward from sellers of products if they want to sell them to his company (Anand et al., 2004), and this leaves the door open for very different interpretations considering cultural and historical differences (e.g. Gopinath, 2008 for a B2B-bribery case study in India). B2B-corruption can be individual or generalized (Pinto et al. 2008). Corrupt organizations typically involve a leadership that is fully aware that it is using corrupt strategies and actions for personal gain and, at times, that of the company (Aguilera and Vadera 2008). In any event, exogenic factors tend to be key when it comes to explaining how this phenomenon spreads (Szwajkowski 1985; Clinard & Yeager 1980), and the Principal-Agent theory (De Graaf 2007) does not always help to explain how to deal with B2B-corruption, since sometimes the most corrupt actor is precisely the principal. In our view, an action is corrupt not only because of the abuse of position or personal benefits but also because it harms a socially and legally protected interest. Corruption would therefore not only be "the abuse of power that a private organization may confer on any of its members, whether directly or indirectly, for private gain". This definition includes corrupt acts in dealings with other companies as well as embezzlement. However, a comprehensive definition would also have to include the use of the power conferred by the ownership of a company to bribe members of other companies for the benefit of the company but to the detriment of the results of those other companies and fair competition. Therefore, a broad concept is proposed where B2B-corruption would be "the use of the authority conferred by the ownership of a company or the abuse of the power that a private organization can confer on any of its members for private gain, direct or indirect, individual or corporate, when their actions are contrary to fair competition and in particular, but not only, when the company or its members interact with other private organizations". Lastly, although B2B-bribery would only be one type of B2B-corruption, it is probably the most important and the focus of this article. Measurement B2B-corruption is difficult to measure for three reasons (Di Nicola et al. 2018). First, a corrupt exchange is normally based on a hidden agreement that does not lead to a quantifiable victim; second, it is underreported to authorities and therefore is not properly included in official statistics (Rose-Ackerman 2007); lastly, it is a phenomenon that, for the most part, lacks sufficient regulation, and, where regulated as an offense, it is relatively new and with few cases in the courts so far. There are quite a few surveys on private-to-public corruption (e.g. TI 2011b; EC 2014, 2017, 2019; WB 2017) but fewer specifically on B2B-corruption. General private corruption surveys tend to mix bribery to public officials with B2B-bribery (KPMG 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002; Kaptein 2003). Furthermore, the complexity of B2B-corruption is acknowledged in the scarce survey-based empirical academic studies (Wood 1995; Hill et al. 1992; Gopinah 2008). In 2011, an international survey gathered information about B2B-bribery (TI 2011a). Some EU-funded national surveys have dramatically improved knowledge on this topic, e.g. in Croatia (UNODC 2013); and in Estonia and Denmark (Johannsen et al. 2016; Soot et al. 2016; Jaakson 2019). In 2016, the EU-funded project Private Corruption Barometer (PCB) bridges the lack of: i) knowledge on private corruption; ii) reliable instruments and indicators to measure private-sector corruption that damages businesses; iii) comparative analyses on private corruption across Bulgaria, Italy, Spain and Germany (see Di Nicola et al. 2018 for further details). Lastly, in 2019, an empirical study of Romanian companies was published (Burduja & Zaharia 2019) with a questionnaire similar to previous surveys. Consequences B2B-corruption not only prevents a fair competition and efficient markets but also reduces the quality of products and services to the consumer (TI 2011a). It also negatively impacts market-based mechanisms, creating inefficiencies, eroding trust among businesses, harming employees’ loyalty toward their companies and respective shareholders, and contributing to a general societal culture of corruption (Argandoña 2003; United Nations 2004; Argandoña 2007). Moreover, the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 1999) included recommendations on active and passive bribery in the private sector and corporate liability. In the United States, the NYSE and the NASDAQ require a company to have and disclose a code of ethics as a prerequisite for being able to be listed. Nowadays, managing corruption risks has become a crucial area of business development (Hansen 2011). From the managerial viewpoint, setting effective measures to control B2B-corruption is crucial and this article sheds some light on this matter. A theoretical framework of B2B-corruption Due to the complexity of the B2B-corruption, a countless number of explanatory variables characterize it. The key is to identify, using a multidisciplinary approach, those that could explain most of the phenomenon while accounting for the complexity of the measurement and promoting a more parsimonious explanation, even if some specificity is lost. We aim at designing a general model that can be replicated internationally to help to understand the differences in B2B-corruption levels between countries. For the construction of the model, we start from the assumption that corruption is a complex social phenomenon. However, it is the individual who ultimately decides whether to engage in corruption (Bichieri and Ganegoda, 2017). According to an analytical approach, a social fact must be explained by detailing the mechanisms through which the phenomenon is regularly produced. From the mechanism perspective, correlations and constant conjunctions do not explain but are observational phenomena that needs to be explained by reference to the mechanisms that brought them into existence. In sociology, the basic entities of a mechanism always tend to be actors, and the basic activities tend to be their actions. According to this theory of action, desires, beliefs, and opportunities are the primary theoretical terms upon which the analysis of action and interaction is based (Hedström, 2006: 75-76). Bribery is an action enacted by individuals driven by desires, beliefs and opportunities, occurring not in isolation but through interaction with other actors. In the case of B2B-bribery, managers have desire and interest in their company's success, which can generate ethical and non-ethical behavior; but they also have beliefs, some shared and others not, about their moral duty, and about how others act and how others expect them to act. Finally, as the result of the formal and informal institutional design existing in each company, business sector and society, there are a series of opportunities (and barriers) to corrupt behavior. The rational choice theory, specifically the Principal-Agent (PA) theory, assumes a subject guided by the desire to maximize profits that can be controlled thanks to an adequate system of incentives and disincentives. Hence, B2B-bribery would be the outcome of the system of barriers (costs) and opportunities (benefits) existing in each organization and in the legal system, analyzed by the actors through the subjective expected utility of their behavior (Bichieri and Ganegoda, 2017). This theory can help to explain part of the phenomenon (the economic frame), but it has many limitations. For example, it does not consider the role of the moral beliefs of entrepreneurs in explaining their behavior (ethical frame). Society’s values are passed from generation to generation through the internalization of norms. Individuals conform to an internalized norm because so doing is an end in itself, and not merely because of the material rewards (that follow from norm compliance) or punishments (that follow from norm violation). In true gene-culture coevolutionary form, a variety of uniquely human prosocial emotions come into play, including prominently shame, guilt, and empathy, directly reinforcing internalized norms (Gintis, 2006: 106-7). Furthermore, PA theory does not consider the influence of certain beliefs on the individual behavior. For example, the belief of what others think he or she should do, or the belief that a sufficient number of others would engage in certain particular behavior (Bichieri, 2006, 13). Corruption is self-reinforcing in nature (Persson et al., 2013), high perceptions of corruption may create larger social problems because it may lead to “a second order collective action dilemma,” (Ostrom, 1998, p.7) wherein rational actors are highly dependent on shared expectations about how other individuals will act. Thus, if a large enough number of actors are expected to engage in corruption, with little possibility of being caught and punished, everyone has something to gain personally from corruption (Morris and Klesner, 2010; Bardhan, 2005). In addition, the collective action dilemma suggests that when perceptions of law breaking reach a sufficient threshold of generalization, even individuals who would not normally accept corrupt exchanges, will be more likely to accept and seek such exchanges. Thus, there is a reciprocal determinism (Bandura, 1986). For all these reasons, we have also turned to moral psychology, criminology, and historical and sociological institutionalism to construct a model that attempts to be robust and overcome PA’s limitations. According to criminological theory (Wikström, 2004, 2006), individual decision-making, insofar as it relates to moral dilemmas, is the product of the interaction between a) individual characteristics and b) the essential features of the space in which a subject makes decisions. First, individual characteristics are a person’s moral values, the present emotions, impulsivity and the ability to defer gratification, and his or her internal motivation. To understand these processes, it is useful to consider too the importance of cognitive defense mechanisms to neutralize the negative emotions associated with the violation of ethical or legal standards. The research on engagement in unethical and illegal activities indicates the importance of neutralization techniques for explaining and justifying deviant behavior. Individuals use neutralization techniques as cognitive strategy to easy feelings of remorse and to disregards the guilt and social stigma associated with engaging in unethical or illegal practices (Hauser et al. 2020). In our research we have considered personal normative beliefs (Bichieri, 2006) as a relevant explanatory variable. There are different theories to explain moral action, e.g. cognitive development theory (Kohlberg 1984), Hoffman’s moral socialization theory (1989) or moral identity (Hardy and Carlo, 2005). We have chosen Kohlberg’s (1984) theory, focused largely on the role of moral reasoning, because some empirical studies have found positive relationship between sophisticated levels of moral reasoning skills and sound moral judgements (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs et al., 1992). Furthermore, we included in our survey certain proxy variables that could replicate some items of the Sociomoral Refection Objective Measure-Short Form (SROM, Gibbs et al, 1992). According to Kohlberg (1984), there are three moral development (MD) levels: preconventional , conventional and postconventional . In our research, the preconventional is when managers accept corrupt practices for the company’s benefit (because “everybody does it”); conventional , when corrupt practices for personal benefit or that of the company are accepted, but only if they are not illegal; and postconventional , when corruption is not accepted in any case. Although Kohlberg considers conventional those who would accept corruption only if it benefits family or friends, given that such particularistic attitude has a major effect on B2B-bribery, we propose to include these practices at the preconventional level. Based on these MD levels, the following hypothesis is tested, assuming ceteris paribus conditions: H1 The higher the level of moral development of the entrepreneurs the less opportunities of corruption are perceived. Second, the individual is directly exposed and reacts to the essential features of the decision-making space, that varies according to the extent to which it “creates opportunity, causes friction and provides control” (Wikström 2004:19-20). Sometimes the space creates opportunities for individual corruption; but there are situations where the corruption motive is not purely individualistic, but collectivist (when individuals consider maximizing not only their own gains but also those that benefit the organization) or relational (when individuals identify not with the organization, but with a smaller group(s) within the organization. It is important to consider that when joining an organization, a person is entering a setting that not only produces incentives and disincentives but also adds meaning. Individuals have a vicarious learning, by following their organization’s internal rules of play (De Graff et al., 2010; Arellano, 2017). When corrupt practices develop within an organization and there are no adverse consequences for corrupt individuals, a normalization phenomenon occurs that can have devastating consequences (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Nelson, 2017). An organization can go from being ethical to having isolated cases of individual corruption and, subsequently, due to impunity, the organization could become one of corrupt individuals and, ultimately, a corrupt organization in and of itself that is teeming with corrupt people if the processes by which corruption is standardized are not halted (Pinto et al., 2008). Neutralization techniques are also an important process favoring the normalization of corruption in organizations. A way of justifying corruption consists of highlighting the high levels of corruption in the environment and the need of bribes to be competitive, or the importance of the economic benefits of corruption for the survival of the company. Our model, to account for opportunities, considers factors such as expected profits for individuals or for the company. On one hand, job position within the company can facilitate individual opportunities since, for example, employees in specific areas have direct contact with third parties, use means such as budget or materials, have a monopoly of power or knowledge, etc (see Klitgaard, 1988). On the other hand, companies in certain sectors can have more opportunities than others in more institutionalized sectors (WEF, 2016). Hence, the following hypothesis is tested, assuming ceteris paribus conditions: H2 The higher the expected opportunities for the employees and for a company, the more often corruption is experienced in general. The decision-making space can also provide control. The deterrent factors that control corruption (DE) can be state-administered legal and informal norms (i.e. criminal liability), societal norms and beliefs and company-administered compliance systems. These deterrent factors account for: a) The consequences for the company, i.e. the expected economic losses from corruption or criminal liability, and for individuals, i.e. the impact on employees’ careers or criminal consequences. b) A well-designed company’s compliance strategy could reduce the opportunities for unethical decision-making and increase the likelihood that misconduct is detected and sanctioned. It includes elements such as ethical leadership, fair treatment of employees, and spaces for dialogue on ethical dilemmas (Treviño et al., 1999). They also have a symbolic value in expressing an organization’s commitment to integrity (Jaakson, et al. 2019). c) Normative deterrents. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) proposed an approach to understand public corruption, identifying a complex set of informal and formal institutional factors, where corruption is best understood as an equilibrium between opportunities for corruption and deterrents imposed by the State and, in an appreciable way, society too. In this sense, it is important to examine societal norms and beliefs to see to what extent they provide an environment that fosters or hinders crime control. A social norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on condition that they believe that in their social setting of reference: a) most people conform to it (empirical expectation), and b) most people believe they ought to conform to it (normative expectation) (Bichieri, 2006, 13). These cultural deterrents place important barriers when universalistic values prevail in social settings. It means that rules and laws are more important than personal relationships as the standard that guides behavior. Alternatively, particularism prevails when personal relationships come ahead of rules as a standard for determining what is right and ethically acceptable. Various studies (e.g. Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Lambsdorff 2006b; Uslaner 2002, 2013), maintain that societies with a strong particularistic ethic are prone to engage in corrupt acts, both in how public policies are developed and implemented, as well as how business is conducted (Parsons & Shils 1951). The reputational lost due to corruption, which is especially low when there is social support upon the particularized distribution of benefits and insufficient encouragement to fair competition, is a good proxy for the particularism/universalism scheme. Hence, the following hypothesis is tested, assuming ceteris paribus conditions: H3. The higher the deterrent factors, i.e. the higher the perceived costs of corruption for companies and individuals, the stricter the company’s compliance system and the more universalist the society, the less often corruption is experienced. The decision-making space can also create frictions (FR) that can increase the likelihood of engaging in corrupt practices due to a perceived lack of fairness and the fear of losing out on opportunities vis-à-vis their competitors. These situations bias the analysis of risks and opportunities (Søreide 2009). Corruption is socially constructed (Andersson 2017) and individuals’ perceptions of the frequency of corrupt acts affect the cost/benefit calculation (Jaakson et al. 2019). Indeed, Bardhan (1997, 2005) argue that potential rewards from engaging in corruption depend on the number of people expected to participate in corrupt exchanges. Provided enough actors are expected to engage in corruption, they will gain personally from the corrupt exchange and face a lesser chance of being caught and punished (Morris & Klesner 2010). Thus, this situation develops a structure of incentives that lead to a collective action problem (Persson et al. 2013). The following hypothesis is tested, assuming ceteris paribus conditions: H4. The higher the perceived frequency of corruption in general the more often corruption is experienced. All these theories set the rationale for a sufficiently complete framework that assumes the three frames theory, solidly grounded in neuroscience, which indicates that B2B-bribery can result from a mixture of ethical, economic and relational frames (Liu et al. 2017). It also assumes theories from analytical sociology, which explain social phenomena by considering the desires, beliefs, and opportunities of interacting people. It also picks up aspects of criminological theory as important as individual moral development, and the tensions that frictions generate to explain individual behavior. Moreover, it does not forget the importance of the institutional environment and social norms both at sector’s activity level and at national level. All this interacts under a weighted multidimensional process, where there are different frames, factors shaping the activation of alternative decision frames, and various interactions and results (Liu et al., 2017). We believe that such a comprehensive framework has never been empirically applied. The abovementioned theoretical framework of B2B-corruption is graphically presented in Figure 1, where the level of private corruption —measured through the experience of B2B-corruption (CO)— is characterized through four key dimensions (MD, OP, DE, FR), where MD is a covariate influencing the perceived OP. --Figure 1 here— Empirical analysis Between January 18 th and February 14 th 2018, the PCB questionnaire was administered in Spain, through computer-assisted telephone-interviews, to a representative national stratified weighted sample of 600 entrepreneurs and executives (from companies with ten or more employees). Table 1 shows the distribution of companies by sector/size along with the weighted sample (to recover representativeness of each sector as compared to the total). --Table 1 here– The sampling error reported, at a confidence level of 95.5% and assuming the principles of simple, random sampling, for the most unfavorable hypothesis of maximum uncertainty (p=q=50%) was ±4.1 points. The reliability was increased with focus group interviews with entrepreneurs in two post-survey meetings. Since survey’s results were highly correlated with other surveys (EC 2017 and EC 2019), its reliability is confirmed. Typically, these kinds of surveys can, indeed, suffer from the common method and Socially Desirability (SD) bias. One crucial mechanism through which these biases arise is decreased motivation for participants to respond when they must accurately report socially undesirable behavior and an increased tendency for participants to engage in satisficing when they have to report SD conduct (Kaminska & Foulsham 2013). This problem was tackled by switching up the response formats for different questions and reducing ambiguity by keeping questions as simple and straightforward as possible (Podsakoff et al. 2012) and in the most neutral and least-threatening way possible. Following Breen et al. (2016) two types of questions were used: ones that explicitly seek information about respondents’ own companies and others that seek information about the company’s market sector, with questions about competitors’ behavior. In any case, after controlling for the SD bias, it was concluded that self-reports do help explain corruption. Stemming from EC PCB survey’s data, see Table 2 for a comprehensive overview of the variables considered in the analysis, B2B-bribery is empirically characterized as follows. --Table 2 here– Experience of corruption (CO) The level of corruption is difficult to measure, and many authors have operationalized it through the CO while relying on that many respondents report on bribes what they truly think their competitors pay or receive, but many also report their own experience with offering or accepting bribes (Jaakson et al. 2019). The CO has been measured at three different levels to avoid the SD-bias: General experience with corrupt practices in the company’s activities, where 18.03% confirm that “often” (15.65%) or “very often” (2.37%) an external stakeholder has shown availability to offer something in exchange of a preferential treatment; and 1.75% have heard of someone in the past twelve months being hired or promoted in exchange for money, gifts, or favors. Experience among the managers and employees of your company, where 3.63% perceive “often” (3.11%) or “very often” (0.52%) that someone shows their willingness to offer money, gifts, or favors in exchange for preferential treatment for the company. Experience about corrupt acts in your company, where 3.94% believe it happens “often” (3.29%) or “very often” (0.65%) that someone has directly offered money, gifts, or favors to decision-makers in other companies to secure a business deal, knowingly harming the interests of another company. Similarly, 3.94% believe it occurs “often” (2.98%) or “very often” (0.51%) that someone, even without making a directly offer, has shown a willingness to give something. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 0.702 for the CO variable, indicating very good reliability. Moral development (MD) Business professionals can accept/reject corrupt actions according to, amongst other variables, their MD level. Following Kohlberg (1984) and based on two PCB survey’s questions (see Table 2) managers have been clustered into three groups ( preconventional , conventional and postconventional ). A fourth group was also identified, which accounts for the “don’t know/no opinion” answers, with 14 cases spread equally across the five business sectors considered. This fourth group was removed from the analysis since it was only relevant to few cases. Furthermore, the final three groups are consistent with a k-means clustering method (between_sum of squares/total_sum of squares = 86.0%) matching the 100% of the clustering obtained from the questions and the three levels. In order to further characterize the MD groups, several statistical tests were performed which identified a greater presence of big companies (+50 employees) at the postconventional level (statistically significant, p-value 0.00125). The estimated odds of being in a big company are higher at the postconventional MD level than at the conventional one (estimated odds ratio is 1.54, with 95% CI (0.955,2.501). To account for a potential gender gap in the positions (see e.g. Figueroa-Domecq et al. 2020, Figueroa-Domecq et al. 2019), the characterization of the MD levels in terms of gender and company position (considered jointly) was found statistically significant. Furthermore, women, both as “employee/other” and “CEO/equivalent” positions, are found more frequently at the conventional and postconventional levels. Additionally, the gender difference in “CEO/equivalent” positions is reduced with respect to the “employee/other” one. Opportunities offered by corrupt acts (OP) The expected gain from corrupt activities for the individual depends on the degree of discretion and monopoly in decision-making within the company (Klitgaard 1988). According to the PA theory, the more discretion and monopoly the more corruption. Based on the expected likelihood of accepting/asking money, gifts or favors, the company’s functional areas considered in the survey were ranked in descending risk order: procurement, retail/wholesale, control and monitoring, human resources. When combining the MD level with the employee’s functional area, it is clearly perceived “no risk” for the majority (57.57%) of the postconventional that an employee would agree to accept/ask for something, and 55.16% for the conventional . However, for the preconventional group, 73.58% consider it probable (jointly, “highly risky” and “risky”). As for the expected benefit for the company, B2B-bribery is widely perceived (90.39%) as contributing “little” or “nothing” to boost the company’s business. When accounting for the MD level, the vast majority of the postconventional group (73.33%) believes that bribing contributes “nothing,” and 61.68% in the case of conventional . However, for the preconventional group, 68.45% considers it contributes something to the company’s business. Both, for the individual’s and company’s gain, there is a correlation between the MD and the expected opportunities offered by corrupt acts, the higher the MD the lower the expected risk of corrupt acts. The OP has been measured at different levels. In the market area where operates the company, 20.5% perceive procurement staff as “often” (15.3%) or “very often” (5.2%) receiving cash or goods in exchange for contract awards, while 31.2% believe contracts are frequently awarded to close friends or relatives (“often” 24.07%, “very often” 7.13%). Additionally, 8.31% believe that, in particular situations, B2B-bribery can be useful to expedite company’s results ("much" 5.42%, "very much" 2.89%). In inventory management, 9.21% suggest that managers “often” (7.27%) or “very often” (1.94%) resell goods via false accounting entries. Regarding company behaviors, 31.46% report mediators recommending firms that offer kickbacks instead of selecting the optimal choices (“often” 24.44%, “very often” 7.02%), and 23.04% indicate that firms frequently offer Deterrence factors that control corruption (DE) As deterrence factors, several expected consequences of B2B-bribery were assessed for both the company and individuals. Financial losses to companies as a result of their involvement in corruption are scarcely anticipated, with 64.7% indicating low expectation (“never” 21.82%, “rarely” 42.88%). Furthermore, the reputational lost for the company due B2B-corruption, as proxy for the normative deterrents, was not frequently expected (“never” 18.85%, “rarely” 29.78%). This indicates that social constraint is not high. As for the employees involved in corruption, respondents believe that often they are neither discovered (“rarely” 42.5%, “never” 25.38%) nor sanctioned even if discovered (“rarely” 43.92% or “never” 25.44%). Hence, the expected consequences of bribery within the company reveals a prevailing perception of impunity, since only 42.99% of individuals “often” discovered are “often” sanctioned. A composite impact was created on the individual indicator that accounts for being discovered and sanctioned, which revealed that the majority (53.3%) consider that the measures for detecting and sanctioning bribery have a medium/low impact, and 16.2% directly indicate no impact. Conversely, 51.63% perceive involvement in bribery as negatively affecting an employee’s career (“very often” 31.08%, “often” 20.55%). Among the most common company’s internal anti-corruption measures it was found that 59.5% of the companies implement codes of conduct (applies to all employees and intermediaries); anti-corruption training programs (14.3%); and whistleblower protection (26.8%). Regarding the level of attainment of the code of conduct, only 17.47% believe that the existing code is not respected by the company’s employees. There are 55 companies (9.4%) with all three measures, 105 (17.9%) with two, 214 (36.5%) with one, and 212 companies (36.2%) with none. Frictions The decision-making environment creates frictions that can be measured through the perceived risk of B2B-corruption in a company’s business sector. Frictions introduce disturbances with respect to the perception of the company’s real costs of corruption, since when FR is high neither reputational nor economic costs of corruption act as deterrents for the company. In general, it was found that 40.9% perceive high risk in the business sector of their company (“very much” 10.89%, “much” 30%), which greatly disrupts the perception of OP and DE. By sectors, Construction is clearly a risky business sector, in line with UNODC (2013). Frictions were assessed at different levels. At the country level, 89.58% believe that political and economic elites to mutually benefit through the use of economic resources and create regulations or self-interested decisions (“very often” 48.19%, “often” 41.39%), and 87.68% clientelism (“very often” 44.16%, “often” 43.49%). 88.24% perceive the crime of corruption is frequent (“very often” 43.52%, “often” 44.72%). At the company level, 45.05% believe that corruption is a significant problem that affects the development of the company in the market (“very much” 19%, “much” 26.05%); 18.41% believe that collusion is frequent in the sector (“very often” 3.38%, “often” 15.03); and 35.51% believe conflict of interests highly affect the company’s activities (“affect a lot” 10.52%, “much” 24.99%). Alternatively, these frictions were measured by analyzing 14 relevant court sentences on corruption passed in the last 20 years in Spain, and the ten most important corruption cases; the five business sectors were ranked according to their (decreasing) level of risk: Construction; Hotels/restaurants; Services; Commerce; Industry. Based on this ranking and the MD level, the two with highest degree of interaction with the public sector (Construction and Hotels/Restaurants) account for the greatest presence of the preconventional group (+12.4%), while the rest have a greater presence of the postconventional group (+66.1%). This leads one to believe that the greater the interaction with the public sector the more difficult it is to maintain postconventional attitudes, i.e. being in a corrupt environment increases the costs of honesty. Furthermore, there is a correlation between the risk of corruption in the business sector (having Construction the highest risk and Industry the lowest) and the company’s internal anti-corruption measures, the higher the risk the lower the deterrence factor Finally, some mediation effects between OP and CO were identified since FR and DE affect the perception of the cost-benefit ratio, by reducing the perceived cost of corruption and increasing the perceived benefit (Persson et al. 2013); hence, creating disturbances in the impact of OP on CO. Results The proposed theoretical model assesses the impact of perceived opportunities for corruption (OP) on actual corruption experiences (CO). We estimated a Structural Equation Model (SEM) with four latent variables (circles): OP, DE, FR, and CO. Observed indicator variables (squares) are associated with each latent factor. Additionally, covariates such as MD, Gender, tenure in the company (Q6), position in the company (Q5_employee and Q5_other, with reference category owner/CEO/CFO) were integrated to control for potential influencing factors. Figure 2 illustrated the model’s structural and measurement components. -- Figure2 here -- Both frequentist (Maximum Likelihood) and Bayesian SEM estimation methods reached good overall fitting (χ²(408) = 809.661, p<.001, CFI=0.916, TLI=0.906, RMSEA=0.041 [90% CI: 0.037, 0.045], and SRMR=0.061. The Bayesian model, after 5,000 iterations, converged adequately (Rhat≈1.000), producing estimates highly consistent with the frequentist approach, suggesting robust results irrespective of the estimation method. The composite reliability scores across constructs were acceptable: OP (0.893), DE (0.807), CO (0.622), and FR (0.634). Hypothesis H1 focuses on the positive impact of the moral development on reducing the perceived opportunities of corruption. The estimates shows that MD negatively influences OP (β=-0.176, p=0.001, standardized estimate = -0.150, CI [-0.277, -0.075]), i.e. the higher the MD the lower the expected OP; hence, confirming H1. Hypothesis H2 focuses on the positive impact of the expected gains (OP), for the individual and for the company, on the experience of corruption (CO). Based on the data, individuals “often” experience corruption 2.7 and 8.8 times more in highly risky positions (where it is very likely that an employee finds opportunities) than in the case of no risk positions, depending on the type of corrupt act and actor. For companies, corruption is “often” experienced between 2.5 and 4.5 times more by those who expect that a great contribution by way of corruption will boost business than in the case of those who do not consider it useful (contributes nothing ), depending on the type of corrupt act and actor. The estimates show a significant positive direct effect of OP on CO, β=0.203, p< .001, standardized estimate = 0.340, 95% CI [0.129, 0.269]. Additionally, OP has a significant indirect effect on CO via FR, with β=0.048, p=0.007, standardized indirect effect of 0.088, 95% CI [0.014, 0.090]. Conversely, the indirect effect through DE was not found statistically significant (β=0.002, p=0.745, 0.003, CI [-0.009, 0.012]). Overall, the total effect of OP on CO was significant and positive (β=0.253 (p < 0.001, 0.431, CI [0.193, 0.313]); hence, showing how OP drives CO and confirming H2. Hypothesis H3 focuses on the negative impact of the deterrence factors for the company and the individual on the experience of corruption. For the individual, based on the data, it is “often” experienced corruption between 1.82 and 2.25 times more by those employees expecting a low-impact of bribing as opposed to those expecting a high-impact . For the company, depending on the stablished compliance system, corruption is “often” experienced 1.49 times more when there are no measures of compliance than in the case of 2 measures (e.g. code of conduct, training program or whistleblowing protection), and corruption is “never” experienced 1.79 