The Micro-Politics of “Party Building into Articles of Association” in Non-State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from China

The Micro-Politics of “Party Building into Articles of Association” in Non-State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from China | Research Square window.SnipcartSettings = { analytics: { enabled: false } }; (function() { var accessVector = localStorage.getItem('access_vector') || ''; window.dataLayer = window.dataLayer || []; if (accessVector) { window.dataLayer.push({ user: { profile: { profileInfo: { snid: accessVector } } } }); } })(); (function(w,d,s,l,i){w[l]=w[l]||[];w[l].push({'gtm.start':new Date().getTime(),event:'gtm.js'});var f=d.getElementsByTagName(s)[0],j=d.createElement(s),dl=l!='dataLayer'?'&l='+l:'';j.async=true;j.src='https://www.googletagmanager.com/gtm.js?id='+i+dl;f.parentNode.insertBefore(j,f);})(window,document,'script','dataLayer','GTM-K279D39R'); Browse Preprints In Review Journals COVID-19 Preprints AJE Video Bytes Research Tools Research Promotion AJE Professional Editing AJE Rubriq About Preprint Platform In Review Editorial Policies Our Team Advisory Board Help Center Sign In Submit a Preprint Cite Share Download PDF Article The Micro-Politics of “Party Building into Articles of Association” in Non-State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from China Danying Bao, Zhixiong Huang, Jialun Zhang This is a preprint; it has not been peer reviewed by a journal. https://doi.org/ 10.21203/rs.3.rs-7161304/v1 This work is licensed under a CC BY 4.0 License Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Abstract Strengthening party building in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) is a critical task to support economic and social development in the new era of China. Through the quasi-natural event of “the Communist Party of China’s Party Building into Articles of Association” (PBAA) of the 2018 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, this paper examines the mechanism of the institutional change of party building in China’s NSOEs from the perspective of “micro-politics”. The results show that local government is not the only actor driving institutional change in PBAA in NSOEs; local government, majority shareholders, and other groupings of actors all play a part in this game acting around their own goals and interests, more realistically manifested as a series of micro-political processes. Further, it is found that PBAA in most NSOEs is a strategic catering behavior. Social science/Politics and international relations Social science/Social policy Non-state-owned enterprise Party Building into Articles of Association Micro-politics Figures Figure 1 Figure 2 1. Introduction In China, the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is the most essential feature of Chinese socialism, and “Party Building into Articles of Association” (PBAA) has therefore become an important part of the construction of modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics. The so-called “Party Building into Articles of Association” refers to clarifying the overall requirements of party building work in the enterprise’s articles of association, incorporating the institutional setting, division of responsibilities, and work tasks of the party organization into the enterprise’s management system and work norms, so that the party’s leadership and corporate governance can be highly unified and organically integrated. This institutional arrangement, which is exclusive to China, can be considered a significant innovation to the modern enterprise system and an important difference from other countries. Now, the central enterprises have finished PBAA as a whole. But in NSOEs, PBAA has moved slowly. In the past thirty years, China’s NSOEs have realized the integration of the modern corporate governance system. And many internal governance concepts and mechanisms have adapted to the local environment, forming a unique internal governance system. However, the introduction of party organizations into NSOEs, especially into the decision-making level of corporate governance, has always been a controversial issue. Judging from the exploration of the party-building path of NSOEs in the past 20 years, the embedding of the party organization is not as initially envisioned. It has not formed a new governance system that is both interconnected and moderately separated. The boundaries of rights and responsibilities have been greatly blurred, with huge transaction costs becoming an obstacle to the mutual integration of party building and corporate governance (Ma et al., 2012 ). Especially since the 16th National Congress of the CPC, which comprehensively pushed forward party building in NSOEs, a series of measures such as expanding the coverage of party organizations, standardizing the basic work of party building, and grasping the training of party secretaries, have been emphasized to combine the development of NSOEs with the progress of party organizations. Unfortunately, the policies advocated by the government have not achieved the expected results but have gone to the opposite side of institutional design (Zhang, 2019 ). One of the important reasons is that it is too convinced of the decisive role of external administrative forces, and fails to realize the series of micro-political processes that are realistically present in the process of PBAA. This kind of game constructed among the internal actors of the enterprise will have a huge impact on the party-building decisions advocated by the country. This paper takes the 2018 PBAA in NSOEs as an opportunity for the above issues’ in-depth study. The reason why we choose PBAA to study the micropolitics in the change of party building system in NSOEs is that: (1) as a new exploration of party organization construction in NSOEs in the new period, it defines the specific responsibilities and guarantees of party construction work, truly embedded in the internal governance of NSOEs; (2) PBAA is a “voluntary” institutional change, which facilitates us to observe and study the behavioral characteristics of the local party committees and different actors in NSOEs to understand the deeper dynamics in the change of the party-building system. This paper may contribute in the following ways. First, this paper provides new insights and evidence for existing studies related to party building in NSOEs. Previous studies have mainly focused on the implementation dilemma (Wang, 2018 ; Zhang, 2019 ), and most of them have adopted the case study paradigm, which lacks the analysis of the goals and strategies of multiple actors within NSOEs, leading to conclusions with too many subjective judgments. Secondly, the quasi-natural experiment of PBAA is conducive to eliminating the interference of other external factors. Finally, the research in this paper has strong practical significance, which can deepen our understanding of the exploration of the party-building path in NSOEs in the new era, so as to provide policy guidance for the integration of party-building and the governance system of NSOEs in the next stage. The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The second section is the literature review and hypotheses, the third section is the research design, the empirical results, and the analysis in the fourth section, the fifth section is the robustness test, and the last section is the conclusion of this paper. 2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 2.1 Literature Review French Sociology of Organizations, represented by Crozier in the 1980s, argued that the analytical methods with a tendency towards structural determinism carried too many subjective judgments, which ignored the role of the interactive game as different interest groups in the research process. However, due to the lack of clear planning and experience in the early stage, the study of the environment was neglected when exploring party building in NSOEs. Then two kinds of priori viewpoints with the tendency of structural determinism appeared: one is “state-dominated” and the other is “enterprise-dominated”. Specifically, the “state-dominated” perspective holds that “organizational coverage” and “work coverage” of the party are the result of promoting actively through strong administrative power of political parties, highlighting the critical role of external party organizations in promoting party building in NSOEs. The important reason why the party organization fails to achieve the established goals is that the state does not clarify what role the party organization should play within the NSOEs, and how to define the connection and difference between the party organization and the existing corporate governance system. However, this theoretical explanation simplifies state-dominated institutional change into a passive acceptance process between the State and NSOEs based on administrative hierarchy, ignoring the demands and behavioral choices of NSOEs themselves. The “enterprise-dominated” viewpoint holds that the party organization in NSOEs is not naturally in the position of leading core (Yi and Zhao, 2019). Unlike SOEs, the party building in NSOEs does not have a legal basis, which lacks the authority of SOEs. Therefore, whether the party organization can play a role in the integration process and what role to play depends on the will of the internal controller of NSOEs. This explanation of institutional change emphasizes the key position of the corporate controller while ignoring the deeper implications of the complex interactions between the government, minority shareholders, and other subjects in the context of China’s capital market. 2.2 Research Hypotheses Every organizational and institutional change necessitates an awareness of the complexities of the context in which it occurs, as Classical Organization Theory has frequently highlighted. That is to say, it is unacceptable to disregard the demands of various interest groups when integrating party organization construction into the internal corporate governance of NSOEs. In the process of PBAA, each actor tries to influence and control the rules and directions of organizational and institutional changes to achieve his own goals (Zald et al., 1980). The game constructed between actors within the enterprise can significantly influence the party-building decisions. Therefore, PBAA in NSOEs will inevitably form a pattern of multi-participation of external party organizations, majority shareholders, minority shareholders, and other actors. According to the deductive approach of organizational decision analysis, the deeper dynamics of any form of institutional and organizational change stem from the power play among stakeholders (Zald et al., 1980). Unlike organizational theories that solely highlight the economic rationality of actors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), we contend that actors’ tactical choices, grounded in situationally specific cognitions, are implicit in seemingly structured formal organizational and institutional change. From the objectives and capacities of the actors, this study endeavors to examine the more profound effects of the embedded process of PBAA in NSOEs and presents the paper’s research hypotheses. 2.2.1 Actor: Local Party Committees As early as 2012, the central government issued related documents on party building for NSOEs, emphasizing that party building in NSOEs should be integrated into the overall design of party building in their regions and make it a significant element in the appraisal and assessment of the relevant leadership teams. Meanwhile, local government officials in China have long been in the GDP championship (Wei, 2021). Based on this background, local party committees have joined forces with local governments to lobby NSOEs to amend their articles of association to clarify the role, status, and specific duties of party organizations. With the onset of the “supply-side” reform in the new era, promoting the embedding of party organizations in the governance system of NSOEs is an essential goal and performance assessment indicator for local party committees and governments. However, owing to different external conditions and regional environments, there are some differences in the executive force of local party committees in PBAA in NSOEs (He and Ma, 2018). According to the thirteenth survey of China’s private enterprises in 2018, NSOEs in the Midwest are significantly better than those in the East in terms of the coverage of party organizations and the completion of party-building activities. There may be three reasons: (1) some of the Midwestern regions with high coverage of party organizations were revolutionary bases before the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the hometowns of most revolutionary martyrs are located in the Midwest, which makes it naturally advantageous to set up a party organization within NSOEs. (2) The market in the East is much more open and fairer, and the local government’s intervention and control of NSOEs is relatively weak. (3) The market in the East is far more equitable and open, and there is not as much local government involvement in or control over NSOEs. Even in some underdeveloped areas, most NSOEs rely on government support for development. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: The stronger the local party committee's executive force, the greater the probability of PBAA in NSOEs. 2.2.2 Actor: Majority Shareholders In contrast to the relatively decentralized ownership structure of businesses in developed countries, listed NSOEs in China have a high degree of equity concentration, which leads to a significant second-type agency problem, meaning the agency cost conflict between majority and minority shareholders. Specifically, majority shareholders hold the actual control rights, resulting in an imbalance in corporate governance, and damage to the interests of minority shareholders. As a supplement to the corporate governance system, PBAA will directly affect the interests of the two groups. Both of them will combine their own goals and resources under their control to take action against the external event to maximize their own interests. First of all, according to the social network theory, majority shareholders with party and political identities are closer to the local party committees in terms of network distance. And the two will be integrated constantly in the process of political contacts and resource exchanges. Consequently, the local party committees’ party-building promotion and education will make majority shareholders in NSOEs internalize the party’s values and concepts into their corporate activities consciously or unconsciously (Xiu et al, 2022). In other words, majority shareholders with political identities will continue to strengthen their own identities and sense of team belonging, leading to the emergence of value internalization features in the social network (Portes, 1998). Therefore, as an important exploration of party building in NSOEs in the new era, majority shareholders with political identities and backgrounds are more likely to be influenced by the values of the local party committee and then adopt PBAA. We thus propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2a: If the majority shareholders have a political identity, the greater the probability of PBAA in NSOEs. Second, the party membership of the majority shareholder precedes the establishment of NSOEs, and this precedence brings many resources needed for the development of the enterprises (Qiu and Fu, 2016). In China, due to the imperfection of the market economic system, the business process of enterprises is often intervened by government intervention. Especially for NSOEs, the allocation of resources, access to industries, and regulation of policy are lagging behind SOEs. More importantly, also the daily operation of NSOEs has to follow the policy orientation of the local government. In this sense, maintaining a good relationship with the local government plays a crucial role in the survival and long-term development of NSOEs. Particularly in recent years, as China’s economic growth has begun to slow down, many NSOEs have faced increasingly harsh external environments and transformation requirements, and their operations have been subject to more challenges and crises. Therefore, we believe that when the majority shareholders rely more strongly on external resources, they will be more active in introducing party organizations into NSOEs to ensure the robustness of their business activities. And the following hypothesis is proposed: Hypothesis 2b: The higher the dependence of majority shareholders on external resources, the greater the probability of PBAA in NSOEs. 