Reframing biological models of mental disorders: phenomenology and methodological pluralism

The relationship between philosophy and neuroscience is complex and fruitful, influenced by thinkers such as Popper, who emphasized falsifiability as essential to scientific rigor. This philosophical perspective has driven the evolution of scientific methods toward evidence-based theories. In neuroscience, simplified models of neural processes are necessary for forming and testing hypotheses empirically, advancing our understanding of the nervous system. This article examines the philosophical considerations that shape the construction and application of neuroscientific models, especially in mental disorders such as major depressive disorder. Despite the challenges of translating animal models into human applications, these models are central in developing and testing new therapies. We consider an alternative theoretical framework to consider the modeling of disorders, based on the phenomenology proposed by Husserl. This approach not only addresses the limitations of current models but also encourages a continuous process of refinement. A phenomenological approach suggests that neuroscience studies simplified models of mental disorders, rather than the disorders themselves. Model pluralism, which recognizes and embraces diversity in neuroscience research, can gather more data about neurobiology and behavior. Integrating phenomenology with empirical science can increase the reliability and applicability of models in neuroscience. This interdisciplinary approach aims to provide a deeper understanding of the intersection between philosophy and neuroscience and how this intersection can inform more robust scientific investigations. By understanding the philosophical underpinnings of neuroscience models, we can better navigate the complexities of this field, uncovering new avenues for understanding the human mind.