times more when 2 measures are implemented than in the case of no measures ; in line with other studies, e.g. Jaakson (2019). It seems that implementing a “code of conduct” is more associated with less CO (43.82% “never” experienced it). The “whistleblower protection” does not seem to influence CO (probably due to the lack of a real protection system since there was not a national law in Spain to protect whistleblowers when the survey was administered). Based on these results, H3 is confirmed and the more stringent the compliance system in the company, the lower the experience of corruption. However, the effect of DE on CO was not found statistically significant (β=0.007, p=0.745, standardized estimate = 0.016, CI [-0.037, 0.050]). The hypothesized relationships have been tested statistically significant except for the effect of the deterrence (DE) on the experience of corruption (CO), which can be interpreted as impossibility of these factors to control corruption. Hypotheses H4 focus on the perception that unfair situations affect the perceived cost-benefit ratio of corruption and this has a positive impact on the CO. Based on the data, corruption is “never” experienced between 6.44 and 9.4 times more by those expecting no risk at all in a company’s business sector than in the case of those expecting a high risk , depending on the type of corrupt act and actor. The estimates show that FR significantly influenced CO (β=0.185, p=0.004, standardized estimate = 0.215, CI [0.071, 0.352]); hence, confirming H4. Finally, it was found that the OP significantly impacts both FR (β=0.261, p<0.001, standardized estimate = 0.411, CI [0.192, 0.328]) and DE (β=0.237, p<0.001, standardized estimate = 0.177, CI [0.111, 0.366]), showing how the expected gains govern the perception about FR and DE. Furthermore, among covariates, gender had a significant negative effect on CO (β=-0.157, p<0.001, standardized estimate = -0.184, CI [-0.236, -0.079]), with males reporting higher levels of CO than females. Additionally, employees (Q5_employee) perceived higher levels of OP compared to owners/CEO/CFOs (β=0.243, p=0.005, standardized estimate = 0.121, 95% CI [0.074, 0.409]), whereas those in other roles (Q5_other) perceived lower levels (β=-0.261, p=0.053, standardized estimate = –0.083, 95% CI [–0.521, –0.003]). Tenure (Q6) showed a minimal and nonsignificant effect on CO (β=0.015, p=0.066, standardized estimate = 0.083, CI [-0.001, 0.030]). Figure 3, 4 and 5 present boxplots for the posterior samples of the latent variables by sector, gender and MD, respectively. -- Figures 3,4,5 here -- Discussion and implications The proposed model, based on the empirically proven hypotheses, confirms the influence among the variables: the levels of B2B-bribery strongly depend on the degree of MD, the opportunities, deterrents and the frictions that interact in a given market. The overall analysis highlights two variables that dominate the CO in Spanish companies: the role of ethics and, specifically, the managers’ MD; and the environment in which companies operate and their FR level. Consequently, the behavior of most managers and employees is not the result of an individual and isolated cost/benefit analysis. Our results likely support the importance of the ethical and relational frames in explaining B2B-corruption (Liu et al. 2017; Bichieri, 2006). Corrupt actions are assessed according to the company’s tensions and risks (contextual cues). A high perception of corruption (empirical expectations), based on either observation of behaviors of others or information received from trusted sources, have a strong influence on managers’ behavior (Bichieri, 2006; Persson et al. 2013; Bardham, 2005). Therefore, the expected corrupt behavior of the other stakeholders in a company’s market has a positive effect on the assessment of the desirability of the benefits and the acceptance of costs. Finally, personal normative beliefs, linked to MD and, probably, identity, even supersede normative expectations and empirical expectations in influencing behavior (Aquino et al., 2009). The relationship between ethical and relational motives varies according to a manager’s MD level. Postconventionals tend to act according to the moral rules and principles of an honest entrepreneur, even when there are risks within the company’s sector. Conventionals , and above all, preconventionals , may exhibit corrupt behavior when the risks of being honest are high. Even when Frictions are high, the postconventional level has proved to be the most robust group: such strong ethical convictions showed a consistent predisposition to rejecting dishonest activities in several situations. Some individual relevant factors have been tested: a) corrupt behaviors by gender, where women, both as employee and as CEO, were found more frequently in the conventional and postconventional levels, in line with Swamy et al. (2001), and Stensöta et al. (2015) women are less involved in bribery and are less likely to condone bribe-taking; b) company’s size, with greater presence of large companies in the postconventional level. Small companies have less resources to confront big risks and limited installed capacity to build DE (e.g. training on business ethics); hence, they bear higher risks than large ones, and these frictions sometimes lead to unethical behavior (Russo & Tencati 2009). The experience of B2B-bribery in Spain was found worrisome: 18.2% acknowledged that external stakeholders often demonstrate a willingness to offer something in exchange for preferential treatment. Most likely, it would be far worse if it was not for managers’ MD. To fully understand the dimensions of the phenomenon, it would be interesting to compare this with the percentage of people who admit to having been required to pay a bribe within the public sector. Public bribery seems low in Spain, only 2% admit to having paid a bribe in the last 12 months (EC 2024). This unexpected finding (bribery in Spain, and probably in other countries, is more widespread in the private than in the public sector) is, without a doubt, a wake-up call for the authorities to devote more attention to this issue. This study has its limitations. First, some degree of SD bias is a concern when using self-reporting surveys; although it likely does not express the entire truth, it is the best available way to determine the experience and attitudes of managers’ towards B2B-corruption (Walburg 2015). Second, this study only analyzes the most visible B2B-corruption type (bribery), and future studies should also cover other categories. Lastly, the case study focuses only on Spain. It would have been advisable to generalize the empirical contrast of the theoretical framework and to extract conclusions about different economies and cultures. Conclusion Many studies on B2B-corruption have analyzed the phenomenon from the perspective of a homo economicus who acts merely according to the system of incentives and disincentives existing in the organization and production sector. Alternatively, we account for internal incentives and disincentives along with other bodies of inquiry based on moral action, collective action and social behavior. Our model considers the decision-making process of a person actually encountering the opportunity to offer or to accept a bribe (Nichols and Robertson, 2017 ) stemming from different theories of moral and social psychology, and criminology. The proposed theoretical framework has been empirically tested through a survey with the greatest representativeness to date of Spanish entrepreneurs. Based on a wide range of theories, the tested explanatory variables (MD, OP, DE, FR) are related to the experience of corruption (not just the abstract perception thereof); this relationship depends on the prevailing MD level among people participating in their own business area, on the potential benefits, the individual costs of getting involved in corrupt business, on the economic and reputational business costs, and on the frictions or tensions managers experience while conducting business. Policy and managerial implications directly emerge from this research. The normalization of B2B-corruption stems from three processes that mutually reinforce each other (Ashforth and Anand, 2003 ): i) institutionalization, where a corrupt decision is made at a given time and remains within the structures and processes and so becomes routine; ii) rationalization, denial and justification, where stories and ideas are developed in favor of corrupt individuals to justify and even value corruption (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008 ); iii) socialization, by which an organization’s neophytes are led to see corruption as normal and even desirable (Milgram, 2005 ). By assuming that unethically defending an organization’s interests at a given (and isolated) moment in time is not a corrupt act and, hence, no sanctions should be applied, sets off on the path of corruption that will be found increasingly difficult to change courses and control. For all these reasons, it is essential to introduce national and organizational strategies to stop corruption at the outset. Based on our analysis, B2B-bribery is the product of social mechanisms where individual, institutional and social factors interact in complex ways. Thus, any attempt to reduce it should take a multilevel and multidisciplinary approach. By understanding the proposed theoretical framework, proper institutional policies to fight corruption can be implemented in line with the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 16. From an individual perspective, we have shown the importance of managers’ normative beliefs for rejecting dishonest activities. But ethical leadership is also essential for creating an organization’s culture of integrity, by inspiring others to think and behave ethically (Bandura 1986 ; Trevino 1986 ); especially when they lead by example and followers see the leader as a moral exemplar, voluntarily accepting and seeking his/her leadership regarding ethical issues at work (Verdorfer and Peus, 2020 ). The congruence between a leader’s MD and an employee’s MD level was positively associated with job satisfaction and organizational commitment, therefore reducing frictions within the company (Schminke et al. 2005 ). Therefore, we think that educating managers on the costs and consequences of corruption and the benefits of ethical leadership for their companies must be a priority. From an institutional viewpoint, business ethics training must be promoted, where the principles of fair competition and social responsibility are internalized and respected. Moreover, the ethical codes and systems for detecting unethical activity should be coupled with an effective implementation of whistleblowers protection and sanctions in cases of a breach (David-Barret et al. 2017). The judiciary has much work to do in this area that is so novel to judges. Detection, investigation, and punishment of B2B crimes should be improved (Trevino and Ball, 1992 ). Lastly, it is true that the level of particularism in societies also influences a greater acceptance of regulatory breaches, especially when the breach benefits “your team” (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars 1993 ). It will be interesting to analyze how the different levels of particularism and universalism affect B2B-corruption in different countries. Finally, the proposed model provides a robust systematization of the determinants of B2B-corruption in a European country as well as their interactions, setting the basis for potential subsequent measurements and comparative studies. Declarations We confirm that all participants in the survey provided their informed consent to take part in the study. The survey was conducted by a professional demoscopic company, which ensured that participation was entirely voluntary and contingent upon the respondents' explicit acceptance to contribute to the research. Compliance with Ethical Standards The authors declare no competing interests. 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WEF (2016) This is why construction is so corrupt. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/why-is-the-construction-industry-so-corrupt-and-what-can-we-do-about-it/ Zyglidopoulos, S., & Fleming, P. (2008). Ethical distance in corrupt firms: How do innocent bystanders become guilty perpetrators? Journal of Business Ethics ,Vol.78,pp.4-5. Tables Table 1: Distribution of companies (population and sample) according to sector and size (rounded values are presented) INDUSTRY CONSTRUCTION COMMERCE HOTELS/REST. SERVICES TOTAL 10 to 49 +50 10 to 49 +50 10 to 49 +50 10 to 49 + 50 10 to 49 +50 Population 24464 5574 13133 1247 22100 3701 10258 1698 50141 12464 144780 30038 14380 25801 11956 62605 Sample 84 22 92 8 102 18 73 18 116 67 600 106 100 120 91 183 Weighed sample 81 19 90 8 95 16 79 13 153 46 600 100 98 111 92 199 Table 2: Overview of the variables considered in the analysis Variable Question Mean Variance Likert scale CO In the activities of your company, how often happens that external stakeholders show their availability to offer something in change of a preferential treatment? 1.849 (SE 0.0341) 0.589 (SE 0.0363) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) CO In the company’s activities, in the past twelve months have you heard of anyone being hired or promoted in exchange for money, gifts, or favors? 0.017 (SE 0.0052) 0.017 (SE 0.0051) Binary: Yes/No CO Among the managers and employees of your company, how often do you think it happens that someone shows their willingness to offer money, gifts, or favors in exchange for preferential treatment for the company? 1.371 (SE 0.0266) 0.328 (SE 0.0333) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) CO In your company, how many times have you heard of someone who has directly offered money, gifts, or favors to decision-makers in other companies to secure a business deal, knowing that it would harm the interests of another company. 1.21 (SE 0.0241) 0.271 (SE 0.0404) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) CO In your company, how many times have you heard of someone who, even if they didn’t directly offer it, someone showed a willingness to give something […] in exchange for a business deal, knowing that it would harm the interests of another company. 1.259 (SE 0.0234) 0.283 (SE 0.0324) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) OP In the market area where your company operates, how often does it occur that: - An employee responsible for acquisitions or procurement receives cash or goods in exchange for awarding a contract? 1.887 (SE 0.0392) 0.76 (SE 0.0045) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - A mediating company instead of recommending the best and cheapest offer, suggests another firm that in turn kicks part of the sales back to the mediating company? 2.067 (SE 0.0424) 0.89 (SE 0.0422) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - An employee responsible for procurements or purchasing goods and services hands over the order to a close friend or relative? 2.074 (SE 0.0411) 0.861 (SE 0.0422) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - An employee responsible for inventory management makes false account entries and instead of storing the goods, resells them? 1.594 (SE 0.0324) 0.518 (SE 0.0401) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - A company offers money, favors or gifts to a customer in order to obtain favors in future? 1.897 (SE 0.0391) 0.775 (SE 0.042) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - A company offers money, favors or gifts to the employees of a financial institute to obtain favorable conditions for loans of financial facilitations? 1.556 (SE 0.0332) 0.531 (SE 0.0402) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - A company offers money, favors or gifts to the employees of a competitor to obtain strategic or commercial information? 1.539 (SE 0.032) 0.478 (SE 0.039) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - A company offers money, favors or gifts to independent professionals with specific roles of control (e.g. consultants, auditors) to convince them to make an act in contrast with their duties 1.564 (SE 0.032) 0.509 (SE 0.038) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) OP Do you think that B2B corruption, in particular situations, can be useful to speed up the business of your company/the company you work for? 1.434 (SE 0.0326) 0.532 (SE 0.0531) 4-point: 1(Nothing)–4(Very much) Variable Question Mean Variance Likert scale DE In the market area where your company operates, how often does it occur that: - who asks/gives a bribe is actually discovered 2.045 (SE 0.0398) 0.744 (SE 0.0459) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - who asks/gives a bribe is actually sanctioned 2.06 (SE 0.0425) 0.865 (SE 0.0544) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - a company is subjected to a financial loss in case of involvement in corruption cases 2.04 (SE 0.0407) 0.78 (SE 0.0491) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - a company is subjected to a reputational loss in case of involvement in corruption cases 2.53 (SE 0.0468) 1.122 (SE 0.0442) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) - giving/receiving a bribe have a negative impact on an employee’s career 2.659 (SE 0.0516) 1.318 (SE 0.0456) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) FR To what extent do you think it is common in Spain - for political and economic elites to mutually benefit through the use of economic resources and create regulations or self-interested decisions? 3.382 (SE 0.0294) 0.467 (SE 0.0289) 4-point: 1(Not freq. at all)–4(Very frequent) - clientelism, that is, the use of power (public or private) in favor of friends and members of a political network. 3.343 (SE 0.0297) 0.460 (SE 0.0274) 4-point: 1(Not freq. at all)–4(Very frequent) FR How frequent do you consider the following crimes to be in Spain: Corruption? 