2.2.3 Actor: Minority Shareholders In China, the second type of agency problem has been criticized (Li et al., 2021). To alleviate it, China’s capital market has duly introduced the independent director system. However, due to institutional problems such as the selection and hiring of independent directors, risk aversion, and high monitoring costs, the agency problem in NSOEs is still very serious (Zhong et al., 2010). Based on this, the participation of the party organization in corporate governance can make the balance of power, which can alleviate the problem of insider control in enterprises to a certain extent. Therefore, PBAA can not only play the role of the party’s political leadership but also serve as a helpful supplement to the corporate governance system, supervising the majority shareholders and preventing the interests of minority shareholders from being encroached on (Cheng and Zheng, 2023). Therefore, the stronger the control of majority shareholders, the more likely that minority shareholders will propose PBAA by the directors they represent to reduce monitoring and agency costs. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 3a: The higher the second type of agency costs within NSOEs, the greater the probability of PBAA. A growing number of minority shareholders are actively participating in corporate governance as a result of the improved investor protection system, expanded participation avenues for minority shareholders, and decreased costs associated with such engagement (Huang et al., 2022). However, majority shareholders have the incentive to improve their own interests by harming the overall interests of the enterprise. While PBAA directly assigns party organizations the duty of taking part in the main decisions and affairs of NSOEs. As a result, shareholders’ rights in NSOEs will be subject to political supervision, which is exactly what minority shareholders expect. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 3b: The higher the degree of participation of minority shareholders in the governance of NSOEs, the greater the probability of PBAA. In summary, the hypotheses presented in this paper are shown in Figure 1. 3. Research Design 3.1 Data The data of this paper are from www.cninfo.com.cn and the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Specifically, the sample is selected from September 2018 (the release of the amendment to the Code of Governance for Listed Companies) to January 31, 2020. The content of the board of directors’ announcements of listed companies on cninfo.com regarding the amendment of the articles of association is captured by Python. We finally obtained 120 samples of PBAA from 2,233 NSOEs. Except for the data related to PBAA, which are collected manually, all other data are based on the database of CSMAR. To avoid the effect of extreme values, continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 3.2 Models and Core Variables First of all, in order to examine the micro-politics in the institutional change of PBAA in NSOEs, this paper constructs model (1) to observe the behavioral characteristics of the local party committees: $$\:Party\_article={a}_{0}+{a}_{1}Gov+{a}_{i}Controls+\epsilon\:$$ 1 where the explanatory variable (Party_article) is PBAA in NSOEs. When the announcement of a listed NSOE involves the amendment of the content of the party organization in the enterprise’s articles of association, the “Party_article” variable will take 1, and 0 otherwise. The core explanatory variable is the local party committee executive force (Gov). We use Gansu, Anhui, Tianjin, Hubei, and Sichuan, which have the highest coverage of party-building activities and party organizations, based on the data from the 13th China Private Sector Survey in 2018 as a proxy variable to measure the executive force of local party committees. In addition, we control for firm characteristic variables related to party-building behavior in NSOEs: firm size (Size), profitability (ROE), financial leverage (LEV), length of establishment (Set), state-owned stock participation (Stockstate), employees (Employee), dual role of the board chairman (Dual_position), region (Province), and industry (Industry). Please refer to Appendix A for detailed variable definitions. Second, to test the behavioral characteristics of majority shareholders in PBAA, we construct model (2): $$\:Party\_article={a}_{0}+{a}_{1}Identity(Equity\_pledge)+{a}_{i}Controls+\epsilon\:$$ 2 where political identity (Identity) and the proportion of majority shareholders’ equity pledged (Equity_pledge) are designed as proxy variables to test Hypothesis 2. Specifically, Identity takes 1 when the majority shareholder has the political identity of National People’s Congress (NPC) deputies or Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) members and 0 otherwise. Equity_pledge measures the extent of the majority shareholder’s external resource needs and the risk of losing control. The logic for constructing this variable stems from the fact that many NSOEs, such as Dongfang Garden and others, have seen their equity pledged for sale in 2019 and had to rely on support from local governments. Finally, we construct model (3) for the behavioral characteristics of minority shareholders: $$\:Party\_article={a}_{0}+{a}_{1}AC2(Minority\_sℎareℎolders)+{a}_{i}Controls+\epsilon\:$$ 3 where the second type of agency cost variable (AC2) measures the agency costs between majority and minority shareholders. Regarding the degree of participation of minority shareholders in governance (Minority_shareholders), we believe that the greater the number of minority shareholders participating in the general meeting of shareholders, the greater their participation in corporate governance. Then the more likely they are to push PBAA as an integral part of corporate governance and to enhance the supervision of the majority shareholders to protect the interests of the enterprise as a whole. 3.3 Summary Statistics Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Specifically, the mean value of Party_article is 0.0537, implying that 5.37% of listed NSOEs have written party building into their corporate articles of association after the issuance of the Principles of Corporate Governance. The mean value of Gov is 0.1, indicating that 10% of listed NSOEs in the sample are located in areas where the local party committees have greater executive force, while the mean value of Identity is 0.192, indicating that 19% of the majority shareholders in the sample have the political status of the NPC or CPPCC. The above data suggests that there is a broad political foundation for PBAA. In addition, the mean value of Equity_pledge is 37.14, indicating that the number of shares pledged by majority shareholders in listed NSOEs accounts for 37.14% of their total number of shares, which is a relatively high percentage. The maximum value of AC2 is 0.782, and the minimum value is only 0.00003, which suggests a large difference in the second type of agency problem among the sample firms. The median of Minority_ shareholders is 11, indicating that the number of minority shareholders participating in shareholders’ meetings is not high in most samples of listed NSOEs. These data provide an initial understanding for our subsequent study. Panel B of Table 1 shows the results of the statistical differences in the presence or absence of PBAA. Specifically, Identity and Equity_pledge are significantly higher for listed NSOEs with PBAA than for the control group, which initially suggests significant differences in the political background of the majority shareholders and the resource demand of the NSOEs in different groups. In addition, our key core variables Gov, AC2, and Minority_shareholders and control variables are not significant in the difference test, which further ensures the balance of the two samples. Table 1 Summary Statistics Panel A: Descriptive statistics results for all variables Variable N Mean Medium Sd Max Min Party_article 2233 0.0537 0.000 0.226 1.000 0.000 Gov 2233 0.100 0.000 0.300 1.000 0.000 Identity 2230 0.192 0.000 0.394 1.000 0.000 Equity_pledge 2233 37.140 0.000 52.970 677.500 0.000 AC2 2230 0.0453 0.0138 0.106 0.782 0.00003 Minority_shareholders 2166 17.850 11.000 23.820 154.000 0.000 ROE 2233 0.0247 0.0698 0.227 0.291 -1.017 Size 2233 21.910 21.810 1.146 26.740 17.650 LEV 2233 0.410 0.387 0.298 8.009 0.00978 Set 2233 20.050 20.000 5.428 62.000 7.000 Dual_position 2189 0.399 0.000 0.490 1.000 0.000 Stockstate 2233 0.0524 0.000 0.223 1.000 0.000 Employee 2218 7.394 7.365 1.180 12.300 2.833 Panel B: Statistical differences according to whether or not PBAA in NSOEs Variable PBAA group Control group Difference test N Mean N Mean Difference Significance(T) Gov 120 0.092 2113 0.100 -0.008 0.009 Identity 120 0.283 2110 0.187 0.096 -0.096*** Equity_pledge 120 49.780 2113 36.420 13.360 -13.354*** AC2 120 0.040 2110 0.046 -0.006 0.005 Minority_shareholders 116 17.640 2050 17.860 -0.220 0.225 ROE 120 0.019 2113 0.025 -0.006 0.006 Size 120 22.030 2113 21.910 0.120 -0.120 LEV 120 0.388 2113 0.411 -0.023 0.0230 Set 120 20.450 2113 20.030 0.420 -0.421 Stockstate 120 0.075 2113 0.051 0.024 -0.024 Employee 120 7.434 2098 7.391 0.043 -0.043 Dual_position 116 0.414 2073 0.398 0.016 -0.015 4. Empirical Results 4.1 Actor: Local Party Committees Table 2 shows the regression results of local party committees’ influence on PBAA in listed NSOEs. Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient of Gov is significant at 2.231 and 2.217, indicating that the stronger the local party committee’s executive force, the higher the probability of PBAA in NSOEs. This is consistent with the observation in the existing literature. It can be seen that local party committees play a crucial role in a series of micro-political processes that may exist in party building embedded in NSOEs. Table 2 Action Characteristics of Local Party Committees Variables (1) (2) Party_article Party_article Gov 2.231** 2.217** (2.14) (2.11) ROE -0.351 (-0.71) Size 0.147 (1.01) LEV -0.916 (-1.45) Set 0.024 (1.16) Stockstate 0.623 (1.53) Dual_position 0.108 (0.51) Employee -0.073 (-0.53) Constant -4.216*** -6.832** (-3.27) (-2.37) Industry Control Control Province Control Control Observations 2,033 1,996 Note: z-statistics in parentheses*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 4.2 Actor: Majority Shareholders Table 3 shows the regression result of the action characteristics of majority shareholders in PBAA of NSOEs. Columns (1) and (2) examine the effects of political identity and external resource dependence, respectively. To be specific, we find that the coefficient of Identity is 0.458, which is significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the social network associated with political identity will continuously strengthen the recognition and belonging of the majority shareholders, thus influencing the decision of NSOEs to incorporate party building into the articles. In addition, the coefficient of Equity_pledge is significant at 0.004, which indicates that when NSOEs have the risk of majority shareholders’ equity change, they are more likely to approach the local party committees and expect to enhance the operational robustness through PBAA, as well as to receive the assistance of the local party committees in the future hard times. Column (3) includes the first two behavioral characteristics variables in the same model. The results show that the coefficient of Identity and Equity_pledge maintain the same level of significance, which implies that the political identity of majority shareholders and the degree of dependence on external resources are both important behavioral characteristics affecting the majority shareholders’ introduction of PBAA, thus Hypothesis 2 has been verified. Column (4) further incorporates the participation of local government into the model, and the result shows that the coefficient of Gov changes from positively significant to non-significant, which implies that the behavioral characteristics of majority shareholders are crucial, which can dominate PBAA in NSOEs under the pressure of external party committees. Table 3 Action Characteristics of Majority Shareholders Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Party_article Party_article Party_article Party_article Identity 0.458** 0.463** 0.464** (2.08) (2.10) (2.11) Equity_pledge 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** (2.60) (2.61) (2.61) Gov -0.076 (-0.23) ROE -0.213 -0.309 -0.190 -0.195 (-0.44) (-0.60) (-0.39) (-0.40) Size 0.072 0.104 0.029 0.029 (0.51) (0.69) (0.20) (0.20) LEV -0.883 -1.046 -1.000 -1.003 (-1.48) (-1.61) (-1.64) (-1.64) Set 0.013 0.021 0.012 0.012 (0.67) (1.01) (0.65) (0.66) Stockstate 0.540 0.547 0.539 0.537 (1.45) (1.32) (1.44) (1.43) Dual_position 0.110 0.149 0.125 0.123 (0.55) (0.71) (0.63) (0.61) Employee 0.005 -0.058 0.021 0.022 (0.04) (-0.41) (0.16) (0.17) Constant -4.853* -6.001** -4.077 -4.082 (-1.82) (-2.05) (-1.50) (-1.50) Industry Control Control Control Control Province Control Control Control Control Observations 2,118 1,996 2,118 2,118 Note: z-statistics in parentheses*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 4.3 Actor: Minority Shareholders Table 4 shows the regression results of minority shareholders’ action characteristics in NSOEs with PBAA. Specifically, columns (1) and (2) examine the effects of the second type of agency costs and the degree of participation of minority shareholders in governance, respectively. The coefficients of these two variables are not significant, meaning the participation of minority shareholders in corporate governance does not affect whether PBAA is in NSOEs. In other words, in the current environment of NSOEs, although minority shareholders are one of the important groups of enterprises, they do not participate in the power game between stakeholders with local party committees and majority shareholders. On the one hand, it is likely that due to the minority shareholders’ low shareholding ratio, the voting decision-making power of the shareholders’ meeting alone usually cannot shake the control of majority shareholders. On the other hand, it may come from the fact that minority shareholders are mostly decentralized and more concerned about the operation of the enterprise, without caring whether or not NSOE adopts PBAA. Columns (3) and (4) further incorporate majority shareholders and local party committees into the analytical framework, and the action characteristics of minority shareholders are still insignificant, while the majority shareholders remain significant. It further indicates that majority shareholders are in control of the rules of the game in the process of PBAA, while minority shareholders do not participate in it. Table 4 Action Characteristics of Minority Shareholders Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Party_article Party_article Party_article Party_article AC2 -0.672 -0.541 -0.532 (-0.55) (-0.41) (-0.40) Minority_shareholders -0.001 0.000 0.000 (-0.17) (0.01) (0.00) Identity 0.547** 0.548** (2.38) (2.39) Equity_pledge 0.004** 0.004** (2.51) (2.49) Gov -0.111 (-0.33) ROE -0.428 -0.357 -0.286 -0.288 (-0.84) (-0.71) (-0.54) (-0.54) Size 0.157 0.175 0.069 0.068 (1.07) (1.14) (0.42) (0.41) LEV -0.830 -1.015 -0.945 -0.947 (-1.29) (-1.56) (-1.44) (-1.44) Set 0.024 0.019 0.008 0.008 (1.15) (0.90) (0.37) (0.39) Stockstate 0.620 0.687* 0.615 0.612 (1.52) (1.67) (1.57) (1.56) Dual_position 0.110 0.062 0.099 0.096 (0.52) (0.29) (0.47) (0.45) Employee -0.083 -0.085 -0.038 -0.036 (-0.60) (-0.60) (-0.25) (-0.24) Constant -6.955** -7.125** -17.932 -16.912 (-2.41) (-2.38) (-0.02) (-0.04) Industry Control Control Control Control Province Control Control Control Control Observations 1,993 1,916 1,894 1,894 Note: z-statistics in parentheses*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 5. Robustness Test 5.1 Replacement of Variable Measure In order to measure the number of majority shareholders’ shares and the size of the corresponding resources in the overall firm more accurately, we replace the majority shareholders’ external resource dependence variable measurement with a ratio variable between the number of equity pledges and the total number of shares in listed NSOEs (Equity_pledge_plus). Table 5 presents the results of this robustness regression. In column (1), the coefficient of the Equity_pledge_plus variable is significantly positive at 0.073, indicating that the greater the risk of loss of control by majority shareholders, the more likely they are to push for PBAA to realize the stability of management control. Column (2) includes local party committees, majority shareholders, and minority shareholders in the model, and the regression results are also robust. Table 5 Replacement of Variable Measures Variables (1) (2) Party_article Party_article Equity_pledge_plus 0.073** 0.088** (2.11) (2.56) Gov -0.177 (-0.52) Identity 0.519** (2.28) ROE -0.069 -0.052 (-1.42) (-1.12) Size 0.151 0.065 (1.03) (0.43) LEV -1.038* -0.878 (-1.69) (-1.46) Set 0.023 0.009 (1.08) (0.47) Stockstate 0.672* 0.591 (1.65) (1.54) Dual_position 0.095 0.114 (0.45) (0.55) Employee -0.076 -0.019 (-0.55) (-0.13) Constant -7.017** -4.798* (-2.42) (-1.72) Observations 1,996 1,940 Note: z-statistics in parentheses*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 5.2 PSM-DID Test Moreover, we adopt the propensity score matching method (PSM) to solve the self-selection problem of PBAA in NSOEs, alleviating the non-random allocation of samples among different enterprises. In this paper, the covariates are screened by psestimate, and the propensity scores are calculated by selecting the indicators of Size, Dual_position, Stockstate, and so on. Then one-to-one matching is conducted by selecting the nearest-neighbor matching method within the caliper. The results of the balance test show that the absolute value of the standardized deviation of each variable after matching is less than 10%, which indicates that the sample-matching effect is good. As shown in Fig. 2 , after PSM, the difference in the distribution of listed NSOEs with PBAA and not is significantly reduced and converges. Table 6 reports the regression results after using the PSM method. The coefficients of Gov, Identity, and Equity_pledge are all significant, while AC2 and Minority_shareholders remain insignificant. In short, it still supports the findings of this paper. Table 6 PSM-DID Test Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Party_article Party_article Party_article Party_article Party_article Gov 3.2231*** (2.7525) Identity 0.9178** (1.9758) Equity_pledge 0.0061* (1.6889) AC2 1.7094 (0.6476) Minority_shareholders 0.0023 (0.2767) Constant 13.6563*** 15.1616 -4.1754 13.6756 14.5833 (2.6563) (0.0192) (-1.0042) (0.0120) (0.0128) Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Control Control Control Control Control Province Control Control Control Control Control Observations 206 206 217 206 199 Note: z-statistics in parentheses*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 6. Further Analysis As a vital exploration of party building in the new period, PBAA in the process of practice is the lack of experience to draw on. The party-building provisions outlined in the articles of association of certain companies are not particularly focused or practical, and their party-building requirements are often quite general. In such enterprises, the party organization may only exist in form without substantially carrying out its work (Zheng et al., 2020 ). The existing literature (Wang, 2018 ) points out in the field investigation that party building in many NSOEs has long been more of a tactical behavior, which is a formalized party building to meet the assessment of party committees. Therefore, although PBAA needs enterprise to clarify the party organization responsibilities and rights boundaries in articles of association, it is also worth exploring the content of PBAA. How to ensure that the party organization is truly embedded in the corporate governance structure is the in-depth research content of the institutional change of PBAA. In this part, we classify two types of PBAA in NSOEs from the perspective of motivation. One is substantive PBAA, which aims to promote the progress of enterprises and gain competitive advantages. It clarifies the rights, responsibilities, and working methods of party organizations in decision-making, implementation, and supervision. The other is what we call strategic PBAA, which seeks to achieve political benefits by catering to the government and party committees. It only addresses the status of the party organization, its central political role, party staffing, and financial support in the articles of association of the enterprise. Based on it, this paper further examines the links between the behavioral characteristics of different actors and the types of PBAA. Panel A of Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics results of the three newly added variables: government subsidies (Support: the logarithm of the total government subsidies in the last three years), the control of majority shareholders (UCSVR: the proportion of the majority shareholders’ shareholding), and the internal control deficiencies (Defect: 1 for the existence of deficiencies in the disclosure reports of the internal control in the last three years, and 0 otherwise). The results show that the mean value of UCSVR is 40.43, indicating the mean value of the shareholding ratio of majority shareholders in listed NSOEs is 40.43%, which is at the absolute controlling level. The mean value of Defcet is 0.159, indicating that 15.9% of the listed NSOEs in the sample have defects in internal control, with a relatively low level of corporate governance. Panel B of Table 7 further shows the content components of party-building provisions for listed NSOEs. Specifically, the number of strategic PBAA is 87, accounting for 72.5% of NSOEs with PBAA. Meanwhile, the proportion of substantive PBAA reached 27.5%, which means that among the 120 samples of NSOEs that have added party-building in their articles of association, nearly 27.5% have adopted substantive provisions. To this end, we construct the Party_strategy variable: 1 for the substantive PBAA, and 0 for the strategic PBAA. Table 7 Descriptive Statistics of New Variables Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables Variable N Mean Medium Sd Support 2220 17.250 17.310 1.469 UCSVR 2233 40.430 38.820 15.970 Defect 2233 0.159 0.000 0.365 Panel B: The content composition of PBAA in NSOEs The content of PBAA N Proportion Provide only for the status of party organizations, the role of the political core, the staffing of party affairs, and financial support 87 72.5% Further clarify the duties and boundaries of the party organization, and clearly define the power and responsibilities and the way of work of the party organization in the decision-making, execution, and supervision of the enterprise 33 27.5% Table 8 shows the regression results in the sample of 120 listed NSOEs with PBAA. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of Support is significantly positive at 0.462, suggesting that the higher the number of government subsidies received by NSOEs, the higher the likelihood of substantive PBAA. Judging from the objectives of different actors in micro-politics, this may be a kind of “cooperation” from the exchange of benefits, that is, listed NSOEs transfer part of their corporate governance rights to the party organization to obtain more resources needed for their business. Moreover, we also find that the coefficient of UCSVR is significant at -0.028, indicating that the higher the proportion of majority shareholders, the more likely they are to adopt strategic PBAA. Combining the behavioral characteristics of the local party committees and majority shareholders, we can find that, although the local party committees actively promote the PBAA of NSOEs, the majority shareholders can decide on all majority affairs of the company. For the substantive PBAA, they are more willing to adopt the strategic PBAA and to seek political benefits without any effort to cater to the government and the local party committees. Furthermore, the higher the shareholding ratio of the majority shareholders, the weaker the minority shareholders. The majority shareholders are more inclined to adopt strategic PBAA to cope, diminishing the role of the party organization in NSOEs. Table 8 Factors influencing substantive PBAA Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) Party_strategy Party_strategy Party_strategy Party_strategy Support 0.462** (2.12) UCSVR -0.028** (-2.06) Identity -0.415 (-0.89) Defect 0.813 (1.16) ROE 0.916 1.034 0.629 0.674 (0.92) (1.07) (0.69) (0.72) Size -0.048 0.187 0.188 0.087 (-0.15) (0.71) (0.72) (0.33) LEV 1.507 1.265 1.052 1.146 (1.10) (0.96) (0.81) (0.88) Set 0.024 -0.005 -0.006 0.000 (0.52) (-0.12) (-0.14) (0.00) Stockstate -0.387 -0.419 0.003 -0.090 (-0.47) (-0.51) (0.00) (-0.11) Dual_position -0.790* -0.593 -0.666 -0.709 (-1.78) (-1.36) (-1.54) (-1.62) Employee -0.420 -0.257 -0.207 -0.192 (-1.60) (-1.11) (-0.91) (-0.85) Constant -5.026 -1.659 -3.017 -1.229 (-1.01) (-0.34) (-0.62) (-0.25) Industry Control Control Control Control Province Control Control Control Control Observations 115 116 116 116 Note: z-statistics in parentheses*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 7. Conclusions Using the PBAA in the 2018 Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China as a springboard, this paper investigates the institutional change of PBAA in NSOEs. The study finds that the institutional change of PBAA in NSOEs is not the result of local governments alone, but the result of a game involving multiple actors, such as local governments and majority shareholders, acting around their own goals and interests, which is more realistically manifested as a series of micro-political processes. It is worth noting that minority shareholders are not involved in this stakeholder power game. Furthermore, the embedding of PBAA in listed NSOEs has not met the expectations of the local party committees, with only 120 listed NSOEs adopting the PBAA in nearly two years. More importantly, only 33 of the 120 listed NSOEs have adopted substantive PBAA. We contend that a major factor in the PBAA’s sluggish progress has been an overemphasis on the state administration’s capacity to dominate institutional change, as well as an ignorance of a series of micro-political processes involved in the process within the company. Accordingly, we believe that the promotion of the party-building system in NSOEs should consider the interests and potential behaviors of different actors. Relying solely on the external local party committees in the process of embedding from the outside in the party-building structure runs the risk of impeding the change or creating a situation similar to the reverse choice dilemma. Consequently, there are three ways to approach the next stage of the PBAA system change: (1) Make good use of the social network of the majority shareholders’ political background, and guide NSOEs to PBAA from the perspective of the party spirit of the majority shareholders. (2) Tap the potential of minority shareholders. Although minority shareholders are not free from the agency problem at this stage, it is already a development tendency for enterprises to increase their enthusiasm and participation. Further strengthen their understanding and recognition of the role of party organizations, and encourage them to promote the embedding and integration of PBAA within NSOEs. (3) It remains necessary for local party committees to lead the way in standardizing and directing the content of PBAA to avoid strategic party-building behaviors. Declarations Declaration of Interests The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. Data Availability Statements The data used to support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request. Funding Statements This research received no external funding. Author Contribution Danying Bao: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Formal Analysis, Methodology, Supervision, Writing - Original DraftZhixiong Huang: Methodology, Project Administration, Software, ValidationJialun Zhang: Data Curation, Formal Analysis, Visualization, Writing - Original Draft, Writing - Review & Editing References Cheng, L., Zheng, Q.H., 2023. Research on the effectiveness and mechanism of party organizations' participation in the governance of private enterprises. Economic Review, (05), 53-70. https://doi.org/10.19361/j.er.2023.05.04. He, X., Ma, J.,2018. Party building is also productivity: A study on the mechanism and effect of party organization construction in private enterprises. Sociological Research, 33(03), 1-24+242. https://doi.org/10.19934/j.cnki.shxyj.2018.03.001. Huang, Z.Y., Luo, J.H., Li, X.X., 2022. The governance effect of "many hands make light work" of small and medium-sized shareholders: An examination based on the number of attendees at annual general meetings. Management World, 38(04), 159-185. https://doi.org/10.19744/j.cnki.11-1235/f.2022.0060. Li, J.Y., Wang, F.J., Zhao, H.S., 2021. "Party Building into Articles of Association" and corporate cost stickiness: An explanation based on party organization governance. Foreign Economy and Management, 43(10), 21-34. https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.fem.20210508.203. Ma, L.F., Wang, Y.F., Shen, X.X., 2012. Research on governance effects of China's state-owned companies' party organization: A perspective based on "insiders control". China Industrial Economy, (8), 82-95. https://doi.org/10.19581/j.cnki.ciejournal.2012.08.007. Meyer, J. W., Rowan, B., 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. https://doi.org/10.1086/226550. Portes, A., 1998. Social Capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.1. Qiu, G.J., Fu, J.D., 2016. From “Wearing a red hat” to “co-governance of multiple subjects”: The logic of entrepreneurs' actions in non-public party building. Social Science Research, 1, 80-88. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1000-4769.2016.01.009. Wang, X.Y., 2018. Non-public party building: empirical picture, organizational foundation and its practical path: Taking S town of Zhongshan city as an example. Lingnan Journal, (03), 74-80. https://doi.org/10.13977/j.cnki.lnxk.2018.03.014. Wei, T., 2021. The path choice of leadership enhancement of local party committees: An examination based on the practice of local governance innovation in Guangdong. South China Journal, (9), 14-17. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1004-1133.2021.09.008. Xiu, Z.F., Gu, Y.P., Yin, J.W., 2022. "Party Building into Articles of Association", state-owned property rights and corporate financial fraud. Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 24(04), 93-107. https://doi.org/10.16538/j.cnki.jsufe.2022.04.007. Yi, M., Zhao, L., 2019. The economic function of grassroots party building and the grassroots practice of shared development: Taking socialist political economy with Chinese characteristics as a perspective. Reform and Strategy, 35(09), 26-34. https://doi.org/10.16331/j.cnki.issn1002-736x.2019.09.004. Zald, M.N., Crozier, M.P., Friedberg, E., 1980. Actors and Systems: The politics of collective action. Social Forces, 61, 328. https://doi.org/10.2307/2578110. Zhang, G.R., 2019. Organizational isomorphism and governance embedding: How party building promotes the development of private enterprises: The case of party building of enterprises in J Science and Technology Park of D City. Comparison of Economic and Social Institutions, (6), 53-61. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1003-3947.2019.06.009. Zheng, D.J., Yuan, W., Deng, Y.L., 2020. Party organization embeddedness and financial irregularities in private enterprises. Management Review, 32(08), 228-243+253. https://doi.org/10.14120/j.cnki.cn11-5057/f.2020.08.019. Zhong, H.Y., Ran, M.S., Wen, S.S., 2010. Government intervention, insider control, and corporate investment. Management World, (07), 98-108. https://doi.org/10.19744/j.cnki.11-1235/f.2010.07.010. Additional Declarations No competing interests reported. Supplementary Files AppendixA.docx Cite Share Download PDF Status: Posted Version 1 posted You are reading this latest preprint version Research Square lets you share your work early, gain feedback from the community, and start making changes to your manuscript prior to peer review in a journal. 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1","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":68630,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003eAssumption model diagram\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"1.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7161304/v1/ffabdfe8d7f34988e9da8ef2.jpg"},{"id":97352808,"identity":"cc3950c0-e5f5-4da2-ba4a-8b926057449c","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2025-12-03 12:51:40","extension":"jpg","order_by":2,"title":"Figure 2","display":"","copyAsset":false,"role":"figure","size":48888,"visible":true,"origin":"","legend":"\u003cp\u003ep-score density distribution before and after matching NSOEs with and without PBAA\u003c/p\u003e","description":"","filename":"2.jpg","url":"https://assets-eu.researchsquare.com/files/rs-7161304/v1/60a4dbd584707b3c43474721.jpg"},{"id":104585525,"identity":"8aa97d78-1e04-487f-bb1b-bfef74f7ff89","added_by":"auto","created_at":"2026-03-13 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Introduction","content":"\u003cp\u003eIn China, the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) is the most essential feature of Chinese socialism, and \u0026ldquo;Party Building into Articles of Association\u0026rdquo; (PBAA) has therefore become an important part of the construction of modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics. The so-called \u0026ldquo;Party Building into Articles of Association\u0026rdquo; refers to clarifying the overall requirements of party building work in the enterprise\u0026rsquo;s articles of association, incorporating the institutional setting, division of responsibilities, and work tasks of the party organization into the enterprise\u0026rsquo;s management system and work norms, so that the party\u0026rsquo;s leadership and corporate governance can be highly unified and organically integrated. This institutional arrangement, which is exclusive to China, can be considered a significant innovation to the modern enterprise system and an important difference from other countries. Now, the central enterprises have finished PBAA as a whole. But in NSOEs, PBAA has moved slowly.