3.328 (SE 0.0293) 0.449 (SE 0.0241) 4-point: 1(Not freq. at all)–4(Very frequent) FR To what extent do you consider the following factors to be a significant problem for your company's development in the market? Corruption 2.448 (SE 0.0439) 1.020 (SE 0.0431) 4-point: 1(Nothing)–4(Very much) FR To what extent do you think there is a risk of corruption in the business sector your company belongs to? 2.439 (SE 0.0352) 0.638 (SE 0.0359) 4-point: 1(Nothing)–4(Very much) FR Based on your experience, how frequently would you say that companies in your sector agree specifically not to compete with each other (collusion)? 1.933 (SE 0.0355) 0.605 (SE 0.0376) 4-point: 1(Never)–4(Very often) FR To what extent do you believe that conflicts of interest affect your company's activities? 2.274 (SE 0.0392) 0.802 (SE 0.0418) 4-point: 1(Not at all)–4(Affect a lot) MD In the hypothetical case where someone offers you something in exchange for helping them do something that is not good for your company , what do you think you would most likely end up doing? I highly disapprove such behavior (89.69%); I’d disapprove if the agreement is against the law (9.97%); I’d only approve it if such person is family or a friend (0.34%); I’d accept it, everybody does it (0.00%) In the case that it is in exchange for something that is good for your company , what do you think you would most likely end up doing? I highly disapprove such behavior (65.65%); I’d disapprove if the agreement is against the law (26.98%); I’d only approve it if such person is family or a friend (2.79%); I’d accept it, everybody does it (4.58%) Additional Declarations The authors declare no competing interests. Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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A multidimensional Model based on Ethical, Relational and Institutional Frames\u003c/p\u003e","fulltext":[{"header":"Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eCorruption has become one of the world\u0026rsquo;s most relevant challenges, a situation deemed unthinkable only thirty years ago, when the word \u0026ldquo;corruption\u0026rdquo; scarcely appeared in the media or social research. There have been political and ideological reasons for that change, and both are likely interconnected. Politically speaking, the end of the Cold War and the triumph of capitalism have reduced the need to support corrupt regimes that favored one of the two blocks, thereby allowing journalists to report on corruption scandals (see Palau \u0026amp; Palomo 2021). All of this has enabled civil society around the world to establish thousands of new organizations devoted to denouncing and fighting corruption, the most important of which is probably Transparency International (TI). Today, reducing corruption has become a global battle to achieve good governance (Rose \u0026amp; Pfeiffer 2018) and sustainable development (Argando\u0026ntilde;a 2017).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll these changes have caused corruption to become one of the most prominent research topics in social sciences in recent years, with 28,283 articles published in peer-reviewed journals by 2024, an exponential increase since 1980 (Palomo et al. 2017). Some topics include the concept of corruption itself (e.g. Heidenheimer \u0026amp; Johnston 2002; Rothstein \u0026amp; Varraich 2017), its measurement (Sequeira 2012; Sampford et al. 2017; Weber Abramo 2007; Lambsdorff 2006a; Andersson \u0026amp; Heywood 2009); its causes (Klitgaard 1988; Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Persson et al. 2013); and its economic and social consequences, for example, on: GDP per capita (Mauro, 1996; Tanzi \u0026amp; Davoodi, 2000); Abed \u0026amp; Davoodi 2000; economic growth and foreign investment (M\u0026eacute;on \u0026amp; Sekkat 2005); inequality and poverty (Gupta et al. 2000); human development (Ak\u0026ccedil;ay, 2006; Holmberg et al. 2012); or happiness and subjective welfare (Frey \u0026amp; Stutzer 2000).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eDespite this high level of academic productivity, most studies constrain the scope of research inquiry to the public sector -although private sector corruption is often acknowledged (Hodgson \u0026amp; Jiang 2007)-, and the relationships between private companies and corrupt national and foreign governments because of their social, political, and ethical consequences. However, private or business-to-business (B2B) corruption has been relatively neglected and only recently started to receive the attention it deserves (e.g. Argando\u0026ntilde;a, 2003). Given the relative novelty of these studies, there are still relevant shortcomings, such as its definition, typology, measurement, causes and consequences. This article fills some of these gaps, improving the knowledge on B2B-corruption, by characterizing the determinants of corrupt behaviors among entrepreneurs (in small companies) and managers in a national setting. Insofar as managers can develop favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward bribery based on the decision frame through which the options are evaluated (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), we try to analyze the economic, relational, and ethical frames (Liu et al. 2017) that explain, in interaction with cultural factors, their behavior vis-\u0026agrave;-vis B2B-bribery. To this end, we propose a theoretical model that provides a robust systematization of the determinants of B2B-bribery and their interactions; this sets the basis for potential subsequent measurements and comparative studies in different countries.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the relevant literature on the concept of B2B-corruption, its measurement and consequences. Then, we present a theoretical framework, the research questions and a set of hypotheses. Finally, based on empirical study, we contrast the proposed model along with the hypotheses, and end up with some discussions about the empirical findings and concluding remarks.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Literature review","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eThe concept\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the main obstacles to conducting an empirical study of B2B-corruption is the very concept thereof. According to Bracking (2013), a range of practices have emerged that can be understood as new types of corporate corruption (e.g. deliberate bankruptcy, thin capitalization, illicit financial flows, etc.) so it is very difficult to have a definition which encompasses all of them (Wu \u0026amp; Huang 2013). Probably, some of them are fraud and not corruption. Anyway, the most widely used general concepts of corruption -i.e. abuse of entrusted power for private benefit - are difficult to apply to the private realm (e.g. TI, 2015; Friedman, 1970; Andersson \u0026amp; Heywood, 2009). And some specific concepts (for example, Argando\u0026ntilde;a, 2003) run the risk of overlooking unethical actions for the company\u0026rsquo;s benefit that could be as damaging to society as those identified as clearly corrupt. Furthermore, cultural differences are also important. Corruption can occur, for example, when a representative is seeking a reward from sellers of products if they want to sell them to his company (Anand et al., 2004), and this leaves the door open for very different interpretations considering cultural and historical differences (e.g. Gopinath, 2008 for a B2B-bribery case study in India).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB2B-corruption can be individual or generalized (Pinto et al. 2008). Corrupt organizations typically involve a leadership that is fully aware that it is using corrupt strategies and actions for personal gain and, at times, that of the company (Aguilera and Vadera 2008). In any event, exogenic factors tend to be key when it comes to explaining how this phenomenon spreads (Szwajkowski 1985; Clinard \u0026amp; Yeager 1980), and the Principal-Agent theory (De Graaf 2007) does not always help to explain how to deal with B2B-corruption, since sometimes the most corrupt actor is precisely the principal. In our view, an action is corrupt not only because of the abuse of position or personal benefits but also because it harms a socially and legally protected interest. Corruption would therefore not only be \u0026quot;the abuse of power that a private organization may confer on any of its members, whether directly or indirectly, for private gain\u0026quot;. This definition includes corrupt acts in dealings with other companies as well as embezzlement. However, a comprehensive definition would also have to include the use of the power conferred by the ownership of a company to bribe members of other companies for the benefit of the company but to the detriment of the results of those other companies and fair competition. Therefore, a broad concept is proposed where B2B-corruption would be \u0026quot;the use of the authority conferred by the ownership of a company or the abuse of the power that a private organization can confer on any of its members for private gain, direct or indirect, individual or corporate, when their actions are contrary to fair competition and in particular, but not only, when the company or its members interact with other private organizations\u0026quot;. Lastly, although B2B-bribery would only be one type of B2B-corruption, it is probably the most important and the focus of this article.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMeasurement\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB2B-corruption is difficult to measure for three reasons (Di Nicola et al. 2018). First, a corrupt exchange is normally based on a hidden agreement that does not lead to a quantifiable victim; second, it is underreported to authorities and therefore is not properly included in official statistics (Rose-Ackerman 2007); lastly, it is a phenomenon that, for the most part, lacks sufficient regulation, and, where regulated as an offense, it is relatively new and with few cases in the courts so far.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThere are quite a few surveys on private-to-public corruption (e.g. TI 2011b; EC 2014, 2017, 2019; WB 2017) but fewer \u0026nbsp;specifically on B2B-corruption. General private corruption surveys tend to mix bribery to public officials with B2B-bribery (KPMG 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002; Kaptein 2003). Furthermore, the complexity of B2B-corruption is acknowledged in the scarce survey-based empirical academic studies (Wood 1995; Hill et al. 1992; Gopinah 2008). In 2011, an international survey gathered information about B2B-bribery (TI 2011a). Some EU-funded national surveys have dramatically improved knowledge on this topic, e.g. in Croatia (UNODC 2013); and in Estonia and Denmark (Johannsen et al. 2016; Soot et al. 2016; Jaakson 2019). In 2016, the EU-funded project Private Corruption Barometer (PCB) bridges the lack of: i) knowledge on private corruption; ii) reliable instruments and indicators to measure private-sector corruption that damages businesses; iii) comparative analyses on private corruption across Bulgaria, Italy, Spain and Germany (see Di Nicola et al. 2018 for further details). Lastly, in 2019, an empirical study of Romanian companies was published (Burduja \u0026amp; Zaharia 2019) with a questionnaire similar to previous surveys.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eConsequences\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eB2B-corruption not only prevents a fair competition and efficient markets but also reduces the quality of products and services to the consumer (TI 2011a). It also negatively impacts market-based mechanisms, creating inefficiencies, eroding trust among businesses, harming employees\u0026rsquo; loyalty toward their companies and respective shareholders, and contributing to a general societal culture of corruption (Argando\u0026ntilde;a 2003; United Nations 2004; Argando\u0026ntilde;a 2007). Moreover, the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 1999) included recommendations on active and passive bribery in the private sector and corporate liability. In the United States, the NYSE and the NASDAQ require a company to have and disclose a code of ethics as a prerequisite for being able to be listed. Nowadays, managing corruption risks has become a crucial area of business development (Hansen 2011). From the managerial viewpoint, setting effective measures to control B2B-corruption is crucial and this article sheds some light on this matter.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"A theoretical framework of B2B-corruption","content":"\u003cp\u003eDue to the complexity of the B2B-corruption, a countless number of explanatory variables characterize it. The key is to identify, using a multidisciplinary approach, those that could explain most of the phenomenon while accounting for the complexity of the measurement and promoting a more parsimonious explanation, even if some specificity is lost. We aim at designing a general model that can be replicated internationally to help to understand the differences in B2B-corruption levels between countries.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor the construction of the model, we start from the assumption that corruption is a complex social phenomenon. However, it is the individual who ultimately decides whether to engage in corruption (Bichieri and Ganegoda, 2017). According to an analytical approach, a social fact must be explained by detailing the mechanisms through which the phenomenon is regularly produced. From the mechanism perspective, correlations and constant conjunctions do not explain but are observational phenomena that needs to be explained by reference to the mechanisms that brought them into existence. In sociology, the basic entities of a mechanism always tend to be actors, and the basic activities tend to be their actions. According to this theory of action, desires, beliefs, and opportunities are the primary theoretical terms upon which the analysis of action and interaction is based (Hedstr\u0026ouml;m, 2006: 75-76). Bribery is an action enacted by individuals driven by desires, beliefs and opportunities, occurring not in isolation but through interaction with other actors. In the case of B2B-bribery, managers have desire and interest in their company\u0026apos;s success, which can generate ethical and non-ethical behavior; but they also have beliefs, some shared and others not, about their moral duty, and about how others act and how others expect them to act. Finally, as the result of the formal and informal institutional design existing in each company, business sector and society, there are a series of opportunities (and barriers) to corrupt behavior.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe rational choice theory, specifically the Principal-Agent (PA) theory, assumes a subject guided by the desire to maximize profits that can be controlled thanks to an adequate system of incentives and disincentives. Hence, B2B-bribery would be the outcome of the system of barriers (costs) and opportunities (benefits) existing in each organization and in the legal system, analyzed by the actors through the subjective expected utility of their behavior (Bichieri and Ganegoda, 2017). This theory can help to explain part of the phenomenon (the economic frame), but it has many limitations. For example, it does not consider the role of the moral beliefs of entrepreneurs in explaining their behavior (ethical frame). Society\u0026rsquo;s values are passed from generation to generation through the internalization of norms. Individuals conform to an internalized norm because so doing is an end in itself, and not merely because of the material rewards (that follow from norm compliance) or punishments (that follow from norm violation). In true gene-culture coevolutionary form, a variety of uniquely human prosocial emotions come into play, including prominently shame, guilt, and empathy, directly reinforcing internalized norms (Gintis, 2006: 106-7). Furthermore, PA theory does not consider the influence of certain beliefs on the individual behavior. For example, the belief of what others think he or she should do, or the belief that a sufficient number of others would engage in certain particular behavior (Bichieri, 2006, 13). Corruption is self-reinforcing in nature (Persson et al., 2013), high perceptions of corruption may create larger social problems because it may lead to \u0026ldquo;a second order collective action dilemma,\u0026rdquo; (Ostrom, 1998, p.7) wherein rational actors are highly dependent on shared expectations about how other individuals will act. Thus, if a large enough number of actors are expected to engage in corruption, with little possibility of being caught and punished, everyone has something to gain personally from corruption (Morris and Klesner, 2010; Bardhan, 2005). In addition, the collective action dilemma suggests that when perceptions of law breaking reach a sufficient threshold of generalization, even individuals who would not normally accept corrupt exchanges, will be more likely to accept and seek such exchanges. Thus, there is a reciprocal determinism (Bandura, 1986).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFor all these reasons, we have also turned to moral psychology, criminology, and historical and sociological institutionalism to construct a model that attempts to be robust and overcome PA\u0026rsquo;s limitations. According to criminological theory (Wikstr\u0026ouml;m, 2004, 2006), individual decision-making, insofar as it relates to moral dilemmas, is the product of the interaction between a) individual characteristics and b) the essential features of the space in which a subject makes decisions.