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn the past thirty years, China\u0026rsquo;s NSOEs have realized the integration of the modern corporate governance system. And many internal governance concepts and mechanisms have adapted to the local environment, forming a unique internal governance system. However, the introduction of party organizations into NSOEs, especially into the decision-making level of corporate governance, has always been a controversial issue. Judging from the exploration of the party-building path of NSOEs in the past 20 years, the embedding of the party organization is not as initially envisioned. It has not formed a new governance system that is both interconnected and moderately separated. The boundaries of rights and responsibilities have been greatly blurred, with huge transaction costs becoming an obstacle to the mutual integration of party building and corporate governance (Ma et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR5\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2012\u003c/span\u003e). Especially since the 16th National Congress of the CPC, which comprehensively pushed forward party building in NSOEs, a series of measures such as expanding the coverage of party organizations, standardizing the basic work of party building, and grasping the training of party secretaries, have been emphasized to combine the development of NSOEs with the progress of party organizations. Unfortunately, the policies advocated by the government have not achieved the expected results but have gone to the opposite side of institutional design (Zhang, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e). One of the important reasons is that it is too convinced of the decisive role of external administrative forces, and fails to realize the series of micro-political processes that are realistically present in the process of PBAA. This kind of game constructed among the internal actors of the enterprise will have a huge impact on the party-building decisions advocated by the country.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper takes the \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e PBAA in NSOEs as an opportunity for the above issues\u0026rsquo; in-depth study. The reason why we choose PBAA to study the micropolitics in the change of party building system in NSOEs is that: (1) as a new exploration of party organization construction in NSOEs in the new period, it defines the specific responsibilities and guarantees of party construction work, truly embedded in the internal governance of NSOEs; (2) PBAA is a \u0026ldquo;voluntary\u0026rdquo; institutional change, which facilitates us to observe and study the behavioral characteristics of the local party committees and different actors in NSOEs to understand the deeper dynamics in the change of the party-building system.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis paper may contribute in the following ways. First, this paper provides new insights and evidence for existing studies related to party building in NSOEs. Previous studies have mainly focused on the implementation dilemma (Wang, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e; Zhang, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR14\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2019\u003c/span\u003e), and most of them have adopted the case study paradigm, which lacks the analysis of the goals and strategies of multiple actors within NSOEs, leading to conclusions with too many subjective judgments. Secondly, the quasi-natural experiment of PBAA is conducive to eliminating the interference of other external factors. Finally, the research in this paper has strong practical significance, which can deepen our understanding of the exploration of the party-building path in NSOEs in the new era, so as to provide policy guidance for the integration of party-building and the governance system of NSOEs in the next stage.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe remainder of this study is organized as follows. The second section is the literature review and hypotheses, the third section is the research design, the empirical results, and the analysis in the fourth section, the fifth section is the robustness test, and the last section is the conclusion of this paper.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.1 Literature Review\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFrench Sociology of Organizations, represented by Crozier in the 1980s, argued that the analytical methods with a tendency towards structural determinism carried too many subjective judgments, which ignored the role of the interactive game as different interest groups in the research process. However, due to the lack of clear planning and experience in the early stage, the study of the environment was neglected when exploring party building in NSOEs. Then two kinds of priori viewpoints with the tendency of structural determinism appeared: one is “state-dominated” and the other is “enterprise-dominated”.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSpecifically, the “state-dominated” perspective holds that “organizational coverage” and “work coverage” of the party are the result of promoting actively through strong administrative power of political parties, highlighting the critical role of external party organizations in promoting party building in NSOEs. The important reason why the party organization fails to achieve the established goals is that the state does not clarify what role the party organization should play within the NSOEs, and how to define the connection and difference between the party organization and the existing corporate governance system. However, this theoretical explanation simplifies state-dominated institutional change into a passive acceptance process between the State and NSOEs based on administrative hierarchy, ignoring the demands and behavioral choices of NSOEs themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe “enterprise-dominated” viewpoint holds that the party organization in NSOEs is not naturally in the position of leading core (Yi and Zhao, 2019). Unlike SOEs, the party building in NSOEs does not have a legal basis, which lacks the authority of SOEs. Therefore, whether the party organization can play a role in the integration process and what role to play depends on the will of the internal controller of NSOEs. This explanation of institutional change emphasizes the key position of the corporate controller while ignoring the deeper implications of the complex interactions between the government, minority shareholders, and other subjects in the context of China’s capital market.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.2 Research Hypotheses\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eEvery organizational and institutional change necessitates an awareness of the complexities of the context in which it occurs, as Classical Organization Theory has frequently highlighted. That is to say, it is unacceptable to disregard the demands of various interest groups when integrating party organization construction into the internal corporate governance of NSOEs. In the process of PBAA, each actor tries to influence and control the rules and directions of organizational and institutional changes to achieve his own goals (Zald et al., 1980). The game constructed between actors within the enterprise can significantly influence the party-building decisions.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eTherefore, PBAA in NSOEs will inevitably form a pattern of multi-participation of external party organizations, majority shareholders, minority shareholders, and other actors. According to the deductive approach of organizational decision analysis, the deeper dynamics of any form of institutional and organizational change stem from the power play among stakeholders (Zald et al., 1980). Unlike organizational theories that solely highlight the economic rationality of actors (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), we contend that actors’ tactical choices, grounded in situationally specific cognitions, are implicit in seemingly structured formal organizational and institutional change. From the objectives and capacities of the actors, this study endeavors to examine the more profound effects of the embedded process of PBAA in NSOEs and presents the paper’s research hypotheses.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.2.1 Actor: Local Party Committees\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eAs early as 2012, the central government issued related documents on party building for NSOEs, emphasizing that party building in NSOEs should be integrated into the overall design of party building in their regions and make it a significant element in the appraisal and assessment of the relevant leadership teams. Meanwhile, local government officials in China have long been in the GDP championship (Wei, 2021). Based on this background, local party committees have joined forces with local governments to lobby NSOEs to amend their articles of association to clarify the role, status, and specific duties of party organizations. With the onset of the “supply-side” reform in the new era, promoting the embedding of party organizations in the governance system of NSOEs is an essential goal and performance assessment indicator for local party committees and governments.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eHowever, owing to different external conditions and regional environments, there are some differences in the executive force of local party committees in PBAA in NSOEs (He and Ma, 2018). According to the thirteenth survey of China’s private enterprises in 2018, NSOEs in the Midwest are significantly better than those in the East in terms of the coverage of party organizations and the completion of party-building activities. There may be three reasons: (1) some of the Midwestern regions with high coverage of party organizations were revolutionary bases before the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the hometowns of most revolutionary martyrs are located in the Midwest, which makes it naturally advantageous to set up a party organization within NSOEs. (2) The market in the East is much more open and fairer, and the local government’s intervention and control of NSOEs is relatively weak. (3) The market in the East is far more equitable and open, and there is not as much local government involvement in or control over NSOEs. Even in some underdeveloped areas, most NSOEs rely on government support for development. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 1:\u003c/strong\u003e The stronger the local party committee's executive force, the greater the probability of PBAA in NSOEs.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.2.2 Actor: Majority Shareholders\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn contrast to the relatively decentralized ownership structure of businesses in developed countries, listed NSOEs in China have a high degree of equity concentration, which leads to a significant second-type agency problem, meaning the agency cost conflict between majority and minority shareholders. Specifically, majority shareholders hold the actual control rights, resulting in an imbalance in corporate governance, and damage to the interests of minority shareholders. As a supplement to the corporate governance system, PBAA will directly affect the interests of the two groups. Both of them will combine their own goals and resources under their control to take action against the external event to maximize their own interests.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, according to the social network theory, majority shareholders with party and political identities are closer to the local party committees in terms of network distance. And the two will be integrated constantly in the process of political contacts and resource exchanges. Consequently, the local party committees’ party-building promotion and education will make majority shareholders in NSOEs internalize the party’s values and concepts into their corporate activities consciously or unconsciously (Xiu et al, 2022). In other words, majority shareholders with political identities will continue to strengthen their own identities and sense of team belonging, leading to the emergence of value internalization features in the social network (Portes, 1998). Therefore, as an important exploration of party building in NSOEs in the new era, majority shareholders with political identities and backgrounds are more likely to be influenced by the values of the local party committee and then adopt PBAA. We thus propose the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 2a:\u003c/strong\u003e If the majority shareholders have a political identity, the greater the probability of PBAA in NSOEs.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eSecond, the party membership of the majority shareholder precedes the establishment of NSOEs, and this precedence brings many resources needed for the development of the enterprises (Qiu and Fu, 2016). In China, due to the imperfection of the market economic system, the business process of enterprises is often intervened by government intervention. Especially for NSOEs, the allocation of resources, access to industries, and regulation of policy are lagging behind SOEs. More importantly, also the daily operation of NSOEs has to follow the policy orientation of the local government. In this sense, maintaining a good relationship with the local government plays a crucial role in the survival and long-term development of NSOEs. Particularly in recent years, as China’s economic growth has begun to slow down, many NSOEs have faced increasingly harsh external environments and transformation requirements, and their operations have been subject to more challenges and crises. Therefore, we believe that when the majority shareholders rely more strongly on external resources, they will be more active in introducing party organizations into NSOEs to ensure the robustness of their business activities. And the following hypothesis is proposed:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 2b:\u003c/strong\u003e The higher the dependence of majority shareholders on external resources, the greater the probability of PBAA in NSOEs.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003e2.2.3 Actor: Minority Shareholders\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn China, the second type of agency problem has been criticized (Li et al., 2021). To alleviate it, China’s capital market has duly introduced the independent director system. However, due to institutional problems such as the selection and hiring of independent directors, risk aversion, and high monitoring costs, the agency problem in NSOEs is still very serious (Zhong et al., 2010). Based on this, the participation of the party organization in corporate governance can make the balance of power, which can alleviate the problem of insider control in enterprises to a certain extent. Therefore, PBAA can not only play the role of the party’s political leadership but also serve as a helpful supplement to the corporate governance system, supervising the majority shareholders and preventing the interests of minority shareholders from being encroached on (Cheng and Zheng, 2023). Therefore, the stronger the control of majority shareholders, the more likely that minority shareholders will propose PBAA by the directors they represent to reduce monitoring and agency costs. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 3a:\u003c/strong\u003e The higher the second type of agency costs within NSOEs, the greater the probability of PBAA.\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eA growing number of minority shareholders are actively participating in corporate governance as a result of the improved investor protection system, expanded participation avenues for minority shareholders, and decreased costs associated with such engagement (Huang et al., 2022). However, majority shareholders have the incentive to improve their own interests by harming the overall interests of the enterprise. While PBAA directly assigns party organizations the duty of taking part in the main decisions and affairs of NSOEs. As a result, shareholders’ rights in NSOEs will be subject to political supervision, which is exactly what minority shareholders expect. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis:\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eHypothesis 3b:\u003c/strong\u003e The higher the degree of participation of minority shareholders in the governance of NSOEs, the greater the probability of PBAA.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eIn summary, the hypotheses presented in this paper are shown in Figure 1.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"3. Research Design","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec9\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.1 Data\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe data of this paper are from www.cninfo.com.cn\u003cspan address=\"http://www.cninfo.com.cn\" targettype=\"URL\" class=\"RefTarget\"\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Specifically, the sample is selected from September 2018 (the release of the amendment to the Code of Governance for Listed Companies) to January 31, 2020. The content of the board of directors\u0026rsquo; announcements of listed companies on cninfo.com regarding the amendment of the articles of association is captured by Python. We finally obtained 120 samples of PBAA from 2,233 NSOEs. Except for the data related to PBAA, which are collected manually, all other data are based on the database of CSMAR. To avoid the effect of extreme values, continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec10\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.2 Models and Core Variables\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eFirst of all, in order to examine the micro-politics in the institutional change of PBAA in NSOEs, this paper constructs model (1) to observe the behavioral characteristics of the local party committees:\u003cdiv id=\"Equ1\" class=\"Equation\"\u003e\u003cdiv format=\"TEX\" class=\"mathdisplay\" id=\"FileID_Equ1\" name=\"EquationSource\"\u003e\n$$\\:Party\\_article={a}_{0}+{a}_{1}Gov+{a}_{i}Controls+\\epsilon\\:$$\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"EquationNumber\"\u003e1\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ewhere the explanatory variable (Party_article) is PBAA in NSOEs. When the announcement of a listed NSOE involves the amendment of the content of the party organization in the enterprise\u0026rsquo;s articles of association, the \u0026ldquo;Party_article\u0026rdquo; variable will take 1, and 0 otherwise. The core explanatory variable is the local party committee executive force (Gov). We use Gansu, Anhui, Tianjin, Hubei, and Sichuan, which have the highest coverage of party-building activities and party organizations, based on the data from the 13th China Private Sector Survey in 2018 as a proxy variable to measure the executive force of local party committees.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn addition, we control for firm characteristic variables related to party-building behavior in NSOEs: firm size (Size), profitability (ROE), financial leverage (LEV), length of establishment (Set), state-owned stock participation (Stockstate), employees (Employee), dual role of the board chairman (Dual_position), region (Province), and industry (Industry). Please refer to Appendix A for detailed variable definitions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eSecond, to test the behavioral characteristics of majority shareholders in PBAA, we construct model (2):\u003cdiv id=\"Equ2\" class=\"Equation\"\u003e\u003cdiv format=\"TEX\" class=\"mathdisplay\" id=\"FileID_Equ2\" name=\"EquationSource\"\u003e\n$$\\:Party\\_article={a}_{0}+{a}_{1}Identity(Equity\\_pledge)+{a}_{i}Controls+\\epsilon\\:$$\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"EquationNumber\"\u003e2\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ewhere political identity (Identity) and the proportion of majority shareholders\u0026rsquo; equity pledged (Equity_pledge) are designed as proxy variables to test Hypothesis 2. Specifically, Identity takes 1 when the majority shareholder has the political identity of National People\u0026rsquo;s Congress (NPC) deputies or Chinese People\u0026rsquo;s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) members and 0 otherwise. Equity_pledge measures the extent of the majority shareholder\u0026rsquo;s external resource needs and the risk of losing control. The logic for constructing this variable stems from the fact that many NSOEs, such as Dongfang Garden and others, have seen their equity pledged for sale in 2019 and had to rely on support from local governments.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eFinally, we construct model (3) for the behavioral characteristics of minority shareholders:\u003cdiv id=\"Equ3\" class=\"Equation\"\u003e\u003cdiv format=\"TEX\" class=\"mathdisplay\" id=\"FileID_Equ3\" name=\"EquationSource\"\u003e\n$$\\:Party\\_article={a}_{0}+{a}_{1}AC2(Minority\\_sℎareℎolders)+{a}_{i}Controls+\\epsilon\\:$$\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"EquationNumber\"\u003e3\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ewhere the second type of agency cost variable (AC2) measures the agency costs between majority and minority shareholders. Regarding the degree of participation of minority shareholders in governance (Minority_shareholders), we believe that the greater the number of minority shareholders participating in the general meeting of shareholders, the greater their participation in corporate governance. Then the more likely they are to push PBAA as an integral part of corporate governance and to enhance the supervision of the majority shareholders to protect the interests of the enterprise as a whole.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec11\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e3.3 Summary Statistics\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel A of Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables. Specifically, the mean value of Party_article is 0.0537, implying that 5.37% of listed NSOEs have written party building into their corporate articles of association after the issuance of the Principles of Corporate Governance. The mean value of Gov is 0.1, indicating that 10% of listed NSOEs in the sample are located in areas where the local party committees have greater executive force, while the mean value of Identity is 0.192, indicating that 19% of the majority shareholders in the sample have the political status of the NPC or CPPCC. The above data suggests that there is a broad political foundation for PBAA. In addition, the mean value of Equity_pledge is 37.14, indicating that the number of shares pledged by majority shareholders in listed NSOEs accounts for 37.14% of their total number of shares, which is a relatively high percentage. The maximum value of AC2 is 0.782, and the minimum value is only 0.00003, which suggests a large difference in the second type of agency problem among the sample firms. The median of Minority_ shareholders is 11, indicating that the number of minority shareholders participating in shareholders\u0026rsquo; meetings is not high in most samples of listed NSOEs. These data provide an initial understanding for our subsequent study.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel B of Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e shows the results of the statistical differences in the presence or absence of PBAA. Specifically, Identity and Equity_pledge are significantly higher for listed NSOEs with PBAA than for the control group, which initially suggests significant differences in the political background of the majority shareholders and the resource demand of the NSOEs in different groups. In addition, our key core variables Gov, AC2, and Minority_shareholders and control variables are not significant in the difference test, which further ensures the balance of the two samples.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab1\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 1\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSummary Statistics\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"13\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c7\" colnum=\"7\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c8\" colnum=\"8\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c9\" colnum=\"9\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c10\" colnum=\"10\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c11\" colnum=\"11\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c12\" colnum=\"12\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c13\" colnum=\"13\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"13\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel A: Descriptive statistics results for all variables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMedium\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSd\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMax\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMin\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0537\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.226\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGov\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.100\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.300\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIdentity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2230\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.192\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.394\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEquity_pledge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e37.140\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e52.970\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e677.500\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAC2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2230\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0453\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0138\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.106\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.782\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.00003\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMinority_shareholders\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2166\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.850\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e11.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e23.820\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e154.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0247\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0698\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.227\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.291\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.017\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSize\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21.910\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21.810\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.146\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e26.740\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.650\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLEV\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.410\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.387\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.298\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e8.009\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.00978\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSet\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20.050\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e5.428\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e62.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDual_position\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2189\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.399\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.490\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStockstate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0524\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.223\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c2\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c4\" namest=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2218\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7.394\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c8\" namest=\"c7\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7.365\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c10\" namest=\"c9\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.180\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c12\" namest=\"c11\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e12.300\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c13\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.833\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"13\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel B: Statistical differences according to whether or not PBAA in NSOEs\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePBAA group\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl group\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"4\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDifference test\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDifference\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSignificance(T)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGov\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.092\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2113\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.100\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.008\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.009\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIdentity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.283\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2110\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.187\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.096\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.096***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEquity_pledge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e49.780\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2113\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e36.420\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13.360\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-13.354***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAC2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.040\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2110\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.046\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.006\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.005\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMinority_shareholders\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e116\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.640\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2050\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.860\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.220\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.225\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.019\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2113\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.025\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.006\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.006\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSize\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e22.030\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2113\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e21.910\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLEV\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.388\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2113\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.411\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.023\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0230\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSet\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20.450\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2113\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e20.030\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.420\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.421\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStockstate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.075\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2113\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.051\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.024\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.024\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e120\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7.434\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2098\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e7.391\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.043\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.043\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDual_position\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e116\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.414\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c7\" namest=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2073\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c9\" namest=\"c8\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.398\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c11\" namest=\"c10\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.016\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c13\" namest=\"c12\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.015\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"4. Empirical