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFirst, individual characteristics are a person\u0026rsquo;s moral values, the present emotions, impulsivity and the ability to defer gratification, and his or her internal motivation. To understand these processes, it is useful to consider too the importance of cognitive defense mechanisms to neutralize the negative emotions associated with the violation of ethical or legal standards. The research on engagement in unethical and illegal activities indicates the importance of neutralization techniques for explaining and justifying deviant behavior. Individuals use neutralization techniques as cognitive strategy to easy feelings of remorse and to disregards the guilt and social stigma associated with engaging in unethical or illegal practices (Hauser et al. 2020). In our research we have considered personal normative beliefs (Bichieri, 2006) as a relevant explanatory variable. There are different theories to explain moral action, e.g. cognitive development theory (Kohlberg 1984), Hoffman\u0026rsquo;s moral socialization theory (1989) or moral identity (Hardy and Carlo, 2005). We have chosen Kohlberg\u0026rsquo;s (1984) theory, focused largely on the role of moral reasoning, because some empirical studies have found positive relationship between sophisticated levels of moral reasoning skills and sound moral judgements (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987; Gibbs et al., 1992). Furthermore, we included in our survey certain proxy variables that could replicate some items of the Sociomoral Refection Objective Measure-Short Form (SROM, Gibbs et al, 1992).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAccording to Kohlberg (1984), there are three moral development (MD) levels: \u003cem\u003epreconventional\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e. In our research, the \u003cem\u003epreconventional\u003c/em\u003e is when managers accept corrupt practices for the company\u0026rsquo;s benefit (because \u0026ldquo;everybody does it\u0026rdquo;); \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e, when corrupt practices for personal benefit or that of the company are accepted, but only if they are not illegal; and \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e, when corruption is not accepted in any case. Although Kohlberg considers \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e those who would accept corruption only if it benefits family or friends, given that such particularistic attitude has a major effect on B2B-bribery, we propose to include these practices at the \u003cem\u003epreconventional\u003c/em\u003e level. Based on these MD levels, the following hypothesis is tested, assuming \u003cem\u003eceteris paribus\u003c/em\u003e conditions:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eH1 The higher the level of moral development of the entrepreneurs the less opportunities of corruption are perceived.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, the individual is directly exposed and reacts to the essential features of the decision-making space, that varies according to the extent to which it \u0026ldquo;creates opportunity, causes friction and provides control\u0026rdquo; (Wikstr\u0026ouml;m 2004:19-20). Sometimes the space creates opportunities for individual corruption; but there are situations where the corruption motive is not purely individualistic, but collectivist (when individuals consider maximizing not only their own gains but also those that benefit the organization) or relational (when individuals identify not with the organization, but with a smaller group(s) within the organization. It is important to consider that when joining an organization, a person is entering a setting that not only produces incentives and disincentives but also adds meaning. Individuals have a vicarious learning, by following their organization\u0026rsquo;s internal rules of play (De Graff et al., 2010; Arellano, 2017). When corrupt practices develop within an organization and there are no adverse consequences for corrupt individuals, a normalization phenomenon occurs that can have devastating consequences (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Nelson, 2017). An organization can go from being ethical to having isolated cases of individual corruption and, subsequently, due to impunity, the organization could become one of corrupt individuals and, ultimately, a corrupt organization in and of itself that is teeming with corrupt people if the processes by which corruption is standardized are not halted (Pinto et al., 2008). Neutralization techniques are also an important process favoring the normalization of corruption in organizations. A way of justifying corruption consists of highlighting the high levels of corruption in the environment and the need of bribes to be competitive, or the importance of the economic benefits of corruption for the survival of the company.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eOur model, to account for opportunities, considers factors such as expected profits for individuals or for the company. On one hand, job position within the company can facilitate individual opportunities since, for example, employees in specific areas have direct contact with third parties, use means such as budget or materials, have a monopoly of power or knowledge, etc (see Klitgaard, 1988). On the other hand, companies in certain sectors can have more opportunities than others in more institutionalized sectors (WEF, 2016). Hence, the following hypothesis is tested, assuming \u003cem\u003eceteris paribus\u003c/em\u003e conditions:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eH2 The higher the expected opportunities for the employees and for a company, the more often corruption is experienced in general.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe decision-making space can also provide control. The deterrent factors that control corruption (DE) can be state-administered legal and informal norms (i.e. criminal liability), societal norms and beliefs and company-administered compliance systems. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThese deterrent factors account for:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ea) The consequences for the company, i.e. the expected economic losses from corruption or criminal liability, and for individuals, i.e. the impact on employees\u0026rsquo; careers or criminal consequences.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eb) A well-designed company\u0026rsquo;s compliance strategy could reduce the opportunities for unethical decision-making and increase the likelihood that misconduct is detected and sanctioned. It includes elements such as ethical leadership, fair treatment of employees, and spaces for dialogue on ethical dilemmas (Trevi\u0026ntilde;o et al., 1999). They also have a symbolic value in expressing an organization\u0026rsquo;s commitment to integrity (Jaakson, et al. 2019).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003ec) Normative deterrents. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) proposed an approach to understand public corruption, identifying a complex set of informal and formal institutional factors, where corruption is best understood as an equilibrium between opportunities for corruption and deterrents imposed by the State and, in an appreciable way, society too. In this sense, it is important to examine societal norms and beliefs to see to what extent they provide an environment that fosters or hinders crime control. A social norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on condition that they believe that in their social setting of reference: a) most people conform to it (empirical expectation), and b) most people believe they ought to conform to it (normative expectation) (Bichieri, 2006, 13). These cultural deterrents place important barriers when universalistic values prevail in social settings. It means that rules and laws are more important than personal relationships as the standard that guides behavior. Alternatively, particularism prevails when personal relationships come ahead of rules as a standard for determining what is right and ethically acceptable. Various studies (e.g. Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Lambsdorff 2006b; Uslaner 2002, 2013), maintain that societies with a strong particularistic ethic are prone to engage in corrupt acts, both in how public policies are developed and implemented, as well as how business is conducted (Parsons \u0026amp; Shils 1951). The reputational lost due to corruption, which is especially low when there is social support upon the particularized distribution of benefits and insufficient encouragement to fair competition, is a good proxy for the particularism/universalism scheme. \u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHence, the following hypothesis is tested, assuming ceteris paribus conditions:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eH3. The higher the deterrent factors, i.e. the higher the perceived costs of corruption for companies and individuals, the stricter the company\u0026rsquo;s compliance system and the more universalist the society, the less often corruption is experienced.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe decision-making space can also create frictions (FR) that can increase the likelihood of engaging in corrupt practices due to a perceived lack of fairness and the fear of losing out on opportunities vis-\u0026agrave;-vis their competitors. These situations bias the analysis of risks and opportunities (S\u0026oslash;reide 2009). Corruption is socially constructed (Andersson 2017) and individuals\u0026rsquo; perceptions of the frequency of corrupt acts affect the cost/benefit calculation (Jaakson et al. 2019). Indeed, Bardhan (1997, 2005) argue that potential rewards from engaging in corruption depend on the number of people expected to participate in corrupt exchanges. Provided enough actors are expected to engage in corruption, they will gain personally from the corrupt exchange and face a lesser chance of being caught and punished (Morris \u0026amp; Klesner 2010). Thus, this situation develops a structure of incentives that lead to a collective action problem (Persson et al. 2013). The following hypothesis is tested, assuming ceteris paribus conditions:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eH4. The higher the perceived frequency of corruption in general the more often corruption is experienced.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAll these theories set the rationale for a sufficiently complete framework that assumes the three frames theory, solidly grounded in neuroscience, which indicates that B2B-bribery can result from a mixture of ethical, economic and relational frames (Liu et al. 2017). It also assumes theories from analytical sociology, which explain social phenomena by considering the desires, beliefs, and opportunities of interacting people. It also picks up aspects of criminological theory as important as individual moral development, and the tensions that frictions generate to explain individual behavior. Moreover, it does not forget the importance of the institutional environment and social norms both at sector\u0026rsquo;s activity level and at national level. All this interacts under a weighted multidimensional process, where there are different frames, factors shaping the activation of alternative decision frames, and various interactions and results (Liu et al., 2017). \u0026nbsp;We believe that such a comprehensive framework has never been empirically applied.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe abovementioned theoretical framework of B2B-corruption is graphically presented in Figure 1, where the level of private corruption \u0026mdash;measured through the experience of B2B-corruption (CO)\u0026mdash; is characterized through four key dimensions (MD, OP, DE, FR), where MD is a covariate influencing the perceived OP.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e--Figure 1 here\u0026mdash;\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eEmpirical analysis\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBetween January 18\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e and February 14\u003csup\u003eth\u003c/sup\u003e 2018, the PCB questionnaire was administered in Spain, through computer-assisted telephone-interviews, to a representative national stratified weighted sample of 600 entrepreneurs and executives (from companies with ten or more employees). Table 1 shows the distribution of companies by sector/size along with the weighted sample (to recover representativeness of each sector as compared to the total).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e--Table 1 here\u0026ndash;\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe sampling error reported, at a confidence level of 95.5% and assuming the principles of simple, random sampling, for the most unfavorable hypothesis of maximum uncertainty (p=q=50%) was \u0026plusmn;4.1 points. The reliability was increased with focus group interviews with entrepreneurs in two post-survey meetings. Since survey\u0026rsquo;s results were highly correlated with other surveys (EC 2017 and EC 2019), its reliability is confirmed.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTypically, these kinds of surveys can, indeed, suffer from the common method and Socially Desirability\u003cem\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e(SD) bias. One crucial mechanism through which these biases arise is decreased motivation for participants to respond when they must accurately report socially undesirable behavior and an increased tendency for participants to engage in satisficing when they have to report SD conduct (Kaminska \u0026amp; Foulsham 2013). This problem was tackled by switching up the response formats for different questions and reducing ambiguity by keeping questions as simple and straightforward as possible (Podsakoff et al. 2012) and in the most neutral and least-threatening way possible. Following Breen et al. (2016) two types of questions were used: ones that explicitly seek information about respondents\u0026rsquo; own companies and others that seek information about the company\u0026rsquo;s market sector, with questions about competitors\u0026rsquo; behavior. In any case, after controlling for the SD bias, it was concluded that self-reports do help explain corruption.\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eStemming from EC PCB survey\u0026rsquo;s data, see Table 2 for a comprehensive overview of the variables considered in the analysis, B2B-bribery is empirically characterized as follows.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e--Table 2 here\u0026ndash;\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eExperience of corruption (CO)\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe level of corruption is difficult to measure, and many authors have operationalized it through the CO while relying on that many respondents report on bribes what they truly think their competitors pay or receive, but many also report their own experience with offering or accepting bribes (Jaakson et al. 2019). The CO has been measured at three different levels to avoid the SD-bias:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cul class=\"decimal_type\"\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eGeneral experience with corrupt practices in the company\u0026rsquo;s activities, where 18.03% confirm that \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; (15.65%) or \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; (2.37%) an external stakeholder has shown availability to offer something in exchange of a preferential treatment; and 1.75% have heard of someone in the past twelve months being hired or promoted in exchange for money, gifts, or favors.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eExperience among the managers and employees of your company, where 3.63% perceive \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; (3.11%) or \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; (0.52%) that someone shows their willingness to offer money, gifts, or favors in exchange for preferential treatment for the company.\u003c/li\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eExperience about corrupt acts in your company, where 3.94% believe it happens \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; (3.29%) or \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; (0.65%) that someone has directly offered money, gifts, or favors to decision-makers in other companies to secure a business deal, knowingly harming the interests of another company. Similarly, 3.94% believe it occurs \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; (2.98%) or \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; (0.51%) that someone, even without making a directly offer, has shown a willingness to give something.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ul\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe Cronbach\u0026rsquo;s alpha coefficient was 0.702 for the CO variable, indicating very good reliability.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eMoral development (MD)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBusiness professionals can accept/reject corrupt actions according to, amongst other variables, their MD level. Following Kohlberg (1984) and based on two PCB survey\u0026rsquo;s questions (see Table 2) managers have been clustered into three groups (\u003cem\u003epreconventional\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e). A fourth group was also identified, which accounts for the \u0026ldquo;don\u0026rsquo;t know/no opinion\u0026rdquo; answers, with 14 cases spread equally across the five business sectors considered. This fourth group was removed from the analysis since it was only relevant to few cases. Furthermore, the final three groups are consistent with a \u003cem\u003ek-means\u003c/em\u003e clustering method (between_sum of squares/total_sum of squares = 86.0%) matching the 100% of the clustering obtained from the questions and the three levels.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn order to further characterize the MD groups, several statistical tests were performed which identified a greater presence of big companies (+50 employees) at the \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e level (statistically significant, p-value 0.00125). The estimated odds of being in a big company are higher at the \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e MD level than at the \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e one (estimated odds ratio is 1.54, with 95% CI (0.955,2.501).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTo account for a potential gender gap in the positions (see e.g. Figueroa-Domecq et al. 2020, Figueroa-Domecq et al. 2019), the characterization of the MD levels in terms of gender and company position (considered jointly) was found statistically significant. Furthermore, women, both as \u0026ldquo;employee/other\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;CEO/equivalent\u0026rdquo; positions, are found more frequently at the \u003cem\u003econventional\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003eand \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003elevels. Additionally, the gender difference in \u0026ldquo;CEO/equivalent\u0026rdquo; positions is reduced with respect to the \u0026ldquo;employee/other\u0026rdquo; one.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eOpportunities offered by corrupt acts (OP)\u003c/strong\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe expected gain from corrupt activities for the individual depends on the degree of discretion and monopoly in decision-making within the company (Klitgaard 1988). According to the PA theory, the more discretion and monopoly the more corruption. Based on the expected likelihood of accepting/asking money, gifts or favors, the company\u0026rsquo;s functional areas considered in the survey were ranked in descending risk order: procurement, retail/wholesale, control and monitoring, human resources. When combining the MD level with the employee\u0026rsquo;s functional area, it is clearly perceived \u0026ldquo;no risk\u0026rdquo; for the majority (57.57%) of the \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e that an employee would agree to accept/ask for something, and 55.16% for the \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e. However, for the \u003cem\u003epreconventional\u003c/em\u003e group, 73.58% consider it probable (jointly, \u0026ldquo;highly risky\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;risky\u0026rdquo;).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs for the expected benefit for the company, B2B-bribery is widely perceived (90.39%) as contributing \u0026ldquo;little\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;nothing\u0026rdquo; to boost the company\u0026rsquo;s business. When accounting for the MD level, the vast majority of the \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e group (73.33%) believes that bribing contributes \u0026ldquo;nothing,\u0026rdquo; and 61.68% in the case of \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e. However, for the \u003cem\u003epreconventional\u003c/em\u003e group, 68.45% considers it contributes something to the company\u0026rsquo;s business.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBoth, for the individual\u0026rsquo;s and company\u0026rsquo;s gain, there is a correlation between the MD and the expected opportunities offered by corrupt acts, the higher the MD the lower the expected risk of corrupt acts.\u003cstrong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe OP has been measured at different levels. In the market area where operates the company, 20.5% perceive procurement staff as \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; (15.3%) or \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; (5.2%) receiving cash or goods in exchange for contract awards, while 31.2% believe contracts are frequently awarded to close friends or relatives (\u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; 24.07%, \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; 7.13%). Additionally, 8.31% believe that, in particular situations, B2B-bribery can be useful to expedite company\u0026rsquo;s results (\u0026quot;much\u0026quot; 5.42%, \u0026quot;very much\u0026quot; 2.89%). In inventory management, 9.21% suggest that managers \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; (7.27%) or \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; (1.94%) resell goods via false accounting entries. Regarding company behaviors, 31.46% report mediators recommending firms that offer kickbacks instead of selecting the optimal choices (\u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; 24.44%, \u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; 7.02%), and 23.04% indicate that firms frequently offer\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDeterrence factors that control corruption (DE)\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs deterrence factors, several expected consequences of B2B-bribery were assessed for both the company and individuals. Financial losses to companies as a result of their involvement in corruption are scarcely anticipated, with 64.7% indicating low expectation (\u0026ldquo;never\u0026rdquo; 21.82%, \u0026ldquo;rarely\u0026rdquo; 42.88%). Furthermore, the reputational lost for the company due B2B-corruption, as proxy for the normative deterrents, was not frequently expected (\u0026ldquo;never\u0026rdquo; 18.85%, \u0026ldquo;rarely\u0026rdquo; 29.78%). This indicates that social constraint is not high.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs for the employees involved in corruption, respondents believe that often they are neither discovered (\u0026ldquo;rarely\u0026rdquo; 42.5%, \u0026ldquo;never\u0026rdquo; 25.38%) nor sanctioned even if discovered (\u0026ldquo;rarely\u0026rdquo; 43.92% or \u0026ldquo;never\u0026rdquo; 25.44%). Hence, the expected consequences of bribery within the company reveals a prevailing perception of impunity, since only 42.99% of individuals \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; discovered are \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; sanctioned. A composite impact was created on the individual indicator that accounts for being discovered and sanctioned, which revealed that the majority (53.3%) consider that the measures for detecting and sanctioning bribery have a medium/low impact, and 16.2% directly indicate no impact. Conversely, 51.63% perceive involvement in bribery as negatively affecting an employee\u0026rsquo;s career (\u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; 31.08%, \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; 20.55%).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAmong the most common company\u0026rsquo;s internal anti-corruption measures it was found that 59.5% of the companies implement codes of conduct (applies to all employees and intermediaries); anti-corruption training programs (14.3%); and whistleblower protection (26.8%). Regarding the level of attainment of the code of conduct, only 17.47% believe that the existing code is not respected by the company\u0026rsquo;s employees. There are 55 companies (9.4%) with all three measures, 105 (17.9%) with two, 214 (36.5%) with one, and 212 companies (36.2%) with none.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFrictions\u003c/strong\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe decision-making environment creates frictions that can be measured through the perceived risk of B2B-corruption in a company\u0026rsquo;s business sector. Frictions introduce disturbances with respect to the perception of the company\u0026rsquo;s real costs of corruption, since when FR is high neither reputational nor economic costs of corruption act as deterrents for the company. In general, it was found that 40.9% perceive high risk in the business sector of their company (\u0026ldquo;very much\u0026rdquo; 10.89%, \u0026ldquo;much\u0026rdquo; 30%), which greatly disrupts the perception of OP and DE. By sectors, Construction is clearly a risky business sector, in line with UNODC (2013).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrictions were assessed at different levels. At the country level, 89.58% believe that political and economic elites to mutually benefit through the use of economic resources and create regulations or self-interested decisions (\u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; 48.19%, \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; 41.39%), and 87.68% clientelism (\u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; 44.16%, \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; 43.49%). 88.24% perceive the crime of corruption is frequent (\u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; 43.52%, \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; 44.72%). At the company level, 45.05% believe that corruption is a significant problem that affects the development of the company in the market (\u0026ldquo;very much\u0026rdquo; 19%, \u0026ldquo;much\u0026rdquo; 26.05%); 18.41% believe that collusion is frequent in the sector (\u0026ldquo;very often\u0026rdquo; 3.38%, \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; 15.03); and 35.51% believe conflict of interests highly affect the company\u0026rsquo;s activities (\u0026ldquo;affect a lot\u0026rdquo; 10.52%, \u0026ldquo;much\u0026rdquo; 24.99%).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAlternatively, these frictions were measured by analyzing 14 relevant court sentences on corruption passed in the last 20 years in Spain, and the ten most important corruption cases; the five business sectors were ranked according to their (decreasing) level of risk: Construction; Hotels/restaurants; Services; Commerce; Industry. Based on this ranking and the MD level, the two with highest degree of interaction with the public sector (Construction and Hotels/Restaurants) account for the greatest presence of the \u003cem\u003epreconventional\u003c/em\u003e group (+12.4%), while the rest have a greater presence of the \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e group (+66.1%). This leads one to believe that the greater the interaction with the public sector the more difficult it is to maintain \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e attitudes, i.e. being in a corrupt environment increases the costs of honesty. Furthermore, there is a correlation between the risk of corruption in the business sector (having Construction the highest risk and Industry the lowest) and the company\u0026rsquo;s internal anti-corruption measures, the higher the risk the lower the deterrence factor\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, some mediation effects between OP and CO were identified since FR and DE affect the perception of the cost-benefit ratio, by reducing the perceived cost of corruption and increasing the perceived benefit (Persson et al. 2013); hence, creating disturbances in the impact of OP on CO.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Results","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe proposed theoretical model assesses the impact of perceived opportunities for corruption (OP) on actual corruption experiences (CO). We estimated a Structural Equation Model (SEM) with four latent variables (circles): OP, DE, FR, and CO. Observed indicator variables (squares) are associated with each latent factor. Additionally, covariates such as MD, Gender, tenure in the company (Q6), position in the company (Q5_employee and Q5_other, with reference category owner/CEO/CFO) were integrated to control for potential influencing factors. Figure 2 illustrated the model\u0026rsquo;s structural and measurement components.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e-- Figure2 here --\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eBoth frequentist (Maximum Likelihood) and Bayesian SEM estimation methods reached good overall fitting (\u0026chi;\u0026sup2;(408) = 809.661, p\u0026lt;.001, CFI=0.916, TLI=0.906, RMSEA=0.041 [90% CI: 0.037, 0.045], and SRMR=0.061. The Bayesian model, after 5,000 iterations, converged adequately (Rhat\u0026asymp;1.000), producing estimates highly consistent with the frequentist approach, suggesting robust results irrespective of the estimation method. The composite reliability scores across constructs were acceptable: OP (0.893), DE (0.807), CO (0.622), and FR (0.634).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHypothesis H1 focuses on the positive impact of the moral development on reducing the perceived opportunities of corruption. The estimates shows that MD negatively influences OP (\u0026beta;=-0.176, p=0.001, standardized estimate = -0.150, CI [-0.277, -0.075]), i.e. the higher the MD the lower the expected OP; hence, confirming H1.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHypothesis H2 focuses on the positive impact of the expected gains (OP), for the individual and for the company, on the experience of corruption (CO). Based on the data, individuals \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; experience corruption 2.7 and 8.8 times more in \u003cem\u003ehighly risky\u003c/em\u003e positions (where it is very likely that an employee finds opportunities) than in the case of \u003cem\u003eno risk\u003c/em\u003e positions, depending on the type of corrupt act and actor. For companies, corruption is \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; experienced between 2.5 and 4.5 times more by those who expect that a \u003cem\u003egreat\u003c/em\u003e contribution by way of corruption will boost business than in the case of those who do not consider it useful (contributes \u003cem\u003enothing\u003c/em\u003e), depending on the type of corrupt act and actor.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe estimates show a significant positive direct effect of OP on CO, \u0026beta;=0.203, p\u0026lt; .001, standardized estimate = 0.340, 95% CI [0.129, 0.269]. Additionally, OP has a significant indirect effect on CO via FR, with \u0026beta;=0.048, p=0.007, standardized indirect effect of 0.088, 95% CI [0.014, 0.090]. Conversely, the indirect effect through DE was not found statistically significant (\u0026beta;=0.002, p=0.745, 0.003, CI [-0.009, 0.012]). Overall, the total effect of OP on CO was significant and positive (\u0026beta;=0.253 (p \u0026lt; 0.001, 0.431, CI [0.193, 0.313]); hence, showing how OP drives CO and confirming H2.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHypothesis H3 focuses on the negative impact of the deterrence factors for the company and the individual on the experience of corruption. For the individual, based on the data, it is \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; experienced corruption between 1.82 and 2.25 times more by those employees expecting a \u003cem\u003elow-impact\u003c/em\u003e of bribing as opposed to those expecting a \u003cem\u003ehigh-impact\u003c/em\u003e. For the company, depending on the stablished compliance system, corruption is \u0026ldquo;often\u0026rdquo; experienced 1.49 times more when there are \u003cem\u003eno measures\u003c/em\u003e of compliance than in the case of \u003cem\u003e2 measures\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003e(e.g. code of conduct, training program or whistleblowing protection), and corruption is \u0026ldquo;never\u0026rdquo; experienced 1.79 times more when \u003cem\u003e2 measures\u003c/em\u003e are implemented than in the case of \u003cem\u003eno measures\u003c/em\u003e; in line with other studies, e.g. Jaakson (2019). It seems that implementing a \u0026ldquo;code of conduct\u0026rdquo; is more associated with less CO (43.82% \u0026ldquo;never\u0026rdquo; experienced it). The \u0026ldquo;whistleblower protection\u0026rdquo; does not seem to influence CO (probably due to the lack of a real protection system since there was not a national law in Spain to protect whistleblowers when the survey was administered). Based on these results, H3 is confirmed and the more stringent the compliance system in the company, the lower the experience of corruption. However, the effect of DE on CO was not found statistically significant (\u0026beta;=0.007, p=0.745, standardized estimate = 0.016, CI [-0.037, 0.050]). The hypothesized relationships have been tested statistically significant except for the effect of the deterrence (DE) on the experience of corruption (CO), which can be interpreted as impossibility of these factors to control corruption.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHypotheses H4 focus on the perception that unfair situations affect the perceived cost-benefit ratio of corruption and this has a positive impact on the CO. Based on the data, corruption is \u0026ldquo;never\u0026rdquo; experienced between 6.44 and 9.4 times more by those expecting \u003cem\u003eno risk at all\u0026nbsp;\u003c/em\u003ein a company\u0026rsquo;s business sector than in the case of those expecting a \u003cem\u003ehigh risk\u003c/em\u003e, depending on the type of corrupt act and actor. The estimates show that FR significantly influenced CO (\u0026beta;=0.185, p=0.004, standardized estimate = 0.215, CI [0.071, 0.352]); hence, confirming H4.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, it was found that the OP significantly impacts both FR (\u0026beta;=0.261, p\u0026lt;0.001, standardized estimate = 0.411, CI [0.192, 0.328]) and DE (\u0026beta;=0.237, p\u0026lt;0.001, standardized estimate = 0.177, CI [0.111, 0.366]), showing how the expected gains govern the perception about FR and DE. Furthermore, among covariates, gender had a significant negative effect on CO (\u0026beta;=-0.157, p\u0026lt;0.001, standardized estimate = -0.184, CI [-0.236, -0.079]), with males reporting higher levels of CO than females. Additionally, employees (Q5_employee) perceived higher levels of OP compared to owners/CEO/CFOs (\u0026beta;=0.243, p=0.005, standardized estimate = 0.121, 95% CI [0.074, 0.409]), whereas those in other roles (Q5_other) perceived lower levels (\u0026beta;=-0.261, p=0.053, standardized estimate = \u0026ndash;0.083, 95% CI [\u0026ndash;0.521, \u0026ndash;0.003]). Tenure (Q6) showed a minimal and nonsignificant effect on CO (\u0026beta;=0.015, p=0.066, standardized estimate = 0.083, CI [-0.001, 0.030]). Figure 3, 4 and 5 present boxplots for the posterior samples of the latent variables by sector, gender and MD, respectively.