Results","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec13\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.1 Actor: Local Party Committees\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab2\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e shows the regression results of local party committees\u0026rsquo; influence on PBAA in listed NSOEs. Columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient of Gov is significant at 2.231 and 2.217, indicating that the stronger the local party committee\u0026rsquo;s executive force, the higher the probability of PBAA in NSOEs. This is consistent with the observation in the existing literature. It can be seen that local party committees play a crucial role in a series of micro-political processes that may exist in party building embedded in NSOEs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab2\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 2\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAction Characteristics of Local Party Committees\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGov\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.231**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2.217**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.14)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.11)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.351\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.71)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSize\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.147\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.01)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLEV\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.916\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.45)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSet\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.024\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.16)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStockstate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.623\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.53)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDual_position\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.108\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.51)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.073\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.53)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-4.216***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-6.832**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-3.27)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-2.37)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIndustry\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2,033\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,996\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"3\"\u003eNote: z-statistics in parentheses*** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec14\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.2 Actor: Majority Shareholders\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab3\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e shows the regression result of the action characteristics of majority shareholders in PBAA of NSOEs. Columns (1) and (2) examine the effects of political identity and external resource dependence, respectively. To be specific, we find that the coefficient of Identity is 0.458, which is significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the social network associated with political identity will continuously strengthen the recognition and belonging of the majority shareholders, thus influencing the decision of NSOEs to incorporate party building into the articles. In addition, the coefficient of Equity_pledge is significant at 0.004, which indicates that when NSOEs have the risk of majority shareholders\u0026rsquo; equity change, they are more likely to approach the local party committees and expect to enhance the operational robustness through PBAA, as well as to receive the assistance of the local party committees in the future hard times.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eColumn (3) includes the first two behavioral characteristics variables in the same model. The results show that the coefficient of Identity and Equity_pledge maintain the same level of significance, which implies that the political identity of majority shareholders and the degree of dependence on external resources are both important behavioral characteristics affecting the majority shareholders\u0026rsquo; introduction of PBAA, thus Hypothesis 2 has been verified. Column (4) further incorporates the participation of local government into the model, and the result shows that the coefficient of Gov changes from positively significant to non-significant, which implies that the behavioral characteristics of majority shareholders are crucial, which can dominate PBAA in NSOEs under the pressure of external party committees.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab3\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 3\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAction Characteristics of Majority Shareholders\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIdentity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.458**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.463**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.464**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.08)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.11)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEquity_pledge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.004***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.004***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.004***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.60)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.61)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.61)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGov\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.076\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.23)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.213\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.309\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.190\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.195\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.44)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.60)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.39)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.40)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSize\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.072\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.104\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.029\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.029\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.51)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.69)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.20)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.20)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLEV\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.883\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.046\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.003\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.48)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.61)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.64)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.64)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSet\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.013\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.021\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.012\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.012\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.67)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.01)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.65)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.66)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStockstate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.540\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.547\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.539\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.537\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.45)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.32)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.44)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.43)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDual_position\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.110\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.149\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.125\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.123\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.55)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.71)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.63)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.61)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.005\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.058\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.021\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.022\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.04)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.41)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.16)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.17)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-4.853*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-6.001**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-4.077\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-4.082\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.82)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-2.05)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.50)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.50)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIndustry\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2,118\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,996\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2,118\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2,118\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003eNote: z-statistics in parentheses*** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec15\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e4.3 Actor: Minority Shareholders\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab4\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e shows the regression results of minority shareholders\u0026rsquo; action characteristics in NSOEs with PBAA. Specifically, columns (1) and (2) examine the effects of the second type of agency costs and the degree of participation of minority shareholders in governance, respectively. The coefficients of these two variables are not significant, meaning the participation of minority shareholders in corporate governance does not affect whether PBAA is in NSOEs. In other words, in the current environment of NSOEs, although minority shareholders are one of the important groups of enterprises, they do not participate in the power game between stakeholders with local party committees and majority shareholders. On the one hand, it is likely that due to the minority shareholders\u0026rsquo; low shareholding ratio, the voting decision-making power of the shareholders\u0026rsquo; meeting alone usually cannot shake the control of majority shareholders. On the other hand, it may come from the fact that minority shareholders are mostly decentralized and more concerned about the operation of the enterprise, without caring whether or not NSOE adopts PBAA.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eColumns (3) and (4) further incorporate majority shareholders and local party committees into the analytical framework, and the action characteristics of minority shareholders are still insignificant, while the majority shareholders remain significant. It further indicates that majority shareholders are in control of the rules of the game in the process of PBAA, while minority shareholders do not participate in it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab4\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 4\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAction Characteristics of Minority Shareholders\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAC2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.672\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.541\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.532\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.55)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.41)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.40)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMinority_shareholders\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.001\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.17)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.01)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.00)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIdentity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.547**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.548**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.38)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.39)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEquity_pledge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.004**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.004**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.51)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.49)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGov\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.111\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.33)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.428\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.357\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.286\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.288\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.84)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.71)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.54)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.54)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSize\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.157\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.175\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.069\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.068\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.07)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.14)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.42)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.41)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLEV\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.830\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.015\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.945\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.947\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.29)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.56)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.44)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.44)