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e-- Figures 3,4,5 here --\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Discussion and implications","content":"\u003cp\u003eThe proposed model, based on the empirically proven hypotheses, confirms the influence among the variables: the levels of B2B-bribery strongly depend on the degree of MD, the opportunities, deterrents and the frictions that interact in a given market. The overall analysis highlights two variables that dominate the CO in Spanish companies: the role of ethics and, specifically, the managers\u0026rsquo; MD; and the environment in which companies operate and their FR level. Consequently, the behavior of most managers and employees is not the result of an individual and isolated cost/benefit analysis. Our results likely support the importance of the ethical and relational frames in explaining B2B-corruption (Liu et al. 2017; Bichieri, 2006). Corrupt actions are assessed according to the company\u0026rsquo;s tensions and risks (contextual cues). A high perception of corruption (empirical expectations), based on either observation of behaviors of others or information received from trusted sources, have a strong influence on managers\u0026rsquo; behavior (Bichieri, 2006; Persson et al. 2013; Bardham, 2005). Therefore, the expected corrupt behavior of the other stakeholders in a company\u0026rsquo;s market has a positive effect on the assessment of the desirability of the benefits and the acceptance of costs. Finally, personal normative beliefs, linked to MD and, probably, identity, even supersede normative expectations and empirical expectations in influencing behavior (Aquino et al., 2009). The relationship between ethical and relational motives varies according to a manager\u0026rsquo;s MD level. \u003cem\u003ePostconventionals\u003c/em\u003e tend to act according to the moral rules and principles of an honest entrepreneur, even when there are risks within the company\u0026rsquo;s sector. \u003cem\u003eConventionals\u003c/em\u003e, and above all, \u003cem\u003epreconventionals\u003c/em\u003e, may exhibit corrupt behavior when the risks of being honest are high. Even when Frictions are high, the \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e level has proved to be the most robust group: such strong ethical convictions showed a consistent predisposition to rejecting dishonest activities in several situations.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSome individual relevant factors have been tested: a) corrupt behaviors by gender, where women, both as employee and as CEO, were found more frequently in the \u003cem\u003econventional\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e levels, in line with Swamy et al. (2001), and Stens\u0026ouml;ta et al. (2015) women are less involved in bribery and are less likely to condone bribe-taking; b) company\u0026rsquo;s size, with greater presence of large companies in the \u003cem\u003epostconventional\u003c/em\u003e level. Small companies have less resources to confront big risks and limited installed capacity to build DE (e.g. training on business ethics); hence, they bear higher risks than large ones, and these frictions sometimes lead to unethical behavior (Russo \u0026amp; Tencati 2009).\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe experience of B2B-bribery in Spain was found worrisome: 18.2% acknowledged that external stakeholders often demonstrate a willingness to offer something in exchange for preferential treatment. Most likely, it would be far worse if it was not for managers\u0026rsquo; MD. To fully understand the dimensions of the phenomenon, it would be interesting to compare this with the percentage of people who admit to having been required to pay a bribe within the public sector. Public bribery seems low in Spain, only 2% admit to having paid a bribe in the last 12 months (EC 2024). This unexpected finding (bribery in Spain, and probably in other countries, is more widespread in the private than in the public sector) is, without a doubt, a wake-up call for the authorities to devote more attention to this issue.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis study has its limitations. First, some degree of SD bias is a concern when using self-reporting surveys; although it likely does not express the entire truth, it is the best available way to determine the experience and attitudes of managers\u0026rsquo; towards B2B-corruption (Walburg 2015). Second, this study only analyzes the most visible B2B-corruption type (bribery), and future studies should also cover other categories. Lastly, the case study focuses only on Spain. It would have been advisable to generalize the empirical contrast of the theoretical framework and to extract conclusions about different economies and cultures.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Conclusion","content":"\u003cp\u003eMany studies on B2B-corruption have analyzed the phenomenon from the perspective of a \u003cem\u003ehomo economicus\u003c/em\u003e who acts merely according to the system of incentives and disincentives existing in the organization and production sector. Alternatively, we account for internal incentives and disincentives along with other bodies of inquiry based on moral action, collective action and social behavior. Our model considers the decision-making process of a person actually encountering the opportunity to offer or to accept a bribe (Nichols and Robertson, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR68\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2017\u003c/span\u003e) stemming from different theories of moral and social psychology, and criminology. The proposed theoretical framework has been empirically tested through a survey with the greatest representativeness to date of Spanish entrepreneurs. Based on a wide range of theories, the tested explanatory variables (MD, OP, DE, FR) are related to the experience of corruption (not just the abstract perception thereof); this relationship depends on the prevailing MD level among people participating in their own business area, on the potential benefits, the individual costs of getting involved in corrupt business, on the economic and reputational business costs, and on the frictions or tensions managers experience while conducting business.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePolicy and managerial implications directly emerge from this research. The normalization of B2B-corruption stems from three processes that mutually reinforce each other (Ashforth and Anand, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR12\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2003\u003c/span\u003e): i) institutionalization, where a corrupt decision is made at a given time and remains within the structures and processes and so becomes routine; ii) rationalization, denial and justification, where stories and ideas are developed in favor of corrupt individuals to justify and even value corruption (Zyglidopoulos \u0026amp; Fleming, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR113\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2008\u003c/span\u003e); iii) socialization, by which an organization\u0026rsquo;s neophytes are led to see corruption as normal and even desirable (Milgram, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR64\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). By assuming that unethically defending an organization\u0026rsquo;s interests at a given (and isolated) moment in time is not a corrupt act and, hence, no sanctions should be applied, sets off on the path of corruption that will be found increasingly difficult to change courses and control. For all these reasons, it is essential to introduce national and organizational strategies to stop corruption at the outset.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eBased on our analysis, B2B-bribery is the product of social mechanisms where individual, institutional and social factors interact in complex ways. Thus, any attempt to reduce it should take a multilevel and multidisciplinary approach. By understanding the proposed theoretical framework, proper institutional policies to fight corruption can be implemented in line with the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly SDG 16. From an individual perspective, we have shown the importance of managers\u0026rsquo; normative beliefs for rejecting dishonest activities. But ethical leadership is also essential for creating an organization\u0026rsquo;s culture of integrity, by inspiring others to think and behave ethically (Bandura \u003cspan citationid=\"CR13\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1986\u003c/span\u003e; Trevino \u003cspan citationid=\"CR96\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1986\u003c/span\u003e); especially when they lead by example and followers see the leader as a moral exemplar, voluntarily accepting and seeking his/her leadership regarding ethical issues at work (Verdorfer and Peus, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR104\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). The congruence between a leader\u0026rsquo;s MD and an employee\u0026rsquo;s MD level was positively associated with job satisfaction and organizational commitment, therefore reducing frictions within the company (Schminke et al. \u003cspan citationid=\"CR82\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2005\u003c/span\u003e). Therefore, we think that educating managers on the costs and consequences of corruption and the benefits of ethical leadership for their companies must be a priority. From an institutional viewpoint, business ethics training must be promoted, where the principles of fair competition and social responsibility are internalized and respected. Moreover, the ethical codes and systems for detecting unethical activity should be coupled with an effective implementation of whistleblowers protection and sanctions in cases of a breach (David-Barret et al. 2017). The judiciary has much work to do in this area that is so novel to judges. Detection, investigation, and punishment of B2B crimes should be improved (Trevino and Ball, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR97\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1992\u003c/span\u003e). Lastly, it is true that the level of particularism in societies also influences a greater acceptance of regulatory breaches, especially when the breach benefits \u0026ldquo;your team\u0026rdquo; (Hampden-Turner \u0026amp; Trompenaars \u003cspan citationid=\"CR39\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e1993\u003c/span\u003e). It will be interesting to analyze how the different levels of particularism and universalism affect B2B-corruption in different countries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, the proposed model provides a robust systematization of the determinants of B2B-corruption in a European country as well as their interactions, setting the basis for potential subsequent measurements and comparative studies.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan\u003eWe confirm that all participants in the survey provided their informed consent to take part in the study. The survey was conducted by a professional demoscopic company, which ensured that participation was entirely voluntary and contingent upon the respondents\u0026apos; explicit acceptance to contribute to the research.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ch2\u003eCompliance with Ethical Standards\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare no competing interests.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAcknowledgements\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis publication is part of the R\u0026amp;D project: PID2020-115869RB-I00, funded by MCIN/ AEI/\u003cspan class=\"ExternalRef\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"RefSource\"\u003e10.13039/501100011033/\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan address=\"10.13039/501100011033/\" targettype=\"DOI\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \"FEDER A way to make Europe\".\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n \u003cli\u003eAbed, G., and Davoodi, H. 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Ethical distance in corrupt firms: How do innocent bystanders become guilty perpetrators? \u003cem\u003eJournal of Business Ethics\u003c/em\u003e,Vol.78,pp.4-5.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"},{"header":"Tables","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 1:\u003c/strong\u003e Distribution of companies (population and sample) according to sector and size (rounded values are presented)\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cdiv align=\"\"\u003e\n \u003ctable border=\"0\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"624\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 75px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eINDUSTRY\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCONSTRUCTION\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCOMMERCE\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHOTELS/REST.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 104px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSERVICES\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTOTAL\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 75px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 56px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10 to 49\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e+50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10 to 49\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 66px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e+50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10 to 49\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e+50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10 to 49\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e+ 50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10 to 49\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e+50\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 75px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003ePopulation\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 56px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e24464\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e5574\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e13133\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 66px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1247\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22100\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3701\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e10258\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 38px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1698\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e50141\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 47px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e12464\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e144780\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e30038\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e14380\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e25801\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e11956\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 104px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e62605\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 75px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eSample\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e84\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 37px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e22\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 49px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e92\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 65px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 49px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e102\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 37px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e73\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 36px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e18\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e116\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 46px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e67\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e600\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e106\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e100\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e91\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 104px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e183\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 75px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eWeighed sample\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 57px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e81\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 37px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e19\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 49px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e90\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 65px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e8\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 49px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e95\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 37px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e16\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e79\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 36px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e13\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e153\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 46px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e46\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" style=\"width: 58px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e600\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e100\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 113px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e98\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e111\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 94px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e92\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 104px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e199\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eTable 2:\u003c/strong\u003e Overview of the variables considered in the analysis\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"992\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eQuestion\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eVariance\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikert scale\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCO\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn the activities of your company, how often happens that external stakeholders show their availability to offer something in change of a preferential treatment?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.849\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0341)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.589\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0363)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCO\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn the company\u0026rsquo;s activities, in the past twelve months have you heard of anyone being hired or promoted in exchange for money, gifts, or favors?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.017\u003cbr\u003e\u0026nbsp;(SE 0.0052)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.017\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0051)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBinary: Yes/No\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCO\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eAmong the managers and employees of your company, how often do you think it happens that someone shows their willingness to offer money, gifts, or favors in exchange for preferential treatment for the company?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.371\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0266)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.328\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0333)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCO\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn your company, how many times have you heard of someone who has directly offered money, gifts, or favors to decision-makers in other companies to secure a business deal, knowing that it would harm the interests of another company.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.21\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0241)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.271\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0404)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eCO\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn your company, how many times have you heard of someone who, even if they didn\u0026rsquo;t directly offer it, someone showed a willingness to give something [\u0026hellip;] in exchange for a business deal, knowing that it would harm the interests of another company.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.259\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0234)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.283\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0324)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOP\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn the market area where your company operates, how often does it occur that:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- An employee responsible for acquisitions or procurement receives cash or goods in exchange for awarding a contract?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.887\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0392)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.76\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0045)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- A mediating company instead of recommending the best and cheapest offer, suggests another firm that in turn kicks part of the sales back to the mediating company?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.067\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0424)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.89\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0422)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- An employee responsible for procurements or purchasing goods and services hands over the order to a close friend or relative?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.074\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0411)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.861\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0422)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- An employee responsible for inventory management makes false account entries and instead of storing the goods, resells them?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.594\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0324)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.518\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0401)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- A company offers money, favors or gifts to a customer in order to obtain favors in future?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.897\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0391)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.775\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.042)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- A company offers money, favors or gifts to the employees of a financial institute to obtain favorable conditions for loans of financial facilitations?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.556\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0332)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.531\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0402)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- A company offers money, favors or gifts to the employees of a competitor to obtain strategic or commercial information?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.539\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.032)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.478\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.039)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- A company offers money, favors or gifts to independent professionals with specific roles of control (e.g. consultants, auditors) to convince them to make an act in contrast with their duties\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.564\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.032)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.509\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.038)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eOP\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDo you think that B2B corruption, in particular situations, can be useful to speed up the business of your company/the company you work for?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.434\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0326)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.532\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0531)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Nothing)\u0026ndash;4(Very much)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003ctable border=\"1\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"0\" width=\"992\"\u003e\n \u003ctbody\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eQuestion\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eVariance\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eLikert scale\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eDE\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn the market area where your company operates, how often does it occur that:\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- who asks/gives a bribe is actually discovered\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.045\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0398)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.744\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0459)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- who asks/gives a bribe is actually sanctioned\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.06\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0425)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.865\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0544)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- a company is subjected to a financial loss in case of involvement in corruption cases\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.04\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0407)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.78\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0491)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- a company is subjected to a reputational loss in case of involvement in corruption cases\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.53\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0468)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.122\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0442)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- giving/receiving a bribe have a negative impact on an employee\u0026rsquo;s career\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.659\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0516)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.318\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0456)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFR\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do you think it is common in Spain\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- for political and economic elites to mutually benefit through the use of economic resources and create regulations or self-interested decisions?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.382\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0294)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.467\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0289)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Not freq. at all)\u0026ndash;4(Very frequent)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e- clientelism, that is, the use of power (public or private) in favor of friends and members of a political network.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.343\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0297)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.460\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0274)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Not freq. at all)\u0026ndash;4(Very frequent)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFR\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eHow frequent do you consider the following crimes to be in Spain: Corruption?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e3.328\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0293)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.449\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0241)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Not freq. at all)\u0026ndash;4(Very frequent)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFR\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do you consider the following factors to be a significant problem for your company\u0026apos;s development in the market? Corruption\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.448\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0439)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.020\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0431)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Nothing)\u0026ndash;4(Very much)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFR\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do you think there is a risk of corruption in the business sector your company belongs to?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.439\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0352)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.638\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0359)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Nothing)\u0026ndash;4(Very much)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFR\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eBased on your experience, how frequently would you say that companies in your sector agree specifically not to compete with each other (collusion)?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e1.933\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0355)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.605\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0376)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Never)\u0026ndash;4(Very often)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eFR\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eTo what extent do you believe that conflicts of interest affect your company\u0026apos;s activities?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e2.274\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0392)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 85px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e0.802\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e(SE 0.0418)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 180px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e4-point: 1(Not at all)\u0026ndash;4(Affect a lot)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd rowspan=\"2\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 95px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eMD\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn the hypothetical case where someone offers you something in exchange for helping them do \u003cu\u003esomething that is not good for your company\u003c/u\u003e, what do you think you would most likely end up doing?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 350px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eI highly disapprove such behavior (89.69%); I\u0026rsquo;d disapprove if the agreement is against the law (9.97%); I\u0026rsquo;d only approve it if such person is family or a friend (0.34%); I\u0026rsquo;d accept it, everybody does it (0.00%)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 548px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eIn the case that it is in exchange for \u003cu\u003esomething that is good for your company\u003c/u\u003e, what do you think you would most likely end up doing?\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003ctd colspan=\"3\" valign=\"top\" style=\"width: 350px;\"\u003e\n \u003cp\u003eI highly disapprove such behavior (65.65%); I\u0026rsquo;d disapprove if the agreement is against the law (26.98%); I\u0026rsquo;d only approve it if such person is family or a friend (2.79%); I\u0026rsquo;d accept it, everybody does it (4.58%)\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/tbody\u003e\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[{"identity":"f50e01f9-2236-4732-b636-a83c99735228","identifier":"10.13039/501100011033","name":"Agencia Estatal de Investigación","awardNumber":"10.13039/501100011033","order_by":0}],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":true,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"private-to-private corruption, moral development, business ethics, corporate governance, bribery, corporate compliance, corporate social responsibility (CSR)","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7138277/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7138277/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eThis article aims to address a key question on business-to-business (B2B) corruption research: what determines corrupt behaviors among managers in a national setting? Insofar as managers can develop favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward bribery based on the decision frame through which the options are evaluated, we analyze the economic, relational, and ethical frames that explain, in interaction with cultural factors, their behavior vis-\u0026agrave;-vis B2B-bribery. To this end, we propose a theoretical model that provides a robust systematization of the determinants of B2B-corruption and their interactions. It supports that the level of B2B-corruption is mainly influenced by four dimensions: managers\u0026rsquo; individual moral development, opportunities, deterrent factors, and frictions. The model operates as a complex multidimensional process where the individual\u0026rsquo;s ethical beliefs, the economic and relational environment, and the institutional and social norms frames interact. The empirical analysis is based on a survey with the greatest representativeness to date of Spanish managers; it shows that moral development is the cornerstone, and that frictions and corruption costs (deterrents) mediates the impact of the perceived opportunities of corruption. This is a milestone in the quest for empirical knowledge of the determinants of B2B-corruption among managers and shed some light on the most effective anti-corruption managerial measures. Based on these results, we offer implications for the government and business professionals and further research avenues.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"What drives corruption amongst private entities? A multidimensional Model based on Ethical, Relational and Institutional Frames","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-07-22 10:00:22","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7138277/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"267b6b93-1d07-441e-a7ee-3c141aa9c342","owner":[],"postedDate":"July 22nd, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":51921680,"name":"Behavioral Economics"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2025-07-22T10:00:23+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-07-22 10:00:22","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7138277","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7138277","identity":"rs-7138277","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}