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSet\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.024\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.019\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.008\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.008\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.15)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.90)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.37)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.39)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStockstate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.620\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.687*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.615\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.612\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.52)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.67)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.57)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.56)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDual_position\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.110\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.062\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.099\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.096\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.52)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.29)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.47)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.45)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.083\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.085\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.038\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.036\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.60)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.60)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.25)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.24)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-6.955**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-7.125**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-17.932\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-16.912\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-2.41)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-2.38)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.02)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.04)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIndustry\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,993\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,916\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,894\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,894\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003eNote: z-statistics in parentheses*** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"5. Robustness Test","content":"\u003cdiv id=\"Sec17\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.1 Replacement of Variable Measure\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn order to measure the number of majority shareholders\u0026rsquo; shares and the size of the corresponding resources in the overall firm more accurately, we replace the majority shareholders\u0026rsquo; external resource dependence variable measurement with a ratio variable between the number of equity pledges and the total number of shares in listed NSOEs (Equity_pledge_plus). Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab5\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e presents the results of this robustness regression. In column (1), the coefficient of the Equity_pledge_plus variable is significantly positive at 0.073, indicating that the greater the risk of loss of control by majority shareholders, the more likely they are to push for PBAA to realize the stability of management control. Column (2) includes local party committees, majority shareholders, and minority shareholders in the model, and the regression results are also robust.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab5\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 5\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eReplacement of Variable Measures\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"3\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEquity_pledge_plus\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.073**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.088**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.11)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.56)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGov\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.177\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.52)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIdentity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.519**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.28)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.069\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.052\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.42)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.12)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSize\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.151\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.065\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.03)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.43)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eLEV\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.038*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.878\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.69)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.46)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSet\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.023\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.009\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.08)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.47)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eStockstate\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.672*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.591\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.65)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.54)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDual_position\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.095\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.114\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.45)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.55)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.076\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.019\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.55)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.13)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-7.017**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-4.798*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-2.42)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.72)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,996\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1,940\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"3\"\u003eNote: z-statistics in parentheses*** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv id=\"Sec18\" class=\"Section2\"\u003e\u003ch2\u003e5.2 PSM-DID Test\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eMoreover, we adopt the propensity score matching method (PSM) to solve the self-selection problem of PBAA in NSOEs, alleviating the non-random allocation of samples among different enterprises. In this paper, the covariates are screened by psestimate, and the propensity scores are calculated by selecting the indicators of Size, Dual_position, Stockstate, and so on. Then one-to-one matching is conducted by selecting the nearest-neighbor matching method within the caliper. The results of the balance test show that the absolute value of the standardized deviation of each variable after matching is less than 10%, which indicates that the sample-matching effect is good. As shown in Fig.\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Fig1\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e, after PSM, the difference in the distribution of listed NSOEs with PBAA and not is significantly reduced and converges.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab6\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e reports the regression results after using the PSM method. The coefficients of Gov, Identity, and Equity_pledge are all significant, while AC2 and Minority_shareholders remain insignificant. In short, it still supports the findings of this paper.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab6\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 6\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePSM-DID Test\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"6\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(5)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_article\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eGov\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e3.2231***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.7525)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIdentity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.9178**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.9758)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEquity_pledge\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0061*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.6889)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eAC2\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.7094\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.6476)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMinority_shareholders\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.0023\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.2767)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13.6563***\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.1616\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-4.1754\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e13.6756\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e14.5833\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.6563)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.0192)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.0042)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.0120)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.0128)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControls\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eYes\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIndustry\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e206\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e206\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e217\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e206\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e199\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"6\"\u003eNote: z-statistics in parentheses*** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"},{"header":"6. Further Analysis","content":"\u003cp\u003eAs a vital exploration of party building in the new period, PBAA in the process of practice is the lack of experience to draw on. The party-building provisions outlined in the articles of association of certain companies are not particularly focused or practical, and their party-building requirements are often quite general. In such enterprises, the party organization may only exist in form without substantially carrying out its work (Zheng et al., \u003cspan citationid=\"CR15\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2020\u003c/span\u003e). The existing literature (Wang, \u003cspan citationid=\"CR9\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e) points out in the field investigation that party building in many NSOEs has long been more of a tactical behavior, which is a formalized party building to meet the assessment of party committees. Therefore, although PBAA needs enterprise to clarify the party organization responsibilities and rights boundaries in articles of association, it is also worth exploring the content of PBAA. How to ensure that the party organization is truly embedded in the corporate governance structure is the in-depth research content of the institutional change of PBAA.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eIn this part, we classify two types of PBAA in NSOEs from the perspective of motivation. One is substantive PBAA, which aims to promote the progress of enterprises and gain competitive advantages. It clarifies the rights, responsibilities, and working methods of party organizations in decision-making, implementation, and supervision. The other is what we call strategic PBAA, which seeks to achieve political benefits by catering to the government and party committees. It only addresses the status of the party organization, its central political role, party staffing, and financial support in the articles of association of the enterprise. Based on it, this paper further examines the links between the behavioral characteristics of different actors and the types of PBAA.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel A of Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e presents the descriptive statistics results of the three newly added variables: government subsidies (Support: the logarithm of the total government subsidies in the last three years), the control of majority shareholders (UCSVR: the proportion of the majority shareholders\u0026rsquo; shareholding), and the internal control deficiencies (Defect: 1 for the existence of deficiencies in the disclosure reports of the internal control in the last three years, and 0 otherwise). The results show that the mean value of UCSVR is 40.43, indicating the mean value of the shareholding ratio of majority shareholders in listed NSOEs is 40.43%, which is at the absolute controlling level. The mean value of Defcet is 0.159, indicating that 15.9% of the listed NSOEs in the sample have defects in internal control, with a relatively low level of corporate governance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel B of Table\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab7\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e further shows the content components of party-building provisions for listed NSOEs. Specifically, the number of strategic PBAA is 87, accounting for 72.5% of NSOEs with PBAA. Meanwhile, the proportion of substantive PBAA reached 27.5%, which means that among the 120 samples of NSOEs that have added party-building in their articles of association, nearly 27.5% have adopted substantive provisions. To this end, we construct the Party_strategy variable: 1 for the substantive PBAA, and 0 for the strategic PBAA.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab7\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 7\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDescriptive Statistics of New Variables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"6\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c6\" colnum=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colspan=\"6\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel A: Descriptive statistics of variables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariable\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMean\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eMedium\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSd\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSupport\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2220\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.250\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e17.310\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.469\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUCSVR\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e40.430\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e38.820\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e15.970\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDefect\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e2233\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.159\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.365\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"6\" nameend=\"c6\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003ePanel B: The content composition of PBAA in NSOEs\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe content of PBAA\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eN\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProportion\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvide only for the status of party organizations, the role of the political core, the staffing of party affairs, and financial support\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e87\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e72.5%\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"3\" nameend=\"c3\" namest=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFurther clarify the duties and boundaries of the party organization, and clearly define the power and responsibilities and the way of work of the party organization in the decision-making, execution, and supervision of the enterprise\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colspan=\"2\" nameend=\"c5\" namest=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e33\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c6\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e27.5%\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eTable\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan refid=\"Tab8\" class=\"InternalRef\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e shows the regression results in the sample of 120 listed NSOEs with PBAA. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of Support is significantly positive at 0.462, suggesting that the higher the number of government subsidies received by NSOEs, the higher the likelihood of substantive PBAA. Judging from the objectives of different actors in micro-politics, this may be a kind of \u0026ldquo;cooperation\u0026rdquo; from the exchange of benefits, that is, listed NSOEs transfer part of their corporate governance rights to the party organization to obtain more resources needed for their business. Moreover, we also find that the coefficient of UCSVR is significant at -0.028, indicating that the higher the proportion of majority shareholders, the more likely they are to adopt strategic PBAA. Combining the behavioral characteristics of the local party committees and majority shareholders, we can find that, although the local party committees actively promote the PBAA of NSOEs, the majority shareholders can decide on all majority affairs of the company. For the substantive PBAA, they are more willing to adopt the strategic PBAA and to seek political benefits without any effort to cater to the government and the local party committees. Furthermore, the higher the shareholding ratio of the majority shareholders, the weaker the minority shareholders. The majority shareholders are more inclined to adopt strategic PBAA to cope, diminishing the role of the party organization in NSOEs.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"gridtable\"\u003e\u003ctable float=\"Yes\" id=\"Tab8\" border=\"1\"\u003e\u003ccaption language=\"En\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionNumber\"\u003eTable 8\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"CaptionContent\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eFactors influencing substantive PBAA\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/caption\u003e\u003ccolgroup cols=\"5\"\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c1\" colnum=\"1\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c2\" colnum=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c3\" colnum=\"3\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c4\" colnum=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv align=\"left\" class=\"colspec\" colname=\"c5\" colnum=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\" morerows=\"1\" rowspan=\"2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eVariables\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(3)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(4)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_strategy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_strategy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_strategy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eParty_strategy\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSupport\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.462**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(2.12)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eUCSVR\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.028**\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-2.06)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIdentity\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.415\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.89)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDefect\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.813\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.16)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eROE\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.916\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e1.034\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.629\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.674\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd 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colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(1.10)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.96)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.81)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.88)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eSet\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.024\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.005\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.006\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e0.000\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" 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colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.47)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.51)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(0.00)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.11)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eDual_position\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.790*\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.593\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.666\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.709\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.78)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.36)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.54)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.62)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eEmployee\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.420\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.257\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.207\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-0.192\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.60)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.11)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.91)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.85)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eConstant\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-5.026\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.659\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-3.017\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e-1.229\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-1.01)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.34)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.62)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e(-0.25)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eIndustry\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eProvince\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eControl\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c1\"\u003e\u003cp\u003eObservations\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c2\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e115\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c3\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e116\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c4\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e116\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd align=\"left\" colname=\"c5\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e116\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctfoot\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd colspan=\"5\"\u003eNote: z-statistics in parentheses*** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.01, ** p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.05, * p\u0026thinsp;\u0026lt;\u0026thinsp;0.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tfoot\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"7. Conclusions","content":"\u003cp\u003eUsing the PBAA in the \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China as a springboard, this paper investigates the institutional change of PBAA in NSOEs. The study finds that the institutional change of PBAA in NSOEs is not the result of local governments alone, but the result of a game involving multiple actors, such as local governments and majority shareholders, acting around their own goals and interests, which is more realistically manifested as a series of micro-political processes. It is worth noting that minority shareholders are not involved in this stakeholder power game. Furthermore, the embedding of PBAA in listed NSOEs has not met the expectations of the local party committees, with only 120 listed NSOEs adopting the PBAA in nearly two years. More importantly, only 33 of the 120 listed NSOEs have adopted substantive PBAA.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eWe contend that a major factor in the PBAA\u0026rsquo;s sluggish progress has been an overemphasis on the state administration\u0026rsquo;s capacity to dominate institutional change, as well as an ignorance of a series of micro-political processes involved in the process within the company. Accordingly, we believe that the promotion of the party-building system in NSOEs should consider the interests and potential behaviors of different actors. Relying solely on the external local party committees in the process of embedding from the outside in the party-building structure runs the risk of impeding the change or creating a situation similar to the reverse choice dilemma. Consequently, there are three ways to approach the next stage of the PBAA system change: (1) Make good use of the social network of the majority shareholders\u0026rsquo; political background, and guide NSOEs to PBAA from the perspective of the party spirit of the majority shareholders. (2) Tap the potential of minority shareholders. Although minority shareholders are not free from the agency problem at this stage, it is already a development tendency for enterprises to increase their enthusiasm and participation. Further strengthen their understanding and recognition of the role of party organizations, and encourage them to promote the embedding and integration of PBAA within NSOEs. (3) It remains necessary for local party committees to lead the way in standardizing and directing the content of PBAA to avoid strategic party-building behaviors.\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"Declarations","content":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eDeclaration of Interests\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eData Availability Statements\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe data used to support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cstrong\u003eFunding Statements\u003c/strong\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis research received no external funding.\u003c/p\u003e\u003ch2\u003eAuthor Contribution\u003c/h2\u003e\u003cp\u003eDanying Bao: Conceptualization, Data Curation, Formal Analysis, Methodology, Supervision, Writing - Original DraftZhixiong Huang: Methodology, Project Administration, Software, ValidationJialun Zhang: Data Curation, Formal Analysis, Visualization, Writing - Original Draft, Writing - Review \u0026amp; Editing\u003c/p\u003e"},{"header":"References","content":"\u003col\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eCheng, L., Zheng, Q.H., 2023. 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Actors and Systems: The politics of collective action. Social Forces, 61, 328. https://doi.org/10.2307/2578110.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eZhang, G.R., 2019. Organizational isomorphism and governance embedding: How party building promotes the development of private enterprises: The case of party building of enterprises in J Science and Technology Park of D City. Comparison of Economic and Social Institutions, (6), 53-61. https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1003-3947.2019.06.009.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eZheng, D.J., Yuan, W., Deng, Y.L., 2020. Party organization embeddedness and financial irregularities in private enterprises. Management Review, 32(08), 228-243+253. https://doi.org/10.14120/j.cnki.cn11-5057/f.2020.08.019.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003cli\u003eZhong, H.Y., Ran, M.S., Wen, S.S., 2010. Government intervention, insider control, and corporate investment. Management World, (07), 98-108. https://doi.org/10.19744/j.cnki.11-1235/f.2010.07.010.\u003c/li\u003e\n\u003c/ol\u003e"}],"fulltextSource":"","fullText":"","funders":[],"hasAdminPriorityOnWorkflow":false,"hasManuscriptDocX":true,"hasOptedInToPreprint":true,"hasPassedJournalQc":"","hasAnyPriority":false,"hideJournal":true,"highlight":"","institution":"","isAcceptedByJournal":false,"isAuthorSuppliedPdf":false,"isDeskRejected":"","isHiddenFromSearch":false,"isInQc":false,"isInWorkflow":false,"isPdf":false,"isPdfUpToDate":true,"isWithdrawnOrRetracted":false,"journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true},"keywords":"Non-state-owned enterprise, Party Building into Articles of Association, Micro-politics","lastPublishedDoi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7161304/v1","lastPublishedDoiUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-7161304/v1","license":{"name":"CC BY 4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"},"manuscriptAbstract":"\u003cp\u003eStrengthening party building in non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) is a critical task to support economic and social development in the new era of China. Through the quasi-natural event of \u0026ldquo;the Communist Party of China\u0026rsquo;s Party Building into Articles of Association\u0026rdquo; (PBAA) of the \u003cspan citationid=\"CR2\" class=\"CitationRef\"\u003e2018\u003c/span\u003e Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, this paper examines the mechanism of the institutional change of party building in China\u0026rsquo;s NSOEs from the perspective of \u0026ldquo;micro-politics\u0026rdquo;. The results show that local government is not the only actor driving institutional change in PBAA in NSOEs; local government, majority shareholders, and other groupings of actors all play a part in this game acting around their own goals and interests, more realistically manifested as a series of micro-political processes. Further, it is found that PBAA in most NSOEs is a strategic catering behavior.\u003c/p\u003e","manuscriptTitle":"The Micro-Politics of “Party Building into Articles of Association” in Non-State-Owned Enterprises: Evidence from China","msid":"","msnumber":"","nonDraftVersions":[{"code":1,"date":"2025-12-03 12:51:36","doi":"10.21203/rs.3.rs-7161304/v1","editorialEvents":[{"type":"communityComments","content":0}],"status":"published","journal":{"display":true,"email":"[email protected]","identity":"researchsquare","isNatureJournal":false,"hasQc":true,"allowDirectSubmit":true,"externalIdentity":"","sideBox":"","snPcode":"","submissionUrl":"/submission","title":"Research Square","twitterHandle":"researchsquare","acdcEnabled":true,"dfaEnabled":false,"editorialSystem":"","reportingPortfolio":"","inReviewEnabled":false,"inReviewRevisionsEnabled":true}}],"origin":"","ownerIdentity":"d0bfc9d4-4120-462b-9464-2d0b792b6814","owner":[],"postedDate":"December 3rd, 2025","published":true,"recentEditorialEvents":[],"rejectedJournal":[],"revision":"","amendment":"","status":"posted","subjectAreas":[{"id":58937433,"name":"Social science/Politics and international relations"},{"id":58937434,"name":"Social science/Social policy"}],"tags":[],"updatedAt":"2026-03-13T15:40:56+00:00","versionOfRecord":[],"versionCreatedAt":"2025-12-03 12:51:36","video":"","vorDoi":"","vorDoiUrl":"","workflowStages":[]},"version":"v1","identity":"rs-7161304","journalConfig":"researchsquare"},"__N_SSP":true},"page":"/article/[identity]/[[...version]]","query":{"redirect":"/article/rs-7161304","identity":"rs-7161304","version":["v1"]},"buildId":"8U1c8b4HqxoKbykW_rLl7","isFallback":false,"isExperimentalCompile":false,"dynamicIds":[84888],"gssp":true,"scriptLoader":[]}